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Thtt thesis entitled "Indoaesisn Stmggle for 
ladepeBdeAee** proridss a ttsdqoe feature of tlM» policial 
struggle sad social l i f e of the Indonesian s o e i e ^ during 
tiM last 36 yeara. I t fiYes a eoa^lete picture of the 
iiq}ort«ice and significance tS the national sKSV i^ents 
striving t^s free and independ«Bt Xndcmeaia during a period 
of 350 years of t!» I>at(^ colonial rule, and 3t years 
of the Japanese yoi»y KB ve i l as afiter tt» proclaauition 
of independence in August 17f t9if5* 
ftm following substantial factors such as relig^^t^, 
culture, econcMsy, ediuation, etc . have been exaalni^rtf^ethar 
vith international eles^nts ^Ich have had far/reaching 
effects on the groirth and progress of the pollltieal condition! 
weA naticmalist sKnreswnt in the country. i 
Multiferious sources and different recol^ % ;^ have been 
collected for the preparation of the thesis . The source .^* 
are available in Inddot^aian, £nglish, l>utchy French etc. 
Joiirnals, periodicals si^ na f^papers ai^ otl»rs are also 
very significant i^ this respect, these Materials are to be 
found |n the Indcoiesiffii enbassy, in the library of the 
Ii^ian coimcil of vcarld affairs, delhi public I*ibrary, All India 
Gcngrass Library, th» O.S.A.lnforsution service libraxy ai^ 
others. 
!FI» setuine of the thesis ccmsists of an introduetioi 
chapter 1, Ctmpter I I , Chapter I I I , Chapter XV, epilogue, 
bibliograp}:Qr and appendices. The intrcMlueticm elaborates 
briefly the term Indonesia and Its geograpliy^ y and history, 
the Sri Vijaya and Ma^opahit eHq)ires, the establishirant 
of Islaffiic kingde»B, the advent of luropean nations and the 
formation of tl^ Dutch East India Company 0/.0,C,) in 1602, 
which was replaced by the Dutch colonial authority up to tJ» 
outbreak of the first world war in 191^« Chapter 1 consists 
of the various internal and external factors such as religion 
education, economy, lanifriiage, etc. responsible for the grsw^ 
of the Indonesian nationaliso. It also deals with the struc-
ture of central^ provincial and local fovermients, judicial 
system, volksraad and its coaposition, native states and its 
powers and judicial system, and finally effects of the first 
world war on national movemaits in Indonesia. Chapter li is 
divided into Part A and Part B. Part A is coeiposed of the 
causes, policies, activities, and developiaents of political 
parties arw3 organisations as well as cooperation and non-
cooperation moveaaents. Part B reviews the Indonesian foreign 
relations with over 20 countries of Asia, iiurope and America 
in political, economic, and cultmal fields before the second 
world war. It also points out the isportent role of Indonesia 
in the international politics like the League of Bations and 
others. Chapter H I deals with the Japanese economic imperial-
isttic expansion before and after the outbreak of the second 
world war, the conquest of Indonesia, the establishffient of 
the Japanese military authority and effects of their oectq>a-
tion on political, economic, educational,cultural and social 
life of the people as a whole, as well as the underground 
iKyvenents launched by nationalist leaders against the Japanese 
iaperialiSB. Chapter IV finally deals with the outbiffst of 
naticmal revolution, t)» establlshaent of the Bepublic of 
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Indonesia in 19*<'5» slgnificsnce of Llnfgadjati, Henville and 
the HafT» a^reeaents, recognition of Indonesia by the O.If.O, 
and other foreign states, as well ss the structure of central* 
provincial aiK! local govemoents, Judiciary &n6 parliament. 
The epliofoe consists of the foreign policy and international 
relations of Indonesia, developiaent of political parties and 
organisatlcms, the first penerel election of 1955 for the 
parllaiaent end constituent assembly^five year plan etc. There 
is also a bibliography, snd appendices of three international 
agreesents. 
Mew approaelias are found in this thesis in the follovinf 
fieldst 
1. Different internal and external elements end feetors 
are discovered in the study, responsible for the rapid grviilli 
and formation of national political parties er4 o^rfaalsations* 
They include religion, Asiatic, political conception, Western 
political ideas nnd thoughts, international contactai, Indonesian 
lanfruage and flag, Indonesia raya, Dutch rMle and lt« segrega-
tion policy, ruthless economic exploltetlon and arsied fcarces, 
national and vestern ediicatlonal system, aodern scientific 
Inventions and effects of13be tworld wars, etc, 
2. The author of the thesis has objectively elaborated 
the s'ovemaental structures of the Dutch colonial rule, the 
Japanese military adnlnistmtion and the republic of Indonesia 
BTid contrasted and systematically corapiled them In the thesis. 
3. With regard to foreign relations, the author has 
explored the laost essential factors of the Indonesian 
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international contacts with over 20 forelipi eoiaitrias litoi 
the Netherlaaids, India, China, 0.S.A., Britain, France, etc., 
before the second world war, in political, eccmoaic and 
ctaltural spheres. Internationally, Indonesia played an 
iffiportant role in world politics becatise of its eeonoaie 
and geographical iBsportance. 
h, Moreover, the author has made deliberate stiidies of 
the Indonesian national novements and political organisa-
tions alone with their primary objectives, principles and 
activities in their struggle for the liberation of Indonesia 
from the Dutch imperialisn and Japanese fascism. These move-
ments used diverse tactics and adopted the cooperation and 
non-cooperation policy which helped to advance the spirit of 
national revolutionary movements throughout the country. To 
meet their demands, the eolcmial authorities were gradually 
c<Mip€lled to five more and more civil and political ri«?hts 
to the people of Indonesia. 
5. Finally the author has tried to discover the far 
reaching effects of the first and second world wars on political 
economic, cultural and social life of the people all over 
tho Indonej^ ian archipelafo. 
6. ^he author has further stt^ i^es the political, 
structure of the native states along with their political 
economic, financial and cultural relations with the Hetherlai^s 
goveri^nt and the central goverraient of Indonesiabefore and 
after tJ» war. 
7* An intensive and extensive sttady has been made in 
connexion vith the adainistration of central ^orerm^nt. Governor 
General and his powers and positions, volkraad and its coaposition 
and election* 
8* Lastly the author has thoroughly studied the cooperation 
and nc«i-cooperatlon aoveaents as iiell as the imdergroiaid aoveaents 
launched by nationalist leaders both inside and outside the 
parliament and councils durinfr the Dutch rule and the Japanese 
occupation. Adeqtttte evidences of t}»i deep rooted consequences 
of the Japanese oceupaticm in the political, econoaic, educational 
and cultural fields as well BB social life of the people are also 
fotmd in the study. 
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I H T B O D P C T I O H 
Ths vord Indonesia %ms deriyed from the two Greek wcnrds, 
Xndos and Negos which i^ans river Indus or India and island 
respectively « hemse the island of India. 7he Indonesian word Nusa 
has the same denotation as that of the Greek %so8. In fact Husantara 
(the Kaplre of islands) has been used for Indlbnesia as well* 
The name of Indonesia was originally coined by a German 
ethnologist called Bastian in 188W, otherwise it was Malaysia which 
covered all the islands of the region, consisting of Formosa, 
British Malaya, Indonesia, the Phillipplnes and Madagascar. Geogra-
phically, Madagascar belonged to Africa and Formosa to China but 
ethnologically to Indfrnesia. 
The term Indonesia or Indonesian is originally a linguistic 
conception. It d^aotes a group of languages spoken in the former 
Dutch i:*ast Indies archipelago except New Guinea and northern 
Halmahera, off northern east coast of Borneo*the eastern part of 
Madagascar in the far west, ICap, the Mariannen or Ladronen and the 
Vulcan islands in the Far East. 1 
To4ay the term Indonesia for political and other 
reasons is applied geographically to the former Dutch i^mnt Indies, 
coaprising of more than «^000 islands, the chief being Java, 
Sumatra, Celebes (Sulawesi), New Guinea and Borneo(Kaliaantan). 
Indonesia lies between 95 and lM degrees east longitude and spreads 
1. Ubanl, 0«K. and Muim Ii^oneslan struggle for Independence, 
Bombay, February, 19^6, p.1 
from the equator vq>to 6 degrees north and 11 degrees south latitude* 
The distance from north to south is I30O miles and from east to vest 
3300 miles vlth a land area of 755*000 square miles. 1 
Lying In such a way that the equator forms Ymr axis, Indonesia 
should be a region of perpetual summer. But tYt& temperature is lowered 
in most parts by elevations and moderated by oceahic winds; the 
It 
temperature varies between 66 and 99 degrees Fahrsiheit. Humidity is 
high. All regions experience a fairly heavy rainfall, in Jaearta it 
is cf7eT SO inches. In Borneo and Sumatra it is 120 to 1M* inches. Hot 
and wet climate, dense tropical vegetation and ever green forest eharac 
terise Indonesia. Bird of plumage and monkeys are ec»mBOn. 
A range of mountains running downward from the Andaman and 
Nicobar islands traverses Sumatra, Java and the islands to the east. 
In Borneo, Celebes and tho largest of Holuceas ranges diverge from the 
centre. In Borneo they are separated by plains. In Celebes and the 
Moluccas they constitute the baekbcme of the penninsuias. Indonesa 
streaked by rivers but very few are navigable. Indonesia is one of the 
most volcanic areas in the world. From the north-eastern part of 
Sumatra through Java and the Sunda islands and then i;q>ward through 
the Moluccas towards the Phillipines, the volcanoes succeed each 
other in ikn Interrupted line. 
The Indcmeslans as a race are descendants of the Malayas 
and the aboriginals. The Halayii were one of the great seafaring 
races of the world and in their wondering they reached the Pacific 
coast of Anerica, the south of Aftica, Slam, Indo-China, Ceylon, 
Haldive islands and the coast of south-east Africa facing Madagascar. 
1. Dr.O.H.De ViHenuevet The economic structure of Indonesa, published 
by I.I.S., New Delhi. 1955, p.1I S.L.PoplaU Asia and Africa in tha 
modem world, N.Delhi, February, 1955, p.77 
Th«lr traces are itill to be found in thasa regions. Thay conquered 
and colcmlaed tha island world in the Pacific and the indian 
oceans. They intermarried %fith the aborifines of Melanesia and 
Polynesia. 
Sense well-known ettoiolosrists such as Kern, ^ on Heine Geldern 
and Ton ^^iekstedt, have grouped the Indonesians into the Mongolian 
race. This is sore recognisable amon^ the Indonesian dwelling Z1OR% 
the shores. Thay are mrked chiefly by a yellowish tin^e, round 
head, stralK^ ht hair and narrow eyes. In the interior of the islands 
the people are marked more by a brown skin, long head and wavy hair.1 
PrerHxatorlfi ^R^ongsia 
Biscoveries in Java since 1890 by Dr.Eugene Dubeis and others 
of primitive skeleton remains.Pi the Eanthropus ii^ ruftus, HCMBC 
Wadjakenis, etc of Pleistecene date about <^X),000 years ago, suggest 
that members of human and prate human stocks reached first this part 
of the world, perhaps even before An^lements were invented. Konlngswal 
discovered yet another species older than that of Pithe Kanthfipus 
i^ ructus, that is, about ^00,000 years back. The 11 skulls and 2 tibiae 
of a people known as Home Soleansis discovered In Ngadang in £<ast 
Java bear Neanderthalman*8 characteristic. According to the anthro. 
pologists, this apecies must have existed nearly M),000 years ago.2 
With regard to the aborigines of Indonesia, the Brothers, 
P. and F. Sarasins advance a theory that the original population ctf 
Indcmesia belonged to a race of dark skin and small stature \diose 
descendants are called the Veda people after the wall-known Veda tribes 
of Ceylon who belong to the same group. It has been also asserted 
1. M.Nazir St.BadJointan* Pengantar 11. Bangasa 2, Bt.Tinggl,1956 
2. Fay Cooper Coles The people of Malaysia, Hew Xork, 19»*5, p.12 
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that the brown race of Indcmesia has been reco^nioed from early 
time as a distinct type of mankind. The Malayanrace has been 
considered as aborigines of Jambi and Palembanf in Suaatra* 
Von Heine Geldern, one of the fotmders of the Indonesian 
pre-hlst«ry end a famotiui African pre-historian, has pointed out 
that the scattering area of the square axe culttire, called the 
implements tl»y brought from their ancestor*s homeland, are eiaetly 
co-extensive with these of the Indonesian languages and so the %fidely 
acceptable theory that neolithic pepple who brought the square axe 
culture were also at the time mt the propagators of the Indonesian 
languages, hence the ancestors of the Indonesian people* 1 
Prof.Kern, the founder of the Indoneiian philosophy, has 
specifically described that the ancestors homeland was situated on 
8e8*8h(^e, that is, Champa and Comboja and adjoining regicms alcmg 
the sea and they were seafaring. This square axe culture, according 
to Von Heine Oeldern conclusion, came eon»where from the region, where 
the great rivers of east and south Asia have their course. This is 
identical with culture whose ancestor's country was in Toking, an area 
which come within adjoining region along the sea. 
Tte square axe culture marches southward branching off further 
to the Indian peninsula and to the Indtoesian archipelago respectively 
through the Malaya peninsula, taking with it the Indonesian language 
and culture and northwards to the southern islands of Japan where it 
mingled itself with the aborigines. 
Both philological and pre-historicaevidences showed that the 
Indonesian migation into Indonesia in two distant waves took place 
during Neolithic age and bronze age respectively, 
1, in the neolithic age, about 3000 B.C., people who spoke 
the language of aborigine of the present Indonesian language came 
1, M,»aair St, Kadjointam op,cit,pp,58-59, 
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sonewhere from the neighbourhood of YunenCSouth Indo-Chlaa) and 
scattered thenselsves across the indlsn penlnsiala In the south on 
the one hand, •specially along the eastern coast, where they piled 
ttwmselves to navigation and later on proceeded to Indonesia and 
to Indonesia on the other hand via Malay peninsula. However, they 
did not fto further than the eastern Moluccas. 
They have already reached a level of hiph civilisatten and 
highly developed ceremonial system. They used b^ iaCiful stone li^lenents 
and stone axes. They were good carpenters and lived In wooden houses 
richly decorated and ornamented. They knew the arts of pottery and 
weaving. The late Prof.Kern's researches revealed that the principal 
means of existence of tl:^  Indonesians at that early stage was agrici:d.tur< 
of a type of highly developed Including the cultivation of rice Mid 
sawahs(irrigated fields) and ladangsC dry fields). They certainly 
knew the science of n^vigstlon. 
2, The second wave of migration which took place roimd sbout 
300-200 B.C., traversed fhs same route end penetrated further east 
as far as New Guinea and spread Indonesian culture there, thus caaking 
New Guinea and northern Halmahira affixed with other Isles. They 
possessed a culture and civilisation snd practised a more highly 
developed navigstlon. Belonging to the bronze age as they were, they 
used metals such as iron, bronze, copper and gold. 
Tl^ two culture namely the neolithic and bronze cultures, 
gave rise to the Indonesian civilisation that existed before the 
coming of the Hindu civilisation to indon4sia.1 
BmihlPt ana H n^^ u Mngdoag. 
Srl vijaya ^aBlr„e 
In the f i r s t and second century of the Christian era, the 
1. ObaniJ Indonesia, feierdeka, issued by 1 . 6 . 1 . , New Delhi February, 
19»^, p.5 
6 
Bvulhist Bissionarles from India came to Indonesia to spread their 
religion and culture. Fah Hein, the Chinesepilgrla W^K) visited Java 
In M^>, found alaost all the population of the islands to be either 
Brahmins or heathens. Budhism vas first preached in Indonesia by 
Gunavarman of Kashnir shortly after ^ 0 . His missionary activities were 
concentrated in Sumatra, th»curh he visited Java too. 
AJl, a prince froia India, came to Indonesia and taug-ht the people 
of Java to write as also tlMi(nK3Iments of astronomy, and chronolofy 
and broufht them clvllsatlon.1 
Gunavsrman converted many princes to Budhism. About the fifth 
or pixth century, BwlhiSTn becaaie the predominant religion of Sumatra. 
After extensive work by Btuaatran missionaries most of Hindu Indonesia 
was ultimately converted to Budhism, The Indonesians bler^ed the twv 
religion and civilisation with their ovn and there spranjr up a new 
civilisation of the Sri Vljaya i-mpire. The capital was the larpe city 
of Sri Vijaya, the present city of Palembanfr In south Sumatra. It was 
a Malayan Budhlst kinedora which used the old Malay lanirua^e. 
Side by side with Sri Vijaya klnrdom, there was the Malay kin^d^ 
of Jambl, which the former ccnfiuered. At first the Sri Vijaya kinprdom 
was confined mainly to Bumatra. Later on In the eleventh century it 
ruled over the western half of Java, Malaya, Borneo (Kalimantan), 
Sulawesi, the Philippines, parts of indo-Chlna and Combodia, Formosa, 
parts of India faclnp Ceylon end probably the territory on the south-
east coast of India Including Harepatam. Commerce and trade and ship-
building were the chief occupation of the Rrl Vijaya Jiimplre. Hence the 
empire was essentinlly a seapower based on trade. For another three 
centuries the empire continued to control trade and commerce of Malaysia 
it was ultimately overthrown by Majopahlt f^ mplre l>n 1377, A.D.2 
1. Viekket The story of Dutch is.Indies, London, 19**5, p«t1; Budhism, 
Sublished by the Ooi bani: op, cit. p.7 verxutent of xndia, 1956. i 
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The Sri Vijaya Empire was renowned as a centre of culture and 
learning where pilgrims from China, on their way to India, used 
to stop. They stjryad there for several years, collecting Budhlst 
manuscripts, studying Bi«3hist Philosophy, acquiring Budhiat 
knowledge. One of the 7 famous priests of the J^rl Vijaya was 
Shaknkltri who had written a book known as Hastadan which was 
translated by 1-Tslnf Into Chirrase. The Budhist priests In Sri Vijaya 
numbered more than 1000 and they studied Budhlsm.1 
The klnrdOB of Sri Vijaya was known to India. It had close 
relrtion with the Pala Xing of Bengal. One of the Sailandra kings 
had a furu(perceptor) from the Cauda country(Bengal), it has been 
discovered that the revenues of some villages in Bihar were devoted 
to the support and upkeep of a ^rl Vijaya monestrles as the famous 
Budhist university of Nslanda end Nagapattlnam. It also maintained 
friendly relations with the Oreat Cholas of south India. But later 
t>» Cholas fell out and attacked it and destri^ed much of its 
powers. I>harmapala, a famous Prof. Of Nalanda, visited Indonesia 
in the 7th century A.D. The famous monk and scholar, Atisa Dlpankara, 
the head of Vlkramasila university, went alsoto Indtoesia in the 
11th century in order tc sttrfy BtuJhlsm under the guidance of 
Candrakiti, a hirh priest. Indian migrants came to Indonesia 
probably at the beginning of the Pallava ascendancy in south India. 
The port of embarkation was Tramlaliptl-Tamaluk in the Midnapore 
district in Bengal. To this port flocked Intending emigrants froa 
Bengal, Bihar, south India and Gujarat.2. 
1. AdinegoroJ Insclopedia, Jacarta, 195'f 
2. Dr.Balkrlshna Gokhale: Cultural ties between India and Indonesia 
Sunday Hews of India, June 11, 1950 N.Delhi, p.3 
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Mttjonahlt i^ o^ira 
Unlike Sufflataa, In Java both Bhiva and Vishnue ward 
worshipped. Both Budhlsm and Shlvalsn existed side by side for 
a while. Th« oldest emples situated on the Dlen^ Plateau in 
central Java and groups of temples of Prambanan were solely 
dedicated to Shiva, The lanjmage of the ruliniif class of Hejopanit 
was Sanskrit. 
At the middle cf the 7th cent\iry, there were either 2 
or three kingdoms. One of the states was the kingdom of Taruman 
in West Java, under the reHn of klnf Purnavarman, probably from 
south India. In central J^va there was another klnpdom of Kalinf, 
whose reli^ l^on was Buihist Hlna Yana. it was a Hindu state ruled 
by Banyaya of Kallnira In south India, 
It ves also a coasmerclal state eni It depended for its 
properlty on trade. Thus there was rivalry between the Sri Vijaya 
and Kajopshit empires and developed into bitter enmity. According to 
Javanese lepend, the prince ^pneyaya was a frrej^ t conquerer, subject-
ing Ball, wUBiatra, Camboja, India and China.1 
Then a new stream of iHrajlfrstion flowed Into Indonesia 
and fi new dynasty known as Shailendra arrived from Kallnfa In south 
India. The rulers of this dynasty were lovers of arts, as these of 
Sri Vljaya were of the sea. The dynasty succeeded in bulldln? a 
considerable number of stone temples such as Serl, Sevu, etc. and 
the E?re8test of all monuments of Shailendra (760-860) was the 
Chandl Borbudtir situated near the city of JofJakarta. 2 
First Mataram kingdom came Into existence only to be substituted 
by the Kadirl state (925-1222). With fall of Kedlrl rose Slni^ asarl 
TTlTekke: p . t5 
2, Sanusl Panes ^edjarah Indonesia, Dji l id 1 , Bab.*f, Jacarta,1952 
p.35 
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state, the last rular of which, Kini? Kartanegara, was the 
fathor of the crown prince Vljayaya, was about 1293, laid down the 
fotmdation of the Majopathit kingdom (129'*). The Chinese troops of 
20,000 men imder the eoBBDon of Caisar Khubalai Khan went to Indcmesia 
to punish the King Kettanefrara and embarked at the port of Tuba in 
Java, ultimately the Majopahlt forces were defeated and a treaty 
concluded, 1 
Under the powerful and excellent leadership of prenier Gaja 
Mada the empire grew rapidly at the expense of tte neiffhbourlng 
states* Oaja Madha became premier in 1332 and retained his office till 
his death In 133'*-* The empire prew so power that it defeated once 
the most powerful sri Vijaya in 1377. Ultimately the entire Indonesian 
islands fell into the mi^ht hands of Ma:5opahlt empire end for the 
first time Indonesia was imited under one Indoneisan government. It 
established food relations with the neiphbourin^ countries and its 
sovereignty was recognised in Slam, Champa, Camboja, Annam, etc.The 
traders and priests of these countries came very often to Java and 
some merchants of Karnatak in south India and of Cauda in Benfral* 
The rovermMnt of this empire was hi^ Vily centralised and 
efficient. The system of taxation, customs, tolls, internal revenues 
was excellent. Among the separate departments of government, there 
were a colonial department, a department of commerce, department of 
public welfare and public health, a department of Inteiror snd a war 
department. Tl»re was a supreme court cnslsting of 2 presiding officers 
and 7 judges* 
Hajopai*iit was a trading empire, hnving a big naval 
establishment and a mighty armada. Tl» export and import were 
carried on chiefly with India, China and its comlt^ies. The state of 
1. ibid: Bab 9, p.87 
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Majopahlt lasted for about 200 years but the greatest period 
of the eapire was from 1M5 to 1380. 1 
The capital of Mejjopahlt was @ fine and prosperous one with 
a Bifhty Shiva tenrple in the centre. There were many splendid 
buildlnps. There were several other greet cities, and many ports in 
Java, There were over $00 temples. Most of these temples were built 
between 550 and 950 A.I. Indeed the vholo Hindu and Budhist Malaysia 
specialised in fine buildings. The -^ialalslans asipht have brought 
large number of builders and masters craftsmen from India and other 
neifhbourlnF countries to help them to build these raiphty triples. 
This injperlslist state did not Icnp survive its old enemies, 
Sri Vijaya. There was civil war and trouble with China which resulted 
In a ereat Chinese fleet coralnf to Java. The colonies fradually 
dropped off. In 1^6 there was famine >?nd foreirn tiade was unfavour-
able end two years later Kajopahit ceased to be an ernpire. it carried 
en however as ©n independent state for another ^ years. Oltimately 
It pave way to the ev^r erowinf force of Islam in 1H^ 78. 2 
The down-fall of the i'^ ajopahlt empire certainly led to 
the introduction of Islam to Indonesia. From the second century 
B.C. Arabs had been developing trade relations with Asiatic countries 
such as India, Indonesia, Ceylon, etc. Chinese annals (67^ A.D.) five 
an account of an Arab chief and of Arab settleraent on the vicst coast 
of Sumatra. But the first chronical date of comin^ of Islam to 
t* UbaniJ Indonesia, Merdeka, X.S.I,, New iJelhi December 25, 19^ 
p.8 
2, Dr.H.De.Graaf: The story of indonesio, Bnndung, 1952, p.75 
11 
Indonosia vas the year 1111 when SOBMS Achinese of the north-vest 
of Sujaatra embraced Islam on the hand of Arabs named Abdullah Arlf. 
Burhsnuddln, one of his disciples« later on carried on Islam down 
the wast coast as far as Farlaman In Minanrkabau. By the 13th 
century, the kinFdo!rf|Mlnangkab8U became virtually a Muslim state. Tl» 
first MuaLias state was set up in Achln In 1205 A.U. rmd Jshn Shsh was 
its first ruler. 1 
Besides the Arat merchants, the Indian morchWits, the i-ndian 
ffieicirhants especially the Gujarat (Camboyandv' uiorchonts, also took par 
pert in the Islamic missionsry work. Missionaries, say Arnold, must 
have also however have come to the Helay prchipelap-o (indfcnesia) 
from the south India, judt?ln?' from certain popularities of Muslim 
theology adopted by the islanders. Most of the Muslims of the 
archdpelapo belong to the Shafynh sect which is at the present day 
predominant on the Koomondel end Malaber coasts, as was the case 
also about the middle of the iWth century, when ibnu Bstutah visited 
these parts (13^5). So when we consider that the Muslims of the 
neiphbourlnp countries belong to the Hanafyah sect, we can only 
explain the prevalence cf the Stinfyah te©chine" by assuming thst it 
hful been brois<?ht thither from Halabor coast, the parts of which 
were frequented by merchsnts from Java. From i-bnu Batuteh, ve learn 
that the Muslim sultan of Sumatra in Sumfitro h^ d entered into 
friendly relstions with the court of Delhi. But lonp before this, 
the merchants from teccan, had established tehmselves in lar/^ e amber 
in the trndlnr parts of these islands -.^-here they sowed the seed 
of new relirion.2, 
1. Dada }'em»xa* Atjeh Seribu tahun dan perlstiwa Teunj^ ku 
Daud Beureueh, Cs, pp.11-1^ 
2, Ubanl and Co s op. clt. p.? 
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Mprco Polo, who visited the north of Buaatre in 1292, found 
MusliiBS in the kinprdooa of Perlak, Achin.A Chinese traveller on 
his way to Suiaatra in lM3» met a popiilation of 1000 Muslims 
families in Leffiblrl and the people and the klnp of Aru klnrdom 
were also Muslims, 
The spread of Islam in Paleabenp and Lampun^ became very 
rapid at the end of I5th century. Kipsionsry i/ork in both places 
w&s carried on by Kaden Rahman from Java and Mlnakhamala Btual, 
chieftain from Lampunr. 
At the end of the 12th centiiry, prince Pa^ajaran, a ruler 
of state in western Jr^ va, introduced islam into the island. He 
went to India as a raorchant end returned home a Muslim missionary. 
A missionary moveaent headed by an Arab named Maulana Malik Ibrahlji 
alonr with 3unan Girl, started aissionary work in Grlsik in cast 
Java, in the half of the iW-th cent\iry. i^ any missionaries were 
instituted from Grlsik. Thousands and thousands of Javanese embraced 
Islam and Muslim states were set up. 1 
Arab, Siaoatran and Javanese merchants spresd islam araonf 
the Inhabitisnts of Moluccas islands. But the real progress they made 
in their mission was in the 1$th century. A heathen kin^ of Tidor 
embraced islam alon?^  with his people. The kinr of Tdrnate went to 
Grlsik in \^9^ in order to embrace Islam, 'ihese two kings, assisted 
by other missionaries, made tireless efforts in ccnverting their 
people to Islam. 
In Kalimantan islam was mostly confined to the coastal 
areas, in 1521, the Spsnierds found a Muslim state at Brunei.An 1521, 
1. ^anusi Pr^ neJ op. clt. p. 172 
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the Spaniards found a Miwlln state at Brunei, By this tine, the 
kinf of BandjarmaBln and his people had been converted to islam. The 
state of '^ ukadana In Borneo had In 1590 a first Muslim ruler, 
in Sulawesi the Maccasar and Bugls adopted Islam in I6O3, while 
Alfoers reaslned l^athens in the t6th century. At the bepinnlng 
of the 17th centxiry, the princes such as Sultan H?jsspnwldln and the 
population SulawBsl (Celebes) embraced Islam In loree number and the 
sultanate of Maccasar become afterwards a very powerful state, 
Similarly all t» other small islands of Indonesia such as Loabok, 
Sumbawa, Flores, Timor, Boti, etc. were overwhelmed by the dynamic 
force of Islsmlc teachings. To<lay 95/«' the Indoneslgns are Muslims 
and the rest remain Hlndius, Christians and heathens. 
In the 16th and 17th century, Indonesia was remarked by 
the prowth of Muslim sultanates end their resistance ggalnst the 
advance of l^ uropean nations, e.f, Portupuesa, the Spaniards, the 
French, the n^tch and the British, 1 
Bound about 1511 there were 3 •'^ uslim ststes in north 
eastern Java, The most important was the sultanate of Demak, which 
controlled the north-eastern parts from -JJapara to Grlsik in east 
Java. It controlled the shipping? lines from Grlsik to Malacca, its 
influence extended to west Java and Palembang in southern Sumatra, 
Lonir before 1522, Bantam had become a I^ .uslim state and 
subsequently became a strong Husllm state on western coast of Java, 
In 1527 tha part of Sunde ICalaps (Jacarta ) was conqiJered by Bantam, 
Abdul Fatah Apun? (1651-1685) was the greatest of its ruler, 
1. Ubani, O.K. and Muln* op.cit. p,^ 
In Sumatra thera was th« sultanate of Aohin. This state 
controlled a large part of the eastern and north-western coast 
of Sumatra. Befca^ e the middle of the I5th century it had 
conquered tha& wall-known kingdom of HinonE^kabau, 
The ruler of OellCMeden) and Indraplrl, on the south 
coast of Cumatra, and the districts of Kedah and Pehanp on the 
Malay peninsula recognised the overlorship of Ach^n. In 1615, the 
Achinc'Se troops attacked Johore and occupied its capital. After 
that, Iflk«ndar Huda, who ruled Achin (1607-1636), controilrd the 
whole noith western part of the i'ialay archipelppo. The pepper trade 
of -mastra, tin mines of Kedah end the deposits of Bgnfka and 
Belli ton were under the control of t)\e -ultanate. 
islam was also the official religion in the Tern?te and 
Tidore states. Durlnr the reipn of i^ ultan Babullah, 72 of the inlands 
recopnised and soverelfnty of Ternate. 
The sultanate of D^mak had been divided into k separate 
states. One of these was ?ad,1anp in central JPVR. In the middle of 
the 16th century, the Sultan of Padjenp wsve B prosperous district 
of Hatarars to one of his noblemen. Tt» son ??nd successor of the 
first ruler of Kuslim *Matrara was Sultan Vl.^ aya (Sinopati). Let^ sr 
on Sinopati succeeded in extendinp his authority over all the 
territory between X^eribon in the west Java and B«ifimbsnpan in the 
east. When the Sinopati died in 1601, only the north-eastern coastal 
districts, aaonj?: which Grisik snd Sxirabaya were prominent, had 
maintained part of their independence.1 
1. Ibid: p. 1M-. 
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Aftar the Sinopatl, Sultan Apun?Cl613-16*+5) was the 
greatest of the rulers of Matarao. He was more strictly Muslio 
than his predecessors and enforced the lew of Koran throupf:hout his 
kini^ doei* K© was a literary man and brave warrior. Re also introduced 
a general tax system. It consisted of exports snd duties on rice and 
other coisiRodities, of ahead tax psid by the people selllnfr in the 
market. These taxes were very moderate. Further, h* succeeded in 
revlvlnir coastal states and the smaller sultanates of the north 
eastern of Java, were uru5er his control. He died in 16^5. 
There were also the ^^ andanese IslaEic republic and Xacassar 
Muslim stetes. When lernate had surrendered to the l^tch, the kinp 
of Macassar became the defender of the falthfull In a lerre pert of 
the Ternpte territories. Ihe state had a plorlous history in the 
propagation of Islam B.n6 in fiphtinp for defending Its freedom and 
independence apeinst foreign iaperialSsm. 1 
THij. COKING CF IK.. ^ AJ.^ijPi^Am. 
Indonesia's conanerclel products had attracted auch of 
both oriental and accidental mtrchents all the world over. The Arabs, 
Indians, Chinese end Japanese come to Indonesia lonp before the 
ouiopeans for the purpose of trade and contaerce, 
WV^n Vasco liegama opened e sea toute to the east coast 
of India via Cepe Good Hope, Albuquerque vss in 1509 entrusted to 
establish Portuguese supretaacy in Malacca, Malaya. In 1511 he 
conquered the city and soon after .%ont at l^ aloca f^nd commercial bases 
in Indonesian archipelapo. Consequently, the flow of roods and 
spices from Indonesia to liurope made Lisbon a preat centre of trade, 
i". Ibid, pT-fJ— 
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Tt» Portugese were In the first j^ uropeans who caaie to Indonesia, 
They were tremendously inspired by the spirit of crusade In all 
their aetivities in Indonesia. They regarded -Indonesian Huslims as 
the moors, whom they had planned to attack wherever they vera. 
Besides carrying on trade, tl»y always tried their best to convert 
Indonesian Muslims to Christinalty. The Portugese missionaries strove 
violently to bring Christian doctrines and its moral principles to 
the inhabitants of Amboina, Hainahera and many other Islands. 1 
This was the foremost reason that caused the Indonesians 
to offer resistance to the Portuguese* The Indonesian sultanates 
simultaneously waged wars against them. The sultan of Demak had not 
only fought the Portuguese in Indonesia but also sent his great 
fleet to support of the miltan of Malacca. The Sultan of Achln in 
Sumatra endlessly threatened the Portuguese year after year. Many 
Muslim traders refused to trade with them. In Ternate they successfully 
concentrated their propaganda of Christianity. Its king, '^ ultan 
Hsrun, victoriously undermined the Portuguese position in the 
Moluccas. In 156? the whole Portuguese mission was rapidly repudiated. 
Though Portuguese and had conquered Malacca, yet 
politically they had no settlenent outside It and In the Moluccas, 
i^ ven Malacaa itself had been continuously threatenod by the sultan 
of Achln. Vainly the protuguese governor of Miilacca tried to 
threaten his opponent by an alliance with other native states. He 
established connections with the Bataks, the only pagan tribes that 
remained in Suoatra. But all his efforts were fruitless. Thus the 
PortugiMse prestige faded away gradually. The arrival of Spaniards, 
the French and the Dutch changed their position from bad to worse.2 
1. Ibid, chap, h p,10 
2. Ibid, p.11 
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Even today the Portujruese still possess a colonial territory 
in the Timore island. By the treaty of 1859, ratified in Auirust 
18, 1860, the Timor island was divided between Portugal and 
Holland; by conventlcm of October 1, 1902, ratified in 1908, a 
botmdary arrangement was made between the two governiaents, certain 
enclaves beinr exchanged and the possession of the other territories 
settled. 1 
The discovery of America by Coluaibla led Spain to search for 
more welath and power in the east. Fernande Harellan, a Portuguese 
by birth but a naturalised Spaniard, reach the spice islands, 
Indonesia, with a small fleet aA visited a small island in the 
Philipines in March 16, 1521. He developed commercial relations with 
native population of the Indonesian archlpelaro. 
Opto 16^ +7, the Spaniards controlled Minado, Tlndore Rn3 
Sanpi Island and since then they were taken over by the f>utch. This 
was the perfect liquidation of the Spaniard possession In Indfcne8ia.2 
At the beflnnlnr of 1530 a Frenchmen, Jean Permentier, had 
organised an expe^tion to Indonesia. He visited Bantam In Java and 
other spice islands fs of the archlpelafo. He traded with native 
people. Later on numerous French merchants came to Indonesia for the 
purpose of commerce. 
In 1595» the first Dutch expedition coamianded by 
Cornells de Houtman, sailed from a port of Holland and reached Bantam 
in June, 1596. The voyape had lasted 1^ months and of the 2^9 members 
of the crew, 1^5 died before they reached Indonesia. Cornells Van 
1, ii.tpstelni The Statesman's year Book, 1937» London, p.1257 
2. Fay Coopers op.dt. p.3^ 
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Houtman concluded a treaty with the sultan of Java and visited 
Simda Kalapa (Jacarta). But in Madura and Achln he and his crew 
were not welcomed because of their Iroproper behaviour and violation 
of the sover«lj?:nty of the native states. He returned to Holland 
in 1597. 
Immediately after the return of Houtman the ship owners of 
Amsterdam sent a second fleet in 1598, consistinp of 8 ships. Apain 
3 souaSrons sailed from Holland In 1599 and 2 more in 1600. In 1601, 
*f expeditions left for Indonesia. Jacob Van ^eck, the admiral of the 
second fleet, visited the i^ o^luccas. Here h» entered into normal 
commercial relations with the natives snd secured economic 
privileges from them. Another aqusdron of the same fleet arrived 
in Ambfcnia and was welcomed by the sultan of Ternate. 1 
In September 1600, a formal treaty of alliance arainst 
the portujruese was concluded between Amdiral Vander Hafhen end the 
inhabitants of the island of Ambolnai The Dutch promised to construct 
a fortress on Ambolna and to protect the natives in return for a 
monopoly of spice trade. 
Sn Achin the Dutch were not welcomed because Admiral 
Van Caerdan, a reckless offfceer had plundered and sank native tradin? 
berks of the coast of Achin and undisciplines of his crew. 
The years 1601 and 1602 brought a turn in events. The 
Viceroy of Goa decided to re-establish ^o^tupuese authority in 
Indcmesia. A fleet of 8 large and small vessels under the cosraand 
of Furtado de Mendoza left Malacca for Bantam. A Jutch fleet of 5 
vessels under the command of isfolfert Herniensz approached Sumatra 
1, B.H.M.Viekkes op.cit., pp.70-72 
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from the wist at the same tine. The^ met the 30 Portupcuese vessels 
on Christmas day, on December 2T^ 1601 In the battle. Ultimately 
the Portuguese were driven from the roadstead of Bantam, in this 
kingdom the reputation of the ^utch was now well-established.1 
After crushinir the patriotic struggle of the Bandanese people 
the Dutch merchants secured a monopoly of spice trade In the island 
of Banda. In i^ a^rch, 1602, the United East indla Company (vereniging 
de Oast Indlsch Compan^ies or ?,0,C) was established and received 
from the States General of ths Netherlands rights of monopoly and 
sovereignty, ^ he company was riven a monopoly of shipping and trade 
in Asia and the power to perform acts of sovereignty. The company 
was given a monopoly of shipping and trade in Asia and the power to 
perform acts of sovereignty in the tiBWi of the States General such 
as making alliances and contracts with princes and potentates of 
the east. The Dutch republic retained only a right of control. 2 
A capital of 6,500,000 guilders was collected and a board 
of 17 directors was Instituted. The new company took over all 
factories that had been established in Indonesia by its predecessors. 
Offices were built up in Bantam end Grisik. 
in 3 years, 3B well equipped ships were dispatched to 
Indonesia not only for commerce but also for other purposes. The 
company was allowed to make war, conclude trestles, possess lands and 
establish fortresses in the country. The directors ordered Admiral 
Van Cer Heghen to attack Portuguese in Malacca, Amboina, etc. and 
succeeded in capturing the Portuguese fortress on the island of 
Tidore. 
1. Ib id : pp.75-76 
2 . Coli^n i^ n Stibbes Neerlands I n d i e , 1, p.271 ; A Vandenbosch* The 
Dutch £.ast I nd i e s , Univ. of Cal i fornia Press , Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, 19Mf, Chap. IV, p,5l 
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The conquest of the fortress of Ambolna pave the ii-ast India 
Company its first ierrittxrial possession in Indonesia. In Febrmary 
1665» Admiral Van Der Hatrhen concltided a treaty vdth all the 
villages of Aaiboina, who recognised the suzerainty of the states 
general of the Netherlands, Monopoly of trade was of course included 
in the treaty. Freedom of relijsrion to all Muslims, Catholics and 
Protestants was in the treaty but it was never fulfilled, 
in 1607, the company's fleet under the command of Jan 
Fieterszoon Ooen left for Indonesia to secure the monopoly on the 
spice islands, Aj^ ain in 1610, 8 ships imder the first Qovernor-
Genersl, Pieter Both sailed to Indonesia. 
Peter Both became G.G. of Indonesia, dealing wtth the 
ooranercial matters and chief director of the company. He was 
assisted by a coundUl of the indies, with 5 members. H« established 
his headquarters in Jacarta, He then appointed in 1613» Jen Pieterszooi 
Coen Chief account and director of commerce in Bantam.1 
In 1618, the directors appointed Coen G.G, of Indonesia 
and the situation was precarious. The people of the Moluccas were 
frumblinp against i>utch claims to monopoly. Pepper prices were foin? 
sky hip;h through the competition of i^tch, linflish, and Chinese 
buyers. At Japara in east Java the Netherlands tradin? post was 
attacked and destroyed by troops of the prince of Hatraiam, On ^ 4arch, 
12 1619, Coen succeeded in defeating the Mataram troops and finally 
the natM of Jacarta was changed to Batavia in the same year. On 
March *f, 1621, the directors of the company confirmed the official 
name to it. This was the official capital of Indonesia, in 1619 
the Dutch company concluded a Joint eonmiercial and military alliance 
1, Sanusi Panes op. cit. p.195 
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with England, in 1626, Coen crushed the people of Bands 
•revoltinr apainst the Dutch and secured the nutmecr trade 
and finally occupied the lands after fierce fifhting. 1 
When the Dutch tried to convert the papan tribes of 
Ceram and Halmahera to the Christianity, the Molaceas Muslims 
and their kinp were at war for 50 years with the i>utch. Ultimately 
the Moluccas people were defeated by Governor Arnold De Viaming. 
When Coen died In September 20, 1626, a new C,C.Jacques 
Speck was appointed and lived in Jacarta, The i>utch tried to 
induce all Chinese raerc4kants in Bantam to tnirrate Jacarta, but 
this move was strongly opposed, by the '^ultan of Bantam, Abdulfatah 
Apunp (1651-1685). I^ he sultan had welcomed the British and the French 
traders to his ports. With the help of these Europeans, he equipped 
his own warships and particularly resisted the iJutch in several 
places. 
The G,G,, Van Dienmen extended the i>utch cofiraercial empire 
and sought to secure for his directors the treasures of all those 
coxintries that were still unexplored such as island of north Japan 
and east of Siberia, Australia and New -Zealand, As a result, by 
the middle of the 17th century, the company spread its wings all 
over the coast lands of Asia. An 16^5, both Sultan Agung ar«3 G.G, 
Van Dlenmen died. In 16'*2, the statutes of Jacarta were publisted 
as the code for the Dutch Asiatic territory. !>uring the 17th 
century, the 3 governors general, Johan Maetsuycker ( a lawyer), 
^•ijklof van Ooens(Conqueror of Ceylon) and Cornells Speelraan 
(conqueror of Maccasar) continued and completed the \rt>rk of J.P. 
Coen in expanding the ^utch colonial empire in Indonesia.2 
1, B.H.H.Viekke: op.cit p.88 
2. Ibid: p.97 
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Under the rule of the 3 governors general, the people of 
Moluccas and Sultan of Mataram revolted against the Dutch 
authorities. The revolt was crushed dovm In 1678 by O.G.of J^carta, 
i^ ijklof Van Coens. in Bsndjara^in, Borneo, the fifhtlnp apfilnst the 
i^ utch, Portupuese and British was in progress since 1669-17f5>. 
Reforms in the policies of tlw company were planned by G.C. 
Baron Van imhoff• The plan of refora was submitted to the board of 
directors durin? the t8th century. Van Imhoff arrived in Indonesia 
with a plan for administration and commercial reforms. He died in 
1750. 
From 1680 on, the Netherlands controlled the whole 
indonesisn archipelago. 70 years later, only 2 of the major islands, 
Bali and Lombok, remained free from interference by the dominatinier 
power. Around 1750, on Sumatra the company maintained regular trade 
relations with the native sultanates and discovered the two rich 
tin mines at Bangka and BiHiton off Siamatra. in Borneo, the company 
found a strong Chinese colony in the sultanates of Samboa. After 
1755t the E.i.C. was the greatest territorial power In Java. The 
majority of its 3t million inhabitants were directly governed from 
Jacarta. in 1855 when the Dutch authority was established, there 
were more than 30,000 Chinese in the north west Borneo. 1 
I'-eckless financial administration at home penurlqjs 
treatBient of its servants in the east and the breakdown of the 
commercial monopoly finally led to the fall of the company. Illicit 
trade with Arabians and the Enpilish was so brisk in the latter 
part of the l8th century that more linen of foreign than of iHitch 
oriprin was sold in Jacarta, Ttm salaries paid to its personnel 
1. IbidJ p. 121 
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were so sllfrht that the company failed to attract able and honest 
people to its Service. This had the effect both of woefully lowering 
the standards of administration and of inducing the officials to 
supplement their meaner salaries by dishonest practices. Nowhere 
was siHUggllnir carried on a large scale in the company's own ships. 
The financial administration was equally bad. L&rfte devidends 
were regularly paid out whether earned or not. Toward the end of 
the 18th century, the company collapsed; its charter was nullified 
In 1798 to take effect January 1,1800. The Dutch republic took 
over both its assets and its liabilities or debts of 13^ ',000,000 
guilders.1 
Indonesia came under direct government control when Branch 
revolutionary ideas were abroad and after the old Dutch republic 
had given way to the Batavian republic (1795-1806). I^ irk Van Hogendorp 
had rendered ereat service in exposing the corruption and abuses of 
the ccwpany and had carried on a campaign for reforms. In 1807 the 
povernment instituted a coimission of 7 members like Van Hogendrop 
and Ncderburgh, to serve it with advice concernini? the basis and the 
manner in which trade in the country's possessions in Indonesia, 
should be carried on and these possessions governed in a manner 
such as would produce t>» greatest welfare for Indonesia, the highest 
profits for the commerce of the republic and the greatest advantages 
of the country's finance. The report of the coranisslon contained 
nearly all institutlcms such as forced labour, deliveries in kind, 
feudalism and monopolies, in certain products. The old idea 
the colonies existed for the benefit of the mother co\antry was 
1. A.Vandenbosch: op.cit. p.53 
2k 
still 
/predominant. The charter of the company drawn up by the conmlision 
came into force in 180^,1 
Upon the recoma^ndatlon of hia brother Napolean, the King 
of Holland, Louis Bonaparte, appointed Dacndels as G.G, of 
Indonesia (1808-1811), Daendels not only did what he to prepare Java 
for defence sprainst British attack, but also instituted a number of 
important reforms. The compulsory cultivation of a few products was 
abandoned. He attempted to remove the evils and abuses from the 
system of forced cultivation and delivery of products. Forced labour 
was increased rather than deminished especially that for the 
construction of public roads and bridges. However, he did put an 
end to the excessive amount of obligatory personal services of 
natives for European officials and limited those which mij?ht be 
demanded by the regents. The powers of the native chiefs were 
reduced and the emoluments of the European officials abolished. The 
powers of the native states in Bontam, Cheribon, and cebtral Java 
were also sharply pruned. The administration of Daendels, says 
de Kat Anpelino, effected a transformation, with rouphness, of a 
coBffliercial and loose organisation into a centralised state authority 
supported by a disciplined Dutch and Javanese administrative body. 
Otherwise it dovetailed into the era of the company in a way which 
one would not suspect,2 
1. A.VendenboschJ op. cit. pp.53-5^ 
2, De Kat Angellnos Colonial policy, Vol, 11, p.26 
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Daendels divided the province of Cherlbon into 5 prefectures 
and 38 rependes. All oflclals received military rank and a 
suitable salary. He undertook a reoreranisation of the judiciary. He 
decided to Five every regency and above the regencies, everly 
prefecture, its ovm court of justice, composed of Indonesians vith 
2 £uropean members in the courts of prefecture. These courts would 
ji:K3pe In all eases in whldi natives of Java alone were involved. All 
eases concernin? foreigners - i^uropeans, Chinese, Arabians or 
Indonesians not natives of Java were to be handled by councils of 
justice, established at Jacarta, Seraaranp and Surabaya. The first 
rroup would render justice according to Javanese customs, the 
second accordinf to tlw existing Dutch Indonesian statutes. The 
system of sefrref^ t^lon of the national froups In matters of Justice had 
been maintained and improved by later administration. In 1^10, 
Daendels was recalled and replaced by Jan WiHen Jensens. 1 
After the Bnpllsh conquest in Aufust 3, 1811-1816, the 
former i^tch possessions in the east were placed under the chief 
direction of the G.C.if India, then Lord Minion, while Java and 
Its dependencies \mTe placed under raffles as Lieutenant Governor. 
Baffles abolished the system of contln??ents and compulsory deliveries 
in kind throurhout nearly all of Java. He introduced a systeTB of 
taxation on Land. He proceeded from the eastern portion that all 
land belonp: to the ruler and that the occupiers or tenants of tl» 
sovereign owner, had to pay land rent. This rent he fixed at 2/5 
at the harvest, which «hare could be paid either in money or products.; 
1, H.A.M.Viekkes o p . c l t . p .13^ 
2 . De Kat An^ellno? o p . c l t , p . 2 9 
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Baffles felt a strong aversion to anything which savored 
of feudalism and he made strenuous efforts to remove it from the 
frovernmental system. The powers of the semi-fuedal regents were 
dmlainished and the contact between the European officials and the 
native population pushed lower down. The i.uropean administrative 
structure was made to rest directly upon the villapes, which 
Baffles considered the only living indipenous units. He systemstised 
the police system and made important reforms in the judicial 
organisation. He abolished the sultanates of Cheribon and Bantam 
and placed tl^ territory under direct government. The native states 
of JofJakarta and Burakarta saw their territory diminished and 
their powers further restricted,1 
In 1815 i^ affles was recalled and Jolm Feudal was appointed 
his successor by the board of directors of the British Bast India 
Company in London. According to the treaty of London of August 13» 
181U^ , the British promised to restore all the former Dutch colonies 
to the Netherlands, On Aupust 1, 1816, the actual transfer of power 
took place at Jscarta, The government of new kingdom of the Netherlanad 
sent three Commissioners General, Elaut, Van Der Capellen and 
Buyskes, to take over the possessions from JSngland, to reorganise 
the administrative system and to draw up a new organic law. This 
work teas completed by the end of 1818, when the povernment was 
turned over to the new C.C,, Van i-er Capellen, assisted by the 
Council of the Indies, 
Outside of Java, Madura and the Moluccas, Butch control 
WES only nominal. And even in Java the iJutch administration was 
limited, as much as Java was still under native rule and other 
IxxftckttiucJ^ iixJfjctkkK^ xMii 
1. Ibid : p.33 
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sections, such as Madura had not yet been deeply penetrated by 
Dutch adoinistretlon. in 1819, the Dutch were in effective 
occupation of only a few small areas In the outer territories: 
Padang and Paleiabanp in Sumatra, Pontianak, Sarabas, and Bandjarmasln 
in Borneo, Maccasar in south and the Minahasa in north Celebes, the 
old centre of the company activity. For a Isree part of the 19th 
century Dutch policy was dominated by intense exploitation of Java 
end obsolute abstention In the outer territories, with the exception 
of Sumatra. The Dutch colonial empire in Indonesia vas very largely 
the work of the befinninp of the 20th century,1 
The Coaanis si oners General (1818-1819) had encouraged the 
opening of Indonesia bo i^ uropean planters and industry and the 
prospects of industrial progress on the new lines seemed bri?ht. But 
G.G,, Van Der Capellen, failed to follow the liberal policy laid 
down by the commissioners and his reactionary policy of suppressing 
western enterprise was largely responsible for the return to old 
methods which shortly took place. In 1825 the kin? sent De Bus 
Ohisignies as coamiissioner general with a mgndste to Institute 
economies and to investigate a new the questions of the advantages 
of the two systems, namely forced for free cultures. His report 
of May 1, 1827 recommended the development of the country by calling 
in private initiative and capital, 
Baffles then became a Oovernor of Benfkulen in south 
Sumatra, He bought the islands of Singapore from the sultan of 
Johore and the British flar was hoisted there on Janusry 29, fek 1819. 
According to the second treaty of London of 182U-, the British 
1, Colijn tin Stibbe- Neerlands Indies, 11, p,1 ; and Kieltra J^n 
Krom; Neerlands 1, p.3^ 
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pepper, and cinnamen, and led to the introduction of tea and 
cinchcma.1 
In 1877, the Netherlands government had gained numerous 
profits of the culture system, amountlnp to about 832,000,000 
florins. Of this sum 236,000,000 florins were used to reduce the 
Netherlands public debt, 153,000,000 florins for the construction of 
railways In the Netherlands, 115,000,000 florins for tax reduction, 
1^,000,000 florins for fortiflcotlons and other purposes. 1 
Movement for reform bepan after 18^. Famine in two sections 
in Java caused the povernn^nt institute reform on its own initlative» 
At this time the native social and economic position and organisation 
deteriorated. The kinr had been in supreme control of colonial 
policy and hence colonial questions were seldom discussed in Parlia-
ment, News and reports from Indonesia were strongly coloured by a 
stridt Fovernment censorship. The constitution revision of 18M^ pave 
the states peneral some control of colonial affairs and required 
that the colonial act should in the future be drafted by the 
lepislature. In the deliberations leadinp up to the passage of the 
Kast indies Ooveminent Act of 1B5S ^ small but powerful minority 
in the second chamber pressed for the abandonment of the policy of 
exploitation, 'i'his minority was led by L»r.^ .ix,Baron Van Hoevell 
and E,D,DQkker. A parliamentary resolution of 1868 on a colonial 
question at lest definitely settled the responsibility of the 
ministers to parliament ond not to the king. In 186*+ the E".I, 
1, Days op,cit pp.2^-9-250; and Vandenbosch; op.cit, p,58 
2. Hflsselmen in Coli.1n en 8ibbe: op,clt. 11, p,25 
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Auditing Act was pessed and after 1867 the Indonesian budget 
came \jnder the annual scrutiny of parliament and vdth it the 
whole Indonesian Bdministrati on. With the aerarlan law of 1870 
the flight against the forced culture system was von. Government 
cultivation of product other than sugar and coffee had already 
been abandoned, before 1870, The sbandonfment of the sugar culture 
was decided upon in princiJIlKS in 1870 and completely effected by 
1890. The compulsory cultivation of coffee remained until 1915. The 
steady deiline inibe yield of the coffee culture finally led to 
its sbclition in 1915 and with it the last vestif^ e of the culture 
system.1 
The shift toward a more liberal policy be?an in 1851, with 
the appointiuent of Duaaer Van Twist as 0,0. He wss the first G,G. 
of liberal tendencies since ue Bus De Ghisinfnles, Toward the end of 
his administration the policy of leaslni? wild lands to Europeans 
began. The deliberation end the vote on the constitutional act of 
18^5 had revealed tl^ presence of a fie-htlng liberal minority. 
Besides Van Hoevell this group included Thorbecke (the leadei/of t>» 
liberal party-*, and Croen Van Prlnsterer C the leader of tl^ 
Christian party). So Indonesia in 1877 was open to private enterprise 
Numerous reforms of minor character were mpde durinp these 
years, A bafinninr was made in 1882 with the gradual reduction an^ 
transformation of the tax in labour into a money tax. The tax system 
war, reorganised. An average of 6,500,000 florins was spent annually 
on the development of ral-roads throughout tMs period. Though the 
war with Achin was consuming millions, expenditures for education 
1, A, Vandenbosch: pp.clt, pp.60-61 
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were considerably increased and important Irpiration projects 
undertaken. 
The Ethical policv was generally dated from 1901 vlth the 
advent to power of the Kuyper ministry, px represantinir a coalition 
of Christian parties. The founder of the Antt-revolutlonaire party, 
Croen Van Prinsterer who was succeeded by Kuyper, had lonr denounced 
the policy of exploitation and had pleaded for n policy of moral 
ohlipation and preparation for self-government. The rise of the 
socialist party in the nineties ani the work of leadln? liberals such 
as Van Der Lith, Vankol and Van Deventer had helped to prepare the 
way for c new emphasis upon the welfare of the colonies. 
In the speech from throne in 1901 there occured the following 
significance; As a Christian power the Ketharlcnds Is obliged in the 
Indonesian archipelsfo to rerulrte better the lepal position of 
native Christians, to lend support on a firm basis to Christian 
missions and to imbue the «rhole conduct of fovernment with the 
consciousness that the Netharlanas has a raorsl duty to fulfill with 
respect tn the people of these regions. In connection with this the 
diainished welfare cf the populntion of Java merits special attention 
I desire to institute an Investigation into the cause of this.l 
Because of the scarcity of food In the r esldency of 
Bemaranp in 1899 and 1900, the welfare investigation coimnisslon was 
appointed 'n 1902 to survey the spot. In March 18, 1905, the Nether-
lands government granted a sum of i«. HO,000,000 florins to Indonesia 
for the improvement of economic conditions in Java nnd Madura. A 
second contribution of 25,000,000 florins was made in 1 9 ^ as 
compensation to Indlonesia for the sacrifice involved in reservlnp 
r.^TbTfr, p.6^ 
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part of its market for the Netherlands during the depression^ 
'the tui-n of the country also saw a chsfife in the policy 
vdth respect to the outer islands. The abstention or non-penetra-
tion policy was abandoned, Several factors influenced this change 
of policy. The fast coast of Sumatra hsd become the centre of a 
pros-perous European agricultural industry and the planters were 
demandinp a more effective administrotion. i'ear of foreign 
intervention also prevailed at this time. Xhe Dutch f^ overnment and 
public opinion had become uneasy over the fierce outbreak of econ<»ilc 
i-Tperlalism in the Far Last, Finally the ethical policy itself 
brought a natural intensification of adrslnistrrtion throughout 
the islands. i3etween 1900 and 1912 Dutch authority was effectively 
established over most of tlK outer territories. Several native states 
either because of continiied resistance tc Dutch authority or because 
of roal-administrBtlon, were incorporated wih the directly foverned 
territory, Cenv:;ral Van iieutsz, who u^ccessfiolly prosecuted the war 
arainst Ach'n, continued ansl virtually completed the task of 
paclficptrlon of the outer territories as C.C. from 190^ to 1909.Bv 
the decentraliSfjtion law of 1903, s first step was taken in un-
burdeninf the central povcrninent of some of the overwhelming tasks 
which the extension and inteaftiflcation of adrolnistrstion was heapini? 
upon it. The same law provided also for a Slight measure of 
deajocratlsatiftn. in 19^2 the Indonesian rovernment was given the 
juridical personality and the finances of the mother country and 
the dependency were sharply separated, iiducation was rapidly 
extended and m-asures for the promotion of the economic developments. 
1. ibid, p. 65 
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of the indoneslans introduced. The serv ices of experts in Muslim 
and Indonesian social i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e C.^Hiirpronje, Prof .Van 
Vollehoven, e t c . were u t i l i s e d hy the fovernment. Indonesian 
policy cons t i tu ted a leading issue In the e l ec t ion campaign of 
1913 between the l e f t and rle-ht prcups in the Nethorlsnds. As a 
r e s u l t , the l e f t won the e l e c t i o n . In 1915, f r . r , , Craff V«n 
Lisihiirp otirurn, opened the volksraad In Jaker ta . in 1922, « revlslem 
of the colonia l a r t i c l e s in the Netherlands cons t i tu t ion took 
place and in 1925 followed the revis ion of the .^sst Indies rovernment 
Act, providing greater independence for the Indonesian poverniaent 
and r r ea t e r na t ive p.*.rtlcipation in the povernment.1 
in 1910 peace ruled every where r^ nd the sda in i s t rp t ion of 
the Tutch had becorae highly e f f i c i e n t , r.ccnomicelly, the country 
had developed amazinply, Cn the advice of Prof.^'.Hurprenje, the 
povernijlent introduced the western c i v i l i s a t i o n to the "ndonesians. 
There two nat ive t eache r ' s col leges in 1866 and 1867. ^ reform in 
the Indonesian school f^ 'ystem was Eiade by the pcvemment which 
spent ov-r 60,000,000, pui lders for the establishment of schools 
a l l over Java and Madura, The " , n . , lieutsz, i n s t i t u t e d v i l l age 
schools where elementary i n s t ruc t ion was provided for the children 
in t he i r mother tonsue. in 1903, there were not more than 1,7CK) 
schools with 190,000 pupi ls in i n i o n e s i a . l 
The population of Indonesia had been rap id ly increasing 
for the l a s t raany years , i t increased f ros ^9,350,B3if in 1920 t o 
60,371,025 in 1930. Java and :iodura had e population of ^,^99,250 
C1C15), 9,37^,020 C18U5), 11,858,700 (1B5^), 19,5H0,8l3<lB80), 
23,609,312 (1890), 2?^,386,121 (1900), 29,92J+,55BCl905),3^»'+33,^76 
(1920) end M ,719,52if(l 930). The population of other i s lands was: 
1. Ibids pp. 6a«69 
2. Viekke: op.cit. p,177 
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Sumatra, 8238,570; Borneo, 2,19^,533; Celebes, »f,226,586; 
Bali, 1,101, 000; Lombok, 701,117; Timor end the adjoining 
islands, 1,656, 636; and the Moluccas and New Guinea, 893,030. 
In addition to the native population, there were also 36,000 
Europeans in 1870; 36,^(1872); ^3,738 (1882); 58,806(1892) and 
2^ *2,372 (1930); 809,000(1920) and 1 ,23if,000 Chinese (1930); and 
11^ -^ 000 other foreign Asiatics (71 Arabians and 30,000 Indians).! 
The Growth of Indonesian Nationalism. 
rolitics in Indonesia was initiated by certain groups of 
Kui-opeans who expressed their thoughts and ideas in the press. 
The political consciousness aiaone the educated Indonetsian began 
to grow. X'his conscious came through books, they read and partly 
through reading statements issued and resolution passed by the 
i!.uropean associations, unions and clubs, in this vay and through the 
help of and contect with some hiimanitarian i^ uropeans and national 
leaders of other countries political ideas spread more and more. 
Moreover, the government's law of 185^ did not allow the 
holding of meetings and the formation of any political movement. 
But In 1903, the povernment effected great chane'e in the law. The 
law of li^ C2, dealing with centralisation of the Indonesian adminlstrj 
tion provided for the establishment of local and municipal 
councils with limited powers. The right of enter politics was given 
to the people, but only for the specific Durpose of advancing the 
people, kiai to the various council established by the government. 
This change benefited not only civil servants but also Indonesian 
political movements. The year of 1903 was a year of great signlficanci 
1, A, Vandenbosch: op.cit, pp.5-15 
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to th« Indcmesian political progress. 
On the initiative of the aedlcal college students in 
Jacarta, an Indonesian aasociatlon called Budi Utomo(Koble 
Endeavour) was forned on May 20, 1908, under chairmanship of 
Sr.Sutoao, It had established nany branches all over Java vlth 
10,0^ members, it held first congress in October 5-8, 1908 at 
Matwam. In 1909 H.M.Titldlsuroyo founded tl» Muslim Chamber of 
Commerce (S.D.I,) at Jacarta. Anotlwr 3erlkat dagang Islam came 
into existence in Solo under the presidentship of H.Samanhi»9i, a 
batik merchant. The S.D.I, was changed to Serikat Islam by H.M.Ctaar 
Said Tjokromrainoto in 1912, The Insulande party (190?), and the 
Indies part (December 25, 1912), were also organised by Dr.E.F, 
Dauves Dekker at Bandung. 1 
Furthermore, there were too youfh organisations such as 
Tritoro Darmo(March 7t 1915), led by B.S.W.Kardama at Jacarta, ^ oung 
Java, ^ ung Ambon, league of !fo)mg Sumatra, Indoamsian association, 
Sekar rukim, etc. The Indonesian trade union was also organised in 
1905* The Mohammadiah Movement cioie into being in November 12, 1912, 
under the chairmanship of K.H.Dahlan. The first Indonesian women 
movement was Inspired by noble idea of Bohana Kudus (December 20, 
1870) and Mrs.Raden Adjeng Kartini (1879-190**). Dewi Sertlka was 
set up in west Java, Puteri merdeka (free %fomen) followed suit at 
Jacarta in 1912. There were still other %#omen organisations such as 
the Madju kemulian, the hati sutji, the keutamaan later! in Java 
the keutammaan isteri Minangkabau (1915) at Padang Pandjang and 
the Keradjian Amai setia at Kota Gedang in central Sumatra. The 
Wilhelmina association was also founded by military men In September 
1, 1908 at Magelang. In 1909, Dr.Tehupetoryin organised the Ambcmese 
1. A.Iandenbosch* op.cit pp.317-319; and Viekke* op.cit. pp.182-l8*f 
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study funds. Many other organisations like tho Anbon btmd 
(1911)« the Bena muria assoeietitm (1913^ et Seaaranf end Holuku 
society came into existence* The rukian ^>inaha8a was forned in 
1912 at -eaarang under tl» presidentship of J.H.Pangeman.l 
1 A.K.Prinfgodi^dot Sadjarah perferakan rakjat Indonesia, Jacarta 
19^9 p.50$ and Lukisan revolusi Indinesia, <7acart8, 1953* P»26 
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Q n H i- T c h 1 
NATIONALISM A-^D STi.PCTUBfc. OF TH.. GOVrlKMfcHT OF IHDOKti^lA, 19l'»»192g, 
I'he Indones ian n s t l o n e l movement I s of recent, h i s t i i r y . I t 
s t a r t e d dur lnp the wucen Wilhe lmina ' s r u l e i n 1898-19*+7. Before 
t h i s p e r i o d , t h e r e were here anc t h e r e c lubs and small a s f o c i ^ t l o n t 
g e n e r a l l y c o n s i s t e d of family -ncmbers end f r i e n d s , lliey were not 
p o l i t i c a l l y o r r^n i sed bodies as a t p r e s e n t , ibey ve ie e s s e n t i a l l y 
s o c l e l i n c h a r a c t e r . There had been of course defens ive f i g h t s 
f*n6 b n i t l e s waged by l o c a l c b i t f s and sialtr-ns such as I ' iponepor, 
lenku Umar, imam Boncij'^l, e t c . a r a i n s t the l o r t u p u e s e , the t 'utch 
and B r i t i s h , i-ut they could not be taker; s d e m o c r a t i c a l l y o r f sn l sed 
n a t i o n a l nover.ent. The f i r s t ort-enised p o l i t i c a l moveaiint may be 
sa id t o heve been s t a r t e d in the f i r s t decade of t h i s centiory. There 
e r e many ffactors r e s p o n s i b l e for the development of indoaAsian 
n e t l o n s l i s r a and consc iousness as v§>ll as p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e of the 
c o u n t r y . 
1, The d e r r e e of r e l i g i o u s homopenity in Indones ia was 
s s i g n i f i c a n t f s c t fo r the provth of n a t i o n a l moveisfent. I s l sm 
efflbrsced by 9^' /^  out of 85 m i l l i o n s of the Indonesian popu la t i on 
was not only a common bond but a l s o a s o r t of in r roup symbol ajrainst 
i m p t r i s l i r t i c f o r e ign a r e r e s s o r s end oppres so r s of d i f f e r e n t 
r e l l p l o n s , s l thouph t h e r e a re a l s o two m i l l i o n Chinese Budhls t s ,2 
m i l l i o n Chr l ? i t l ans , 1 m i l l i o n Hindus e s p e c i a l l y In the I s l a n d of 
Ba l i and the r e s t are a n i m l s t s . 1 
r e l l p i o u n l i b e r t y wes much p .an ted t o western deminet ion. 
1 . I n d o n e s i a , " a y , 1 9 % , i s sued by in format ion s e r v i c e Indones i a , 
New D e l h i , 
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The p r o t e s t a n t s coimted i n 193^-, 30 i c i n i s t e r s , 3^ + p reacher s 
and a s s i s t a n t p r eache r s ano 337 n a t i v e p reache r s paid by th« 
ffovernment and i n s d d i t ^ n 867 n a t i v e ns.-^istants not paid out of 
p u b l i c funds ; t he itoisan Catholic; 37 p r i e s t s an:3 ^k n a t i v e 
p r e a c h e r s paid by tha povernraent, 3*^ 7 p r i e s t s oncl ) n a t i v e preqtchers 
not Srt la i red out of tho p u b l i c funds . '"lU'ln? 1935, 3'+ s o c l c t i o i were 
allowed t o p r n c t l s a t h a i r miss Ion-'ry wor'-:. "n t h e o ther h?>nd, the 
Fovernment did not encourApe or r^llow the ^'.usll-n s o c i e t i e s or 
or ran lss t fens t o propspn-^c much f r e o l y tho p r i n c i p l e s of i s l am, 
d e s n i t e of the f a c t t h ^ t the •-'U^JIITI con?»ti tute^ 95 '?^ of the 
popul.Tt5 on. 
T>tus WertheIrR 9 t R t e s : 6ne can In^^eefl s u s t a i n the pi^radox, 
the e x t e n s i o n of If-T'sm in indcnes lan a r c h i n a l a r o ws" due t o the 
vostern'^-rs. 'Tho a r r i v a l of Portu^ue^^o pc-ror i'^ ^ t h e '^rea, he s a y s , 
Indeed I r - r re numhC'T of Indones ian p r i n c e s t o omhrnce the I s l smic 
f a i t h as B p o l i t i c a l Tiove to counte r C h r i s t i a n p e n e t r a t i o n . 1 
2,A5 the Islam i s the ch ie f r e l l p i o n of the Indonesian 
popul^^tlon, so t h s isl?>rriic modernis t movor.ent sn^! I t s t each ing 
in Ca i ro found sn e x c e l l e n t res^^cnsG In inr^onoslB, ihe L'xjtch 
colon! P1 r'?rirne in in'.1on^5?i'=s w^s a f r a id of the Pqn i s l s ra ic Idess 
vhich thf> - 'nncnets i sn schol'-^-rs such ?s Imsm Eoml.lol, H. O.iala 'uddin 
T«5lb, " u c h t s r Lutf 1 , H.K..5?n«rullah, e t c . - t^ t-leccn nnd Ceiro brought 
back vl t h theT; rnd Introducf'c' tho ir.odern I s l amic concept ion baupht 
by f^ o^hc Abdu>^ = '-mc! D.jf?l?.iuddln Afrj^ni^tan i n C a i r o . 
'^nouck Hurfron.lo, ^ Dutch o r i e n t a l i s t , ch ief adv i se r 
to the colonir- l r ep lme , observe 1 in 1911 , t h n t Jndonesi?)ns than 
s tudy ing in the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 'Mohnnaaadan m i l i u of Mecca vera 
observing Pnn I^larcic i deas which con aieke t h e i r d i s p o s i t i o n towards 
1 . M.iupstelns S t a t e s m a n ' s Year Book, 1937, P* 1176 
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the i-uropean ac j i in l s t i a t ion of t he i r fatherland of unfsvcurabl«. 
Happily, he continusd, by giving the Indonesian population, a t 
l e a s t i t s e l i t e , s west's:!- educ t i c n , i t vould t e turned svay from 
the islsTi tovariS cu l tu ra l associa t ion yit>i the -u tch , and t h i s 
would re3t.ov£ a l l p o l i t i c s l snc socia l slpinificsnce froa the 
difference of relip^ion. If these cssocla t ions vexe not assde, he held 
the i n e v l t a t l o impulse of tht, c l v l l i s s t i c n of the Indonesians, 
vould be tc r.ovfc further an-" further avsy froT. us , for then othar 
than we *111 control the d i rec t ion of thf-ir I n t t l l . c tual evolution. 
«hllc pi 'cvlclnr the Indonesians v i th v/ost~rn et^ucstlor., the rovernmenj 
VB5 to control Muhsmmadf-n educr t ion, wfitchlnr j^fsinst e l l psn 
Is l r r . l c propars-^^da and be completely Int rnnslpent srp.inst sdmlsflon 
of a l l po l i t i c r ; ! elements of i'.ohnmtJGcnn roc t r ine end Isw.l 
• c sp i t e the e f fo r t s of tb'. '^^ utch t^ cxtinr'ilKh the islQisic 
modernism, p o l i t i c a l elem::.nts of "'ohamrna^Dn tcac^lnp-, the modernist 
pc l i t i c f ' l :^ni ^oclrd Idcos were found in the f i r s t n<^wexftil 
int'.onesjrm n n t l o n a l i s t mcves^nt, the ^er iks t islam ( '^ .1 . ) . I t WRS 
o nption? l l s t i c moven_-nt, rmti-iriip'riali^>ts anc; s o c i a l i s t too , 
ra ther thr;n the ic'eas of psn islam, 
3 , The x^-iatic j -o l i t i cn l cDnceptlons were not l e s s 
Important t}',an the ',ves".-'rn p o l i t i c a l Ide^s in the growth of 
inJonesian nst ionpllsm. The s t rupf le of the F i l ip inos ?5pa1nst ^paln 
and the ear ly Airi:iic8n cccunatlon, the success of K^mal Ataturk in 
Tui'key .-JFainst western mil i t - ' ry pov/: r , the a c t i v i t y of the congress 
party in India led by Mahatcia Gandhi 8nd Mr.Ilehru, the r i s ing t ide 
of anti-wt3St::rn, the Chinese n-.tlonfltsm reprosentod by -^r.^un Xat 
3en in 1912, the i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n of Jppan «nd tha t country 's 
1, S.Hurpron,1e! I^etl^rlonds en I s l a a , x>*'^^> 
ko 
victory over Kussia in 1905, all combined to quicken the flowing 
tide of national movement in Indonesia, 
Modernisation of Japan had made a great Impression on many 
indonesians. The example of -Japan encouraged Indonesian leaders 
to seek equality of rights with the Kitropean in their country. 
By 1911, the imperial government in China was over-thrown 
by the revolutionaries headed by l>r.Sun Xat "^ en and in 1912 a 
republican government was established. The throb of Chinese 
political changes was also felt in Indcaiesia, I>ue to the effort 
of an Indonesian doctor, f'udlro, a political club was formed, 
h, A very limited numbers of Indonesian students studying 
in the Netherlands in particular and in Europe in general, have 
been strongly impressed by the Ciitch political ideas, civil 
liberties and democratic government there. Tbs Irish and Polish 
netional movements, those in Finland and In the Baltic states were 
also to influence the students. Beck in Indonesia, they started new 
nationalist movement such as study club, Budi Otomo, P.K.I, and 
others,1 
The writing of Buhkarin, Karl Marx, Hegel, Stalin, and 
other political philosophers as well as Gandhi doctrine, ccmcerning 
liberal!S!B, imperialism and capitalism, as well as socialism had 
vigorously influenced the handful of Indonesian students studying 
in continental i^ urope and in the Asian countries. They, therefore, 
advocated both full political freedom and complete economic 
independence for Indonesia.2 
$m The AfiKrican revolution of 1778, based on democtraticism 
and liberalism, the French revolution of 1 8 ^ with the slogan of 
1. Viekkes op.clt. pp.178 and 186 
2, Kahin: Nationalism and revolution in Indonesia, Ch8p,2, New York 
1952, p.»*9 
liberty, eiiiallty and fraternity and th© Bussian revolution of 
1917 led by Lenin and Stalin, bad e profound effort on the 
Indonesian people. The eyes of Indonesians looked more and more to 
the example of Soviet i^ ussla as a beacon llpht for their future. 
6. The adoption of Mslay in national lanpiuape was another 
important factor to th© development of national movemeilt. Historicallj 
Malay was the state lanruaf® in the Sri Vijeya (5CX)-lU00) and was 
the medium of instruction in the '^ ri Vijaya university, it was made 
up of different rerionsl lenfuapes and contained Arabic, Sanskrit, 
Persian, iinflish, Dutch, French etc. 
The extensive use of the indoneslan lanpruape as the medium 
of expression throughout Indonesia was made prorressively. Kl Kad^ar 
Dewantara, the founder of Taman Slswa, Introduced it first in his 
school curriculum. He stressed before the colonial educational 
congress held at the Hapue in 1916, the application of the J-ndonesian 
as medium of instruction in Indonesia, in 1928, the Indonesian 
youths at their congress swore to have one country, Indonesia? one 
nationf the Indonesian; and one national lan^age, the Indonesian 
language, 2his widespread use of the Indonesian language in schools, 
papers, broadcasting and so on was a preat contribution to the 
increasinply progress of Indonesian nationalism and patriotism. In 
1925, the Indoneiian members of the volksraad demanded the fovernment 
to recopnise XndoneAlan as an official language of the country, in 
October 20, 19*+2, an Indonesian language commission (komlsl bahasa 
Indonesia) headed by Dr.Mohd Hatta, was founded by the Japanese 
authority to progress the language. And since the proclamation of 
independence of the republic of Indonesia in Atigust 17, 19^5, the 
Indonesian language was formally declared a state language.1 
1 Ubanit On Indonesian Language, Herdekp, No.17, I.S.i,, New Delhi 
' November 12,19*f7, p.8 
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7. the national fla? of Indonesia, the Red and white, 
was also sn outatandlnp elenent of the ai^er-increaslng growth 
of patriotic liberation Bovement in the country, Historically, this 
flag was first used by Jayakatonp, revolting against the kinfdon 
of Singasari in east Java in 1292, It was used by Siatan Apunp in 
1628, when Java was united under his rule. This flag was diosen 
by Indonesian nationalists who struggled against the foreign 
domination and oppression 
the Indonesian association formed in the Netherlands 
in 1908, introduced the red and white flag with the bull's head 
to Europe in 1922, It was used as the flag of national party (P.N,I) 
In 1927. 
The hoisting of the red and white flag was 
prohibited by the Dutch, but it was flown publicly In Jacarta 
in October, 1928, during the Indonesian youth congress* Hence the 
red and white came to be used generally by the growing national 
movestent and has thus beetMae the synbol of an independent anS 
sovereign state of the Kepubllc of Indonesia. 1 
8, The Indonesia i^ aya (Indonesian national anthem) was 
a unifying factor and arousing spirit of ever-growing nationalism 
in Indtoesia. It was composed by Mr.Supratman in 1927. It was sung 
for the first tls» in the youth congress at Jacarta in 1^28, 
Again in 1933 when political parties led by Sukarno, 
Hatta and Shahrlr, were suppressed and their leaders externed, the 
national inthem was entirely prohibited. It was permitted again only 
after the Dutch were driven away by the Jepanese in 19^. 
1. Obani* Indonesian national flag, Merdeka, lfo.18, N.D.Nov.2^, 19^7 
p.9 
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With th* proclamation of the republic of Indonesia in 19^5$ 
the Indonesia raya was a»ade an official national anthem of the new 
state. It thus became a sounding ponp and full of the warmth end 
plow of patriotism and revolutionism, calling upon the youth to be 
ready at any moment to crush the t>utch colonial aggressive war and 
defend their motherland.1 
9. The establishment of the Dutch authority in Andonesia welded 
tcgether people of various tongues and cultures into one political 
unit and in so doinf? tended to develop in them a netion consciousness 
Thereby the Dutch helped to join the archipelspo's many local 
patriotism together into one ell embracing patriotisaj, 
10, The discriminstory policy employed by the Dutch in the 
political, economic, social and culturnl fields between the 
Netherlanders and Eurasians and ind4ifrenous popUlf^ tion had undoubtedly 
noiffished Indonesian nationalism end political consciousness of 
the masses. Many Netherlanders and Eurasians practised the social 
discrimination toward Indonesians strictly maintained their 
superiority to them; even the former's education backrround, 
manners and ability were, as Colijn remarked, often inferior. 
Despite some matlgetinp clrctimstances, this apathied 
policy and attitude of superiority continued to be important in 
generating nRtlonallatic feelings as late as 19^» Dr.Van Koyen, 
chairman of the Netherlands delegption in Indonesia in 19'*9> stated 
thst such dlscrlmlncition reflects unfavourably on the political 
situation and is not in accordance with the Netherlands task in 
the country,2 
TJM judicial administration and penal legislation 
discriminated sharply against indoneaians. The courts to which they 
1. Ubani» The Indonesia Raya, M©rdeka, No.17, Nov.12, 19^7, S.Daihl 
pp. 5-6 
2. SiB PO, June 10, \9^ 
had access vera of much poorer quality than those provided for the 
European populptlon am} becauie of the participation of executive 
officers In them, offered much less protection, ^hereas leeally 
trained judges sat In the courts for Europeans, Indonesians were 
forced to rely on courts, half of whose menbers combined both 
executive snd leral functicms, two of the members beln? active or 
retired and pensioned members of the Indonesian administrative 
civil service, Indonesian as opposed to i::^ urope8ns, could be held 
in Jail under preventive detention, even thouph no judicial 
authorisstion had been made. 1 
Discrimination in the economic sphere was greater and of 
more widespread importance. Not only the new western education 
elite in particular, but also educatt* Indonesians in p;eneral, felt 
strongly that the pRUcity of jobs and the few good positions open to 
them in the civil service and private enterprise were a result of 
employment practices which discriminated apainst Indonesians. Almost 
e'very nationalist felt the bitterness born of this realisation. In 
1939, there were K^X) Indonesians and 100 Dutch who took the examina-
tion for entrance to the povernment school of civil service. 23 and 
3 Indonesians were accepted. This system of discrimination was also 
practised In other povernment institutions throufhout indonasie. The 
entrance to a law school in 1909, a medical collepe in 19J3 and such 
other schools was made much more difficult to Indonesians than to 
the Dutch. 
Acute dissatisfliction developed because of the lower rate 
of pay of Indonesian povemment employees in comparison to the Dutch 
and Eurasians doing similar work. For instance, In the Indonesian 
branch of civil service those who had passed the clerkship examination 
1. Itahin» op. clt. p.50 
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started at 25 guilders per month, while fiuropeans (mostly 
aureslan) passing the same examination started at 60 guilders 
in th« iiuropean branch. Similarly in the army, Indonesian 
privates received either 15 or 25 guilders per month, while 
privates who were Netherlanders or Eurasians received 60 fuilders.l 
In education, the Indonesians were provided far less 
facilities than European children. The government's per capita 
expenditure on education for Indonesian children was 0.55 guilders 
per year as afainst ^7.80 for European children. While Dutch and 
iiurasian children were tuition free unless the yearly income of 
their parents was more than 1,200 guilders. Income tax statistic 
for 1939 listed 2*f,059 Indonesians having incoo^s over 1,200 guilders 
per year as arainst 67»229, i^ -uropeans. Among Europeans 17,'f53 had 
income of less than 1,200 guilders. 2 
Oiving proper education to Indonesians was politically 
dangerous to the ruling classes and such education should be 
curtained. Thus Colijn in 1928 saw in the quick growth of western 
education for Indonesians as danger for the peaceful development of 
the course of affairs in Indonesia. 3ueh education had been too much 
expanded, he felt, and should be limited to the point there the 
indigenous economy itself could absorb it. 3 
11. The exhaustible economic exploitation of national wealth 
of the country by the Dutch capitalists and Increased poverty of the 
vast populjtion living in rich soil said much greater exports than 
1. Ibid 
2. Indisch Verslag, 19M, pp,l8»f-lR5 
3. Plijns Kolonial Vraagstuken avn heden en margen* 
Ceen rust maar hezining, Holland, 1929, pp.ln^l? 
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Imports had furnished delib«rately the political conscioiisnesg »nd 
developoents in Indonesia. 
Also Inportant were the price differential between the governai 
rubber monopoly's price to ^ uropej and Indonesian growers, leaving 
tax burden to be borne by the lnd<me8lan population and Its greater 
reletlve increase as compared to that borne by Jiuropean residents 
of Indonesia and the high percentppe (about 30 >) of Indonesian 
wealth that went to non-Indtnesians 
12, The army and police forces wholly officered by Dutch 
and iiuiasiens with a major proportion of their rank snd file drawn 
from these elements and Indonesians from the Minahasa, Ambon, and 
Timor, were the chief instriuBents of the '^ utch repressive power. TM 
police and military power was supplemented pnd intermeshed with 
government regxiletlons which noirowly circumscribed and often almost 
completely cut off legal organisation end prosecution of the; 
nationalist movement. The strength of the army and the police force 
and their non-sympathetic attitude toward the nationalistic movement 
in conjunction with the general ability of the political intellegenc 
service (P.i.D), the government's secret service, made it really 
difficult to develop the movement effectively on the extra-legal 
plan. Insplte of these llmitstions, the spirit of nationalism had 
been kept alive in the hearts of nationalist leaders.1 
13» -f^  nationalistic educational institution called Taman 
Siswa (children garden siichool) established by Ki Hadjar Dewantara 
In July 3, 1922, was another pertinent factor responsible for tl» 
penetration of Indonesian national movement. His idea was that no 
Imitation of the western world but construction from the bottom up 
of a civilisation inttially Javanese, later Indonesian. 
1, Kahln: op. clt. p.51 
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He maintained tha principle that the national culture 
of a nation could be lient but should never be broken. Wisd(», 
beautff ai^ t, and science frcM abroad were %ralcome. Every body, he 
said, who learns foreign language gains access to a new world. But 
foreign elements should be absorbed into native life, enriching 
the already existinp treasures of national civilisation. 
He built up at least 250 school all over Indonesia without 
any government or foreign help. There wer^ 27 branches of the Taman 
Siswa in 1929, 53 in 1930; 187 in 1937? end 215 in 19^.1 
Similar contribution to nationalism was given by different 
nationalistic educational establishments such es Pertl, Oinith 
School, Normal islam, Islaolc College, Training College, the 
Thawallb schools, the Indonesian national school or i.N.B, U926) and 
ethers. Likewise, the Mohammadiah institutions developed the 
political consciousness of its members and its pujiplls taught in its 
many schools. The MohaiMiadiah move^nt formed by H.Ahmad Dahlan 
In RoveEber 18, 1912, had established 29 branches %ri.th k)00 members 
and built about "^5 schools in 1925; 150 branches with 10,320 members 
in 1928; 209 with 17, 550 members In 1929; 267 with 2l+,383 members 
in I93I; and 710 (3I6 in Java, 236 in Sumatra, 79 In Sulawsl and 
29 in Borneo) with ^3,000 members in 1935. It had set up 126 
schools and many clinic in Java which treated 81,000 patients in 
1929. in 1930, There were considerable .Mohaomadlah schools and 
colleges in 3tamatra. It was still a deep tributary of the stream of 
the political nationalism and a strong pillar of Indonesian movement.2 
1, A,K.Prinpgodir»do» op.clt, p,87 
2. Ibid pp.108 and t8»* 
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The Dutch colonial government tried to hamper the developaient 
of nationel educetlonsl Institutions by issuing an ordinance in 1923 
in which the government assumed control of all private owned 
schools, numbering about 2000-2500 in 1936 vdth 130,000 and 500,000 
pupils. In 1925riM.s regulr^tion was tightened up by s degree which 
provided the government with the right, if necessary, of suspension 
of teaching by teachers in private owned and non-subsidied schools. 
But all this could not kill but inflaxrod the continuous growth 
of heroic national liberation movement amonp the vast masses, 
1^. i-n addition to the ebove mentioned factors, the education 
was also immediately responsible for the development of a new 
indonesian elite. The higher demand for cheap clerical help by the 
Dutch imperialistic administration and private capitalistic enter-
prises in Indonesia, western education was exceedingly made avail-
able to Indonesians durinp the first four decades of this century, 
though the number remained extremely small. 
Tl^ Dutch administration had deliberately starved the 
eduC' tional system. This trend is, says John Gunther, to keep the 
people in subjugation and to prevent the normal growth of political 
aspirations, ^utch policy, it had been said, is to the bellies (not 
even bellies) full and their minds oa^ty. Illiteracy is 95 A nnS 
the school system is myth. Indeed the record of the Dutch in 
education is miserable.1 
According to the latest census in 193^1 92.8 % of the 
Indonesian people were still illiterates. The r-utch children were 
given more educational facilities than the Indonesian people. Tha 
1. John Gunther: Inside Asia, U.S.A., p. 38»* 
percentage of the bijdpet for the Indonesian education was only 
11.^ y^ , while 88.6 ^  was laid aside for the western primary, 
middle and high education. And there was no compulsory system 
of educfition. 
Kr.B.H.M.Fiekke, » «>utch propagandist, said that in 
Indonesia edticntion had not vet reached the masses of the people. 
llthoufh kO /« of the children between 6 and 9 years of age went to 
school in 19'HO, more than 80 >> of the population were still 
illiterates.1 
The development of education during the ^tch refine was 
as follows* -'here weie public (povernment municipal) primary schooli 
where instruction was piven through bhe medium of the Dutch 
lanfuege, for Cl )i:.uropean3 and persons assimilated with them (a 
7 years course); (2) Chinese (Outeh Chinese schools with a 7 years 
course); (3) Hatives (i-utch native schools with s 7 years coxirs) 
and (^ ) link-schools (with a 5 ye^rs course). Public schools where 
instruction was given through the medium of a native tongue were 
(1) the second class schools with a 5 years course; (2) village 
schools with a 3 yeers coiarse of extremely elementary instruction. 
Besides, there were schools wit>> an extended primary institution in 
the r;utch lanpuape with a 3 years covxrse (15 Hulo schools, 3 ^•^» 
I.A,, and 3 H.B.S,) opened to all certificated puJipils of the 
primary schools with a 7 years course,without public schools, there 
were various private schools. 2 
1. t>.H,.M,Flelikc! Nusantara, p. 386 
2. M.%stein: op.cit. p.1177 
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For secondary education there vers public secondary 
schools with 5 f-nd 3 years cour'se in connection with the 
primary schools and elao with three years co\irse in connection 
with the extended primery schools. 
There were 5B prlisaiy schools in 1865; 1700 In 1903 with 
190,000 pupils, 177^ in 1910; 5039 in 1916; 5990 In 1919; 202^2 
in 1935 with 53^57 teachers, 195,5^^,2 pupils and with the 
expenditure of about ^37f21,300 guilders. In addition to the 
jsroverniBent Institutions, there were five private secondary schools 
for girls with a 3 years course end 3 with 5 years cours, Hipher 
education was riven at the technical collei'e af Bandxing, erected 
in 1920, Furtherjj^ ore, a college for law opened in 192*f and a medical 
college erected in 1927, both at Jacarta.1 
^;oreover, there were in 1935 the following training 
colleges or schools; - 3 public schools for training In enpineerlng 
architeciiure, electrical engineering and mining (5 years course) BIMJ 
1 similar private schoolC^ f years course), with 79 teachers and 
1,3*^ pupils; 58 public and 7 private trade schools for native 
C55f two years course and to 3 years course and U- years course), 
with kOB pupils; 2 agricultural colleges with 22 teachers and 265 
pupils; 1 vctenary school with 13 teachers end 16 pupils; 1 training 
school for police with 26th students; 1 public medical college with 
35 teachers and ^ 0 students; 1 private nautical school for 
iiuropeans.2 
For native teachers there were 7 schools with 10^ 
teachers and 965 pupils; with the institution in the native tongue, 
19 schools and courses with 76|teacher3 and 1,292 pupils* i''urthermor« 
1, Ibid. p.1176 
2. A. VandenboschJ op.cit.pp.211-212 
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there vera 8 schools and coiirses for i-iiropeans teschers with 88 
teachers and 578 pupils. 
For Chinese teacher there was a school with instruction in the 
Dutch lanfuage with 12 teachers r,nd 178 pupils. Finally there were 
In 1935t 332 indiistrial schools si'lvlnp instruction in the vernacular 
and 379 where I^ utch was the mediiAui used; 2B Indonesian Innpuare 
business schools and +^8 business schools In which iutch was the 
lsnP"uepe medium. 1 
By 19*^, there were 88,223 Indonesians enrolled in all schools 
flvlnp western primary educstion; 8,235 In I'ulo schools and 1,786 
in all hlph schools, Frois these 3 types ±m of school respectively 
7,790, 1130 end 2^ +0 were fraduateSin 19^. ^n 1 9 ^ hlph school 
educ-tion was still largely reserved for the "uropeen population, 
5,688 of the students in such schools being i:.\iropeans as apainst 
1786 Indonesians. 2 
15. jfhe fTowth of the national press and radio was a torch 
bearer cf the ideals of the nationalistic struggle for the freeom 
and emancipation of the motherland. Lonf before 1900 several 
newspapers In the Indonesian lsnf?uaj?e had already been published 
in Java and S^ Biatra. Their contents were merely current news. With 
appearance of the newspaper >.e .an Pryati^civil servant's paper) at 
Bandung under the leadership of 1.M.Tirtoadisuryo, a change was 
beginninp tr- be evident since 1900. The Bintanp Hlndia (the star 
of the indies) under the leadership of *^ r.lival was published in 
Amsterdam and distributed in Indonesia. 
The difference in degree of political consciousness between 
Java and Siaaatra manifested itsielf in the difference found in the 
1. V.ihompson: Labour problem'ln S.E.A., N.York, 1952, p.120 
2. indisch: Verslap, 19M 
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newspapers of both the Islands, respite the fact that ^BVB -ass 
puhllshins' a nevspeper such as the l^ tusan Hindia ( Indontslan 
delegation) of the late O.S.TJokroamlncto, which was considered 
very radical et th?it time, on account of the fact that the paper 
contained the nspirations for self-government. Padsnp in Siimatre 
wss 5?tlll publif-hlnp the newspaper like -inar oimatrg (Sumatra riy) 
under whose title appeared sentencess Mey the tiutch li-^ r for ever, 
loyal tc- the Dutch fovcrnmemt unto the death, The publisher of thl» 
newspaper v;,«?s Do '/olhardln?, A Chinese ^utch concern unuer the 
supervision of Messrs, Lien Aur Kam sno A.Vp.n iVn, Another paper 
published in Padran>>r *^R nnd followiniE' the same policy was the 
Wsrta Hindia (-i-ndoneslan news). It belonged to the upper strata 
of society. 1 
But the above slavish mentrVlty disappeared altopehther in 
1921 when the nr tlonsl Kavement r.«ae itself felt in -umatra vest 
coast, it was followed by the appearance of the newsp«per Banlh 
Merdek?? ithe seed of freedom) nt Hedan r,nd Slnpr raf-rdakfi (the 
ray of freedomjat ^adanp '^ iclenpuan, in Java there also appeared 
the Aplji-a^jatCthe fire of the people) at Mrdiiiin, The ' inar dianut 
in '^^ umr'tr?! changed Its name into the 3lner Hlnaia ( the ray of 
•Indonesia). 'Ihe Api (the fire) at vemsr^nf nnd the Njala (flame) 
at Pontianak and severs! oth r newspapers made their appearance. 
The /\pi|rakjot published in 192^-1926 -t Madiurn devoted 
to radical mriss action for the attalniaent of free Indonesia. The 
Indonesian journalists startinr frora i .H.'^itoedlsuyo, rirht down to 
young; journalists such ns )r.I-'atta, • ubsidjo, Hazir fassontjak, 
Mustafa, etc. wei a the pioneers nnd mosnenpers in the fit-ht for 
1. P. lisreViap: An article in Merdeka t^o.aB, March 22, 1 9 ^ , 
New Delhi, p.9 
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national emfincipation and independence were published by them 
in iiuropeen newspapers and magafctnes, while I^r.A.Kivai, ET.Amir 
and Mr.Adinegoro together with Mr.Dsrsono continued ss foreign 
conrespondents of Indonesian newspapers. The articles vo'itten 
by ti»se joiimalists especially in the Mnrlls beru (New Indonesia)| 
th<i i-^'intaaB' timur (star of the east) and the suara vtmm (public 
opinion) helped much in wideninf the outlook of the Indonesian 
people for the achievement of notional liberation, iJurinp the 
Japanese occupation (l9*+2-19^5) the national press was involved 
in all parts of the Japanese propaganda mschine. It played the 
most important role during the national revolution against the 
iiutch imperialism and inspired the masses with the spirit of self 
determinntion and aense of national consciousness and realisation. 1 
16. i'he develop'icent of transport, coimunic&tion and the 
increased ?eopraphicsl mobility of the people as well as ideas of 
modern economic orranisstions in Indonesia was another vital 
factor which helped to spread national understanding, consciousness 
tmd nf'tionalism as well as mutual cooper? tion aaonF the vast 
ffiass of population. 
On December 31» 1935, Indonesia had 36,000 miles of 
highways, of which 25,000 were Inacadan (6,300 miles with 
bituminous surfaces), 50 asphplt - concrete and brick and about 
11,000 low type, earth, sarrf-clay or gravel, warded or drained. 
The highway sileapes of some of the larger islands were reported ts 
follows C the numbers within parentheses stand for bituminous 
surface roads): Java and Madura, 15,B00 (if,500); Sumatra, 11500 
(1,300); Borneo, 1,U00 (50); Celebes, ^ ,300(200); Moluccas,Bali 
1. Ibid. p.10 
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and Lonbok and Tinor, 3,100(230), 
At the «nd of 1935, the total len?th of rail and tramways 
(State and private) waa about f^^ dSO alles(3,M0^ in Java and 1226 
in Sumatra); the gross receipts (1935) about 5*f,216,0OO gtuilders; 
working expenses about 37,126,000 puilders, number of passengers 
about 65,U2if,000,1 
The number of post and telegraph offices (corabined), post 
offices (simple) and telegraph offices( simple in 1935 were 
respectively 226,80 and 521 for Java and Madura and 178,109 and 30^ 
for the other islsnds, s total of lM8 offices. 
Moreover, there were 1 3 ^ rural postal agencies and rural 
telegraph agencies. The number of telegraph offices including 60 
government radio telegraph offices for public service( including 
lOstations and 2 offices for wireless traffic with other countries), 
6 private radio telegraph stations for public services and 23 
radio posts erected in li; isolated regions for the purpose of 
connertin? the governaKJnt civil service officials of these out-
stations with more populated centres. The government telegraph lines 
extended in 1935 over ^831 miles, the government telegraph cables 
over 282 miles, making a total of 5113 miles. There was a direct 
government radio telegraphic service from Java to the Metherlands, 
Germany, France, Siam, French Indo-China, Philippines islands, 
Mongkonp, China, Japan, the 0,S,A. and Portuguese Timore. The niMber 
of telegrams was 718,000(internal) Bn6 58^,000(foreign), Internal 
ordinary letters and post-cards carried in 1935 amounted to 29,238,0©e 
while there were 31,128,000 printed matters, newspapers and C, 
1,2»*9,000 pfiid registered articles, 11,620,000 official letters 
and 1,698,000 official registered articles for the interior,The 
1, M.£.spteins op.cit, p.1180 
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international correspondanees dealth with were 9,73^,000 letters 
and postcards 8,063,000 other articles and 650 registered 
articles.1 
The fovernieent telencphone aerial lines extended in 1935 
over 16,096 miles, the roverniaent telephone exchanges and 371302 
telephones, there was a direct radio-telegraphic service to th« 
Netherlands, fiiaa, Malaya, Philippines, the U.S.A., Austrklia and 
Japan* 
The royal Netherlands Indies airlines Cy. ( K.N.L.L.M.) 
Baintained internal subsidied airlines between the principal towns 
of the islands of Java and Sumatra, the island of Bali and Singapore, 
In 1935 about 577,016 miles were covered on the ree-ular lines, 
12,2if5 passengers, 69,061 kgs, of freight and 22,836 kgs, mall 
were carried. 
In June, 1935, the I>utch royal airlines Cy, (K.L.M.), the 
Ha^ue, who maintained already (since October, 1931^ a weekly service 
carrying mtall, freight and passengers between Ansterdam and 
Jacarta, had commuted this service into a twice-weekly service 
between and Singapore via Jacarta, Svjrabaya, Heabenp and Kupang and 
vice versa to link up with the imperial airway service London-
Singapore,! 
17« Frequent contacts and good understandings with 
nationalist leaders of different countries In international 
conference and the League JJf Nations had far-reaching effects on 
the rapid growth of Indonesian nKtlonalism fin6 nptional consciousness 
1. Ibid. p,1l8l 
2. Ibid, 
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aajonf Indonesian intelllpantsla ond patriots,In 1922 the Serikat 
Islam led by Abdul Mulz and H.A.vSalia established close relations 
with the Indian national congress and edopted the policy of 
non-cooperation. T}^ S,l, also sent delerstlons to the world 
Islamic conferences at Mecca in 192M- and in Cairo in 1926. Mr. 
Aliraln and Sutjitro of the coraaiunist party attended tine Pan 
Pacific labotir conference \mder the comlntem aiisplces at Canton 
In Jyne 192^. Mr.Tan Malaka, president of tl:e partai republik 
Indonesia (Pari) in Banpkok and comlntem agent for '^ .i.A. end 
A\Mitralia( Aslia), also attended the Pen Malayan movement's 
conference in Manila in 1927. The Indonesian delegation also took 
part in the geaaral assembly of the League of Nations in 1928 
and 193B. 
Other world contacts which the Indonesian nationalists 
made for t^ -eir movement were in February, 1927, at the conference 
of the League against Imperialism in Brusels. it coincided with 
large scsle arrests and deportations of the nationalist leaders of 
the revolution in 1926-1927 In Java and Sumatra. The Indonesian 
delegation consisted of Dr.M.Hatta, Semaun, Nazir Pamunt,iek and 
Subardjo, who met the Indian delegates, Kr.Nehru end K.M.Panikar. 
I>r,Hatta contributed the first speech about Indonesian 
nationalism to an International gathering. In September, 1927 he 
addressed the conference held by the women's international league 
for peace and freedom in the Palai ^gmant, near Paris. He gave an 
outline of Indonesian resistance to tutch rule and of development in 
the 20th century of a conscious n=?tionalism. This conference in 
17 
Its resolutions fully supported tha liberation moYesidnt la Indonesia 
and condeained the Duteh imperialism* 1 
STRlKJTUKa OF TEL lN;>CNx.SX^ N GCVfch^ jMKUT 
After the dissolution of the i'Utch l>ast indies Company in 
1798, Indonesia was governed by the Netherlands government in 
Holland, The system of the Dutch colonial governaent in Indonesia 
was a odxture of direct and indirect rule, the indirect being no 
so much as a matter of policy or design as of expediency| for It was 
the only way in vhlch vast country could be ruled by a small number 
of European officials, 
cWtRAL GOVLBRMi^HT 
The Indonesian governiaent rraiained highly centralised and 
bureaucratic. The administration and executive authority rested in 
tl% hands of a governor general. The G,G. was appointed by the 
crown upon tl^ recoma^ndatlon of the ministry. He should be 30 years 
of age and a Dutch statesman and well acquainted with eonditicms 
in i-ndonesia. His term of office was generally five years. He was 
to take oath of fidality to the constitution of the Netherlands,2 
He also received an annual salary of 89,000 florins 
(^  30,000) plus a 100,000 florins i^ ^0,000) representation 
allowance, lie was granted a small travelling allowance. Two palaces, 
one at Jakarta end one at Bofor ell in Java were at his disposal, 3 
There were three limitations of thejp.G, J Cl) He might 
not lay down his office or leave Indonesia without the consent of 
1, D, Woodman* The Hepublic of Indonesia, London, 1956, p,19**' 
2, D,M,Campbell: Java, past and present, Vol.11, London, 19-15 
P.11B9 
3, A,Vandenbosch» op,cit,p,95 
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the crown, (2) He might not directly or indirectly be a share-
holder in or went surey for, any business enterprises which had 
entered into a ccaitract for profit-making purposes with the 
Indonesian government or any of its political sub-dlvisicm. (3) Nor 
might he be a share-holder in any concession or business ertlerprise, 
of whatever neture, established in Indonesia or doinp business there, 
The crown also appointed a Lt.Hovernor-General, in the absence 
of a Ijt.O.O,, the Vice-President of the council of the East Indies 
was the first In line 6f succession to the office of G.G, 
POk'EBS AND £KSPONSXBXLXTY OF GOV£: NOR GfcNfcF^ If 
In the name of the klnp, t!» Governor General exercised all 
administrative and offical functions. He was responsible to tlw 
Minister of colonies who in turn was responsible to the -tates 
General. According to Article 6^ H.B,, the directors, the heads of 
departments were not personally responsible members of the ^ovemnent 
in the sarae way as ministers were in the mother country. He was to 
supervise the work of the general secretariat, the council of the 
iiast Indies, regional and local councils. He was to answer the 
questions and criticism of the volksra8d,2 
The G.G. was assisted by a general secretariat (Alpemeene 
secretslne). It was originally intended to serve as the secretariat 
bureau of the council of the Indium and the G.G., workinp in reality 
as central department of general administration, examining jciia and 
passing upon all recOBOiendations, whether from the departments 
or from the Council, it developed Into super department, it came to 
be the adviser extra-ordinary of the G,G, and exercised an influence 
upon him far greater than that of department heads and council.'Ifetil 
recently, the G.C.dld every thing? he attempted to control even the 
1. Ibid. ^ ,99 
2, Articles 60 end 6^ ,^ B.B. 
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detfills. 
The General -ecretarlat was charged with conductlni the 
eorrespondenoe of the C,G,, Including that with tYm minister of 
colonies and of aiding him In working out his decisions and 
orders. Thus the work of the General Secretariat still touched the 
substance as well as the form of the Governor General's work.1 
At the head of the general secretariat was the general 
secretary who was practically the governor general's adviser.He 
was one of the most important officials In the Indonesian government. 
He superintended the publications, dispatch, registration and 
preservation of the directions issued by the C.G, and dealt with 
all government correspondence as well ss the contents of the 
Java court or official organs( Javasch courant).2 
ppUITOIL OF THK a AST XNDXi^ S (RAAD VAH INDIK) 
The G.G, was also assisted by the council of the 
iast Indies, which was formerly established In 1611, composing 'f 
members. In 1B11 and 1816, it had a vice president and 2 members and 
1 Vice-President end h members in 1836. As a rule the council was 
made of two former governors or residents of Java or other islands, 
1 ex-Judicial chief officer and 1 ex-chief officer of the general 
secreteriat. The choice of the 5th was left open to administrative 
department. All the five members %iere Netherlanders. In 1930 the 
membership of the council was enlarged to 7 persons and 2 
Indonesians were given poiition in it. In 1932 it was reduced again 
to 5> with one place reserved for an Indonesian. The members were 
appointed and subject to the removal by the crovm,3 
1. A.Vandenbosch* op.cit. p.102 
2, M.Campbell: op.cit.Chap.XlX, p.1iaJ+ 
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Previous to 1836 the head of the Indonesian fOTernawnt was 
the G.G. in Council. The menbers of the council were co-members 
of the government with the G.G, With this body rested the legislative 
and executive In the highest legislative and executive authority in 
the government of Indonesia, The alast Indian Government Act of 185V 
restored to the council much of the powers lost in 1836. Consent of 
the council for important administrative nwasures and the issuance 
of ordinance was sade mandatory. However, the G.G, was not altogether 
bound by the advice of the Council. Under special circumstances he 
was free to carry out his will without the concurrence of the 
Council.1 
The revised Act of 1925 made the followlne poisition of the 
council. 
1. The G,G, was free to consult the council with respect to 
all matters of general or special interest and from this provision 
no subject was excluded. 
2. The G,G, night consult the council in a number of matters. 
These Included the regulation of political reletlons wth Indonesian 
princes and peoples, general measures taken by the civil authorities 
in case of war or insurrection, unusual measures of ©n important 
nature, important announcements and proposals to the volksraad, 
the enactment of ordinances upon the sole authority and responsibility 
of the G.G,alone, the drafting of government bills, appointments 
to important positions and suspension and removal of superior 
officials, in all these the G.G,alone decided, only he might notify 
the council of his decision. 
1, A.Yendenbosch: op.cit.page 103 
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3. The G.G iai|rht not only consult but also obtained the 
concurrence of the cotwicil In e small number of matters. This 
concurrence was necessary with respect to the prohibition of 
sojourn in the form of externment or exile, the assifrnaent of 
specific place of sojourn, the declaration of amnesty and aboliti<m 
iid.th respect to native princes and heads, the ^rantinr of dispensatit 
from the executive orders, the settlement of lurisdictional 
ccmtraversies bet^raen the judicial and administrative departments 
between the law courts end native pr*ests and heads, between civil 
and military courts, and in declaring repulstion for Europeans 
applicable to others not In this category, i^ ven in the matters of 
required concurrence the G.n. vas not entirely bound by the council* 
When unable to accept the advice of the council he ml^ht be 
endangered by further delay, he mipht tske the meastires he deemed 
necessary without waiting for the decision of the crown. But before 
takln? such taeasures the O.G. mlirht again exchanpe views, first In 
writing and then orally, with the members of the council as to the 
proposed step. 
^, The council also had the rleht of initiative In making 
proposals to the C.G. When the G.G. met the council, he was its 
presiding officer. In his absence the vice-president of the council 
preslded.1 
5. The G.G. mlKht charpe the members of the council with 
special commissions within the confines of Indonesia, provided always 
that the vice-president and 2 members remained present at head-
quarters of the council. The G.G,frequently availed himself of this 
1, ibid. p,105 
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privilege, for next to his offlet, the nembers of th« council 
•ere regarded swl as the highest officials in the Indonesian 
government m6 their prestige weighed heavily with the native princet 
and peoples.2 
The Council was criticised badly. For it was composed only 
of foraer civil servants who were not free from the traditional 
official attitude. Its raeiabers were choosen not 3«03H»*% for their 
feneral political and economic Inslrht as for official expertne8S.2 
The Central povernment possessed the followinic depertments* 
1. Depaitment of agriculture. 2, Department of interior. 3.Department 
of Justice. ^. Department of finance, 5. Depj^ rtjcent of civil 
public works, 6. Department of instruction, public workship and 
industry, 7. Department of general chamber of account. B.Departaent 
of marine. 9. Department of war. 
At t\)& head of each the first 7 departments was placed 
8 director, who was appointed by the kinp and responsible to the 
0.0, The departments! chiefs might, however, send orders or 
instructions to the rovernors or residents, etc. but beyond that 
their sctions depended msinly on the amount of tact they dis-
played or otherwise. At the head of the mfiriiie department was the 
commander of the flett and of the war department, the coirmjsnder 
in chief of the forces. 
Moreover, liaison officers were appointed between 
departments and services. The director of education for exanple 
had two advisers from the i-uropean administrative service to help 
him In respective of native education. 
1. Ibid 
2. Kluntjiss op.cit. p.269 
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Th«r« was also a special liaison officer between the 
agriculture, credit and civil service,1 
Much use was nade of spedsi1st advisers, charged with 
studying important problens, but without any responsibility for 
policy. There had been ajlvlaers on native affairs, on Chinese 
affairs, on Japanese affairs, on credit institutions, on netlve 
education and decentralisation. These advisers made a continual 
study of lar^e issues from a broader aspect thst Is possible for 
officials, Inmcdlstely ccncernlnf with- the dally routine of 
administration, it WRJS lsr?ely throuph the advice of the advisers, 
S.HuTfronje, on Muslim affairs that the Ciitch finally succeeded 
in pacifyinp Achin. 
Xn order to assiire a closer contact between central and 
regional orfranlsstlon, the annual administrative conferences were 
to be held. To these the G.G,invited all the rrovemors and 
residents, the heads of departments, the central advisers and other 
high officials, while similar conferences were held to ascertain 
the views of the refents. i^ ef?lonsl leaders in this way learnt batter 
to imderstand the recfulreraents of general policy, while the central 
leaders became better Informed as to local variations and situations. 
The G.G. was cofraiander in chief of the srmy and navy 
and could control as he wlst»d both these forces. The administrative 
officers of t>!« navy however were under the control of the I^ utch 
Admiralty in Holland, 
In case of war or rebellion he was empowered to take all 
necessary measures for the safety of Indonesia, even such as wotild 
require the sovereign's authority under other conditLjons. He might 
1. M.Campbell: op.clt. p,1lP.9 
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declare martial law or a state of slegne In the whole or any 
pert of Indonesia and had extensive leplslatlve authority. 
The government regtalatlons periEltted and euthorlifed him to 
declare war, make peace and conclude treaties with Indonesian 
princes and peoples, provided the sovereign's coramands be observed. 
Judicially he also had the rl?ht of ^lantlnF pardon, amnesty and 
abolition of death sentences,1 
qiaXIClgM OF THL Cx:.|^ THAL Cmc.B:MliM 
1, The centrpl poverranent was leek of interration. Several 
factors contributed to this. One factor was the freo^ raphlc 
distribution of the departments of povfrnment, the main residence 
of the G.G. vas Boror, while the seat of the volksraad, the council 
of the iiast indies sncl departtaents of justice, finance Interior, 
adieinistrstlon, education and relisyion, economic affairs, traffic 
and public-works was at Jacarta. Two departments, those of marine 
snd war, -nd the public health service were located in Bandung. Thus 
the capital of Indonesia was scattered smonp three cities, Ths G,G, 
exercised control over his depertments at e distance snd merely In 
writing, 'ie mlpht issue a formal pronouncement in numberless 
departmental affairs; the most inslprnlfleant conflicts between 
departments mipht ro to him for s decision end likewise differences 
in points of views between branches of thr. central government and 
offices of the reRionsl fovernmenta. 
2. But the most itoporttsnt fpctor impendinr interration was 
the existence and the function of the council of indies. The coiaicll 
still wielded an enormous infliience. it had preater Influence with 
the volksraad than the depprtment heads. The O.G, caa^ to Indonesia 
1. ibid. p.1185 
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vlth only vafu« idea of policy and except with respect to matters 
on which they held strong personal views they relied upon the 
advice of the coiancil. Furthermore, the ^ast Indian government Act 
specifically enfcrused the function of advising the G.G. to the 
Council and not to the department heads. The headship of a departmenl 
was reparded as practically sn eutomatic promotion for able 
pemanent officials; the appolntnents were not msde cm the basis of 
views on policy. 
3. "ccoTdlne to a leacUnp indonesien official, the rise of the 
volksraad h?»d filso contributed to the undsr-nlnir snd disinterration 
of the central erovernfnent orfan. Tepartment bends mtrht aften appear 
before the volksrasd to flfht for massures which thoy first proposed 
to the council, but which the council sericusly altered. When the 
volksrand knew of this, It m^de the most of opportunity to embarrass 
the department heads« Between the council nnd the department heads 
the n.n. •^'-^s in B difficult position.1 
As a way out, Mr,J.Schleke, thx former head of the 
department of l^u'^ tlce, proposed th??t the depprtment l^ads be united 
with the council of the Indies. 2 /rtlcle ^ of the Fovsrnment Act 
of 1925 provided th^t the heads of the denartments of general 
administration should ba summoned to attend those meetlnfrs of the 
council of the ^^ ast Indies, which were presided over by the C«G, 
unless the latter, for special reasons should decide otherwise. 
Department heads rairht also attend meetings of the council not 
presided over by the C.C., whan the council had under consideratiwi 
measiires fglllnf within the province of the depsrtn^nt. In either 
1, i.Vandenboschs op.cit. p.107 
2. J.Schrlekes de Indlsch Politik, pp.119-126 
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of these sttuations, the heeds had only an advisory voice. 1 
T p YOLKSJxAAD ^PhOPLE'S COUaCIL) 
The ministers Van l^ odu® In 1893 and Frock in 190B had 
planned to set up a representative body for the Indonesian 
people. But unluckily their plan vas rejected by the Netherlands 
rovernment. On account of stron?" deisRnd of the Serlkst Islam and 
political parties as well as other associations for rreater 
participation in tlKJ affairs of the fovc^ rnment of Inc'onesla and the 
hard pressures of internetionsl crisis, the tainister, Pleyte, 
presented bis proposals In 1915 for the institution of the volkaraad 
in Indonesia. His proposals were accepted by the -"tates General in 
October 16, 1916, vhich, therefore, created ths volkeraad in May 
13» 1918. 
The coEpositlon of volksraad in 191^-1921, consisted of 3B 
members and 1 chairman was appointed by the crown. Of these 10 
Indonesians nn^T^ 9 •^•uropeans nnd foreign Asiatics were elected, and 
5 Indonesians and 1^ i'Uropeens ^nd foreirn Asiatics were appointed 
by the ''.0, in 1921-192^-, the .ner'ibership was Inoreasc^ d to hPi persons 
20 Indones'nns (12 elective and B appointive^ and 2R i'^ uropeans and 
non-native Asiatics (12 elective and 16 appointive). In 192^1927t 
the niemborship regained constant, e.p. 21 Indonesians and 27 non-
Inderaneous. In 1927-1931, it was 60; 10 lndoneslsn9(20 elective 
and 10 appointive) and 30 non-nstive members (l^ elective and 12 
appointive), in 1935-1939, the membership vsr^  untouched, in 1939-
19**3» thore were 30 Indonesians (19 elective n^d 11 appointive) and 
30 non-netive nsesbers (18 elective and 12 appointive). TYyQ terra 
of office was three years in 191B-192^ and later on it was four 
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years from 1925 onwards,1 
Before 1927 separate electorates for each of the 
racial frroupa (indcmeaia, iiiaropean and non-native Asiatics) did 
not exist; these were introduced in the revised iiast Indies 
Government Act of 1925. The system of indirect election was 
retained? the members of local, regency, and municipal councils, 
the "iiropean, Indonesian and non-native Asiatic laeiBbers forming 
seprsrate electjroral colleges to choose their own communal re-
presentatives in the volkaraad, Aliile the xiiuropean and foreign 
Asiatic memhers rf the local councils throughout Indonesia fomsd 
one common electoral college, the Indonesian members were divided Intl 
electorf^ l circles or districts, b«aed largely on ethical considera-
tions. These electorel circles wore west Java, middle Java, east 
Java, the native stste of Java, south S^ unatra, east Sunatra, 
HinsnFkabau, north Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas and the 
small SumdQ islands.S 
The taembers of 18 municipal end 67 repency councils on 
Java and Madura and the mombers of municipal, 2 irroup coomune, 9 
coEiinune and 7 local councils in the outer islands participated in 
the 1939 volksrann elections. The total number of electors was 222B, 
of whoBs 1817 where on Jeva and Madura ©nd ^11 in the outer islands. 
Of the electors ^^^2 were Indonesians, 5^ 3 were Netherlanders and 233 
were non-native Asiatics, in the native states of Java, the syst«B 
of election was different. Where the h Indonesian princes and the 
senior governors were tl^ only electees. Candidates for the 
volksrsad were elected on the basis of proportional representation. 
A special bureau, called the volksraad electoral bureau, had been 
set up to count the votes.3. 
1, Hr,A.K,Pringgodipdo! op.cit. p.169 
2, Article 5$ of teh Indonesian fovt. Act., 1926 
3, A.Vandenboschs op.cit. p.116 
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In 1925 the volksraad was raised from an advisory body to a 
co-legislative body, i**or this purpose, a college of dele^at^s or a 
permanent conmiittee of 20 and later 1? In 1935, chosen by the full 
volksraad from amongsts own members on the basis of proportional 
representation, was created. The chairman and the secretary of 
the volksraad served in the snme capacity for the college of 
delegates, which sat when the volksraad was ad.joiarned. The college 
of da^ef ates exercised a considerable powers in the volksraad. The 
members of the college of delegates served for four years,1 
The legislative power in the Netherlands- the crown and th« 
states general- might by law set up and modify the fovernmental 
organisation Bn6 further might legislate on any other subject \Aien 
ever by law appeared necessary. The states general of course had tha 
power to reg-ulste all imperial affairs. The power of the crown to 
legislate by general administrative order had been limited to the 
specific cases enuii^rated by law. The power of lefrislation mipht 
be exercised by the G.C. after consultation of the volksraad with 
respect to the following: 
1, All subjects not denied to it in the Netherlands 
constitution, 2ast Indian Government Act, or other laws, 
2, Other subjects the regulations of which in accordance 
with law or frenersl administrative order, aiust take place by 
ordinance. 
3, in case of emerfrency, subject to later confirmation 
by lew or peneral administrative order, all subjects the regulation 
of which otherwise would have to take piece by law or penersl 
administrative order, so long as this regulation has not yet taken 
1. ibid p.117 
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place. 
h, in case of emergency, subject to later confirmation by 
law or feneral administrative order, the modification or suspensicni 
in whole ox In part, for all Indonesia or specified parts of it, of 
lews or general adminlstretive orders.1 
5, The G.C, mlpht elso, after mandatory consultation with 
the council of the indies, Issue executive orders, the execution 
of laws, ?ener?tl sdminlFtratlvc orders &n6 ordinances so far as 
this further rsg-ulation had been delegated to hiin.2 
ihcuFh the volksraad had the power of initiation as well 
as amendment, the ordinary procedure was for the G.G, to initiate 
leHslatlon. The G,G, had also the right of veto. Ko could veto 
a bill for amendments to a bill passed by the volksraad, if 1^ tea 
of the opinion that the bill was contrary to the peneral interests. 
He ralFht also rule out the decision of the volksraad and proraulgate 
on his ov.'n responsibilities the rejected or seriously amended bill 
by the volksraad, if he consid<urod that the general interests of 
the country required instant action, 'i^he O.C, or the povernment 
fflifht brings tl-ie bill in the volksraad if the latter approved it, the 
bill become the n.C.'s ordinance, if it was tiirned dovm, in non-
urfent case, the bill did not becoj^ lav, but after six months, he 
mipht present it cfoin to the volksraad with some amendments if he 
thought It necessary to dc so. if in the second introduction the 
bill vsK not accepted, the roverniaent could pass the bill as law 
with the sanction of the crown.3. 
in matter of finance, the annual budget had to undergo 
a strict scrutiny of the states general at the Ha^ue, in the event 
i. tthe i-ast indissn Covt. Act, Articles 82792 and 93 
2 . i b i d Art .81 
3 . IJbanl and Co: O p . c i t . Chap. 1 , p.MO 
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of any contrary, the Hague had final decision.Hence there was no 
financial autonomy In Indonesia. 
The members of the volksraad had the following riphts and 
previlefes* 1. Freedom of speech. 2, right of initiative. 3. right 
of addressing or petition, h, right of interpellatlcm. 5. right of 
proposing the budget. 6. right of flvtn^advice to the povernaent. 
7. rlcht of amendn^nt of any Mil. 8. rifht of legislation. 9. recelv 
inf of attendance allowances Rn6 addittonRl prants and indemnifica-
tion for loss of imsoffles, 10, Freedom of arrest and prosecution.1 
The volksraad met st Jecarta. The opening of the volksraad 
session was held on Tiiesday In ^ 'ay everv year, Tvo ordinary sessions 
were held annually, its meetings were public, unless for son» 
specific reason the public had to be excluded. Its first aeeting 
was opened by ths ^ .n., Van Llniburff StlruiE on Mny IB, 191B st 
Jacarta. It made its own stsndlnf orders. And the last session 
of the volksraad vas attended hy the rj.r, Tjerde in 19M. Dr.J.W, 
Keyer Kanneft was the last chelriaRn of the volksrai&d in )9h2. 
The volksraad had been criticised stronply by different 
leaders, Mr-^ e^mffun said th^t the volksra."^ d vas only an empty shoW| 
p tactls of cppitslists to dee-ive the vast rm^f^es tc attain the 
highest profits. It was purely pn adviptory body which could do nore 
than talks and Its voice vf>s net hearlfd in the council.2 
Mr,Cell,In BISO criticised the volksraad. He pointed 
out that the value of the parliamentary system lies precisely in 
the; responsibility boiny by the sninisters in offices .^.nd by the 
opposition which may be asked to assume leadeir^hip, specially if 
the cabinet, believinp- it hna b'-ten unfairly criticised reslnis and 
1. Ibid. p.38 
2, A.K.Prinf^godlfdo: op.clt. p. 17 
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invites the opposition to take office. Nov it is clear as day that 
this parliamentary pive BnC^ take does not exist in the volksraad, 
the majority cannot upset the rovernisent, nor can the latter resign 
find compel the opposition to succeed it.1 
Moreover, the volksraad had failed to win support either 
with the masses or with the intellectuals of Indonesian society* The 
masses had not yet svpkened and the intallectualr* were; still 
rel'itively few snc because of the CQlonic^I relationship itr^ ny of the 
latter were non-coop&iators. 
The volksraad faced preat difficulties in its function due 
to the pcvernmental systex. There wss first of sll the divided 
responsibility between the P-spue snd inconesia. The volksiaad never 
knew v?hether It h^d before it the Indcnesisn rovcrninent or the 
colonial office* if the volksia£d offerer; ^^ n^ arricndiaent to the budret 
or B bill rnd the minister of colonies crdors, it rejected, the 
in'onesien pcvern'nent n=^turally refused ell tiebpte over the nca\« 
acceptance; r^ painst the mlnlr-t'r the volksraad could not ccntravert. 
A similar difficulty existed In the- relstionshlp between 
the C,C, end the directors of the depfirtnents, Acccrdinf to th^ 
fcvernrcent act, the- lattc-r v-cre fubordinfits to the 0,(\ «nd subject 
to his coraraands. As ad;r.!nistratlon spokesmen in the volksraad they 
hf-d no independent authorl^y^ they jdmply trfJispets of the sdmlnistra 
tion. A director mlrht dofend an ordinance vhich he h*--)c drswn up 
but which hed undergone Important chonpes .-^s ren^ ilt of modifications 
m«^ de tv the council of Indies and accepted by the G.^ -. The directors 
udpht then dyfend the measures aFslast r-rf-^ TEentn which he himself 
used sF'^lnst it before the council. 
1. Coll:}n: Over Indie, p . ^ 
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Another weakness of th« volksrsed was th« political condition 
In Indonesia. Party life was still weak. Political f?ro\sps wer« 
crossed and crisis-crossed by racial, ethical, economic and religious 
lines. 19 political parties such as n^do-iiiiropean union, Christian 
politicel party, parindra, etc. were represented in the V^ olksraad 
in 1939.1 
The social life of indonesis f-'lso contributed to the weakness 
of the vclksraad. The x^iropeans made Indonesia as their temporary 
home; their chitjf concern naturally vss not political but economic. 
The number of educated i-ndonesians was vt-ry small. The membership of 
the volskraad consisted of the official class, both x-uropuan snd 
indontsian. There had been complaints from these members that they 
had been called to look by their chiefs for what they had said and 
how they had voted in the volksraad. 
The chief defect cf the vclksraad was undoubtedly a slight 
contact with the Indonesian copnunity. The duration of the sessions 
was steadily becoming longer, with the result that many members who 
made their livelihood in business or professions could not remain 
until the ^nd. As a result many siissures were acted upon during 
the last weeks by a steadily decreasing nu'^ ibor of members and the 
relative strength of the parties was changed by factors unrelated 
to changes in public opinion. The p-overnmcnt transferred its 
officials who were elected or appointed to the vclksraad, the central 
offices fit Jakarta, This led the official lose living contact with 
the georrfsphicel area or the specific population pioup he was 
elected or appointed to represent. 2 
1. A.V'r^nf^snhosoh'. o p . c l t p.121 
2 . i b id P.I 23 
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The volksrasa had also suffered from pre-occupptlon vdth too 
many small snd local matters. Improvement in this respect should 
come with further proi?ress In decentralisation. If the sessions of 
the Volksraad were sroinp to be continuous, there would be little 
Justification for the college of delepates. The volksraad reserved 
all important matters for itself, leavlnp- to the college only ijn-
important details, 
Inspite of the above mentioned defects and difficulties the 
volksraad hsd served very useful purposes. 
1. It had enabled the government to ascertniin whet was poing 
in the ©inds of the people r-nd to explain, modify and justify its 
policies. Even before 192? the povernment accepted a lar^e number 
of the smendments and adjusted a larfe number of complaints and 
other important matters upon the demand of members of the volksraad. 
And it had piven the colonial bureauc^racy a larpe measure of 
responsibility to the Indonesian society, since It mlpht now vKsrk in 
the op«?n and mlr'hty at any time he asked to explain ond defend its 
doinps. The position of a lepislstlve body in a dependency was at 
best a trylnp one, little less so th^t than of the executive. The 
executive had two msstors, for it could not lf»Bore a responsibility 
to the colonial leplsleture, while the legislature was in danger of 
oscillating between thf? extremes of a feelinf?: of utter futility on 
the one hand of laiderstrained criticism on the other, 1 
2, In the period since 1927, the rovernment apflied the 
reconsideration, the so-called conflict re^ulction, which pave the 
O.G, the power to issue emergency degrees upon his own Initiative, 
15» times. Of 21 times that the G.G,asked reconsideration of e 
rejected measixre, agreement between the government and the volksraad 
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was reached in 16, frequently after Important concessions from 
the side of the government and In only 5 did the oeasiire became 
law by intervention of the crown, 13 of the emergency defrees 
issued by the G,G, on his own responsibility in 1932-1937 and 
remaining in 19^-19M. Agsinst these occasions upon which the 
desires of the volksrasd were ignored mipht be placed the more 
than 500 government bill which reached the statute books with 
amendments offered by the volksraed and accepted by the fovernment 
or which did not become law because the government acquisced in the 
negative judgen«nt of the volksraad. During this same period, the 
government accepted 37 of the 92 volksra*d amendments to bud-fet bills 
in 1928-1938,1 
3. The power of Initiating legislation was used frequently 
only 6 times in the 15 years, 1927-19M inclusive. On three of 
these occasions the government accepted the proposed legiJeslation 
and placed it on the statute books. The right of petitioning the 
governi^nt was also sparely used* Throughout the course of Its 
life the volksrasd issued 16 petitions, many of which were answered 
favourably after a short or longer period. A favourite device of 
the volksraad was the adoption of the resolutlons-^1 in the period 
of 1927-I9M.2 
h. Lastly the volksraad had represented the multiplicity 
of political parties of the various races and communities such as 
Indonesian, European, Chinese and Arab, In the latest volksrasd, tb 
25 fiuropean members represented 8 parties, 1 belonged to no party; 
of the 30 Indonesian members, 23 represented 10 parties and 7 !^ ad 
1. Tien ^aar volksraad arbeid 1928-1938, '^ 'erslag van de 
comaisie tot bestudeerlng vsn staatscrechlljke hervarminse 
en 1,iXXX, pp.116t-120 
2. A.Vandenboschi op.cit. p.123 
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no party affiliation and even in the snail grovqo of other meabers 
there were 2 and at one time three parties. To a certain extent, 
this was due to the system of nomination of SOBO members of the 
volk8ra»d by the C,G. This was, however, a sort of democratic 
parliamentary practice pursued in the country. The volksraad was 
also an educative institution where the reoresentatlves of the 
people learned and discussed various matters concernlnp the 
interests of the country.1 
PEOYIXIAL G0y2MiMi:.NT 
^ince 1870 there was a hierarchical and highly centralised 
form of the rovernroent, ImBiediately below the O.G, stood the 
resident who was the head of division, aided by Several assls-tant 
residents as heads of sub-divisions. There was also a head repion 
called controleur. A n this formed the European administration, 
Hepardinf the native administrfttion, there were iiadana (district 
official), assistant wedana (sub-district official) and lastly villafc 
heads, 
^Ince then there was a decentralisation fflovement for Indonesia 
Minister ^-Ihn Dedum in 1893 proposed the creation of regional councils 
and financial decentralisation but in vain due to the dissolution 
of the chambers In 1B9^, Minister Idenbur? advocated the same view 
successfully. Minister Mtsens Van Cek and Hr.Van Eev..-enter pleaded 
for the establishnient of autonomous regencies and more liberal 
political decentralisation, in 1V03, the states general of Holland 
passed a Decentralisation Act, which provided for the institution 
of 3 kinds of councils: (l) regional or residency councils; (2) 
sub-residency or local councils; (3) Uirban coraiaunal councils,2 
r. J. "•^urnlvalls Netherlands India, Combridsre University Press, 
Or.Britain, 19Mf, p.260 
2. VandenboschJ op.eit, p,128. 
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All these councils were 60 in number. They were as yet 
not successful and undemocratic In character* Because a large 
nuifiber of the councillors were ex-offIcio members and even the 
private members were appointed. The only elective members were 
found in the urban communal councils and even here only the 
iiuropeans were at first elective. The regional cc\mcils could never 
develop into an imajediate imit of ?ovyrnment, for the areas they 
served verg too small for regional and too lar^e local eovernmental 
units. The residency governments could not be equipped with the 
technical apparatus and personnel required for lar^e repional work. 
Ihere was also a lack of financial resources.1 
Because of the many defects of the /ict 1903» the second 
chamber of Holland in 191^ was in favour of divine: more recional 
provincial autoaomies to Indonesia, In 1918, i-lr.Pleyte, the Minister 
of colonies, introduced a bill in this spirit, but only for Java and 
Madui'a, i-e Craaf, minister of colonies, in 1919 withdrew the bill 
and leplaced it with s new bill which, after the discussion in the 
volksrapd in 1920, was presented tc the states peneral in 1921 and 
passed into law in 1922, 
Under tte Act 1922, the coxintry was divided Into 3 
provinces, west Java U926), east Java (1929) end central Java 
C193O), under eovernors and sub-divided into residencies numbering 
Rbout 76 residencies altogether, governed by residents, who were 
assisted by assistants residents ani a number of subordinate r^ uropta 
officials. Local government was almost entirely exercised by native 
civil servants, under the regents,2 
T7 Ibid p,1"29 
2, M.-psteins op 
2, ibid. p.130 
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The outer islands were divided into 19 residents and 9^ 
divisions »uch as Hinagkabau, Band Jar (193B) and Palembang (19^1) 
and others, governed by residents, who were assisted by 90 
asstt.residents, about 180 controleurs, 100 cciaaanders «nfi a 
number of subordinate European officials. In July 1, 193^, the 
provinces of Sujustra, Borneo, and the ^rest East were set up and 
governed by governors. By 19^1, 3 such ethnic irsunJcipalitles, each 
witb councils, had been established, namely "inapkabau raad, 
Pelembanp raad C-umatra) and Band;5ar Eaad (BorneoJ.I 
As regards the povornment adnilnl;5trrition in Java w re in 
1900, IB residents, 78 assistant residents, about 118 controleias, 
50 asstt.controleiirs, some 70 rerents, ^ DO wedanas snd 1000 asstt. 
wedanas, in 1930, there were 3 governors snd in 1903 there were 15 
residents and 38 residents and 18 asstt.residents in 1922. In 1931» 
the nunber of residents was further reduced to 19. The total 
number of administretive high officials declined from 222 in 1922 
to 150 in 1933.2 
The governor was the afent of both the central and the 
provincial governc^nts. He was appointed nnd removed by the C.G, 
The ijovernaent of province consisted of the provincial council, th« 
board of deputies and the governors. The provincial council comprised 
elected and nominated members of all three sections of the community 
(Netherlanders, Indoensians end non-indepeneous Asiatics), with 
the provincif;! povernor as chairman. The electorate consiPted 
of the me2ib«rs of the resency and urban councils and was predominantly 
official and largely nominated, For the province of vest Java the 
1, K,£pstoini op.cit. p.1lB2 • ' > ^ ' 
2. Er.De Kat Angelinox op.cit.r>.369 ,.., 
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membership was h^ (20 Netherland«rs, 20 indoneslens and 5 non 
Indlpenj^ ous Asiatics). Of this meabership, 11 Nethcrli»nd©rs, 13 
Indonesians, 3 non-indipenous Asiatics v;ere elected, while the 
others were appointed by the C-.G.X 
The provincial council mirht leplslnte v/ith respect to such 
subjects as had been delepeted to it by the central foverncent. Tax 
laws and joint regulstlons between the two or more provinces 
required the approval of the C.C, This spprovel rairht elso be 
deaandee by ordinetnce for other stipu].ated subjects.Morewver, the 
G.G, had the power of suspending snd vetoing acts of the council 
whenever he considered thes to be in conflict with the general 
interest or some law ox ordinance.2 
The £ast Indian povemiDent Act of 1925 created B board 
of deputies, This board, formed in the 3 provinces so created, was 
elected by the councils, in electing the d|>putles the council was 
not restricted to its meffibership; all the deputies mlpht be chosen 
froic persons not in the council. The nurcber of deputies misrht ranpe 
from 2 to 6; the council itself determined the exact number within 
this ranfe, tiach new council chope its own board of deputies. They 
received a salary fixed by the council end subject to the approval 
of the C.C. The council issued the re^ 'ulf^ tions poveming the deputies 
in the exercise of their powerf, which rejFulations likewise copnised 
the approval of the O.G, The board of deputies was charred with the 
daily administration of the provincial Foverninent. It also made the 
preparation of the agenda of the council; the execution of the 
council (jecisions; the settlement of administrative disputes^ the 
fixlnp' of salaries and wages; cooparr«tion In the execution of 
1. Cr.Ce tvat Angelinos Colonial Policy vol.11, the J^pue,! 31 »P»76 
2, A.T/andenboschJ op.cit. p.^ 132 
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reguletiona of th« central government; and supervision over the 
regency and municipal councils. The deputies were individually 
and collectively responsiblo to the council.1 
The governor was by the O.n, upon consultation with the 
Council of the Esst Indies. In case of sickness, absence or inability 
of the governor, the board of deputies nnmed one of its members 
as his temporary successor. Tha fovernor presided on both council 
end board of deputies, but he executed only such decision as thas* 
bodies entrusted to his cere. As ???rent of the central government 
he had its servants at his <5ispossiI ?ind ©s the arent of the 
provincial e-overnrec-nt, he mi^ht coirariand the provincial civil servants. 
As the representative cf the central povernment ho exercised a fenaral 
supervision ovrr the vork of the council and baord of deputies. 
As such ho broufht to attention of the C.'^ ,^ such acts of these 
bodies RS he deemed to be in conflict with law, crdinence or the 
peneral interests, if the f.H. did not suspend or veto the law within 
3 months, the fovfinor ml•'ht proceed with the execution of the 
decision. He had a double responsibility? for his duties as 
representative of the central government, he ^^ as responsible to the 
n.n.» for the d'-il7 policy and administration of provincial 
affairs, he was responsible to the council. The revenues of the 
provincial povernmsnt were larfely derived from public services 
and others.2 
According to the annual report of 192S, the functions 
of the provincial rovernment consisted of eductien, popular health 
service of water ways, Irrlpatlon, roads, bridpes, sluice pates, 
1. ibid p. 133 
2. ibid 
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habour works water distribution, a salt monopoly, an airricultural 
information service, a venetary service and a number of 
provincial hospitals. 
The revenues of the province consisted of taxes(addltLonal 
percentape of government taxes and indpendent levies), other 
levies (Income from provincial enterprise, lepral fees) payment 
by the government of the dlfferenlse between the total of the 
ordinary expenditure and that of the ordln?5iry receipt, special 
frents In n±r\ from the government, »nd loans. 1 
THS BEG&SCY G0VER1I»§E^ 
The policy of Indirect rule or the protectorate policy 
was adopted by the T/utch colonial authority. About 7 ^  of the area 
of Java and sllgrhtly more than 50 % of the area of the outer Islands 
had been left under its own rulars. Outside of the h sultanates in 
Java the Dutch had followed a policy of semi-indirect rule by means 
of the Javanese officials known as regents. 
The east Indian company established relations with the 
repents for the purpose of obtaininpr products; for the rest, the 
regents enjoyed a wide autonomy, in the time of Daendals (1909-1911) 
the position of the repents was diminished. They became officers of 
the Indonesian government and were pieced under the autocratic oonma 
of the residents. This position continued till the end of r>utch 
authority in 19**2. 
The regency ordinance of 192^ - created a rerency council 
and a board of deputies chosen by the council, with the regent es 
chairman of both. The regency councils of vest, east and central Jav 
provinces ceme Into beinpj in 192^, 1926 end 1929 respect!vely.2 
1. Dr.De Kat Angellno » op.clt. p.396 
2. A.Vandenboschs op.clt. p.135 
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The regency coimcils were composed of Netherlanders, 
Indonesians, and non-Indigenous Asiatics, The regency eo\xt\cll 
of Jaearta for Instance, was established with the regent as 
chairman and 2? iBeml>ers, of whom only two were subjects of Dutch 
origin whereas 20 were indigenous people and 5 foreigners, 1^ of 
the indlgeneous people were to be elected, 6 for the district cf 
Tangerang, h for the district of Blaradje and four for the district 
of i^udek. The non-Indlgeneous merabors end the non-elected 
indlgeneous iMsrabers were appointed by the governor of the province of 
west Java from 2 persons recommended by the recent from each place 
that had to be filled, £lected and nominated members sat for a 
period of four years, 1 
In 1932, out of 1583 awmbers of the regency councils, 
813 elected and 770 nominated, no less than 651 elected and I86 
nominated native aembers were officials. Only 5^ of the members were 
classed as cultivators but the officials apparently Included village 
headmen, who were agrlcolturiats and sometime large landlords.2 
According to regency electoral ordinance of 1^26, the 
election of indigenous members took place as follows! The admlnlstra 
tive districts in the r.gencies formed constitutencies of about 
1^ 40,000 inhabitants. During i'iBy of the year when an election was to 
take place, electors wore indicated In each desa (village)5 to 
the number of 1 elector for 500 Inhabitants or less, 2 electors for 
1000 inhabitants, 3 for 1500 Inhabitants and so on. The appointment 
of electors was done in so far as possible in accordance with the 
local custom governing the election of the desa headman, in tl» 
presence of a electoral committee, with the sub-district chief as 
member end chairman. The vote was secret and on tlw basis of 
proportional representation, fivery Indegeneous inhabitant of the 
1. Ibid pp. 135-13^ " 
2 , J . S. Fur n iva l I t Colcmlal pol icy and p r a c t i c e , Cambridge,19^, 
Chapter VII , p,250 
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Tegenaff vho was deeflrad to have raached tha aga of 21 and who 
had been asaessad In the course of previous year In raspact of 
any governraant provincial or rerency tax or who had th* right by 
law to take part In the election of the desa chiefs (therefore also 
women) and those who In the judreiaent of the regency councils were 
entitled to take part in the election of the headman, had the right 
to vote. Th® secondary electors might satisfy the same requireraents, 
be 
but/aged 25 st least, belonfad to the male sex end be inhabitants 
of the desa In which they vere elected for inhabitants of the 
constituency by which they were chosen. Horeover, they laleht be 
shle to reed snd write. A report concerninr the appointment of tha 
electors was made by the electoral comalsslon end s copy was sent 
to the official of the electoral district concerned,From this data 
this official drew up the list of the secondary voters.1 
The electors could, therefore, deliver et the office of 
this official on a day indicated beforehand the list of CRndld^ates, 
which mlrht be slpned by et least three electors. If the collective 
list of candidates for a district contained more nsffies than the 
number of members who hsd to be returned for the district, the 
official mode up a list In elphebeticsl order; every secondary 
elector received a copy end the list was also published. A day for 
the vote was then fixed and anno\mced and every secondary electOT 
received a card summoning hlra to the election. Voting took place 
In the capital of the district, in the presence of a board of 
consisting of three members. The voter filled in the ballot paper, 
with the names of his cendldstes in the order in vhich he preferred 
them. Every paper counted as a vote for the first cendidete 
1 Di.Kat Angelinoi op.clt. p.390 
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mentioned on it» W>»n the necessary proportion of votes for the 
first candidates was reached, the ballot paper counted as a 
vote for the following candidates mentioned on it. This was wll-
known process of proportional representation.1 
The elected members of the regency council rals^ht be male, 
Dutch subjects, resident in Indonesia, domiciled vlth the resrency 
aged 25 at lesst able to write in Latin character, they Mpht 
not be in a state of bankruptcy, etc. The members of the council 
received Indemnification for travel and maintenance.2 
The repency council had vsrlous functions. Incorporated 
cities were excluded from its Jursdictlcn, however. It made 
leplslatlons for administration of the Internal afffjirs of the 
regency and issued ordinances, it also levied taxes, appointed 
suspended and dismissed officials In the service of the repency. 
It fixed the nnnxaal budget for t\w repency, approved by the beard 
of deputies. 
The resident (Art.12^ rapency ordinance) had the 
supervision of the repency council snd could make to which the board 
of deputies ohlieed the proposals he deemed necessary. All decisions 
of the council and of its executive bcsrd of delerptes, which were 
in conflict with pcnoral Interests or with 6. general or provincial 
ordinance mlirht be submitted to the CT.G, by the board of deputies for 
suspension or annulsent. The decision of suspend to annul was announce 
in the provincial paper, with fiill statement of roasofts.The council 
could cooperate vvlth other autonomous communities in the rap:ulatlons 
of common affairs, interests or works. These arrenisrements required 
1. Art. 125+ itiid. 
the approval of the board of deputies.1 
The meetlnfrs of the council were public; the regent 
convened and presided over the aeetlnfr. Debates inii?ht take place 
in the local lanimare, in Dutch or in Indonesian, 
The regency council established a board of deputies for the 
direction and execution of the affairs of the regency. This body 
consisted cf the rerent as .TseiEber and at least 2 more members. The 
letter wore chosen by the council from their own meiabers together 
with 1 or more substitute raerabers. They jmci the meabers of the 
council set for some course of years. Their trnvel end maintenance 
expenses were paid. The duties of the bo,ird of deputies included 
Bmon?: dhers the task of carrying out the decisions of the council 
snd general or provincial ordinances. If these duties were not 
executed with reasonable efficiency the resident could obtain powers 
from the rovernor to carry them out himself, at the expense of the 
regency.2 
The board of deputies also carefully pvepared and studied 
the agenda for the meetings of the council, except such Itens as 
hsd been left to special consmittees appointed by the council, it 
represented the regency in court and out of court. The board In its 
entlrity as well as its chairnifln and sembers individually, was 
responsible tc the regency council for the dally direction and 
execution of affairs. They mi^ht therefore provide all the information 
required by the council frois them, whether personally or collectively. 
•If such information was refused the coimcil could suspend or disaiss 
one or more of the members of the board although this did apply to 
the members of the boar 
1. Art.12l^  Ibid 
2. Art. IB, H.O. 
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the regent ehairusan. For actions of self-frovernment executed 
upon the Instruction of higher authorities , the board was 
responsible not to the council but these authorities. It finally 
exercised supervision over the vlllape povernments and their 
budgets, ju^ 't as the provincial board of deputies exercised 
sopervision over the regency rovernnsents. 1 
The regent was chairman of the regency council and in ease 
of absence his place was taken by the Patih, in the absence of a 
board, its taks was performed by the regent, lie had to execute the 
decisions of the regency council, when required to io so, '^M 
also those of the board of deputies. All the officials of the 
regency acted under his orders. Ke might also order, in so far as the 
interest of the country allowed it, all government officials 
rubordinate to blm in his capacity as regent to discharge various 
duties in the Interest of the repency* -*« decision which hs Judged 
to be contrary to a general or provincial ordinance or against the 
public interest needed not be executed by him. In such a case he 
informed the regency council or its board of deputies, while he also 
announced his objections to the board of deputies of the province. 
If no suspension or annulment by the G,C, followed within three 
months, he was compelled to execute the council's or board's 
decision. 2 
The rerency ordinance also established a regency council 
of Jacarta in 1925. The fimctlons of the council consisted of the 
admlnlstrption, public roads, street lirhting, fire station, bazoors 
1, Dr.Kat Angelino: op.cit. ?. 392 
2. Ibid. 13.39^  
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and bazor bulldlnra, arreslon wells, general burial XHI places 
and ferries situated within the regency end formely belonging to 
the adaainistrstion of the residency of Jacarta. The regency on the 
other handjoight contribute in part to the redeisption of and interest 
payable or debts previously incurred by that community.1 
11^ regency had the supervision «(t indlgeneous conaimes 
or villages. The board of deputies had the rif»ht, formerly held by 
the repent, to annial villap-e decisions. For soue lep-al actions of the 
village d^ffiinlstrstion, -written powers had previously to be obtained 
froas this board. This ccncernGd matters like losns snd certain 
contracts as well as the initiation and cessation of litigation. The 
regency council had a certain right of legislation iti vsiious other 
iopcrtant matters which concerned the dess. Indigeneous education 
woiild be within the council's competence,2 
g;uB»DiVi.nxQn G0Vi::i-wife!fr 
The Assistant resident stoo-d at the head of a sub-
division of residency, and administrative area which generally 
corresponded with the regency. He exercised the f\jinctlons of the 
resident except that of legislation and at least officially, the 
contact between the Buropean end the native administrative corps 
took place at this point. I'he Assistant residents constitute the 
lowest branch of the £uropean administrative corps having independent 
sphere of action, '3?h© assistant residents in txjrn, wore aided by 
controleurs, who theortticelly had no indopcndent f»phere of action| 
they were supposed merely to collect information n^ri execute the 
orders of their siaperior. But in the outer islands, the controleurs 
1, S t b t , 1925, p.383 
2, A.Vendenboschs o p . c l t , p .126; ^nd Kat Angellnot I b i6 . p.395 
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legally enjoyed an independent splwre of action, thtui earryinf the 
contact between the European and native adninistrative corps, a step 
close to the people.1 
Begarding the powers of the controleurs, Mr.Fakens 
enumerated their fimctions, 1. Execution of the administration 
of the Indonesian popul^^tion, 2, domestic affairs of tlw desa, 
3. agriculture end industry, k. agrarian conditions, (?) taxation and 
compulsory services, 8. health and education, 7* public works, 
8. exercise of considerable influence upon the tmderstending and 
cooperation between the indoneiian chiefs, the population and the 
Dutch authorities, 9. assisting the policeln detecting the authors 
of misdemeanours and usually acting as mapistrate, 10 contracting 
and supervising the village headmen and the village administration 
In all their activities and 11, transmitting the orders of the 
Jiuropean authorities to the native officials and supervising their 
proper execution 12, and others, 2 
The controllettt" personally investiagad the desa complaints 
by the population. The weekly gatherings of the village chiefs 
in sub-districts, the mcmthly ones in the principal place of the 
district, the regular meetings of asstt.wedanas and wedanaas wblch 
were prescribed by the inlendseh reglement, he tried to attend as 
much as possible and according to the importance of the business on 
the agenda. 
1, A, Vandenbosehi op.cit. p.127 
2. Dr.Fakken: op. cit. p.20 
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Dr.Van Gorkam's guide book mentioned some of the subjects 
discussed by the controleurs with the native officials at these 
regular meetings* U Police (particular Incidents, vrfctch houses, 
watch services and criminal cases under investigation, 2, taxation 
3» cultivation, h, agrarian questions, 5. compidsory government 
services and desa services, 6. cattle, 7* health* 1 
in short, the Dutch had adopted the indirect rule of the 
country and through the controleurs they exercised the native 
governments. By this policy, said Dr.Van f^ 'orkasp, that Holland has 
been able to make western strength take root in the Indonesian 
archipelago, to assure peace and contentment to diverse populations 
and to make possible an administration with a relatively small number 
of officials. (250 men in Java and Madura), in 1937 Buper Emerson 
observed, that the system of indirect rule served a highly efficient 
device for breaking and segregating potential nationalist movements 
and as sonwthlng of a moral Justification for denying the claims 
to power of the more advanced elements of native society.2 
Mr.Temple pointed out the real meaning of the indirect r\ile 
which maintained firmly the strong foothold of the Dutch colonialism 
in Indonesia. By indirect rule I mean a system of administration which 
had been created by the native themselves which recognises the 
existence of amirs, chiefs, pagan cour«ts, native police controlled 
by a native executive, as real living forces and not as curious 
and Interesting pagenatry, by which European Influence is brought 
1, Ibid. p.211 and Kat AngellnoJ op.clt. p.85 
2. Ruper ^^ mersons Malaysia, New York 1937f p.518 
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to bear on the native indirectly through his chiefs and not directly 
through European officers, political police, etc. and by which 
the European keeps hinaelf as good deal in the backrround and leaves 
the mass of the native individuals to understand that the orders 
which came to theai emanate from their own chief rather than from 
the all pervading white sen* The underlying policy of this systm 
is to assist the native to develop that civilisation which he can 
himself evolve.1 
The regencies were divided into districts, each with an 
official called wetana at its head. The districts were divided into 
sub-districts, presided over by Asstt.wedanas. The native administra 
tive officials had no legislative power. Below sub-district heads 
stood the villages, whose administrative organisation was purely 
Indigeneous. All native officials received instructions from the 
higher Dutch authorities and executed them accordingly. 
The Decentralisation law of 1903 had established the first 
municipalities. Before 1905 the cities were governed by the 
administrative corps. The governmental rei?organisation of 1922 and 
1925 had set up municipal council. The composition of the council 
differed from the provincial and regency councils In that ell of its 
members were elective, who were mostly Dutch men. Mayor, like the 
governor and the regent, served doubled capacity. He was both an 
official of the central and provincial governments and of the 
municipal council. Like the regent council, the municipal council 
stood under the preventive supervision of the provincial board of 
1. I^.Kat Angellno: op.clt. p.88 
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deputies end the repressive control of the G.Q. 1 
The revenue of the council CMje mainly from access on 
government taxes mostly paid by Europeans and from municipal 
services such es housing, the supply of electricity, water, trams, 
and buses. The council also dealt with theatres, swimming baths, 
roads, markets, primary education and so on.2 
VARGADSRIHG (ASSEMBLY) 
The vargaderlng was a meeting tei which an official 
discussed affairs with representatives of the people end had both 
educative and democratic character. From the restoration of Dutch 
rule in 1816, the resident was expected to hold once month a 
vargaderlng of his subordinates for the dlseussicaii of current 
affairs; the regent held similar meeting of his subordinates. Van 
den Bosch developed the practice under tlM culture system, till the 
down fall of tlw Dutch regime.3 
The sub-district officer held a gathering of his 10 
or 12 village headmen once a %reek; the district officer Iffild 
gathering of sub-district officers and others ao^ny times a month; 
the regent held a gathering of district officers and others once a 
month and the resident or asstt.resident like-wise held a gathering 
once a month. The controleiir held no gathering, but attended that 
of the resident or asstt.reeldent and was at liberty to attend the 
gathering of the mm regent or his sub-ordlnates. Attendance was 
restricted to administrative officers and village headmen. At every 
meeting, from that of the sub-district upwards, departmental officers 
of the appropriate rank might ask or be invited to attend for the 
1. A.Vandenbosch* op.dt. p.137 
2. Ibid 
3. FurnlvalU op.dt. p.237 
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discussion of affiirs concerning their departments.Forest officers 
public health officers, education officers and officers of tl» 
agricultural, vetenary or credit services mipht attend as 
necessary to explain policy or smooth out difficulties. Sinilarly 
at the gathering of the sub-district or district officers, the 
village officials, the village police-oen, school master or the nan 
In charge of irrigation might accompany the village headmen. 
Ordinarily only 1 or 2 services would be represented in any meeting 
and there was no need for specialist officers to attend unless there 
was some matter within their sphere of interest to discuss. ThB 
ccmtroleur might be presented at any of these meetings to represent 
the views of government and to help in clearing up misunderstandings 
and removing difficulties.1 
CIVIL SERVICE 
The indonesian civil servants may be divided into European 
and Indonesian officials. The former were recruited and trained 
in the Netherlands, while the latter were recruited and trained in 
Indonesia. The crown had tli« right to appoint the members of the 
council of the £ast Indies, chairmen of the volksraad, president 
of the hiph court, chairman and members of auditing chamber, 
governor general, and other sxqperior European officials. All 
iiuropean officials had to undergo training in the royal academy at 
Deft and at the Leiden university in the Netherlands. The course of 
study was five years. After completing their studies there, they 
were selected for different posts in Indonesia.2 
Whereas, the Indonesian civil servants had also to undergo 
some training at the administrative school called Osvia. The school 
1. ibid p. 239 
2. A.Vandenboschi op. cit. pp.165 
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was 8 In number; 6 in Java, 1 at Bukit 9ln«gl, central Suaatra 
and t at Maceasar in Celebes,. The course of study was three 
years. The graduates of the Osvla went bat Into the service as 
asstt.%redanas (sub-district heads) or wedanas (district heads). 
The G.G. appointed and reiaoved all the Indonesian officials, H© 
had the power of conferring the power of appointment and removal 
upon lower authorities. 1 
The salary scale of the Indonesian officials was also 
classified into ^uropeon and Indonesian. The Etiropean civil servants 
received their salaries per annum as belowt C.G,, £ 1if,000, free 
use of 3 palaces and allowinees; each member of the council of the 
cast Indies, ^  3000| governor, £ 1,800, free houses and allowances 
(from £ 150 to £ 300); representative for native palnces, £ 1,600 
free house end reception money, ^  300; residency adviser, £ 1200 
resident £ 1100 and ^ 1000 at first and free house; residency 
secretary (first class), i^ 1000 and £ 800 at first and (second class) 
£ 800 end $ 600 at first; Asstt.resident, £ 75 - ^  ^50 at first 
end free house; administrative controleur, £ 300; controleur, £ 700 
and £ 225 at first and free house; Asstt.controleur, £ 180 
and aspirant controleur, £ 150 per annum,2 
While the salary (or Indonesian officials wast Bupati 
(regent), ^  1200 and £ 53»600 only for the regent of Tjiandiir per 
annum; patih, £ h?^ arwj £ 325; patlh of Jacarta, who was not under 
any regent, £ 600 and £ 500; Itemang, £ 260; Luras £ 1^5 and Kliwan, 
£ 100. The desa headman received no regular salary but he was |ranted 
1 . I b id , p.167 
2 . Csmbelix o p . c l t . p.1190 
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8 ^ of the taxes he collected, together with the produce of 
certain fields allotted to hlm.l 
Xhe ladonesian civil servants also received pension, sffiBOuntlng 
to half of their salaries, after 25 years of service. They could 
obtain furlough or leave only once in 10 years. Widows and orphans 
were also provided with liberal pensions. 
The government expenditure for salaries increased from 
37,000,000 florins in 1900 to 96,000,000 florines in 1917 ond to 
22^,000,000 florins in 1928. The cost of pensions alone increased 
from 38,000,000 florin* In 1922 to 72,000,000 florins in 1932, 
exclusive of the pensions in the government enterprises. From 1916 
to 1928 there was B marked Increase in both the number of employees 
BXiH the average salary. During this period the number of employees 
increased h7 % and the average salary 50 %, The total number of 
employees Increased from 153,795 in 1917 to 212,386 In 1928. The 
number of European employees remained practically constant, 29,055 
in 1917 and 29,3^3 in 1928. Between 1928 and 1932, the number of 
Ind<aiesians employed in class B civil service category rose only 
from ^,872 to 6,05V and in class C, from 190 to 277. Europeans 
(Ihitch, Surasian)CiaS3 B personnel niMberod 11,16^ - In 1928 and 8,761 
In 1932; Class C, 7,9^ in 1928 and 7,951 in 1932. The total 
salary of B and C classes in 1928 was »+7,500,000 and 58,700,000 
florins respectively.2 
In October, 19^, out of the 3039 high ranking civil 
services position only 221 were held by the Indonesians. Indonesians 
1. Ibid. Chap. XIX, part v, p.1190 
2, A.Vandenboseh: op.cit.p.171 
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in 1 9 ^ held 5023 out of the 13»172 upper middle civil service 
potsltions and B83O out of lM-,212 lower middle rank poisltlons.1 
The statistics of October, 1938, showed a distribution of the 
k civil service catefories: Europeans, lower personnel, 0,6^, lower 
middle, 33.3^, middle 57.65*^ , higher 92.2^, Indonesians, 9B.9J^ , 60.6JS 
38.0^1 assimilated Indonesians, 0.3^ » 3»3>9 2,0, 0.5^, Chinese , 
0,3^, 2,3^, 1.5>i», 0,3/^  and assimilated Chinese, lower middle, O.U^, 
middle, 0,8^ and hipher 0.5!^ . 1, 
The ordinary expenditures of the central provernment in 1931 
amounting to 516,000,000, of which 192,000,000 florins went for 
salaries and another 65,000,000 florins on the public debts end 
retirement. The ordinary receipts declined from 521, 813»0CK) florins 
in t928 to 3^+6,000,000 florins in 1931. Thus the expenditures on 
salaries, pensions and Interest on the public debt about equaled tl» 
public revenues,2 
LOCAL GO?t.KNMENT 
The East Indian povernment Act of 185^ laid down the 
regulation and the administration of its desa or village were 
left to the ind^ feryjus commune. Article 128, section 1, of the 
act guaranteed to these desas the rtpht of electing their heads airf 
administrators. Art,128, S,1, section 5 and art,26 draft ordlBBn«« 
granted the village or coaaaune complete autonomy,3 
After an official statement by Queen Wiihel&ina in 1901, 
concernini: the liberal policy in Indonesia, the system of local 
self-government was introduced in the country in 1903, In 1906, the 
1, Brugman and Sunarlot op. cit, p,56 
2, 4,Yandebosch: op.cit, p,172 
3, Art. 128, S,i., section 5, and Art,26 draft ordinance. 
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povernraent decided further to regulate lefal position of the 
vlllspe autonomous units in Java and Madura. There were over 20,000 
villagea in these places. 
The village administration In Indonesia was conducted by a 
village council, consisting of a village head-man Rnd several other 
elected members. The composition and the election of the head of the 
village council were subject to the approval of the regency council.1 
The incomes of the village council (headman end his 
assistants) were fixed by the regency council in agreement with the 
populf^tion. The dess headman was generally responsible for good order 
and for the administrsition of the internal unit of the rest of the 
ccnmune. He supervised the finance, the lands and the establishments 
and oth r possessions of the village in accordance with the rules 
made by the regency council and he hod to indemnity the coamune for 
damages resulting from his bad faith or neglect. 
For village credit institutions special rules had been 
laid down by ordinance in 1925. In the exercise of his power, the 
desa headman consulted as far as possible the other members of the 
desa adminlstrfition. He represented the desa in and out of court.2 
The village headman {jlayed important role in supporting 
the Dutch colonial regime in Indonesia. He became a strong backbone 
of authorisation in the village. Being an agent of the company, he 
supplied native labour to the C>utch capitalists and forced the 
village population to construct roads and other public works. In 
Java such compulsory labour of the villare population was ended 
in 1916 and outside Java it was never abolished, though in 19M 
1. Art, 1 in Stbl, 1907, p.212 
2. Stbl. 1925, p.65C for the province of west Java 
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a law bas passed makinf? It possible to avoid lljsbillty for s\ich 
labour by the payment of the tax, Ths liability for such labom* 
in Java was ^2 days per year in 1882, from 12-36 days In 1R93 and 
10-30 days In 1921, thoufh by the latter date the averape actually 
worked was only 5 days. In 1905, the population was ?riv9n the 
alternative of makln? a raoney payn^ny In lieu of labour. As late 
as 19^1, the vllln?e headman was almost exclusively an Instrument 
of the Dutch authorities.1 
The village council dealt with the following sub^ectss 1. roads 
and ways, 2, lock pates, 3. buildlnps, V. open places, 5. aarket 
places, 6. water conduits and reservoirs, 7. preparation, spend of 
the village budpet passed by the vlllape assembly, B, leaslnp of 
vlllape to planters, 9. primary schools, 10, vlllaire bank and pady 
bank, stud bull and pedlf^ ree poat, 11. repistratlon of marrlape and 
death, 12, convelnp of villape meetlnp, 13- hearinp and settllnp of 
snsall disputes amonp the vlllapers, 1^. appointment and removal by 
the vlllspe headman of raliplous priests, police etc and 15. other 
related matters. 1 
The elQctorel law was promulpated provided for the election 
of desa headmen In Java and Madura. Inhabitants who coiald be able 
to render personal services were entitled to vote as well as members 
of the desa adajinistration, foriser headmen who had honourably left 
their function end rellfious teachers, mosque officials and the keeper 
of secret graves who had been recopnised by the chief of the division. 
The siiffrope also depended upon the possession of property and land. 
The electoral meotlnp took place in the villape in the presence of a 
t. Burgers op, cit. p. 167 
2. Can|>beli: op,cit. p.^0 
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coBoaission appointed for every sub-district by the chief of the 
division. A conanission consisted of at least 2 members. The 
voters elected fr desa headmen frora the list of candidates proposed 
by the villagers. This election should be approved by the 
recrency council, ^ he elected headman served his term for life so 
lonr as he w8S loyal to the I^ utch repime.l 
Qutside JavB| village unions and federations of unions had 
been established by the fovemment In 1918. The village administra-
tion of the west coast of -umstra, for example, was entrusted to 
e vlllsfe council and a desa headman. The council va« composed of 
popular chiefs or elders of the village and inhabitants of the 
village appointed from a list cf candidates by the head of regional 
adai nistr-tlon. These candidates mifht be able to read and write. 1h» 
council elected from Its midst a village chief who became leader of 
the council. Here decision of the council micht be preceded by the 
consultation prescribed by local customs. The headman of the desa 
mii^ ht execut* the decisions of the council. He was at the day to 
day administration in the desa &r^ mljrht call upon inhabitants to 
render cc"Rmunal services. But the council progress was handicapped to 
some extent by the adat prevailing In the country. The illiteracy 
of some cess headmen and their life terms of office also hampered 
the democratic development of the village institutions all over 
Indonesia. 2 
N.HTXV& STATES 
For the last 32 centuries Indonesia was under direct 
and indirect rule of the Ihxtch government. There were 282 native 
1. Ctbl. 1907, 212» Ibid, p.398 
2. Dr.De Kat Anfelino* op. cit.Chap. V,p. 1*01 
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states (indirect ruled states); 278 in tlw outer provinces and 
h in Java. TlMse states had more than half the area of Indonesia 
outside Java and 7 3& of that island. They differed greatly in size 
population, and iaportance. They ranged in population from 350 to 
1,70^^000 persons. The four states In Java possessed a population 
of 1,700,000(Surkarta), 1,W00,000(JokJakarta) 910,000 (Mangkunagara) 
and 110,000(PakualaiB).1 
As regards the administration of state, it wss divided 
into regencies, divisions, sub>-dlviiiions, districts, sub-districts 
and villsfes, Iftider the ruler or sultan, the administrative 
communities could continue to exist with their corporate administra-
tion, while in other cases direct administration organised by the 
ruler partly took the place of the adat chiefs. In som«e cases a 
ruler or sultan roverned with assistance of a council of state 
composed of members of his family to which were or were not added some 
popular chiefs I in other cases there was a council of state 
consisting of representatives of confederated small states with the 
influential sidtan as their leader. This system was called the 
corporate form of government. In south Celebes were this form fo 
the government was found, the federative states were composed of 
so called ornaraentships over which the chiefs had great authority 
because they were the keepers of certain sacred objects like meteroriei 
stones, flags, etc. 2 
Moreover, in art. ^, section 2 of the Indonesian state 
rtales, the governments of the states were empowered to appoint an 
1. B.ii.fflerson, iop. c i t . p.V59 
2 . De Kat Angelino: op c i t . p.llU-
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advisory council fcf they wished it. In view of the fact that 
in such a council by the side irrandeos soma popular chiefs might 
also be appointed, popular Influence might be able to establish 
a link between the lower adat communities and the government of 
states, in Java the sultan recant y had decided to establish 
representative advisory councils(Balal agung) whose functions might 
be gradually extended.1 
In short, the native states V9TB autocratic or oligarchie 
in character, they were outwardly ruled by their sultan, nominally 
hereditary and the regencies were under the leadership of regents 
selected by the Cutch authority from the most ar:-ristocrBtic family. 
The state law, finance and internal affairs were subject to the 
Dutch control, the sultan was not in reality an Independent prince. 
• 
The native princes recey*>ved Indemnification for the loss of 
their power Income. In Surakarta it amoianted to as much as £ 73,278 
annually and in Jakarta to ^  39,305. Besides this they had enormous 
Klncoraes from their private estates. A n the money was spent, however, 
in keopln up their huge establishments with their state and pomp,2 
RELATIONSHIP BfcTWi^ N THc, CLNTML GQVbBimENT AND THii. NATiVK STATES 
in the early days of the East India Company, the relationship 
between the central government and the native states was on a 
basis of equality. Later, treaties of alliance were made between the 
company and some of the states and the relationship between the two 
was that of confederate against other states. Later still the 
company began to exercise some authority in some of the native states 
but only on the basis of agreement. In the 18th century, the relation 
ship changed as the chapter of the company gradually shifted from 
1. Art.^ section 2 of the Indonesian state regulation 
2. De Angelino, op.cit. p.116 
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that of merchant to ruler. The native states now bepan to take 
a position of vassalage. The last example of an international 
state waf Achin before the Achln war (1870-1918). Thus the 
position of the native states was pradually reduced to from that 
of an independent state to a subordinate part of the Dutch East 
Indies Company., while the relationship |>etween the Esst India 
Company and the Hetherlandes and the natives states also shifted 
more and more from a Bilateral to a unilateral basis,1 
After an insnreection in Loiabok(1B96) and in Achin 
(1898), the government decided upon a new policy, which was later 
formulated in a declaration of policy by G.G., Van Heutsz in 190? 
This policy in theory included for? 
1. The judicious extension of Dutch influence in regions 
where the existing circumstances were a hindrance to welfare, social 
freedom, culture and civilisation, freedom and the development of 
the country and the people; 
2, The abandona^nt of the policy of abstension from 
Interference with the internal affairs of states left with greater 
or less degree of self government; 
3» Peaceful efforts so as to change the relationships with 
the native states and to prive satisfactory guarantee of a gradual 
improvement in admlnlstretion and Justice; 
^. Special attention to finance in order that the revenues 
mi|Bi:ht serve the development of the country end its people; 
5. A decisive insistence with the avoidance of anything 
which mipht lead to the use of force, that the rulers of the 
native states strlved for the welfare and the improvement of the 
1. De Kat Anfelino* op.cit. p.112 Van Vollenhoven; Kolonlal 
Tijdschrift, March, 1928, p.12? 
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economic conditions of the pejjple; 
6. The incorporation of the native states Into the ptovemment 
territory only takes place at the request of the chiefs or the 
people or where it appeared unavoidable in the interest of the people) 
7. In the Javanese principalities the administrative 
organisation which would lead to the gradual assimilstlon of social 
and economic conditions to those existing In the directly rtiled 
areas.l 
According to the short declaration signed by the Dutch 
authority and the native statc3S, the ruler of the state recognised 
the sov«rclsmty of the Nethailands or the paramountcy of the crovni 
promised not to enter into political relations with foreifn powers and 
apreed to execute and ffi£.intain all regulntions and rules which 
with the respect of the state were issued In the name cf the queen 
or C.C. cr his representatives end in peneral to carry out ??11 
orders eiven him by or in the nome of the fi.G, or his representative. 
At present there were 2^h native states who signed the short 
declr^retlon, while 'i^ others still maintained the Ion? declaration 
(contract),2 
The short declerations were supplemented by the native 
states regulations of 191**-, 1919 and 1927. The n^ jti-ve states 
regulation of 192? was regarded as a constitution for all native 
ststes and had forced them into a single mould no matter how great 
their actual diversity in size, pcpiilntion, traditions, customs, 
Institutional structures, etc. Ihe marttine belt was always excluded 
from the constitution. The botmdaries of each state were set by 
the head cf the district adtainistration after consultation with the 
ruler of the state. Disputes over boundary lines cf the states were 
1. Devld Wehl: Ihe Birth of Indonesia, London, 19^7, p.22 
2. Kat AnpelincJ op, cit. p.113* ^ VendenboschJ op.clt. p.1^9 
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settled by the chief district officer, subject to appeal to tl» 
G.G.Free \ise or cession of land might be granted to the central 
governinent whenever the latter required it, subject restitution 
to individtials who had claiias on it. The central government might 
grant concessions or licenses for the exploitation of the sub-soil 
within the states; the profits from these grants were divided 
equally between the central governioent and the states. The decision 
of the profits In each case woi:ild be made by the -.^. The C.G, 
might remove a ruler for misconduct in office. The successor to the 
office was made by the G.C. The fT'sndees or advisers to the ruler 
were appointed and dismissed by the chief district officers, after 
conFult?tton with the ruler, in the absence of a ruler the chief 
district officer temporarily took over the adm5nl??trRtlon of th« 
government. In Surakarta ond Jog.iakartB the G.G, appointed a 
speclsl Javanese, acting as immedlater between the resident and the 
native prince, being paid ^ 1000 a year.l 
Furthermore, there was far reaching power on the part of the 
appropriate local officials to declare applicable tc the native 
states rules and regiilBtlons which were in force elsewhere in directly 
ruled territories or alternatively by agreement with the rule»s, to 
secure the enactment in the states of identical legislation. 
The sultanates of Jog.lskarta and Surakarta in central Java 
were ruled nominally by the sultans. To these states, governors were 
appointed to, who with their staff took care of the relations between 
the indonesisn central government and the native states.2 
1. ^ (ielfbestuurs regelen, ^ 927^ Arts. 1,3,*+,6,7 and 8; 
Vpndenboscb! op cit pp.l^O-IJl 
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Theoritically, the native states were left free in the 
refulstion of their Internal affairs, but in practice they ^ ^re 
deprived of their jurisdiction and freedom of actions over the 
followlniK subjects^ 1. control of foreign affairs, 2. military 
defence, 3. importand export, h, possession end trade in fire 
arms, ammunition and explosives, 5. harbour, 6. police and 
administration. 7» telerraphs and telephones, R, prospectlnr and 
exploitinir of minerals, 9. repulprion concerning the disposel of 
land or the use of lend bv person not belonrinf^ to the native 
populetinn of indonesic, 10. the mutuel rights tnn duties of 
employers nncl employees or works, 11. wat?^ r boprd, 12. Bepul ^ -tlcm 
of the rlpht of association rtnd i^ ssem'oly nnd the llmltstion thereon, 
fnd 13» other related mattern.l 
Besides, tbo central -cvernraent i^ iomctlme took ever the 
administration of Justice ?rad larre part cf educ'tlon. All secondary 
oducstion, all lov?or eaucation for Europenns nnd Chinese, as lower 
education for Indonesian children with Dutch as the medium cf 
Instruction, was In the hajds cf the central frovernment, The G.G, 
(/trt,ir)re4iined the exclusive rirht to prohibit persons regarded 
as threatening the public peace nnd ordor-^ ^ froir; lanalninf in any 
state 01 tc asslpn to such persons s definite place of residence 
outiide the native stste.2 
The rulers of the states mu^t accept the ruidance of tlw 
i-viropean sdniinistrr tlon. The central fovernffient, under the fiction 
of furnishing aid, sent one of its services Into s stste to take 
over thr.t hranch cf tha stete adF.inistrtticn. 
/iccordinp to Art.lS of the netive strtc? repulrtion of 
1927, the follov;inr persons VKTQ excluded from the state's 
i . Pi.^mersonJ o p . c i t , p.^52 
2 . Art.18 of the s tp t e r e fu l - t i on of 192? 
10"^  
3\arisdiction and enjoyed full?/ the extra territorial rifht. 1. 
Europeans and those assimilated to them, 2, Non-lndipeneous 
Asiatics, 3« indonesian employees of the central governaient, ^ .All 
persons settled within the boundaries of the state on land ceded to 
or placed at the disposal of the central government, 5. Indonesians 
from the outside temporarily s^ Jjourinf within the state, and 
5. incionosi«»ns who had entered Intr a l^bcur contract- contract 
coolies nr\6. free labourers.1 
'Xhese subjects of the contrel rovornnient vera imder the 
^urisQiction of the central fovermaent in every respect, law, 
administration, police, justice and taxation. The number of 
persons enjcyln? extra-territoriality natuially varied from place 
to place, in the east coast of ^^umatra, their number was alraost 
twice as ths state own sub,-jects. Cf 10 mi'Ilcn (now 12,UO0,0CX)) 
total population of the states, about 700,000 persons were banifica 
ries of the system of extxaterritoriality. 
I'/lth repard to the Judicial field, the central Fovemment 
also Intelvened in the Jualcl^l problems of tha states, Various 
state's subjects had been broufht before the courts of the central 
government, All persons who enjoyed the extraterritorial rights 
vere under the jurisdiction of the central povf^ rnuient. The central 
t^ ovtrnFicnt'3 courts mipht take- jurisdiction, over offences arainst 
the secuilty of the realm or concerning the property Rnd revenue of 
the central government and over violations of fenernl snd local 
ordinances and repulf:tlons which were applicable to the state. -Even 
within their own limited sphere of jurisdiction tbe states courts 
1. Ai.aaeraon: op.cit. p.15^ 
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were of course subject to th« ruidanoe and supervision of the 
local Dutch adainistrators and elbaroete provision was made in the 
native state regulations for the review of their decisions. To the 
G.G. was reserved the exclusive rls^ ht of pardon as well as the right 
of review all death sentences before their execution. In brief, the 
states surrendered to the central government either the whole or s(»e 
part of their Judicial powers.1 
in financial matters, from ancient times all the incoiae of the 
state was at the free disposal of the ruler, i^ instruction of 1907 
provided for separstion between the income and expenditures of the 
rulers and the income and expenditure of tJ» state; the Introduction 
of yearly budgets and the fixing of the civil list for the ruler. As 
a part of Indonesia, the native states might contribute to the 
general expenditure of the central government. This contribution was 
made indirectly in the form of indirect taxes collected by the 
central government such as import duties, the Income from theopium 
and salt monopolies and mining concessions.2 
Of a total IncoB^ for all the native states in the outer 
islands of 19,622,000 florins In 1935» |he central government 
contributed 1,265,000 florins as IndemiifIcatlcn from the rights which 
It had removed from them and a further sum of ^,019,000 florins 
(1035) was the sum paid as restitution to the central government. The 
states might also make partial restitution for services of the 
agencies of the central government in functions for which there was 
a joint responsibility. In short, the bt»3get making and the budgetary 
1. Ibid p. 1*55 
2. Vandenboscht op.clt. pp.151-152 
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control had been passed Into the hands of the European officials 
on the spot. The state's revenue was very limited to the income 
of taxes over the trade, individual Income, public services, etc. 
Tli«y yet contributed huge amoiant of money to the central government 
annually.1 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
The Indonesian judicial orfaniaatlon can be divided into: 
1. Government courts for fiuropeans, 2. Government courts for 
Indoneftians, 3» government courts for all population groups, h, 
native state's cours, 5. priest courts, 6, military courts and 7. 
village courts. 
The governa»nt courts mSt for Europeans consisted of 1 high 
court at Jakarta, 6 courts of Justice at Jakarta, Semarang, Surabaya 
Padang, Medan and Makeasar, and 90 residency courts found in every 
capital and big towns all over IndcHiesla,2 
The high court of Jakarta was the highest court in the 
country. It consisted of 1 president, 1 vice-president, 7 members, 
1 attomy-general, 2 advocate generals, 1 secretary and 2 under 
secretaries. The president was appointed by the king, while other 
members were named by tYte G.G. with the advice of the council of the 
Indies. The high court had both original and appealate jurisdictions. 
It was also charged with the general supervision of the work of 
the lower courts. 
The eoicts of justice had also both original and 
appeallate jurisdictions in civil cases involving the Europeans and 
those who were subject to the European civil and commercial laws 
and in criminal cases over the Europeans,only. Their jurlsdictlcHJi 
1. Zelfbestuuren, ^ cylopadie, IV, p.830 
2, De Ket Angelinot op,cit. p,1*t5 
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extended over the Europeans and natives, foreign Aslat&s. 
The composition of the courts of justice of Jakarta, Surabaya 
and Semarang respectively was? President, 1,1, and 1 j vice-
president, 3» 2 and 1j oembers, 10,6, and 5; officers of the justice 
1,1 and 1; secretary, 1,1 and 1 and first deputy secretary 1,1 and 
1. 1 
TtkB residency courts constituted the lowest courts for the 
Europeans and vas coa^osed of a judge who was assisted by a secretary^  
The judpe of the residency court served in a double capacity, as he 
was also chairman of the landraad. in Java and Madura he might be a 
law graduate but in the other islands he was often an official of 
the interlim adminlstrstion. These courts had a civil jurisdiction 
involving the amount not exceeding over 1500 florins and over all 
labour agreements irrespective of nationality of the parties, in 
the outer territories these courts had jurisdiction over minor 
offenses.2 
The governnent courts for the Indonesians consisted of 
1. 90 landraad (siQ>erior Indgeneous courts), 2, over 79 regency 
courts and ^. over 395 district courts.3 
T>w landraad was instituted In every capital of regency 
and other places and was composed of an official judge(chairman) 
and several other members as well as a secretary, a clerk and 
ajdjaksa (prosecutor). The chairman of tlw landraad were mostly 
Kuropeans and very few Indonesians. The landraad was a general court 
for civil cases for natives and non-lndlgen.-ou8 Asiatics. Appeal 
could be made to the high court of justice at Jakarta. 
1. iDr.Suporaoi Sistem hukum di Indonesia, Jakarta, April, 195^,Chap.2 
p.30 
2. Arts. 77-80, 8^-99, I.K. 
3. Or.Supoi^k, op.cit. pp.lW6-1**7 
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The Togeney covert was set up in every regency, it i«is foraed 
by tl» regent or patihCgovernor) as its sole Judpe who was assisted 
by councillors. There were also a djakaa and penshulu as advisers. 
It decided both civil and erinlnal cases subject to appeal to the 
landraad. 
The district court was established almost in every district 
all over Indonesia and consisted of the head of the district as 
judge who was assisted by many indigens^us chiefs as advisers 
appointed by resident after consultation with the regent* 
Besides, in some places in the outer provinces, there were 
magistrate courts directly under the charge of magistrate. They 
decided crlminll oases for which there was no appeal as well as 
sometimes civil cases, subject to appeal before the landraad. 
Moreover, theri were also 52 land tribunals (Mf in Java 
and Madura and 8 in other islands) for all population groups, each 
consisting of a jurist who was assisted by a clerk. Tl^y decided 
minor criminal cases without appeal.1 
in the native states there were foxir kinds of courts* 
1. pradoto, 2. Surambi, 3» pradoto gede and h, inner kraton court. 
All these existed only in Surakarta, Mangkunagara and JogK^karta 
in Java, while the rest of the native states had lost their judicial 
powers. The pradoto court consisted of a judge(chairman), several 
members as advisers, secretary and djaksa. The surambi court was 
coB^osed of wadona Jogaswara as a judge, some subordinate officials 
and a secretary and that of pradoto gede comprising a chairman, 
some iwmbers (Katibs), a secretary, djaksa and penghulu(prlests). 
1. Dr.De Kat Angelino* op.cit, pp.155 
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Finally the inner Icraton court consisted of a chairnan, 2 
lumbers, 1 secretary, penghulu and djaksa. The prince(putera 
raahkota) acted a chairman and appointed all other mmBbers of the 
court .1 
Moreover, there were also 1, priest court(readagaaa), 
2. high priest court(makkamah Isles tinggi) at Jakarte 3.kadi 
court(penpradlIan kadi) and k, chief kadi court. The priest court 
consisted of a chairman, and 3-8 oembers appointed by the resident 
or governor. The high priest court comprised a president, 2 members 
a secretary and a deputy secretary. The kadi coiirt consisted of a 
kadi(judge), participants of the court session and a secretary and that 
of the chief kadi court, s chief kadi, participants of the 
court's session and a secretary. These priest courts followed the 
rules and principles of Mohammadan law and decided exleiastical 
questions such as family, marriage, divorce, Inheritance, etc.2 
in addition there were 1. military courts, 2. high 
military tribunal at Jakarta, 3. naval tribunals at Tjiwahi, Maccasar 
and Padang. The military court consisted of a president and k 
members appointed by the military commander and that of the high 
military court, 2 lawyers Cone of them becan© president), 2 high 
officers of the army, 2 high officers of the navy and a secretary. The 
naval tribunals comprised the naval officers.3. 
Finally, the village courts still existed throughout 
Indonesia. In the residency of J^ngkulen there was a great rapat 
(tribunal) presided over by the controleur, acting as the chairman 
1. Dr.H.Supomo* op.cit. pp.69-72 
2. Ibid. pp.76-79 
3. ibid.pp. U9-53 
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of the court, consisting of at least five chiefs of morg:as 
Cvlllage union) and independent chiefs of passers. The village 
rapats in other places consisted of a few headmen, in south 
Tapanull, the village court kas conducted by chiefs of the village 
coBBBunity, assisted by the village headmen. In central Sumatra 
the rapet neferl, rapat nlnik mamak and rapat kaum was presided 
over by the village headman, consisting of chiefs of tribes 
Kadi and priests. There was a village court in Ambon in every 
village, compasing of the village chief as chairman and members 
of the village council as members. The village court was baaed 
on the customary law. Appeal could be made to the district courts 
of the regency.1 
iSFFJaCTS OF THE FIRSy WORLD WAR ON INDOWESXA 
The first world war had considerably strengthened the 
national consciousness, progressed political reforms and Influenced 
the economic and social conditions of the Indonesian people through 
out the country. The natlonlist leaders were endeavouring to spread 
the spirit and sense of nationalism, liberalism and democraticism and 
to organise political movements to attain the Independence of 
their motherland. The Serikat Islam formed in 1915 advocated the 
struggle for national emencipfition. 
The national consciousness grew rapidly with the formation 
of iBultiferious netional organisation^and parties throughout the 
country. These orfranisations indluded the Budl utomo (1908), Minahasa 
association (1912), Mena Miffla organisation (1913),Wilhemina flssocia-
tion(l908), Aipbon bond(l919) Mohemmadiah movement (1918), natitmal 
1. Ibid, ppi.81-82 
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Indies perty (1919), Sumatra association (1918), society of 
students interested In Indonesia (1919), Indonesian social democ-
ratic association (191^), the Indonesian independence associaticwi 
or N.I.V,B,<1916), the Christian ethical party or C.E.P. (1917), 
Indonesian Catholic party or I.K.P.(1918), political economic 
league or P.E.8.(1919) Maduran association (1920), Maduran leagut 
(1925), Timor union (192^), Ahmadiah ]$oveaent(l92U-), Coraounist 
party of Indonesia (1920), hlfh council of Islam or Mlfi[l(l922) 
and nationalist party of Indonesia (1927). The serikat abanp (191W 
the sftTlkat Hejo (192^), the Indonesian trade union (1918) and 
others were also organised. The jambl revolution of 1916, the 
Padang congress of 1922, a pan Islamic congress of 192? at Bandung, 
the budi mtorao congress of July 30, 192*+ and the Indonesian 
student's association in the Netherlands, all struggled for 
national liberation and economic emancipation of the country.1 
With regard to political developments, certain reforms 
notably unification of the income tax, ele^ibility of all subjects 
to office, equal rights of the population in other respect as well 
legislation and creation of the votksraad came into effect only 
after the first world war (191»+-1918). 
The war had led to the loosing of ties which formerly bound 
Indonesia to Europe and consequently Indonesia had formed mercantile 
connections xdth other countries round the pacific ocean. There 
had been a general congress at Jakarta In 1922 and conferences for 
medicine and ethnology. Experts from various countries round the 
Pacific had visited Indonesia to study condition and public 
1. A.K.i'rlngfodigdo* op.clt, p.26j Aiting Buin» The Netherlands and 
the world war, 3 vols., New Haven, Holland, 1928, Chap.vll,p.90; 
and Viekke: op.clt, p.i8^" 
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educetlon there. A feneral congress of Jurists planned by 
Japan was held In Indonesia.1 
ii-ven before and during the war, the political freedom for 
i-ndonesla '-"as openly expressed by the Indonesian leader. Tjokroa-
minoto at the first national confess of 191^ 6. The war compilled 
t^« Dutch government to change their policy toward Indonesia. In 
1916, the Netherlands parliament passed s bill for the institution 
of the volksraad at Jakarta. The volksraad was materialised in May 
1918. It hRd an advisory functions and the franchise was vary much 
restricted. The majority of its members were Netherlanders residing 
in Indonesia. Sorae of Its members wore appointed by the G.G, £n 
192?, its membership was expanded to 60 persons. At the opening of 
the volksraad in 1918, the O.G,, J,P,C.?an L.Stlrua, said "The 
road has been taken, never to be abandoned, toward the goal of 
responsible government in Indonesia Itself, which in concert with 
the volksraad, shall have the ripht to take final decisions In all 
Blatters which are not of general imperial (state) concern. In 
proper time and degree, so far as is c<MBpatible with due appreciation 
of the consequences of each new step, we must proceed directly 
toward this end,"2 
In 1918, ainistor, M.Colijn, (prime minister in 1925) 
published an nrticle in which he declared that the institution 
of the volksraad would Intensify the wish for a complete parliament. 
The second session of the volksraad in the aJnitumn of 1918 pave 
further form end substance to this point of view. The volksraad was, 
durlnp the discussions, declared as revelation both to the governaent 
1. Altlng Bunlngs op.cit. p.111 
2. Ibid p.112 
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and to the coiantry.l 
The radical concentration in the volksraad, consisting of th* 
Indonesian social democratic union, the serlkat Islam, the insullnde 
part, the national -Indonesian vsTty and the hudl utomo domanded for 
convocation of a provisional parliament to frame a nev democratic 
constitution. For this purpose, the revision commission was 
appointed by the povornment on December 17» 1918, consisting of 30 
members such as Prof.Carpentior Altlng (chairman), Jacob, Utoyo, 
Badjiman, -uklman, Teevan, Wawaruntu, Arus railm, r.M.r,Xoch, 
D5rwl.« C't.XadJelelo, Cramer, H.H.Kan, Kinderman,Welter, etc.2 
In June, 1920, the coimaission submitted its report to the 
Ibvernment the following main proposals to be included In tl^ 
constitution of the kingdom of the Netherlands: 
1. Recognition of Indonesia as an independent part of the kingdom, 
the centre of gravity of the g^overnment, being shifted to indonetsia 
itself? 
2. Elevation of the volksraad to the status of a peneral co-
legislative representative body, to be constitute for the greater 
by election; 
3. Transference of government of Indonesia to a board formed by the 
G.G, and the council of the Netherlands indis, the former having 
authority to over-rijCLe the latter, and the members of this governing 
body, being charged with political control of the general adminlstra 
tive departments; 
V, Limltetlon of the authority of the legislative body in the 
Netherlands, (a) settlement of qucstLons concerning the klnpdcmi 
I.IBid 
2. Mobd. Natslr: Capita selocta, Jakarta, 195*f 
as a whole, (b) suspension or annulment of legislative measures 
adopted in Indonesia if contrary to the interest of the state, 
(c) and adjustment of disputes in dealinp with lefisletive measures, 
arising between the Government and parliament of indonesia? 
5. Transfer at least in principle, of the right of establishing the 
bT^ aget to the G.G, end the representative body in the Uetharlands 
similar to that mentioned in the preceding parapraphi 
6, Formetlon of all representative bodies, Including those in 
subdivisions of the country, msinly by fiirectlons and by establishini 
equal rlphts for all races, between which, therefore, no dlstlnctl<Mi 
can be roBXie except in the government of purely ne-tive cooimunities.l 
The amended constitution of t920 had accepted the principle 
of the autonomy of Indonesia and it presupposed the creation of a 
representative body to cooperate in legislation. At the same time 
a decision was reached in priiiciple to limit the authority both 
of the legislative body and the jyovernment in the Netherlands as 
regards the affairs of the oversea dominions.2 
In the military field, the world war had increased the 
importance of the defence problem in Indonesia, A navy bill was 
rejected in 1923 and new measures were now being prepared. The 
compulsory military service was introduced in Indonesia, in 1920, 
but the regulations of 1922-23, it was imposed only upon -Europeans, 
not upon natives or foreign orientals. As a result of the war, an 
energetic propaganda of the service was carried on by an Indonesian 
committee of defence, which was composed of representatives of 
various proups of inhabitants and which visited the Netherlands, 
1. Aiting Bunine : op.cit. p.113 
2. Ibid. 
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in 1916 to promote this principle, meeting with cardial appaieciation. 
The Indonesian social democratic union was afslnst the 
Indonesian defense movement, whereas the serikat islsm was in favour 
of this view and was of the opinion that decision upon compulsory 
military service could be made only by a really representative body 
elected by the people of Indonesia and thrt the Introduction of a 
mllita should be contigent upon grantin? political rlphts to the 
« 
natives. A militia bill was discussed durinp- the second session of 
the volksraad of t919» On Janusry 16, 1920, & motion was passed 
to postpone the bill. Since 1916, natives in indonesla mifht be 
trained as officers and If they had received their preparation in 
the Netherlands, they were on en equal footln? with European 
officers.2 
Kconoralcally, the war hod numerous consequances over the 
economic life of the country. In Indonesia the price of food supplies 
rose up and this led the government to intervene and take measures 
to prevent. Exports of majrize, pround-ntts, rice and cassava products 
were prohibited? the commissariat was instructed to take steps 
necessary for the purchase of essentials of life for officials 
of the state and where required for the civil population; maximum 
prices were fixed for some articles such as rice. In 191^, after 
1 or 2 months, most of the export prohibitions were withdrawn. 
The financial measures taken were the notes of Java bank 
which were declared to be leFal tender, the obllfratiory specie 
coverlnr beinp reduced from ^ to 20 ^  and the shape of activity 
of the bnnk of issue beinr extended to support commerce and 
1, ibid p.115 
2. ibicl p.116 
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and industry. In 1915, it becai^ necessary to prohibit exports 
of gold and silver coin end to issue notes of one and two an half 
guilders. The pold produced in Indonesia was purchased by the Java 
bank at the rate of 1,6M5 puilders per kilo fine. Ultimately, en 
ordinance was promulpeted which authorised the governi^nt to issue 
end mortfage treasury notes and exchequer bonds. A5 a result the 
price of food stuffs fell GIK' the prices for Indonesian export 
produce, due to hirh demand In the belliperent countries, rose 
f-^ftei their initial sharp decline,1 
lurinf the first few months of the war, absolute contraband 
and conditional contraband commodities mifht be transported freely* 
In tha second half of August, 191^, however, freifhtera were again 
put in service,aad cargoes were accepted for all destinations, though 
at a much hi«?her rate, ^ ccordlnR to a communiCRtlon from the section 
of industry and commerce this was fixed on August 1, 191^, at 15 
puilders per cubic nieter, Cn Aufust 12, freight retes for ell 
cormoJities were raised by 20 /». As .from i^ oveaber 20, the freight 
rate bas already ^0^ above that of AuFUst and on December 16, another 
20 p was added. The freight rate for coffee for example, had risen 
from 19.50 guilders on Aupust 1 to 30.50 guilders per cubic mater 
in i^ ecember. After September 3, no cargoes ware accepted for the 
central powers and all shipaents of rice, cocoa, coffee, tapioca, 
tea and rubber were stopped unless destined for a French or British 
port. Various other products could be consipned to the Netherlands 
g-overnment, while shipments of coffee in small quantities of 20 tons 
mirht he sent to the ifetherlands.S 
1. Ibid p.119 
2. Ibid p.63 
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in addition to the restraints upon the contraband 
commodities, trade was hampered by th© delays in telegraphic 
coojmunication due to the censorship and the closlnf of the ^ ap 
cable office and also in delays in the postal service. At the end 
of 191^» the price of refined sufar had risen from 7*50 guilders 
per picul in July to 12 puilders in August. Prices cf tobacco, 
coffee, tea, rubber and other Hiuropean plantation products were 
satisfactory. On the other hand, such native outputs as copra, 
peanuts, cassava products, maize and rice remained low because of 
export prohibitions and hiph freight rates, in 1915, prices of pepper 
cassava and copra had advanced considerably owln? to high demand 
from America. The Netherlands overseas trust company (N.O.T.ft) 
carried out Indonesian trade. From 1916 onward exports to U.S.A. 
Australia and Eastern Asia increased heavily and importers also 
began to order more and more goods from Amorica and Japan. As 
early as 191'f, the Netherlands steamship company and the f-otterdam 
Lloyd had beBan service from Java to New York round the Cape in 
Jan\iary, 1916.1 
By the end of 1916, owing to lack of carfo space, large 
stocks were stored in warehouses and only cinchona and tobacco could 
be exported freely to all destinations. Consequently the prices of 
riee, sugar, bread and clothing had risen to about 1^ 0 in 1916, as 
compared with 100 in 191^. Food stuffs of foreign origins such as 
flour, maizena, maize, etc. were en enavorafe 50 ^ dearer than in 
191^, while textiles had risen by about 30> in 1916. 
1. Ibid p.6^ 
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Indonesian exports and imports with the U.S.A. and Japan 
in millions of guilders in 191^ and 1916 were as follows: U.S.A. 
imports, 10 and 31 millions and exports, 16 ond 98 millions; Japan 
6 and 27 m, and 19 and 18 m. In 191'*- end 1916 the Japanese business-
men visited Indonesia to study economic conditions of the countr-y 
end to capatttire Indonesian markets for their manufactured roods* 
Jakarta had beccme an important market durinp the war.l 
In July, 1917, the Indonesian commerce and agriculture was 
seriously affected, when the T»ctherlonds withdrew vessels under its 
flap from Indonesia traffic. C^ nly 5 ships arrived in the Netherlands 
from Indonesia and only 16 vessels sailed to Indonesia. Prices of 
sugar, coffee, rubber, etc. fell down considerably. In 1918, Indonesia 
faced with an increasinp shortage of food stuffs. This was due 
to the embargoes on the export of rice from f'ansroon in October, 1917 
In Deceraber, 1917, the Fovernroent of Indonesia imported ^0,000 
tons of rice from lianeoon and 85,000 tons of rice from other countries 
in 1918, Flour was purchased in Australia, soya beans were imported 
from Manchiiria and sago was brought to Java from the outer 
provinces.2, 
^ In 1918, the value of Indonesian export to Europe declined; 
65 million guilders in 1918, 300 m. in 191V; to the U.?^ .A., 110 m. 
in 1918, 200 m. in 1917, 16 m. 1911; to Japan 78. m. in n»1B, 31 m. 
in 1917, 19 m. in 191^; to Singapore, 28 m. 20 m. in 191^. In the 
same year Indonesia imported from iiurope to the value of 95 millions 
1. Ibid pp. 65-57 
2. Ibid p. 68 
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gui lders (79 of which came from Br i t a in alone) es apalnst 235 o. 
(191^); from U.S.A., 62 m. (61 m. In 1917> as against 7 m, in 191^| 
from Japan im- m. (55 a . in 1917) as against 7 m. in 191^; from 
Singapore, 13^ o. as a fa ins t 7 m, in 191^; and from Aus t ra l ia , 21 m 
as against 10 m. in 191^? the balance coming from eas tern Asia.l 
The year 1919 and 1920 formed the period of apparent 
p rospe r i ty . Comaidltles produced by Indonesia l i ke sug:ar, t e a , 
rubber e t c . were sold a t f a n t a s t i c p r i c e s . Commerce and agr icu l ture 
prof i ted twice. The t o t a l values of the Indonesian exports from 
1913 to 1923 In mil l ion gui lders were? In 1913, 68»*; 191^, 6Bh^ 
1915, 771? 1916, 868; 1917, 793; 1918, 680; 1919, 2,167; 1920,2,238 
1921, 1,196; 1922, 11«*9, 1923, 1,378. The difference of the value 
)HA of exports between 1913 end 1923 was pbout 690 mil l ion fu i lders .2 
The Java bank In i t s report published the export f igures 
for Java and Madura In 192^- as follows* Not l e s s than 1,829,000 
tons of ref ined sugar were shipped from Java in 192lf and export of 
Java tobacco rose from 38,000 tons in 1923 to 50,000 In 192^, of 
coffee from 21,000 to 39,000 tons and of r i c e from 35,000 to 38,000 
tons , of ma»lze from 38,000 to 79,000 tons and coconut o i l from 1.W 
mil l ion l i t e r s to 7.9 mi l l ion . The pr ices of most ccsamodities were 
higher In 192^ than in 1923, the export value of the former should 
be over 1500 mil l ion gulld4jm,3 
Another consequence of the war was the increased yields 
of the lncoit» taxes for 191*4- to 1923, amountlnp to 3,378 mil l ion 
gu i lde r s . Before the war I t was estimated a t about 20 mil l ion gui lders , 
1. Ibid p . 70 
2 . Ibid p . 71 
3 . ibid p . 93 
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annually. Tha hsndalsreni^hinf Aasterdam and the c\]lt\inr 
naattsehappi;) der varstende ineraased their capital investnents in 
Indonesia by 8,OCX),000 and over 10,000,000 guilders respeetively. l 
I t also affected the Indonesian budfot* The public debt of Indonesia 
increased by about 1125 mill ion guilders, bein? due to def ic i t s ,on 
(a) ordinary expenditure, 225,000,000 guilders, (b) extra-ordinary 
expenditure ,886,000,000, (c) expenditure for navel extension, 
26,000,000 and (d) expenditure for food, 8,000,000; t o t s l , 
1 ,125,OOOTJ^OOO r u l l de r s , 2 
The raet ordinary expenditure ssio"unted in 1913 to 156.600,000 
gui lders snd 3,800,000 gui lders (I91*f-1925). The Indonesian revenues 
appeared In bixiget for 1926 were as follows; Taxes, 103 million 
fu l lders (1913) r?nd 27*f.ai<1926); surpla-? nonopolias, 35 m. (1913) 
=nd 52 m, (1926); surplus cstpbllBhments, 11 m, <1913) and 36m. 
<1926); surplus products , jU- m, (1913) nnd kh m. (1926); ?md 
alEcel laneous , 7 m. (1913) nnd 13 TS. (1926). The t o t a l value of the 
revenue wos 190,OX,000 gui lders in 1913 '-nd '+19,000,000 in 1926.3 
The govDrnment axpenditures for 1926 were 56 iTiillirn 
gui lders in 1913 snd I38 mi l l i cn In 1926 for c i v i l s e rv ice , se l f 
fovernment, j ud ic i a ry , p o l i c e , prison col loc t lon of t a x e s , pensions, 
adminis t ra t ion , e t c ; 57 ra. in 1913 m^ 109 m. In 1926 for defence 
km, in 1913 pnd PB in. in 1926 for i n t o - e s t pnr- sinkin? fund; 12 m. 
in 1913 "'nd 36 iti. in 1926 for public i n s t i t u t i o n ; 6 m. in 1913 and 
16 m. 1926 for c i v i l medic?;l s e rv i ce ; 25 tn. 1913 ^-nc 1? m, in 1926 for 
c i v i l public vorks; 2 m. In 1913 "nd 5 m, in 1926 for f i s h e r i e s and 
5 ra, in 1913 f''n(^ 9 m. in 1 .)26 for miscellaneous end t o t a l 167,000,000 
in 1913 ^ne MP,DOC,OOP in 1926. 
1. Ibid . 0.95 
2. Ibid , p.121 
Ibid • pp.12 
Ibid . p. 125 
3. . 2-123 
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Finally the increasing effiployiaent of official in the government 
offices led to increase the administrative expenditure. The 
officials employed in the various departments were in 191^, 56,000 
in 1919, 75,500 and in 1923, over 100,500; but in ^92h- the number 
was reduced to 93,800. It was not primarily the pay of native 
officials which had caused the item of salaries tc bGCome so 
larpe. Out of a total of 160,000 officials nearly 1UO,000 were 
natives and 20,000 were Euiopeans. Cf these 1^0,000 natives, 117,500 
received not quite 600 guilders per annum, whereas only 65Cthe 
repents) had an annual income of more than 12,000 g-uilders. Of the 
20,000 E;iropeans, on the other hands, over 750, received 120,OCX) 
guilders and more; over ^00 drew between 5,000 and 10,000 
guilders end only 630 were in receipt of less than 600 pullders. 
The averspe income of the native civil servants was about 650 
guilders per anniaa and thct of his i^ uropean colleges over 5 times 
as much. The travelling expenses for civil servants from and to 
Indonesia rose from wit about 2,770,000 guilders in 1913 to more 
than 17,000,000 guilders in 1926.1 
1 Ibid. p.126 
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C H A P T E R I I 
( 1926 - 19^} 
PART A: THK SYSTEM OF NATIONAL PARTIES. 
Nationalist Party of-in^ongala ^ P . N ^ I . ) . 
After the drastic suppression of oonmunist activities by the 
Dutch government tn January, the Persatuan nasional Indonesia 
(P.N.I,) was founded in July, 192? by Dr.Sukarno at Bandung, This 
party essentially nationalistic, based imt on religion as the 
serikat Islam, nor on party doctrine as the comaunist party, but 
on nationalistic principles. It was an organised political party 
with a definite aim- Indonesia merdeka, that is the liberation of 
Indonesia from the colonial yoke through conscious popular movement 
based on native force and ability. By means of ncm-cooperetlon with 
col(»iial governiront it attempted to attain political independence and 
to erect a national administrative system within the frame work d the 
eidsting general administration.1 
The moving spirit behind the P.N.I, were the repatriated 
members of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian association) in 
Holland and other members of general study club at Bandung. The first 
executive oeMOBittee were composed of the following p0«Tsons: Chairman 
Sukarno, secretary, lahak Tjokro hadsurjo, commissary, Sams! 
Sastritiidagda, Sartono, Stmarjo and Anwar 1, Onder the leadership 
of these persons, the P.N,I, socm became a dynamic power in nationalist 
movement• 
Sukarno was the leader of the propaganda activities 
1, Kahin* op,clt, p.90 
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of the party and soon shown not only as a gr«at orator but also 
as natiiral leader of the masses. During the first year, the party 
held a nunber of propaganda iroetings at Bandung and other large 
cities, each meeting droving more crowds than the last, speeches 
<»i different subjects specially the principles of the P.N.I, were 
delivered by btilliant speakers of the party.1 
In 1928, the propaganda activities of the P.N.I, were 
extended to cover small towns and villages and leaders were sent 
out to remote pieces to meet and talk with the masses at their native 
Jiaunts, For this purpose, the P.N.I, set up a sort of people's 
university, in which members were given course in propaganda work. 
These trained propagandists not only sought followers for their 
party among the -Ullage and mountain people, but they also preached 
their party disciplines in other associations and institutions. In 
this way, within one year, the party had already 600 members, most of 
whom were foimd either in Jaakarta or Bandung. 
The P.N.I, leaders now stressed the Indonesian unity idea 
in their speeches. They used the Indonesian language in their meeting 
ar^ also in their party organ. The persatuan Indonesia in which the 
principles and aims of the party as well as its non-cooperstion 
tactics were set forth for the benefit of those who could not ccaae 
to their meetings. They adopted the white and red flag with a bull's 
head on it as their party flag and held it up to the masses as their 
symbol to free Indonesia. They were also the first to use the 
Indonesia raya, now accepted as the national anthem, in their 
meetings.2 
1. Indonesia Review, April - June , 1951 Jakarta, p.211 
2. Kahint op.eit. p.91 
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The P.N.I, endeavoured to form a national front. For this 
purpose, they took the initiative in the orfanisation of a fiederatlon 
of nationalist societies in December, 1927* ^is federation called 
Permufakatan perhiapunan • perhispunan politik kebangsaan Indonesia 
or P.P.K.I.I,( a federation of the Indonesian political parties) 
was composed of 7 political parties* the P.N.I., the serlkat Islam, 
budi utomo, lasundan, kaun Batavl, the Snrabaya study club and the 
Sumatra bond. The main purpose of this federation was to unify tt and 
establish the activities of the member societies and to carry out 
this pxxrpose and advisory council ctMprised of a representative of 
each party plus a chairman and secretary was set xxp* Dr.Sutomo, 
u. 
leader of the ^abay stiffly club, was chosen as the first chairman. 1 
In a meeting held at Bandung in December, 1928, the P.P.P.K.I 
decided to flfht for the abolition of the penal sacntlon an3 certain 
other articles of the criminal code, to set up a ccxomisslon on 
national education and to devise means for the release of the 
exiles at Boven Dl^ul. The Indonesian association in Holland was 
meanwhile appointed as their advance post for foreign propapandfi*In 
the economic field, it organised Indonesian cooperative imion for 
the support of the native industries and the development of coopera-
tive societies in Indonesia. 
In •iay, 1928, in his speech before the volksrasd, the G.G. 
alluded to the propaganda carried on by the P.N.I,, calling: it 
revolutionary nationalistic propaganda, hinting that its revolutionary 
nature would hifft its own cause. In July 1929, when the propaganda 
1. Ibid. p.112i Biumberger, de nationalistische beweging in 
Netherlandsch Indie, pp.206-2Mf 
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speeches of the P.H.I, had become almost violent In their attack 
on cononialism and capitalism, the government informed the 
volksraad that the P.N.I, had been sufficiently warned that they 
would be responsible for their words and deeds and the reaction 
that might be expected from the tmeducated masses. In October, 1929 
the governor of west Java forbade tl» members of his police corps 
from joininp the P.N.I,; the same prohibition was laid down by the 
commander of the Dutch East Indies army (K.N.I.L.) for ^ his 
entire personnel.1 
In December, 1929, the government searched the houses and 
offices of the P.N.I, leaders. 8 persons were arrested, h of whom 
were later prosecuted, nanwly Sukarno, Gatat Mnapkupradja, f^ askun 
and Supriadinata. The suhseqiient trial was going from August 18 
to December 22, 1930* The sentence of four year imprisonment passed 
on Sukarno was later reduced, while Oatot M8ngkuprad;Ja was released 
after one year of imprisonment. On April 25, 1931| the P.N.I, was 
officially dissolved. 2 
As a result of the removal of the P.N.I, from the 
political field, the Suiabaya study club chenped in October, 1930 
its name into Persatuan Bangsa Indcmesia (Indonesian jmity) and 
opened its membership to ell Indonesians. It assumed a cooperative 
attitude towards local ^ovennment councils but its members mifht 
not refuse to sitting in the volksraad as a protest against the 
government treatment of the P.N.I.leaders. 
The ex-members of the P.N.I, split up into two groups 
after the official dissolusion of the party. Thost rallying around 
Sartono organised a new party called the partal Indonesia(partindo) 
1. Indonesia review* op.cit. p.112 
2. Blmmberger: op. cit. p.907 
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at the end of April, 1931» "^ be pertlndo had the sass elms of th« 
dissolved P.N.I., that is to strive for e free Indonesia on self 
help and self ability. Jfr.Sartono was elected as president of the 
partindo. In October, 1931, the party established 12 branches with 
1,700 members and 2** branches with about 7»000 members in October, 
1932 and 71 branches with about 20,000 members in 1933« Because of 
the ftrrest of its leaders in December 28, 1933, It withdraw frcwa 
P.P.I.K.I. in February and in November, 1936, it was oflicially 
dissolved. 
The remainders formed the Indonesian national education 
party (new P.K.I.) in November, 1931» under the leadership of 
Dr.Mohd Hatta. Mr.Sutan Shahrir joined the party in 1932. In June 
26, 1932, the P.N.I, had established 65 branches with 2,000 members* 
With a new vigour then, the partindo snc the P.N.i., both based upon 
national independence, took the lead in the orpanisation of the 
Indonesian national movement. They were however not allowed to 
function in peace. The frovernment stepped in with its strong measures* 
Early in 1938, Sukcrno was re-arrested and interned on the island 
of Floras until 1938, whence he was removed to Bengkulen ar^ lastly 
in February, 19^2, to Padang. Both Hatta and -hahrir were also 
arrested in the same year and exiled to DIRUI and then to Eanda 
Nelra. Their two parties were suspended under the meetinfrs 
prohibition Act.1 
After the failure of the serikat Islam to accept the 
1. Indonesian review No,3* op.cit. pp.211-213 and Prinegodipdo* 
op.clt. p.127 
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extresra proposals of Semaun's faction, he and other leaders of 
the social denocratic association undertook to cemvert their 
orii^ anisatlon into the coHJiBUnlst party of Indonesia in May 23,1920. 
Seraaun was elected as president, i^ arsono as vice-president, 
Berfsman as secretary and H,W,Dekker as treasurer. 
The P.K.I, developed a close relationship with the Comintern, 
^oinlnf that orfanisation at the end of 1920. Sneevliet, who re-
presented Indonesia at the second congress of the Comintern in 1920 
esteblished contact with the Indonesian party via Shanghai and in 
1921, Darsono went to Moscow to represent Indonesia at the third 
congress of the Comintern, Tan Malaka, one of tho party's top 
leaders, represented Indonesia at the fourth congress in the subse-
quent year and took an active part in framing; its policies, in 
Aupust, 1923, %maun was arrested and forced to leave the country 
or face exile to Tinor and by tlw end of the year all iJutch leaders 
of the party had also been forced to leave. According: to Semaun, 
the departure of the *Jutch leadeis from the party raised the 
prestife of the party in the eyes of tho caasses, because of 
existing prejudice aj^ ainst the F^ utch, wahiLtever their attitude 
towards colonialism,1 
Indonesian communists look to the comlntcrn for guidance 
but not to the Netherlands commwiist party. At the fift|i congress 
of the Comintern in 192^, Semaun bluntly indicated that the Nether-
lands communist party was more of a liability than an asset to the 
Indonesian conmuniitsts. 
In the meantime, the leaders of serikat Islam like 
Abdul Muiz were not in rood term with the members of Semaun faction. 
1, BlumberRerx Le comraunisme nxa. Indies Neelandaises, Peris, 1929, 
p.18 
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They made violent attack af^ alnst the fovernnent which stirred tha 
population. As a result, short Insurrection in Toll-Toll In the 
Celebes, TJlaorcans, west Java lod by a local serlkat Islam leader, 
took place In 1919 arainst the povemaent In protest against 
Its collection of rice. By the end of December, 1929, the serlkat 
Islam successfully managed to unite 22 Indonesian trade unions, 
tojitalllnp 77fOOO members, under one of its leaders, B.M.Surjopranoto 
At its first congress in August, 1920, '^ eafiun was elected ehairman» 
Surjopranoto, vice chalrsian, end H.Afrus Sgiim, secretary. 1 
Diie to his failure to wrest control of the orfanisatlon from 
the B.I., Semeun in June, 1921, was successfully in settinp up a 
rival association of the trade union, the revolutionary trade uAlon 
Central. 
The struggle between the r>,I, gnd P.K.I, came to an end when 
H.Afus Salim seconded by Abdul Muiz, introduced a notion at the 
6th national congress of S.I, in October, 1921, calling for party 
disciplines and requiring that no members of S,I. could at the same 
time hodl membership in any other party. Whereas Semaun and Tan 
Halaka deadly opposed the motion and accused the S,I, of belnf 
capitalist and anti-ieclallst. Finally, after R.A.Sdim answered the 
questions, a vote was taken with a lare'e majority of delepstes 
favouring the party discipline and the cotomunists present resigned and 
communists controlled branches of Semarang and its --icinity seceded. 
The cofmnunists within h years could control most of t>» 
1. Scmaunt the situation in Indonesia, co-report to the 6th congress 
of the Comintern, 30th session, August, 15 1928 
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local branches of ^. I. but raost of their larfre pea^ a^nt n^abershlp 
melted away. This was due to two reasons* 1. the government's 
Increasinfly effective barring of contact between the leaders and 
the peasantry and (2) the coarounists alianated the peasant members 
by violatinf their religious sensitivities. % 1926 the conmitinists 
had apparently realised the sericusness of this mistake and change 
their tactics.1 
In order to win control of the S,I,branches, the communists 
at their congress of December, 25 1921 at Senaran? decided to set 
a red serikat Islam headquarters to comete with the orlfrlnal central 
leadership of Tjolroaminoto, ^ allm, and Mulz. At the befinninp: of 
1922, Tan J^ ialaka orfanised a feneral strike of ipovernment pawn ^ M>p 
employees embracing all Indonesian labours. The revolutionary trade 
uliion central called upon all works to fo on sympathy strike but 
was not successful and Tan Malaka arrested by the fjovernawnt and 
plven choice of exile or leavlnp Indonesia, for left Bussia. 
After returninr home from 7 months visit to Moscow to 
attend a Par fiestern labour conference on Kay 22, 1922, Semaun on 
September 3» 1922 at a peneral meeting of Indonesian labour 
organisations at Medium, was successful in pulling the member-
unions of the trade union central away from the control of its 
leaders into a new all-embracinr xmion known a Union of Indonesian 
labour unions in which the communist party leaders were dominant.2 
In February, 1923, the leaders of the S,l, due to growing 
communist influence, extended party discipline to all constituent 
parts of the organisation. In retaliation the coimnunists at their 
1. K«hini op.clt. p.76 
2, Bluabergart De nationalistisch beweglng in Nedelandseh-Indies, 
P.35 
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March congress decided to establish sections of red serlkat Islam 
wherever there was a branch of P.I., recruiting their members from 
these branches. The name for these new communist-controlled unit» 
was changed to ^«rlkat Bakjat ( People's Association) and they were 
conceived of as a foundation of the communist party in the masses.l 
The pan Pacific laboiir conference held under Comintern 
auspices at Canton in Jiine, 192^ -, and attended by 2 important 
Indonesian coianunist leaders, Allmln and Btudi Sutjitro, decided to 
control trade union movement as it was emphasised by the 5th 
congress of th© comlntern In June-July, 192M>, 
The Indonesian communist party was adherent to this decision 
Aiiarcham, e secretary of peasant party, introduced at the meeting 
of the party in December, t92lf, a resolution calling for the dlssolu -
tlon of the sorlkat rakjats and their replacement by trsde union as 
the party's mass base. The serlkat rakjet, he argued, contained too 
many bourgeois nationalists who could not be counted upon in time of 
violent revolution. Aiiarcham's proposition was strongly attacked, 
finally a compromise was reached. The serlkat raXtfits were gradually 
dissolved, while the comBBunists concentrated their forces on the 
trade union movemeiit. In addition it was agreed that the cadres of 
the O.K.I, had to be disciplined and their qiiality improved so that 
they would be able to undertake effective revolutionary action. 
Finally the programme drown up demanded the establishment of a soviet 
republic of Indonesia.2 
1. Sitorus* op.cit. pp.30-32 
2. Semaun* International imperialism and the communist party in 
Indonesia, 1926, p.121^ 6 
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Diirinp the coiirse of 1925h, the P.K.I, controlled a greater 
number of trade unions and organised strikes. Thouirh S,l,leaders 
had tried to brlnp about nationalist solidarity early in 192M-
at a joint meeting with the P.K,I. and budi utomo, the communist 
appeared not to wish re-approachoent with their bourgeois national-
ists. Substantial cooperation was effected by the P.K.I, with the 
comwunists among the Chinese labouring community but in general the 
social base of the communist movement shrank greatly dtiring 1925.1 
The leadership of the Comintern particularly the leaders of 
the soviet Russia, had taken a particular interest in Indonesian 
and were dlstld-bed at the failure of Indonesian communists to follow 
the orthodox interpretaticwi of the 192V Comintern directive. Stalin 
speaking at the end of May, 1925, accused tlra Indonesian ooiratinists 
of leftist deviation.2 
The Executive coimnittee of the Comintern in its plenary 
session of March, 1925, specially called upon the communists in 
Indonesia to form a united anti-imperialist fron with the non-
communists Indonesian nationalist organisations and to utilise the 
S.B. as an independent national revolutionary organisation linked 
up with the masses. A spokesman for the comintern noted some 6 months 
latter that despite growing pressure from the rank and file of 
non-comuunist nationalist organisations for a united front against the 
Dutch and the efforts of Tjokroaminoto in the summer of 1925, to 
start ney^otiatlons with the P.K.I. leaders vt for such a block,the 
negotiations had led to no results.3. 
During the course of 1925, the extreme elements within 
1. Ibid. p. 81 
2. J.Stalin* Marxism and the national and colonial question, 
Moscow, 19^, p. 192 
3. The revolutionary movement in the east coamunist internatl(»ial 
Leningrade and London, No.18-19 m.1926, ppl13-115 
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the Indonesian eomnunist party came under the control of Aahlan 
and ^^ ukra, Itaders who refused to take orders from the regular 
party leadership. They continually agitated for revolution and 
resorted to terroristic methods in order to dominate the party. In 
their efforts they were hacked by 2 of the important established 
party leaders, Allmin and Musso. This frroup was able to dominate 
a decisive meeting: of the executive committee of the party and the 
leaders of the principal communist-controlled trade unions held at 
the temple of Prambanan in mid October, 1925. As a result, revoluti<m 
was decided upon. A strike by the railroad workers was to be the 
slpnal for a general strike which was in turn to develop into the 
revolution in which the Putch power to be overthrown and replaced 
by that of the communist party. For the revolution to be a success 
It was felt neces^ Iary to have the support of Moscow and of the 
prominent Indonesian communist leaders forced to remain outside 
Indonesia. Of these the support of Tan Maiaka- the Comintern's 
aeent for south east Asia and Australia- decided by the ^th congress 
of the Comintern in 1922, was felt to be particular essantlal.Z To 
aks for Moscow's support without his backing would be awkward, it 
was realised. In order to have time to mobilise this support and to 
make the necessary preparations in Indonesia this support and to 
make the necessary preparations tn Indonesia, the date for the 
revolution was set for June 18, 1926.2 
The activities of the communists during the interim period, 
however, did not develop as had been planned. On Novemeber 28, 1925 
the government suspended the right of assembly throughout Indonesia 
1. Tan Maiaka, Thesis, Jakarta, 19^7, pp. 39-M, 59-60 
2. Annuaire de documantation coloniale comparee, 1927,p.190 
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for the communist party| the S.E, and most of the communist-
controlled laboxir organisations. As a result, the strategic sequence 
of strikes thst the communists had planned at Prsmbanan did not 
go off as s*cheduled. The major strikes of workers in metallurgical 
concernes and dock workers broke out in Surabaya in the middle of 
December, 1925, 6 months ahead of 8«)li?(fuled. 1 In the suppressicm of 
these strikes the government cracked down hard arresting most 
of the important lebour leaders concerned in addition to 3 of the 
remaining top leaders still in Indonesia, Darsono, Aliarcham and 
Mardjoha,2 
The failure of the communist revolutionary effort was due 
mostly to the great schism in the ranks of Indonesian communists. 
The Mslaka had deadly opposed the prambanan decision taken at the 
P.K.I, congress of December, 192^^, calling for the dissolution 
of the S.It, So he refused to come to Singapore, because he knew that 
the people assembeled there would out-vote him and his suppoKTters ani 
that according to the formula of democratic centralism, he would 
call upon to abide by their decision.Alimin was then sent by the 
coimDunists assembled at Singapore to see him in Manila. Tan Malaka 
refused to sanction the plans for revolution and maintained th^ 't 
any way the decision had to be made in Moscow in consultation with 
the Comintern. Finally he gave IHimin a document stating his 
reasons against the Prambanan decision to be communicated to the 
group in Singapore and the P.K.I leadership on Java and Sumatra. 
1. Ibid J Mass Actie, Jakarta, 19*+7, pp.^5-50, 56-61 
2. Ibid: p.V5 
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Allmln did not deliver this document to the group in -Ingapore and 
apparently led theas to believe that Tan fjalaka as he ?!nd Musso did. 
This ^roup then voted to support the Prambanan decision and Alimin 
end Husso were dele^ 'ated to proceed to ^ o^scow to ask for its 
clearance and support for the revolution,1 
Shortly, after their departure Tan Malaka arrived in Sinfapwe 
where he p»Bsuaded at least two of the commimist leaders, -ubakat 
and DjaraaluddL-n Tamin, that conditions were not favourable for a 
revolution. Tamin was piven a copy of the memorandum previously 
given to Alimin and ijiaediately left for Indonesia. With this he 
travailed through Java and Sumatra contactinp most of local leaders 
of P.K.I,, many of whom he was able to dissuade from backing the 
projected revolution. Tarotn*s final efforts rai^ht have been 
considerably aided by the circulation of the booklet written by 
Tan Malaka in the middle of 1926 and printed in Singapore a few 
months before the revolution broke out in Jsvn, This booklet, Mass 
actle, incorporated points made in his memorandum. In it he argued 
that a successful revolution demanded mass support. A putsch by 
leaders divorced from the masses never succeed, he warned. If inde«d 
the communist leaders possessed the necessary support, they had 
already let the psychological and practical moment for revolt, he 
said. That should have eccured , he maintained. Immediately upon the 
Dutch arrests of P.K.I, and labour leaders and the suspension of the 
rlfht of assembly at the end of 1925. 2 He concluded by Fuesting 
whether the P.K.I, had sufficient mass backing and whether Marxist 
education had been correctly and sufficiently plven so that our work 
have Marxist stability and Lenist elasticity. If this were not 
1. Tana Malaka* Mass Actle, Jakarta, 1926, p.39 
2. Ibid J Mass Actle, Jakarta, 19*f7, pp. ^ 5-50,56-61 
135 
If this vere not the case, he foresow, chaos In the whole 
revolutlonsry movement in Indonesia.1 
Alialn and K\jsso arrived in Malays in the middle of Deceaber, 
1926, having returned from Koscow via Canton. On December, 18 
tl^y were arrested by the British In Johore, neither returned to 
Indonesia^ Whatever the reactions of Moscow to their proposals, 
they had never made it public. 
The communist party was forced to operate more and more 
underground while deprived of Its ablest leaders. Its activities 
became less and less coordinated, with the extremist leaders who 
had dominated the Prarabanan conference manafrln? to maintain their 
ascendancy in mtch of Java despite the anti-revolutionary prose-
lytising of Tamin, leader of P.K.I, in central Sumatra. During 
the first 10 months of 1926 more snd more of the coamunlst leaders 
were arrested. Intra-organisational contact was progressively 
dlsruped as was attested by uncoordinated sporadic out-breaks of 
violence at widely Isolated place* throughout Java. The accel ra-
ting disintegration of the communlt party organisations was 
accompanied by a rapid loss of contact with former peasant si^ jporttet 
many of whom were in any case being alienated by the policies of the 
inferior communist leadership in Indonesia. The communists postponed 
the date of the revolution and not until the night of November, 
1926, did it break out. The revolution broke out first in Jakarta 
and a full month later in Padeng, central Suaistra, after the 
revolution In Java had been completely crushed.2, 
At the end of December, 192^, there were 36 branches of the 
1. Ib id . p.if? 
2 . KahlnJ o p . c i t . pp . 83-B^ 
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P.K.I, with 1 1 ^ Bombers and 3 ^ branches of Serlkat Hak^at, 
totalling 31 ^ l^^- members. The following years, the F.K.I membership 
increased to 3000 based on 65 branches. Therefore, probably the 
most that the communists could count on in their revolution were 
some 3»000 party members and e mass base of no more than 31 
peasants and a some what smaller number of urban labourers. Th&re 
were 5,000 persons actively involved in either the Java uprising 
or on the west coast of Sumatra. Only in Bantam and In central 
"Sumatra were the communists able to rely on a measure of si:qpport from 
the local peasantry. The revolution every where was crushed. As 
Semaun himself admitted, the masses of the works in the cities as 
well as on the plantations adopted an attitude of Sifiirence 
towards the revolutionary movement.1 
The reasons of the failure of the commimist revolution were 
substantially to limited and confined work of the communist effcarts 
on Java and to the west coast of "umatra and the ruthless measvires 
taken by the government to annihilate all organisations. It was Tan 
Malaka and his associates thet caused chiefly ths failure of the 
communist revolution. On charge of being Trotskyist by Musso, 
Allfflin and other leaders of the P.K.I, based upon his refusal to 
accept the Prambanan decision, his effort to stop the revolution, 
shortly after the end of the revolution, Tan Malaka established a 
new party, completely outside the communist fold. At the 6th meeting 
of the Comintern in August, 1926, he made a vigorous attack against 
ty^ programme and Bukharin who called him a Trotskyist,2 
Tan K.alkaka's new organisation, Partai Indonesia 
Bepublik or Pari (Indonesian republic party) was established by hi^ | 
1, Semaun* The situation in Indonesia, August, 15, 1928 
2, Dr,Sakirmanx Menlngjaw perdjuangen partai, Jakarta, 19'*6, p.10 
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end his two lieutenants, Tamln and Subakat, in Bangkok in 1927 
Pari*s iBoediate objective was the training of Indonesian ui^er-
ground workers in Bangkok who were to return to Ind<mesia and 
there train additional members and build up underground cadres.Xts 
long term objective was the building up of coordinated prolestarian 
movement in Aslla(S.E,A, end Austrfclia). Tsn Halaka envisaged an 
eventual fusion of the refional communist federations, Aslia, West 
Burope, Hussla, Iran, Africa, China, north America and South 
America. Possibly the fact that Tan Malaka had been appointed 
Comintern agent for S.^.A, and Australia had something to do with 
this idea. Tamin, however, did make some progress towards building 
up an undergroiand in Indonesia. Though the membership of this 
underground was never large, its leadership in Java, eventiially leaded 
by Adam Malik and Sukarno, was a capable one and while attaining 
influential positions in legfll youth organisations, usually managed 
to keep clear of Dutch suspiclon.1 
With the failure of the 1926-27 revolutions, the cosmunist 
organisation was crushed, as the large majority of communists, 
nationalist and religious leaders were arrested and deported to the 
concentration camp of Tanah Kerah in New Guinea, a notorious un-
healthy place, full of malaria and fatal diseases. Altogether some 
13,OCX) people were arrested. Of these V500 were given prison sentences 
and 1308 were interned, 13O8 being sent to Tanah Merah. The rest 
were soon released.2 
According to the statement of the government of Indonesia 
to the volksraad in May, 1929, the number of politically active 
pejsons who had been banished to Boven Digul was as follows* 112^ -
men, h^O women and 52 childre. The group of these called irrconeilai>-4>. 
1. Kahint op.cit. pp.85-86 
2, Blumberger: op.cit p.Ill 
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were placed 35 kilo meters further In the interlor.l 
After the arrest the povmrs of the communist were broken 
for the remelnder of the period of Dutch rtale. in 1928, a relatively-
weak eoi»-back was developed by a proup of Surabaya communists who 
hftd laid law durinf the revolution. In July, 1928, under the 
leadership of Sianarjo and Marsuki, a close acquaintance of Musso, 
they establislwd a small labour union federation (serikat kaim buruh 
Indonesia). Its plan of operation was to infiltrate the various 
unions with Its own cells which would eventually come to control them. 
After reaching a select and disciplined membership of some 700 
nnd after a year's existence, the organisation was dissolved by the 
srovernment and its leaders arrested.2 
In April, 1935, Musso menafed to re-enter Indonesia, remain 
Inp nearly a year in the Surabsya area before leavmp aj?aln for 
Eussla. Here he built up what was to become the chief Stalinist-
oriented-conmunist underground, the so-called illegal indonesian 
communist party. Aspirant probationary ambers were orpranised into 
s close associated orpanisatlcn, the pertai Komunis mudaCyoiJng 
communist party), it was probable the unjailed membership of the 
Indonesian trade union (^ .K.B.l,) provided mvxih of the nucleus of 
Kusso's orpanisation. Both Musso and Ten Malaka's underp-round were 
however, relatively weak and the centre of the stage in the national-
ist strupple durinp the remainder of the period of the Dutch rule 
was held by non-communist leaders and their organisation, louring 
the Japanese occupetion (l9^-19'+5)Tan Halaka and other communist 
leaders organised underground movements to fight the Japanese 
lmperialism.3 
1. K,Abdul Gani* A basic information on Indonesia, the ministry 
of information, A.I., Jakarta, 19^» p.3*^  
2. Musso! The independent trade union of Indonesia and Its 
suppression, inprecor IX, lfo.16,0ct.25.1929.p.1322 
3. BiuaibergerJ In ^mcyl. Nederlandsch- Indie, p.96§ 
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PARATAI INDOKiiSIA BAJA(P.I.B). 
The Indonesian stiJdy club foroed by Dr.Sutomo In October 
16, 1930» at Surabaya , was changed to the persatuan bangsa 
Indonesia of P.B.I,(Indonesian association) In January V, 1931, 
based on Indonesian Integrity and nationalism. The members of the 
executive council of the P.3,1, consisted of Dr.Sutomo, Itr.Subroto 
and others. In 1931 it hed established 15 branches and 30 branches 
with 2500 members In May, 1932* It adopted a policy of non-coopera-
tion with the I>utch authority. Its annual conference of l-iay, 1933» set 
up an agricultural cooperative society( rukun tani) which had 
established 158 branches with 2CXX) members in July 1933f in April 2 
193^, the P,a.I, had 38 branches and formed a scout organisation, 
the Surla ^^ iroman, 1 
At its congress of April 18-21, 1935, at Surabaya, the P,B,i. 
decided to form a fusion with the Budl Utomo. As a result of the 
Solo conference, partal Indonesia raja or ?»l,h, (Creeter Indonesia 
party), cerae into beinp in F'ecember, 26, 1935 at Surabaya under the 
Presidentship of rr,r,utorao, aiming chiefly at achieving Indonesia raja 
The P.I,!', had established 53 branches with 2^25 members In 1935 and 
57 branches with 3^5 members in 1936. It had also rukiin tanl 
orpanisation with 2,700 members. It orptanlsed the first congress in 
May 15-lB, 1937 at Jakarta and adopted a policy of cooperation with 
the colonial government. The second congress of December 2^27, 
1938, at Bandunp, elected K.H.M.H, Wukjaningrst as prsident of the 
party and discussed labour problems, colonisation and reformation 
of Justice. In 19'4'1, *t becan» static and passive.2, 
1, A.K.Prlnggodlpdo* op.cit, p.139 
2. Ibid. p.139 
^he p a r t a i r ak ja t Indonesia or P .H. I . (people ' s par ty of 
indonesie) was founded by Mp.Tebrani in -September 1^, 1930 at 
J aka r t a , aiming to achieve the indeponcloncG of innonesia thrcuph 
a parliementary systeia and e s t a b l i s h i n r ccnser^uently a dominion 
s t a tu s povGined by the indonesinns.To th i s end, i t would attempts 
1. to expand the- volksread and oth-r counclln vhich f.'^ riBod s 
r ea l pari i am-'at, represent ing the ont i re populat ion. 2 To h3"7e 
Indonesian represen ta t ives in the League of Nation'^. 3 . ^^'^ -i-ndoneaia-
nise c i v i l and mi l i t a ry se rv i ces , h. to enact laws for the 
Indonesian c i t i z e n s h i p , i t adopted c pol icy of cooperation with 
the Fov^rnrntnt. Due to s t ronr opposition and cr t ic i sm of other 
p a r t i e s and l e a d e r s , the party hr,a s e t up only two or th^ee 
branches and f i n a l l y ceased to e x i s t . 1 
The paitRi paif^atuan Indonesia (parpindo) was a lso 
formed by Kohd -ifamin in July 20, 1939 at .Takaita. This par ty adopted 
a policy of cooperf-tion end v;ss based on socio-netionalism and socio 
deKOcrscy.2 Ihe people 's essccint ion of JofJakarta (P.X.Ii.) was 
in s t i t u t ed by 3urJodiningrat in June 19, 1930 fit JorJakar ta , i t s 
membership rose from 30,000 to 110,000 in Hsy, 1931; 2 2 9 , 6 P O 
to 253»2Cl (30,^/1 women) In July 29, 193B» i t s youpht orpranisatlon 
bed 10,000 members. The people ' s league of S-urakarto (P.K.n.) 
under the i n i t i a t i v e of Mr.'^infpih carae in to being in June, 1932. In 
1937» i t had a mesbiirship of ,7,500 of which 1,000 wc-re v;oinen.3 
The people 's union cf Kangkunepara CP.K.M.) was formed 
in 1933 v l t h 30,000 members. The Vaderlandsche cliib followed su i t 
1. Ib id ; p.155 
2 . Ib id : p . 135 
3 . ib id t pp.5?a-l53 
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In 1929 and sia-vlved u n t i l May 1 9 ^ . The forward t h u r s t 
orjrenlSRtlon was a l s o s e t up by Van Hook i n 1930 a t J a k a r t a and 
l a s t e d up to 19^2. The s e r i k a t Madijre (Februa ry , 1925) pe r se r l i s t en 
WadurCJj^nuary, 1920) perhimpunen Timor(Aufust , 192*+) were 
e s t a b l i s h e d . The Indones ian Chinese p a r t y ( P . T . I , ) was a l s o 
organised by l^r.Lien i^^ten Hian in December, 1932 a t J a k a r t a . The 
lndonf>'?l«n Arab Bar tv ( P . A . I . ) under t h e p r e s i d e n t s h i p of Abdvur 
I^ahT.nn BRswerSen followed s u i t i n 193^ . 
L a s t l y srerakan rak . l s t Indones ia (Corindo) was formed i n 
i'iay 2^^, 1937 on the b a s i s of the indepen^'Jence of Indones ia arw3 
coope ra t ion \-dth t h e i ^ t c h r e e i m e . I t convened the f i r s t congress 
i n Ju ly 2 0 - 2 ^ , 193?, nt J a k a r t a and the second one in Ausrust 1-2, 
1939, a t Pftlemban?. Cn October 1 , 19*^0, the worklnsr committee of the 
p a r t y c o n s i s t e d of A , K . C a n l ( P r e s i d e n t ) , B ,Wi iopo (Sec re t s ry ) , 
Mr .^s r tono ( v i c e - p r e s i d e n t ) , in 1932, the a c t i v i t i e s of the p a r t y 
were suspended.1 
?A?UKDAN ASGOGIATIOK 
The Pasandan Assoc ia t ion ws*^  formed by Mr.Bieni? Kanduran 
Ardi Winata In September, 1 9 1 ^ , a t Jakartfi and becanse a p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t y in 1919. I t s t i i v e d fo r the p r o v i n c i a l autonomy of west Java . 
I t held the coneress in Dece?nb3r, 1925 a t Taslkmalajs and Joined the 
P . P . P . K . i . i n December 1^ , 1927. On Kay 20 , 192P, i t decided t o 
Tiber a t e Indones ia from the ' u t c h Imper ia l i sm through ccope ra t lon 
with c o l o n i a l povernBKJnt. At t h e ^asiKi't^^n c o n r r e s s of March 3O-
Apri l 1 , 1929, the p r e s i d e n t of the p a r t y , Kr.Oto Subrs ta s t r e s s e d 
s t r o n p l y on n a t i o n a l u n i t y and nr-stionsl emancips t lon sn6 c u l t u r a l 
develoDiaants as w e l l , 2 , 
1. i b i d . p . 157 
2 . i b i d . pp.79-80 
In t^ snuary, 1930, the association had established 32, 
branches and three women sections with 3»950 aembers. In 1931f 
it had 1^ branches with 3t900 members and 52 branches with 
3,317 members in 193'+» while the women organisation had 11 brenchei 
with 800 members in 1931 snd 25 branches with I7OO members in 
193^» inhere was also s Fasimdan youth organisation called Jasana 
Ober fasundan CJ.O.P,;i 
The 20th congress of the party was held in April, 19-22 
1935 at Bandung; the 21th conferess on April 9-12, 1936; the 22nd 
conpress in March 26-29, 1937 and the 23rd congress on April, 1938 
at Sukabumi. ^ 'he conpresses decided amone others to support the 
Subardjo petition, for an imperial confference and economic develop-
ment as well as employment, Amonp the important leaders of the 
association were Cto isksnder Dinata and Atik Suardi. i'he 2^th and 
25th conrresses were held In April 6-9* 1939 at Xjiandur and in 
March, 19^, respectively adopting the red and white and indonesia 
raya as n?>ticnal flar and national anthem and supportlnir the 
strufple for Indonejbaian parliament.2 
Si:.idKAT ISLAM (ISLAHIC ASSQCiAlxGN) 
The name of the islamic chamber of commerce (S.D.i.) 
founded In 1911 by H.Samanhudi was changed into the Serikat islam in 
1912 under the leadership of H, Umar Said Tjokroaminoto, i-n January, 
1913, and 191^, the people joined the party <'H mass which was 
based purely on the isldmic principles. In 1915 it had established 
1. ibid: T^. 152 
2. ibid: p. 153 
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50 branches and 89 branches with 360,000 members In June 17, 
1916. 1 
In 1916, It become a full-ffledped political party, 
strufplinp for free indoneslp(dominion status) and adopted a 
policy of cooperation with the colonial povernment. it had a member-
ship of 800,000. The congress of October, 20-27, 1927, decided to 
achieve a complete independence for indonesis by evolutionary system 
not by revolutionary one. The third confrress of September 29-
Octobor 6, 1918 et -urabeya was deadly opposed capitalism and 
joined the radicj^ l concentration In Hoveab*^ r 16, end had represeniia-
tives(T,-<okroarainoto nnu Abdul Muiz) in the volksrasd in May 18, to 
fipht for national freedom. The ^th congress of October 23-
November 2, 1919 at Surabsye decided to institute a bicameral parlla 
ment and lead class stuffle movement. The 5th and 6th congresses 
were held in March 2-6, 1921 c^t Jokjakarta and October 10, 1922 at 
Surabaya respectively. The 7th congress of February 17-20, 1923 at 
Kedium denounced commiinism and adopted a po2>icy of non-cooperotion 
in May 19, 1923, ^ 'emaun was arrested, while Tjokroaminoto 
propapated the party ideology outside, 2 
In order to ?^ chieve I'USlim Qnity, a Pan islamic movement 
was organised by H.A.Seiim. The second congress al islam held in 
May 19-21, 192^ at Cerut, was attended by the Muslim leaders of 
Islamic orpnnisations, except the Nahdatul Olama. 1'he Serikat isla« 
mectinp of Tecember 2J^26, 192^, decided to send two delegations 
to the Califate congress at Cairo in March 192? and to the world 
Islamic congress sponsored by the Kinp J-bnu Saud at Mecca in June 
1, 1926. It also dispatched a delegation to the congress of the 
1 . Viekkes o p . c i t . pi.lTS^'f 
2 . A.K.PrinFirodlpdo: o p . c i t . pp.1+6-^ 
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league for the struggle airalnst imperialist domination in ^urope.1 
The S.I.formed a madjelis ulsma Indonesia in January 29,1928 
and in 1929 it was changed into partai serikat Islam Indonesia or 
P.S,I.I,(Indonesian Islemic part/). The BBCa.l convened its firtt 
COTigress on April 25-27, 1929 at Surabaya and the 2nd in January 
2»f-27, 1930, at Jokjakarta which decided to establish legllative 
and executive councils and struggle for the realisation of naticmal 
unity, freedom, democratic society and democratic economy of the 
country. Its membership rose from 19,000 to 23,000 in 1930j 30,000 
(1933) to Jf5,000(l935). The congress of 1931, 1932 and 1933 
ccmdemned capitalism and|imperialism, reviewed economic cJisis and 
other religious problems. It established 3^ branches of the women 
section with 6000 members in May 26, 193^. in 1935 It had formed 
I'+O branches all over Indonesia, At held a congress in July 8-12, 
1936 at Jakarta to re-examine the non-cooperation policy and other 
economic matters.2 
Dr.Sukiman, a spliter of the P.S.I,I., formed a new party 
called Indonesian islamic party (Peril) in 1932 at Jakarta and H.A.S 
Salim, Barisan PenJ-edar (the tcmsclous movement) in April, 1936. 
They adopted a policy of cooperation with the government and 
opposed the non-cooperation of the P.B.I.I. The B.P, established 
h? branches in 1937. In September 1?, 1937, Dr.Stiiiman, Wall Al 
Fatah and others re-Joined the P.S.I.I,, which condemned the Islamic 
high court at Jakarta and other religious affairs.3 
On account of discontent of Dr.Sukiman group at the 
Jokja congress, partai Islam Indonesia (P.I.I) was founded in 
December, 1938, at SQIO under the presidentship of R.M.Wlvoho. 
1. Ibid p.If? 
2. ibid P.1»f7 
3. Ibid p,^k6 
The party joined Gap! to stnuggle for a parllanient for Indonesia. 
It was based on Islam and natlonallsn. It had set up 115 branches 
and organised its first congress in April 11, 19I4O at Jokja and 
because of the second world war, it suspended all Its activities. 
While the P.B.I.I, held its 25th congress In January, 19^ at 
Palembang and participated in a parilamentery movement of Gap! and 
finally withdrew from the Capl and the volksraad in December 13, 
19^ 1 as a protest against Cutch imperialism.1 
Another islamic association, the Nahdatul Ulama (Islamic 
conservative party) was formed in Ifanuary 31, 1926 at Surabaya, 
based on the four Islamic sects, it orgarnlsed the first congress 
in October 8-11, 1928 at Surabaya, opposing the modernist movement 
and reviewing other religious affairs. The congress of 1933, ^93^^ 
1935, 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939 further discussed religious 
matters and economic situation In the country. In 1935, it estab-
lished 68 branches with 67,000 members. The congress of 19^, set 
up a women organisation (Nahdatiil Dlama Miisliaat or N.U.M.) and 
youth movement (Ansur) In 1935, under the leadership of Mr.Tohlr 
Bakrl. Among the most outstanding leaders of the N.U, were Hasjim 
Asjarl, Abdul Wahab, Hahfux Siddlq and Wahid Hasjlm.2 
Furthermore, another Islamic organisation called the 
Muslim union of Indonesia (Parml) was founded In 1930 at central 
Sumatra on the initiative of Muchtar Lutfl, Djalaluddln Taib, 
based on Islam and nationalism, stmrnggllng to achieve the Indp^endene 
of Indonesia. Due to Its popularity among the masses, the Dutch 
authority took drastic measures against the party by arresting its 
leaders and lastly by banning the party itself. All Indonesia 
1. Ibid, p.150 
2. Ibid, p.160 
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Islamic congress of 1937 established the high cotmcll of Islam 
(M.I,A.I.) in Java. 
Again there were also other rellgloiis bodies such as the 
Catholic political party (P.P.K.D.) in Java formed In February 
1925 at JokJakarta under the chairmanship of I.J.Kaslmo, the 
Christian association (P.K.C.) in 1929, under the initiative of 
Kr.B.M.Notosutarso and the Indonesian Christian party (P.K.M.I) 
in December I3, 1930 at Jakarta led by Mr.F.Laoh. There w#re also 
the Christian ethical party (C.E.P), the Indies Catholic party 
(i.K.P) the Indonesian Ahmadya movement (September, 1929) Callielic 
political party (P.P.K.D in July 1938, Catholic Onion or B.P.K. 
in October, I9M and the Christian Teacher's association (P.G.C) 
in 1939 at JokJakarta. 1 
Budi Utomo (High ^ndeavoiy) 
The Budi Utomo formed in 1908 had established kO branches 
with 10^000 members in 191^ and held a congress in August 5, 1915 
It participated in tlm Indonesian defense committee in July 23,1916. 
It joined the radical concentration in the volksraad in November,1918 
which demanded a parliament for Indonesia. In September, 28 1919it 
had set up 80 branclws with 20,000 members. Among tJ» most Influential 
leaders of the D.U, were Dr.Badjiman Wediodinlngrat, Dwidjes^wojo, 
A.Surjo Suparto, and Mangkimegara Vll, At its congress of December 
21-25, 1921 and November ^ 5 , 1922, the B.U.discussed national 
education, strikes and adopted a policy of cooperation with the 
colonial government. It joined the P.P.K.i. in 1928. The 20th congress 
of the B.O, on December 23-2M-, 1929 at Solo demanded a free Indonesia. 
1. ibid, pp.87, 156 and 157 
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The members of the executive coaraittee of the party In 1930 
consisted of Kusumo Utojo (president) Wurjonlngrat (vice-
president) end Mr.Singpih (secretary) and its membership was 
1300. Finally the congress of May 25, 1935 decided to form a 
federal organisation called partai Indonesia raja (P.P.B.).I 
ISDOMESIAN XOUTH MOYMSNT. 
The formation of the student association (B.U.) in 1912 was 
followed by Trl Koro Darao (student movement) in March 1915, based 
on strength, character and service. In 1918, its name was changed 
to the young Java under the presidentship of R.Satiman Wiryosojoyo, 
Its objective was to achieve a great Java by means of promoting 
solidarity among the students of seccmdary school; advancing the 
general knowledge among the members and stimxilating and deepening 
the love for language and other cultural expressions of Indonesia. 
The young Sxaaatra league (1917) was followed by the formation of 
young Minahasa League, young Ambon league, young Celebes league, 
young Betak and others. All these leagues had their seats at Jakarta. 
There were also the Muslim youth of Indonesia of the F.?.I,, the 
boy scouts (slap and hizbulwatan of the Mohammadya). In January 1, 
1925, Mr.Sam founded the young Islam association with H.A.Talim 
as its adviser^ based on Islam and nationalism. In order to establish 
close contacts among the various youth organisations, the first 
Indonesian you|h congress was held in 1926 at Jakarta under the 
chairmanship of Mr.Tabranl. On August 31, 1926, the yo\mg Indonesia 
(Indonesia muda) came into being on the basis of Indonesian unity. 
At the initiative of the student's union (F.P.I) the second youth 
congress was convened in December 26-27, 1928 at Jakarta. At this 
1. Ibid p.13*^  
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ccmgress the youths pledged solemnly that they belonged to one 
motherland, indonesla; one nation, the i-ndoneiian; and spote one 
language, Indonesian. Consequently an Indonesian youth unicwi 
(Indonesia muda) came into existence Ln December 31, 1930 iinder the 
presidentship of Mr.Kuchoro Purtooprawoto. it established 2^ - branches 
with 2,Woo members. The union aimed to achieve greater Indonesia 
(Indonesia raja). The young islam association and the Muslim 
Indonesia did not Join the union. The boy scouts movement of the 
united organisaticm were united into one organisation, the Kepanduan 
indoneikia.1 
The third Indonesian youth congress of December, 1939 had 
decided to pursue literacy campaign; helping and guiding the 
farmers; abolition of the youth unemployment and rural uplift and 
reconsrtruction. The Indonesian youth wholeheartedly supported the 
Gapi's demand for a parliament for Indonesia and proposed that if 
the government did not concede the Gapi's claim, the Indonesian 
leaders should i^ uit the government offices and councils.2 
Besides pursuing their studies abroad, the Indonesian youth 
also took greet pains to make Indonesia popular with the outer world 
They established contact with youth organisations in other countries 
and participated in world conferences and assemblies. When the youth 
congress movement in La Courneuve, Paris, organised a rally in 
August 7-23, 1937, seven students participated in it. 11 Indonesian 
stiadents were present at the international students' conference, 
promoted by the world student'f« association in Paris in August 25-30 
1937. At a conference of British, Dutch, Chinese, lndonesiot» 
1. D.Sudjonoi A general outline of the Indonesian youth movement, 
Jakarta, 19*+6, pp.2-6 
2. A.K.Pringgodigdo» op.cit. pp.198-203 
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Indonesian stixdents In Leiden,Holland, Indonesia was yepresented 
by 26 of her sons. The all world youth congress organised by the 
world youth congress movements(Geneva). In Vassor state, U.S.A., 
was attended by 3 Indonesian students. At the international 
conference of the world's youth association, Paris, in December 
17-18, 193B, and Indonosian student held a spedeh. 
On all these occasions, the Indonesian students not only 
delivered speeches but also arranged exhibitions of Indonesian 
arts. At those international conferences, besides representing the 
organisation of their own's universities, the Indonesian students 
were also riven mandates by various youth organisations in Indonesia. 
Mu Vassar congress concluded with a peace pact of which art. 
1 reads as follows: We pledge our word to advance brotherhood and 
cooperation amongst the youth of various nations? To intensify the 
sense of solidarity amongst the young people•their related countries 
and to strive for farmery with youth of their countries, irrespective 
of race, religion and convections.1 
INDONESIAN WOMEN MOVt^ MaNT 
The national consciousness of Indonesian women appeared 
when the first women organisation was started by K.A.Kertini in 
1911, Puteri Merdeka (1912), keutamaan Iftieri Mina5igkabau(l91 5) at 
Fadang Pnadjang, keradjinan araai setia at Bukit Tinngi and Gorontalis 
Muslim women's association (1920) at Gorontalo in Celebes.2 
Some of the women organisations such as the wanita 
utomc^t Mataram, the wanita mulia and pawijatan wanita worked 
purely in cultural field. There were also the Aiahiah of Hohammadla, 
women movement of P.3.1.I., women movement of Parmi and so on. 
1. D.SudjonoJ o p . c i t . pp. 7-8 
2 . A.K.Prlnggodigdo* o p . c i t . p.31 
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I^der ths Initiative of Njonja Aju Suicnnto of the wanlta Otomo, 
Njl Hadjsr Dewantara of the wanita taman si#we and Non Sujanti of 
puterl Indonesia, the first -Indonesian vromen's congress was held 
on December, 22-25, 1928 at Jakarta. The conaress was attended by 
30 Indonesian women's orpsnisatlons. The main aim of the congress 
was to effect several Indonesian women's associations and the asso-
ciation would promote the interests of the Indonesian women, the 
conrress would estaMish foundation for inUpent pirl students and 
would combat child marriage and issue a monthly mafazine, isteri.l 
The Indonesian women aasoclatlon received an invitation to 
attend the Pacific confrress for women suffrage at I^olulu in 1928 
but was unable to participate in it. 2 Indonesian women representa-
tives attended the x\ii Asiatic women's conpress at Lahore in 1931f 
sponsored by Mrs.Sora^o Naidu, Niar Hemada, Kodame Run Xat Sen and 
others. The principal aim of the congress was to make the Asiatic 
women more conscious of their task to uplift their country «nd 
people and to cooperate with each other.2 
The second Indonesian women's ccn^ress of July 20, 2lf,1935 
at Jakarta, which was attended by many bip women orpanisations, 
discussed the problems of combetlnp illiteracy for the progress of 
the Indonesian people; the importance of youth in the Indonesian 
women's movement; the position of Indonesian labour In Indonesia and 
the legal status of the woTT^ n In Islam. The konpres perempuan 
Indonesia (K.P.i.) established a body to examine the position of the 
Indonesian women labourers nn6 to promote their interests. The 
combatinp of illiteracy was entrusted to a special body to examine 
the lepa status of the women in Islam in 1931. 
r. Ibid, pp. 113-110 
2. Ibid, pp. 118-193 
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Some of the Indonesian women's orpenlsations had already 
fought R long time for vromen siiffrape. They wanted to have repre-
sentatives of the J-ndoneaien women in several coxmclls. In February 
1938, the Dutch povemment frave passive suffrajre for the town councils 
to Ijfomen in this country, but not active suffargje. In August, 1938 
several Indonesian ladies were elected members of the town councils 
at Bandung, Semaran? and Surabays. 
The third women conpress (K.P.l.) of July 25-28, at Bandung 
discussed the matters of vomen suffrage, prostitution in Indonesia 
lepal position of teie professional and married women and education 
of the Indonesian youth. The All Indonesian women congress attended 
«11 Indonesian conpress (K.R.I.) at Jakarta In December 23-25, 
1939, sponsored by the Gapl. The 'fth Indonesian women conrress of 
July 25-2B axatnined the worren suffra«»e question. As a result, the 
Dutch povemnsent gave them the native suffrafe in Septeiaber 20, 
I9M. The Indonesian women organisation fully supported the 
nationalist movements in the strufple for free Indonesia; several 
Indonesian women had been in jail for political conviction su«h as 
i'ai8\ma Said of central Sumatra.1 
LABOUE OEGANiSATIOSS 
The growth of trade union in Indonesia was very slow. The 
first union was formed in 1908 by employees of the railways end 
tramway for the protection of their Interests. This befinnlnp was 
followed in by the formation of a union of customs officials and 
In 1912 by 2 unions of functionaries of the educ«5tlon and treasury 
departments. Althouph some members of these unions were Indonesians^ 
other wholly native unions were soon formed. In fattly rapid 
1. Maria Ulfa -antosoJ On brief backgroiand of the Indonesian women 
movement, merdeka No.20, I.S.I,, New iJelhl, November, 19^7|PP«7-11 
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succession custom officers In 1911, education officials In 1912 
the state pawnshop In 1913| the opium re?le employees in 1916 
snd official of public works and treasury department In 1917 and 
established their own unions under the influence of the nationalist 
organisations like bufll utomo and serikat Islam. lndonesl«ns employed 
in private undertakings formed similar orfanisations such as the 
union of africultural labourers, in 1915 and that of factory 
workers in 1917.1 
During the first world war, (191^1918) there appeared many 
trade unions includlnp the harbour board union, the Dutch Indies 
teacher's union, the union of opiuBi tax workers, the union of native 
pawnshop workers, the custom house union*, the union of factory 
personnel(P,ii.B«), the seamen lanion, ware-house workers union, 
electrical factory trade union, driver*s union and other of small alz« 
In order to strive aralnst Dutch imperialslm, the trade 
union In 1919 succeeded in forming a central authority in JokJakarta 
called united movement of workersCP.P.K,B,) consisting of 22 trade 
unions, covering 72,000 members. Mr.Semaun of the union railway and 
tramways personnel (V.r.T.P.) became president^Mr.Siirjopranoto of 
the P.F.B., vice-president and H.A.Salim, secretary. This central 
authority was conducted on the basis of cooperation between the 
cornmunist party (Bemaiai) and the islamic party (H.A.Salim). But 
this cooperation led to failure; and could maintain itself only 
for a period of two years; in 1921 it split up into 2 froups. Mr. 
'^ emsun and his proup withdrew and formed the revolutionary central 
orpan in September 5, 1922; he mede accusation apalnst Mr.SurJopranfetc 
president of the P.F.B,, saylnp that the failure of P.F.B. strike 
i i i w ! • • . . - . . _ . . . • - • — . - ^^^ ^ I I I I I I I - 1 1 I III I II - • •• • • - n n 
1. A,K,PrinfgodiRdot o p . c i t . pp.27-28 
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in 1920 was 8 aresult of the P.F.B. 'sipnorinp the central union 
orf:anisation.1 
There ware many other unions such as native civil servant 
onionCF.V.P.N.) in May 31, 1929, the P.P.P.H. with 25,000 members, 
V.I.P.A. with 3,000 members, O.^.B.H.B, With 700 members and 
revenue officers union with 600 members. The native official union 
(F.P.B.B.) founded In M^rch, 30 1929 Had established branches in 
every regency with 5000 members end had 6 representatives in the 
volksrand In 1931. In March 1933, the study club of Surabaya formed 
the Indonesian trade union(P.S.S.I) under the presidentship of 
Mr.fuslan rtan^sokumo. There were also Indonesian teacher's union, 
railway and tramway workers union(P.B.F.,T.) and native official 
union which hpd 13 orfenisations with 29,700 members. In 1931, the 
P.V.P.N, joined the International leapue of trade union. In January, 
1933, the Indonesian teacher's union (P.G.I.) had set up 163 branches 
with 29,000 members; 175 branches with 20,000 awmbers in January 5, 
193^. "Hie P.V.F.N, had 8,000 members in April 22, 1935 and 22,600 
in 1936 and 22,386 in 1937. It held conrresses on January 29-31 1930 
at Eandunp pnd in February 25, 1 9 ^ respectively, urging the 
government to increase the salaries of civil servants, it had ^,000 
members of I8 organisations. In February 3, 19^, the Indonesian 
labour p^rty (P.B.I) was formed at Malang, In July 27, 19M, pabungan 
serikat partlkullr Indonesia ((^ aspl) was also founded by B.P.Siiroso 
of the P.V.P.iM. , conslstin? of 30 orfanisetions with 18,000 member8,2 
1, V.Thoraspons Labour problems In '^ .a.A., N.York, 19^7, chap.*f,p.158 
2. Indonesia review* issued by the ministry of information, Jakarta 
19^7, p.8; and A.K.Prlnggodigdos op.cit. pp.99-105-and 17^ and 18 C 
The year 1930 was th« lowest ebb of national movemertts In 
Indonesia. It was the depression of political life, It was the 
depression of economic life and It was the depression of social 
life. Indonesia suffered tinpreeedented decree of economic reverse 
and depression. After 1930f Indonesia was flooded with the Japanese 
products. Political activities were strictly restricted and 
society was deprived of Its leaders. 
The coHiiaunlst revolution of 1926-1927, compelled the 
f'OvernHJent to take stronp measures which forced the Indonesian 
political movements to retreat from the p-rcund they gained with 
larreat difficulties. After arrest of Sukarno, combination act was 
passed, the assembly find meetings were not allowed especially for 
those of tV» P.N.I, and the Partlndo and other radical and revolution 
ary leftist movements such as P.S.I.I and the Perwi. 
The exorbitant rlfhts of the G.G. were reckelessly made 
use of, with the result that all the top mo?t leaders and founders 
of the national movements were either Itrrprisoned, Interned or exiled. 
They were the crime of society, the sensorium of social and political 
life. Hence all the voices and the people's movei^nts were silent. 
The government laws in practice closed the door for political 
activities. The P.P.P.K.I.(federation of the Indonesian national 
political parties) could not hold its proposed congress of 1933 at 
Polo. Similar was the case with the proposed congress of the Partlndo 
in December, 1935. 
Arts. 1$3 and 161 of the criminal code strictly 
prohibited strikes, publication of papers and speeches etc. As a 
result of this, the central working coiaiittee of the partlndo 
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on November 7| 1936 end the chapter of its history was closed.The 
pel mi changed its tactics end to the P.S.l.i. was born a revolt 
child, penjedar ^heaaed by K.A.rpiini. And the P.R.I, of Retta 
lived a ini?;er8ble life.l 
But this political nlphttiare wes not last lonf. The people 
bed to rerlise some ttiaans to achieve complete independence of their 
motherland. This was only cooparstion. '^O they were prepared to 
cooperate with the Fovernraont. And fortunately they found capable 
leaders first in I^ r.-utomo and then in M,H,Th8»rln.2 
In feet, Pr.Sutcrao did not apree with Dr.f-ukamo's radical 
tactics of non-cooparfttlcn. To him non-cooperRtlon was an emplement 
in the political struffle but was not a principle. He favoured the 
method of cautioxis and cnreful action. It was for these reasons that 
the P.P.K.I., of which he vras the chairman was much appreciated.After 
the apprehension of Dr.-ukf^uno j^nd his party the new tendency of 
cooperF.tion asserted Itself more and more. 
Inside the vclksraad itself the same expression of 
national faellng was sounded by M.R.Thaurin. He stef^ ped on to the 
floor of the volksra?^ d in 192? and on Janiiary 27, 1930, he aloni? 
with other friends formed n national political fraction, consisting 
of different representstlves of various Indonesian political 
parties. Amcnr the most prominent leaders of the fraction were 
M»H,Thrj»arin(president), Kusumo Utojo, Mochtar, Soanpkupon, ^iohd 
iMui-, Abdur Rcshid, V/iwoho snd so on. The raaln objectives of this 
united front were: 1. to pet the constitution amended, 2, to abolish 
all political, eccnoniic, socl'?! ??nd educational discriminations, 
3. to achieve free nr\6 independent Indonesia, *+-. to use all peaceful 
1. Ubani and co: op.clt. pp.55^ -58 
2. Ibid 
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means to attain the foal. Thamrin proved himself to be the 
ablest loader of opposition in the volksrasd.l 
Outside the volk^ ra.-^ d, tho politic-^ movoaents began to 
breathe n new life on:' draw nev inspiration. Study club end 
other bodies orf^ anised thoDiSclvns as pprtal b.-mpsa Indonesia or 
P.B..I, (Indon-^ slan pert'f), under tho leadership of rr.Sutomo, 
In 1935, 'T.-utomo succeeded in unitinr hi? P,3,I, with bxwJi utomo. 
The new p'^ rty took the name of partai Indonesia raJoC parindDa). 
The p.^ rty decid?:d to work vtth tho fovermaent for the amelioration 
of Indonf'sian conditions end to rarke its further attitude 
ccncerninp cooper-^ tJcn dependent on the results achieved, by the 
rovernwent In its function for the welfare- rmil prosperity of the 
people.2 
Tho other restnrnts, the partai Indonesia (partindo) 
ro-froupcd themselves in the f.erakan rak.lat Indonesia(Gerindo) which 
for the tine beinp rejected non-cooperation ris a political weapon. 
The perindo formed In Kay 23, 1937» aimed to achieve free Indonesia 
under the le?^ dership of Pr.Amlr S,lariffuddin snd :^^ .^ ichd iTemin. 
Now the Indoneslnn political novesients struppled apein 
and c«!ne out vrlth n^w politic?»l stand and new slopan but with th© 
SB'ne object!vo, Ind-^ nesl?? merdeka. They proposed to cooperate and 
COM ©borate v^-lth colonial f'overniaent. Almost all people's movements 
foufht the battle of Indonesian freedooi in the volksraed and in the 
pcvernment councils, except 2 political parties which still upheld 
their principles of non«coopcj ation end were nothin'- to do with the 
competition for seats in the volksread and ether councils. Cne 
of them ves f^ e P.".!.!. v^ich still upheld its principle of non-
cooperation f^nd the other was the P.N.X., which still struck fast 
to the doctrine of non-cooperation, lexS by Dr.'^ukamo and Hatta.3 
1. Lukisan revolusi rakjat Indonesia, Jakarta,19^5,p.18 
2. Obani and cot op.clt* p.60 
3. Do you know more about Indon0aia,i.S.I.N,Delhl,1953.p«l5 
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Semsun as a president of left wlnp in the Serikat Islam and a 
leader of the railway labour unionCV.P.T.P.) led the opposition 
party. Other leftists such as Darsono and Alimin followed him in 
tactics. They strenuously launched non-cooperation movement atrainst 
the Dutch government. They opposed the constitutional steps 
adopted by the S,I, This was the reason why they never becanae 
members of the volksraad created by the Dutch government In 19l8k.1 
Thus, in the local councils as well as in the volksraad, 
Indonesian members belonprinp to the moderate groups formed opposltionn 
fronts apalnst the colonial government. 
The Pasmndan party and oth^r orranlsations had also adopted 
the cooperation tactics. This cooperation In Muslim Politics was 
inflamed by the partai penjedsr of A.Seilm who was discontented to 
struggle under the banner of non-cooperstion. The newly founded 
P.S.i.i. followed suit H.A.Ssliffl, if he was before well-known as a 
chairman of non-cooperation and dubbed the volksrasd as the comldy 
of nonsence, now followed the new trend of cooperation and said that 
he entered the volksraad not as a star who mlrht be Isurhed at, but 
as a conscious spectator if the volksraad showed efain its old 
attitude, in 1923, the Indonesian association In the Hafue had 
become a revolutionary netionalistlc organisation, and adopted a 
policy of non-cooperation and was neutral in religion.2 
The dMJsnd for a responsible grovernraent and for ?? 
parliamentary self-government for Indonesia had been deep rooted 
in the hearts of national leaders and this question was raised in 
1. Ubanl and co? op.clt. p.11 
2. Ibid. p.62 
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and out of the volksraad. On July 15| 1936, Mr.Sutardjo alonp with 
many other representatives of the volksraad brought In the volksraad 
a motlon(petltlon) In which the government of the Netherlenda-was 
asked to call an imperial conference to discuss the best method by 
which the self-government of Indonesia always within the limit of 
art.l of the Ifetherlands constitution of 1922 could be realised and 
fix a time limit <ll.thin which this self-government should become 
effective. Art.l of the constitution indicated by its wording that 
the Netherlands in i^ urope and the territories in Indonesia and the 
west Indies were considered spparate entities with equal rights.That 
is to say, the territories were integral parts of the Netherlands 
realm. On September 29, 1936, the motion was accepted in the 
volksraad by a majority of 26 as against 20 votes. Thus by itself 
the petition became the volksraad petition and was submitted to 
the Queen Wilhelmina to be fiirther considered in the states of 
the Hague .1 
But after 2 year's hatching it was found that the egg was 
not capable of producing chicken. So the koninmlijk besluit,(royal 
decision) of November 16, 1938, rejected Sutardjo's peititlon on 
the ground that» 1. the petition was not clear and the proposed 
imperial conference was against the existing constitution.2.Art 
1 of the Netherlands constitution did not at all contain any 
explanation of the right of Indonesia to self government irflthln 
the Netherlands kingdom.2 
The crown rejectikdn did not only affect those who were 
in the committee of Sutardjo's petition but also all political 
1. Ibid p.63 
2. Suara F.S.I,I,, Jakarta Noveml^r, 1938 
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movem«nts of Indonesia. Because the royal decision shoved that 
Indonesian politics was not as yet capable of fulfilliniK all the 
conditions required by the petition. 
Furthermore, Sutardjo's petition was supported not only by 
intellectual groups, educated class and persons of high standing 
and position both in Indonesia and the Netherlands but also by all 
political parties which adopted cooperation tadtics. The rejection 
of the petition taught the people that liore efforts, more pressure 
more skill and more scientific and perfect handlini! were required. 
The refusal did not discouraged them but accelerated their effort 
to reach the goal of independente. 
In order to consolidate all national movements, various 
attempts had been made to form a united front to strive more 
effectively against the Dutch Imperialism. Dr.Sukarno of P.N.I, and 
Dr.Sukiman of P.S.i. had succeeded in setting up a federation of 
Indonesian national political partlesCP.P.P.K.l) in December 17, 
1927, consisting of P.N.I,, Algemeene study club, P.S.I., Pasundan 
party, budl utomo, serlkst Sumatra, ksum Betavl, Indonesian study 
club, serikat Madura, Tlrta|asan association Bn6 per^erikatan 
Celebes. It had establislwd an advisory council and cabinet executive. 
Its congress of September 2, 1928 and March 29-30, 1929 decided to 
intensity national struggle and propaganda at home and abroad for 
a free Indonesia. At its congress of January 12, 1930» it decided 
the Indonesia raja as national anthem, the red and white flag, 
national emblem, Ind&neslan^ national language and Indonesian merdeka 
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national poal. Its executive members consisted in 1932 of 
Dr.Sutomo, Kr.Thamrln, and Otto Iskandardinata, etc. in 1933 
Timor Verbond, partai, serikat Celebes, partai Indonesia, serikat 
Ambon, etc. joined the fiederation, while the P.N.I. (Hatta), F.S.I, 
and Claristlen organisations stayed outside it. The partindo with-
drew from the organisation in February 9, 1935. The F.P.P.K.i. 
lasted upto 1939. 1 
The cooperation and non-cooperation movements were further 
strengktened by the formation of a federation of Indonesian 
politicsCG.A.P.I.). Due to the Internetional crisis in Europe and 
in the Far East, and the position of Indonesia in the world conflict 
tlw greater Indonesian party (parindra) proposed all Indonesian 
national movements in the country »i to hold a grand-conference to 
fix up their attitudes and to forgu mutual understanding aaong them-
selves about future Indonesian policy toward the international 
political crisis, that had taken place. On May 21, 1939, under the 
chairmanship of Mr.H.Thamrin the conference of all political parties 
to discuss the formation of a national fiederation held at Jakarta 
was attended by the representatives of the PS.i.l., P.I.I.pasundan, 
serikat Minehasa, gerindo and P.K.K. As a result, the Gabungan 
polltik Indonesia or G.A.P.I, (federation of Indonesian politics) 
came into existence. The members of its cabint executive consisted 
of %.H.Tkamrin, Mr.Amlr Sjarlfuddln, Hr.Abikusno Tjorkrsujono, etc 
The Gepi adopted e policy of cooperstion with the colonial authority 
and was an open and democratic federation. The leadership of the gapl 
fell into the hands of Mr.Thamrln who was the first parliamentary 
1. A.K.Pringgodlgdoi op.cit. pp.156-160 
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Indonesian leader and the first thoroughly nationalist politician. 
He was also a great social worker and humanitarian. He was one 
of the founders of the kaum Betawi and of the P.P.P.K.I, and 
became vice-president of the parlndra. He died In January 11, 19M.1 
On September 20, 1939, the gapl held a session for the first 
time at the gedung permufakatanlndonesia in Jakarta, attended by the 
delegates of different Indonesian parties and representatives of 
different Indonesian press. On September 29, 1939, Gapi's manifesto 
was circulated and on September 27, Gapi's call was published. The 
call contained* Indonesian press, Indonesian parties and group and 
all Indonesian people let us lonlted one opinion, one effort and one 
voice to support, to defend and to champion the demand and the 
cause of a parliament for Indonesia, The gap! manifesto clearly 
stated that the current world crieis caused from day to day the 
increase in danger that threatened the authority of Indonesia and 
its society.2 
Due to the aforesaid danger, the gapl was prepared to call 
upon Indonesian people to render all possible help, If the demand of 
Indonesia could be satisfied In a previously fixed time. The gapl, 
nay the people of Indonesia, had made its stand abundantly clear, the 
gapl could not be Indifferent and silent in facing world crisis. The 
gapl observed carefully the world's situation especially tn connection 
with Indonesia and accordingly chalked out its future actions which 
were to be achieved by peaceful constitutfconal means. 
It demanded a parliament, the members of which were 
elected by, for and from the people with a government responsible 
1. Umbani and Co| op.clt. p.161 
2. Ibid: p,67 
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to the parliament. 
The plenary session of the gapi held on Wednesday night, 
September 9-10, 1939, in Jakarta, attended by representatives 
of the gerindo, the persatuan Minahasa, the partai Islam Indonesia 
P.P.K.I,, the parindra, the P.S.I.I, etc was of the opinion that* 
1. From day to day the danger that threatened Indonesia and 
its society was increasing In its intensity due to the international 
happenings. 
2. It would be much better if the cooperations between the 
Netherlands people and Indonesian people were started. 
3. The cooperation should be started by means of giving new 
rights in the tasks of the government of the country to the people 
of Indonesia.1 
The session also decided that: 1. That gapi's members 
would not act individually but would act collectively as a gapi and 
gapi was prepared to work together with other organisations. 2. That 
a government with a parliament elected from and by the people and 
a government responsible to the parliament might be formed. 3. If what 
was said in 2 could be previously fulfilled the gapi was prepared to 
call upon the Indonesian people to render all possible helps, h. To 
circulate this resolution to all classes of Indonesian people calling 
upon all Indonesian movements and the press to declare their 
approval of it. Besides, the gapi proposed to held an Indonesian 
people's congress.2 
While discussing the legal and constitutional aspect of 
the demand for parliament, Dr.Tadjudln Nur, a member of the volksraad 
1. Ibid. p.162 
2. Ibid. p.70 
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declared in his speech in the volksraad, thst the demand for a 
parliament was based upon the art.62 and the followinp arts, of 
the Netherlands constitution of 1922. 
It is true that In the constitutional changes of 1922, there 
was no mention of the actual words transferring the responsibility 
from the Netherlands to Indonesia, yet the phrases that were used 
could not mean any thing else. What would be meaning of fivlnp law 
making, autonomous |}cv©rnm«nt and self-povernment to Indonesia 
as puaifinteed by the constitutional changes of 1922, if not 
responsible government for Indonesia. 
The Netherlands constitution of 1922 maintained, in art.62 
and the following arts, thrt it is a duty of ordinary law piver, 
in enforcing any constitution, to form governments in overseas 
colonies in such a way that the central governments In those 
colonies on behalf of the monarch are left in the hands of FCWBrnor 
generals, while only certain specific matters, previously fixed 
are to be dealt with by the monarch. So also the law making in 
connection with internal affairs in the overseas territories is to 
be left to the bodies In the territories leaving certain specific 
matters in the hands of the monarch 
In short, the monarch is responsible to the realisation 
of autonomy and self-government in Indonesia and West Indies. It 
was acknowledfed In the government explanatory statement about 
the constitution of 1922, that tjhether law raakinf? or government deal 
Ing with internal affairs must be left as mtidh as possible in the 
hands of these bodies and leaders in Indonesia herself. 
In the volksraad, twice the government discussed the 
above affairs stating emphtically that the constitution of 1922, 
decided with all certainty the handing over of the law making and 
t6^ 
and tYm governoont of Indonesia to Indonesians,1 
The Indonesian people enthusiastically responded to the 
Gapis' call and whole-heartedly approved of and supported it. Ty® 
IiKionesian journalist unlon(Perdi) and the Indonesian Arab union 
(P.A.i.) and the Muslim youth movement (P.P.I.I.) voiced their 
entire approval and pledged full support to the Gapl's call.Later 
on the R.P.i. was accepted as a member of the Gapi. 
When the Gap! launched the mass movement action demanding 
a parliament for Indonesisi the Indonesian youth and students 
whole-heartedly and solidly stood behind the Gfipi. The youth put 
forward a radical proposal that if the povernment/dld not concede 
the Gapl's demand, the Indonesian leaders should quit the povernment 
offices and councils. 
The federation of Indonesian Islamic political parties 
(Mial) headed by the P.S.i.l, was purely Islamic orponisation, 
consisting of almost all Muslim associations in Indonesia. After 
hearing and reading tl» Gapl's manifesto demanding a parliament 
for Indonesia, the Misi's secretariat immediately held an iraergency 
conference on October 12-13» 1939. The conference was attended by 
9 Muslim organisations. It discussed the above said problem at 
length and approved and supported the Gapl's action in demanding 
a parliament for Indonesia. It also approved of the Gapl's holdins 
tYve Indonesian people's congress. At the same time, Gapi in the 
volksraad prepared a petition putting forward a similar de!n<?nd and 
sent it to the second chamber of states general at the Hague.2 
1. ibid, p.72 
2. Ibid, p.76 
165 
The 6api*s meeting oB 22 Sovenber, 1939, tanctlonedt 
1, Mass Movement action, demanding a parliament for Indonesia* 
The working committee of all the parties, uniting under the Gapi, 
were ordered to launched a mass movement action demanding a parlia 
ment for Indonesia* Whatever there was no gapi*s branch, it was 
decided that a committee for a pjkerllament should be formed to 
pass resolution demanding a parliament for Indonesia* 
2, It was also decided to hold a congress of the people of 
Indonesia, aiming at Indonesia raja. Lastly the gapi called upon 
the people of Indonesia to support the gap! and the proposed congress 
of t>» people of Indonesia morally nn6 materially.1 
On 17 November, 1939, the meetings of the mass movement motion 
were peacefully and successfuly held In more than 100 places by 
all political parties, groups and committe«5(throughout Indonesia. 
This action demonstrated that the demand for a parliament was 
people's demand. This showed not only political groups who were 
politically conscious but the messes also have spontaneously 
championed for an Indonetsian parliament* 
The demand for a parliament was furthered by the Indonesian 
people's congress. The people's congress (K.F.I.) was held on 
December, 23 , 2^ - end 2?, 1939* It passed a resolution which inter 
alia stated thpt« 1. From 2M- December, 1939, permanent K.E.I, would 
come into existence* This K.fi.I. aimed** the prosperity and secittity 
of Indonesian people. To v±n a parliament for Indonesia was the 
first step in this direction* 2. The gapl was to be mede the executiv« 
of the K.B.I. The K.B.i.was to accept all parties end groups as 
I — i i M . . ! • » •mm I — • « • I" I wi'mw i M—'I— • ii i ii i • » ^ n mi i • i w w w a am m i — • — — • • i i » •*• — •••'•—WW 1 m — — — i i i m iiii ii iiw«w—w—iiMwiwi H I > W > — > ^ — — — W M — ^ K — W W W 
1. Ibid p.75 
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Its nembers, the election to It was to be deaocratle and decision 
to be taken intensified and to be led by the Rapi. ^ . The K,R.I, 
also officially declared that the national flag was to be red and 
white and the netional anthem, Indonesia raja, Indonesian lanfuafre 
was to be used in office and councils.1 
Meanwhile, the secretariat of the gapi received a letter from 
the connission of colonial affairs parties, social democratic labour 
party and Netherlands trade union (S,I>, A.P.) and N.V.V, in the 
Netherlands. The letter declared that the parties would raise.the 
question of a parliament for Indonesia in the second chamber of the 
states general at the Hague* 
The expression of sympathy by those parties created a 
new enthusiasm in Indonesia and added to the strength of the movement. 
The extended hands of the S.D,A.P. end N.V.V. were well received in 
Indonesia. Later on this S.U.A.P. through its representative, 
Stokvls, and the Christian democrates fought for Indonesia In the 
second chamber a loosing battle. Stokvis moved a resolution which 
was summarily dismissed. 
The Dutch second chamber met on February 20, 19^}, to 
consider the Indonesian budget and during the course of the debate, 
the burning qitestion of a parliament for Indonesia was hotly 
discussed when the question was raised. Minister Welter, the Dutch 
minister for overseas territories who was s\;^ ported by all political 
parties except the S.D.A.P., the Christian democrats and the 
communist party, rejected the gapi's demand for a parliament tor 
Indoneftia even before it was officially subffiitted.2 
1, ibid. p.76? A.K,Pringgodigdo: op.clt. p.t61 
2. ibid. p.77 
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Dr.L.^.Palar, foraer Indonesian ambassador to India, and 
secretary to colonial coamisslon of the J^ .D.A.P., wrote from 
Holland In the iBBpaalne(Pandji islam) of April 8, 1 9 ^ , the 
following s Indeed for a IORF time rlp^ ht from publication of the 
papl*s manifesto, the dcwaend for a parlliment for Indonesia, has 
been dlsciissed by som© of the dallies In the Netherlands* From 
the attitude of those newspapers It could be predicted that a 
great majority of those who express public opinion do not apte© with 
the PRpl's slopan. 
What attracts our attentlcari most Is that their attitude Is 
formed on no food backeround, We say that the background Is not 
good, because how can a man form^an attltufle towards a problem vhi<sh 
Is Influenced by end irrows from the Indonesian movetnent. If ha Is 
not acquainted with the A.B.C. of the Indonesian politics.1 
The Aneta's news (Dutch news agency) is far from enoufh and 
often then not wron? news. The Indonesian newspapers ere seldome 
read in the Netherlands. The news In the Netherlands press Is 
biased and v«ry scanty. None of tlKj editors of any newspapers in 
the Netherlands has sufficient knowledge of the Indonesian movement. 
S'herefore, the Indonesian movement and its strength and 
the aim of every party and its Ideals are not known in the Nether» 
lends. It is not wonder that many members In the second chamber of 
the Netherlands people's coilncll, which ultimately decide how 
Indonesia is to be povemed, put forward to the minister for over-
seas territories, a demand to rive a femoral survey of Indonesian 
1, Pandjl Islam, Jakarta, April B, \9kQ 
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movement to the second ohamber. At the time when the demand for a 
parliament for Indonesia was discussed in the second chamber this 
feneral survey was not as yet given to the mMtfbers. Thus, those who 
were ignorant of the Indonesian politics had to partake yet in 
forming the attitude of the second chamber towards the Indonesia 
demand. Although ignorant of the Indonesian situation they supported 
the rejection of the demand of the Indonesian movement. 1 
The Dutch public do not pay much attention. The Interest of 
the other members of the second chamber was still much less. The 
Indonesian problems were usually hand-led by committee of colonial 
specialists. No wonder if a majority of the members of the second 
chamber are to be fovoad in the coffee chamber whenever the most 
important Indonesian questions are being discussed. Only when they 
have to vote they are again seen in the second chamber, if these 
conditions are taken into consideration, one has to come to the 
conclusion that a body such as second chamber is not competent and 
has no right to decide Indonesian problems.2 
The t«Bporary report of the second chamber and the 
explanatory memorandum of minister Welter, registered strong 
rejection of the demand. The minister was of the opinion the demand 
for a parliament for Indonesia was the demand ofm^tf a smell groiQ) 
of persons of educated classes who were consciovts of their right 
to share in respcaislbility in the governance of their country. 
Minister Welter viewed this demand with a mixed feeling 
and deplored the action of the gepi in the demanding a parliament 
for Indonesia. The minister added that on account of the inqposslbilits 
1. Obani and Co. Op, cit. p.78 
2. Ibidji Islam: op.cit. 
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of bringing f\andaii»ntal change in the position of Indonesia in the 
political constitution of the kinirdom and in that of volksrasd 
in the constitution of Indonesia, he was of opinion tYitit there 
was no reason to appoint an investigation committee in connection 
with the Indonesian politics. 
The rejection of the demand for a parliament was based 
on the following reasonss 1. The time was inopportunate? the world 
was facing crisis; it was not rood time to introdiice any constitu-
tional chanPG in Indonesia, 2. The majority of the people of 
Indonesia did not demand the extension of the political rigjhts 
aa they were Illiterate. 1 
After examinlnp the groups on which the rejection of the 
demand by the '^tch was based, the secretariat of the gapi held 
a meeting which came to the conclusion that the rejection would and 
could not halt the mass action for winning « parllj^ ment for Indonesia. 
All Indonesian press expressed the same view. In other words, the 
massiHBvement action for a parliament for Indonesia was to be 
intensified and to be legally carried on ceaselessly. 
T.J.S.Stokvis, colonial specialist of the S.L.A.P., 
defended the demand of the Indonesian people in the second chamber. 
In the government's explanatory memorandum, he SRid In the chamber 
minister of overseas territories insists upon refusing the 
extension autonomy for Indonesia, There ere three difficulties 
advanoid by the minister: 1. The Indonesian manses are not yet 
ripe5 therefore the upper strata of society will d9mln8te; 2,Before 
having trained the people through the lower councils(city and local 
councils) the parliamentary rl«rhts cannot be given to the people| 
1, Obani and Coi opici.p.77 
170 
3. A -volksraad %Aiieh has parliamentary rlfhts cannot be 
reconciled %o the Netherlands responsibility.! 
When the Nazis amies Invaded the Netherlands before dawn in 
May 10, 195>0, the Cutch povemoent fled to England and the states 
general ceased to function. The exiled povernraent continued to 
direct the International relstlcms of Indcmesla from London. All 
power in Indonesia was invested in the hands of a G.G, In fact 
said Mr.H.ThaHirin in the annual meetinia: of the volksras-d, while 
Indonesians fiphting the battle for parliament, the construction 
of the government in Indonesia has become more or less totalitarian. 
Totalitarian system is much blamed by Dutch, it is much used by them • 
The concentration of sll power in the hands of the high officials 
tended to widen the gulf between the fovernment and people and 
inKnedlste remedy for this must be founded. 
During this international crisis, the tutch rovernaent 
proraised to consider conBtitutlonsl change in Indonesia when the 
Netherlands end their power were restored. According to the 
explanatory memorandum said Thamrin in the annual meetlns; of the 
volksraad of 19^, the government redaction of the demand of the 
people was based on two excuses? 1. The situation In the world %ras 
under!?clnr a chsnpe end whet shape democracy would take after the 
war was not known. 2. Because there had to be changes in the law of 
the Netherlands in order to alter the constitution in Indonesia, so 
the return of i^ bodies of the authority In the Netherlands must be 
awaited before ar^thlnp! could be dona, because the only matters 
considered to be important could be changed by caeans of emergency 
1. Ibid. p.80 
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eonstltution.1 
Dr.Tadjiiddin Htir, a prominent menb«r of the volksrasd, 
warned the government of the consequence of the government's 
obstinacy* He said X am afraid that the decision to make this 
country(Indonesia) a part and parcel of the great Netherlands vould 
be a m^re mockery. 
The government's spokesmen intensely deplored the 
attitude of the nationalist sMmbers of the volksraad who defended 
the right to achieve independence. Further the government represen 
tatives said that to orgue the p«ople outside the volksraad to 
render help to achieve independence could be interpreted as an action 
against the authorities in the Netherlands, because their govemaient 
were strongly against the right of the Netherlands subjects to secede.1 
In the session of volksraad in June 3» 19MD, the nationalist 
cooperators introduced three important bills which were warmfy 
debated, calling for 1, changing the volksrasd in full pledged 
parliament, 2. creating an imperial conference, 3. chan|4sc the 
official name of the country from the Netherlands Indies to Indonesia 
^. creating an Indonssian citizenship which would be conferred on 
all persons who had attained a certain intl^lieetual and cultural 
development regardless of race. The bills foimd considerable 
support, even among the ^urompean members, but nevertheless were 
wlthdra%m by their authors when the government declared it could 
not accept them.2 
The government on its initiative now took a step in 
the direction of satisfying the widespread and deeply felt desire 
1. Ibid. p.85 
2. Ibid. p.86 
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for constitutional refom under the leadership of a united front 
(gap!)* On Sefttember 1^, 19^» It announced the appointment of a 
coamission to ascertain the desires, aspirations and ideas with 
respect to the political development of Indonesia which obtained 
amonf the various races and classes of tlie Indonesian community and 
to submit to the government a carefully prepared report of its 
finiing together with e study of the consequences to governutent 
legislation and society if the desired reform should be Incorporated 
in the organic law« In its double function of Investigation and 
study the commission was especially requested to consider the 
possibility and the consequences of instituting an Indonesian citiren-
ship and of instituting in legislation some otl^r term than in-
landers* 1 
The commission which was ©xpected to make its report within 
a year, was composed of seven members with Br.F.H.Visman, a member 
of the council of the i^ ndies, as chairman. Of the seven members, 3 
were Netherlanders, 3 were i-ndonesians and 1 was Chinese* There was 
criticism of the coamission with regard to both the scope of its 
charge and its c(Mposition* The commission had only a hearing 
privilege and consisted only of civil servants* There was nodalega-
tlon or representatives from the Netherlands, it had no right to 
advance suggestion to form a parliament and a responsible government* 
The commission was nothing because it had miich less power to cope 
with the increasinp demand of the people* The coflralsslon could not 
1. Viekkes op.cit* p.205i Prlnpgodigdos op.clt. p.162 
17a 
p^ ive concrete fora to the expressions and desires of the people* 
Because the majority of the coramlsslon consisted of those who had 
no capability of pondering over the constitutional problems, had 
no political experience in the matter of Investigation and had no 
knowledge of the Indonesian society. It was not a skillful artist 
who undertakes tim outlines of the Indonesian society, said 
Pedoman Masjarakat in October 10, 19**5.1 
In its plenary session of October, 19^, the Gapi was of the 
opinion that the commission was unnecessary. It forbade every party 
uiwJer it to establish contact with the commission individually. 
The coimai8sion,however, proceeded with Its work and by 
December 9» 19M, ^vat three months before the fall of Indonesia, 
the commission furnished its report. The report of this investigatltm 
was in two parts* 1. Deallnjr with development of political, social 
and economic conditions in Indonesia between the two wars. 2. It 
contained the espiration of the people. It dealt with a series of 
problems such as racial problems, those of cosmion indoilesian cltlKen-
ship, of the eventual organisation of the administration on a 
federal basis, of local government and its future development^ of the 
reform of the volksraad and extension of franchise, of re-adJust» 
ment of the relations between the Hetherlands and Indonesia and 
finally of the establishment of a joint imperial council for all 
parts of Netherlands.2 
Before the Visman commission had completed its report, 
in April and May, 19M, the minister of colonies, Mr.B,Welter and 
minister of foreifn affairs, Mr.Van KLeffen made a visit to Indonesia. 
1. Pedoman Masjarakat, October, 10, 19^5 
2. Obanl and Co» op.clt. p.87 
17^ 
In a farewell addrass over the radio on May 7» minister Welter 
declared thpt in the political structure of the kingdom after the 
war expression would have to be ^iven to the changed position which 
Indonesia kad acquired in and through the war. In a broadcast to 
the empire from Londori^ n May tO, Queen WUhelmina likewise promised 
a chsnfe in the fovernmental structure of the empire so as to rive 
the various parts the position due them from the change in conditions. 
In July 30, IS'fl, the Queen again declared that as soon as the 
Netherlands are liberated from the oppresser, a new cabinet will be 
formed. This new cabinet mist immediately prepare a revision of the 
constitution? a revision by which amonp other thiniErs, the relations 
between the mother country and the other parts of the kingdom will 
be re-organised. To prepare this revision a board constituted by 
representatives of all parts of the kingdom will be appointed. Be-
sides, the revision of kingdom, that of administration acts now in 
force for each part of the kingdom oust be undertaken. Thi» will be 
done in the common agreement with representatives of those territories 
In this we can iay the foundation for a happier and more prosperous 
future for the entire kingdom.1 
In his address opening tV» volksrasd on June 16, C.G., 
Tjarda 3,Stachhouswer, made s declaration with the approval of the 
Queen and the ministery in London, that a chief itemcf the post 
liberetlon propramrae would be changes in the constitutional structure 
of the empire whereby the status of Indonesia and the West Indies 
would be brought into conformity with the Importance of these regiwis 
1. Vlekkes op.cit. p.20? 
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in the empire, Koreover, the tnternal polltica3(3tructure of the 
overseas territories woiald continue an integral part of this 
propramme. Opportunity would be given to bring to the knowledge of 
the croi(m the desires and ideas obteininp on the subject, in order 
thst these inlg;ht be carefully considered. The Queen's government 
proposed after the liberation of the motherland, to call a conference 
of prominent perrons from the various parts of the kinpdoa which 
should serve the crown with advice on the subject.1 
This p'overnmental declaration was generally welcomed but it 
did not completely satisfy even the moderate prominents of the 
constitutional reforms, for while it promised reforms it put them off 
imtil the end of the war. The desire for reforms was, therefore, still 
stronger and the pepi, consisting of both cooperators and non-coopers-
tors, streneously itrived for political independence of Indonesia. 
The cooperation and non-cooperation moventents were in full swing 
to fi^ht for human rights. 
The pspi boycotted the Vsim-m commission and the fight 
for a parliament for Indonesia was intensified. The Indonesian 
women's congress (K.P.I) a federation of almost all women's movements 
in its meeting of July 28, 19'+!, passed a resolution of approval of 
the estsbllshraent of a parliament in Indonesia's demanded by the 
Gapi snd decided to work VIth the Cgpi in achieving a parliament 
for Indonesia 
The Indonesian people's congress(K.I.. 1.) held a 
conference at Mataram on September 13-1^» 19^1 passed a resolution 
to form a new body called Madjelis Bakjat Indonesia or M.E.I. 
1. A.VandenboschJ op.cit. p.^7 
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(Indonesian people's assaasbly), based on democracy alriiinf at th« 
security end dignity of Indonesia. According to it this was to be 
achieved? 1. by holding laass raeetlngs and conferences where the 
people could express their opinions snd pass resolutions on Batters 
of interests for Indonesia. 2, Specially making efforts to carry 
on the action for a parliament for Indonesia. 
The membership of the K.F.,I,consisted of all organised 
Indcneslsn prrties and groups which took part in advancing the 
people, whether the parties or groups worked in the field of 
politics or in social or rellplous field or in any other field. The 
M.R.I, was administered by B body called Bewan pimpinan (executive 
council), consisting of representatives of various federation under 
the M.R.l. There were four big federations vender the M.F.I., that 
is to say, the Gapi, the Miai(religion), the E.P.I.(women) and the 
V.V.P.PKlaboiar).! 
On November 9, 19M, just one month before the treacherous 
Pearl Harbour attack,t^ lw Gapi held its plenary session at Jakarta, 
which was attended by the representatives of the gerlndo, the 
persatuan Mlnahasa, the pagjudan Fasundan, the P.I.I,, the partai 
kaum katolik Indonesia, the P.S.l.l,, the partai Arab Indonesia, 
and the parlndra. The session passed as many as 11 resolutions, the 
most Important of which were as followss-
The Gapi'8 plenary session decided (1) to put forward to 
the worklnf' committee of every member of Hapl a question regarding 
further step of gapi in connection with the action for parliament, 
for Indonesia, taking special notice of the proposal of the partai 
1. Obanl and Co» op.clt. p.9'* 
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Islam Indonesia of sending the people's delegation to London. 
(2) To drew a plan of demand regerdlnp the future economic 
reconstruction with ref irence to the pleitnary session of the Capi 
of AuruJ?t 8, 19M and the papi's Tneraorandum of January 31, 19M , 
section C. sub 6: Ca) which guarantee to the masses of the 
Indonesl an workinp class to live a human way of life and in pace 
with economic progress, (b) which pive the state such as power over 
the principal and key Industries as to make the purpose and the 
aim of those industries no more to concentrate riches In the hands 
of individual or of a small class of the society but to a aiass th« 
larp© amount of wealth for the pen^ral welfare of the people, (c) 
which puarnntee the abolition of racial dlscrlraln tion in Indonesia 
based on the old time considerations which now-adays creates con-
flicts end disturbs social harmony. (3) '^ o propose a change in the 
composition of the Indonesian parliament's committee which will be 
named perakan Indonesia berparlemenC a parliaaient fljr Indonesian 
movement), the M.B.I, will authorise the Capi to deal with every 
thing connected with the said gerakan Indonesia berparlemen. (*+)The 
Cerindo alonp with the secretariat of the Oapi are entrusted to 
Ijake a step so that the policy of deportation of the Indonesian 
leaders may be abolished as soon as possible.1 
The Oapi's conference of Beptambor 19-20, 1939, and 
December 10, 19^, decided to continue the flfeht for s parliament 
for Indonesia. The Capi established various committees for Indonesian 
parliament all over the country, for the purpose. The fsapl's conferenc 
of January 3I, 19M , at Jakarta, drafted a plan of the parliament 
1. Ibid, p.96 
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which consisted of two chambers, the house of representatives 
end senate, each hevinp 200 &nd 100 mensbers respectively. They 
were to he elected by the people on the basis of proportional 
system. The parlisment was o supreme authority to make laws in the 
country. The Indonesian citizenship would cover the entire Dutch 
East indies,1 
iVs regards the structure of government, Indonesia was to bo 
governed by a president. The president had a ri^ht of veto and was 
impeacheble in relation to officiel s4fMi functions done by the 
governoent. The executive power was vested in the hands of the 
president. Ke had powers to appoint and dismiss all ministers in 
consultation with the parliament, Ke was assisted by an advisory 
council(cabinet). Indonesia snd the Netherlands formed tofether a 
ststen bcndCconfederstionK Presenting the draft as memoranduffi to 
the VismEn commission on February lU^ , 19M , the general secretary 
of the Gapi Kr.Abikusno said that the C^pi secretariat had received 
the approval of 21,0^ -7 persons pnd 2^6 orpanisation!:; all over 
Indonesia demanding a parliament for Indonesis.t 
Furthermore, the defence problem or militia question had 
been hotly discussed by the nationalist cooperators snd non-coopera 
tors inside and outside the volksraad. When the Netherlands were 
occupied by the nerman troops in May 10, 19^0, the younf Netherlands 
in Indonesia proposed that the Indonesians should participate in 
defending Indonesia, because anythinp that was possible to happen 
in future, would directly affect the interest of all population of 
Indonesia. By the royal degree of July 15, 19^, s defence coDsmlstion 
under the chairaanship of J.H.B, Kuneman was appointed. The coaaiisiion 
investi—fed the question of the militia for Indonesia. 
1. A.K.Pringgodigdot op.dt. p. 163 
2. Obani and Coi op.clt. p.93 
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On October 1, 1^^, tbe coimaission submitted to th© |overniaent 
Its report of inquiry in which Inter alia it was ststedJ- The 
commission rxt least came tc the conclusion thr<t the best way to 
make thlr country cnjsable of defending itself is to introduce a 
limited nstlve railita. iMr.I'.Noe, Assistant resident in Java 
expressed the sane view in September, 19^ +0. 
As a result, on July 11, 19M, the volksra^d pessed a bill 
introducing militia. The railiti« wes limited to Java, Madura and 
sons refions outside Java such as Hinahasa and Arabon. The island of 
Suaiatra and other Islands w«re left out. 
In reality, the people of Indonesia had been demanding' tha 
Introduction of militia for the last 26 years. In 1915| a military 
authority put forward its militia proposal to the rovemment of 
Indonesia, In one of the meetinp of the Indonesian association of 
mlllt^iy officers held on March 5, 1916 at Jakarta, the militia 
proposal discussed. The introducticm of the militia was agreed upon 
in principle.1 
In August, 1915, the budl utomo had the share in proposing 
militia. But the militia mlrht be introduced by the people, Therefori 
a peorle's council hrvinf legislative power mipht be instituted flrs^  
The serlkat Islam was of opinion that the militia was citizen's 
duty in the state to protect the state against foreiim afgression. 
That was the state nii?'ht have its own 8overel«mty. A colony of 
dependency was like a lifeless object. It it was asked to ack and to 
protect itself, it mipht be animated first. Sane mind could not 
think of askinf an inanimate object to act an'l defend itself or 
to participate in defending itself, ralRht be given quality of 
1. Ibid. p.16'f 
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state.1 
Through their organisations the people objected ^he method 
of introduction of th© militia bill. The militia bin wss broufht 
in the volksraad by the povernment. And the bill WPS passed In the 
volksraod a ^ government ordinance. It wes not Introduced ?>nd 
passed by a true representative parliament ??nd responsible povernaent 
The volksraad had no rlpht to discuss it. The plenary session 
of the C-api held at Bandung on June 21, 19^1» con<:isted the militia 
a heavy duty of the people, life tax, which must he established with 
the consent of the wllllnpne5!3 of the people snd decided to approve 
the introduction of the mlllti?? only when it was introduced by a 
real people's psrliament es explained in the ^apl's manifesto. 
Mr.Supnpkupan of the G.N.I, asked in the volksraad why could not 
militia be Introduced In the bir Island of Sumatra and if so, the 
volksraad has no right to discuss the militiia.proposal. 
In the volksraad, the nationalist members united in the 
nrtionsl fraction of Indonesia advanced the followlnp erfumsnts arains' 
the G.G.'s ordinance, (l) ^ Ince the militia was limited, the 
volksraad had no right to discuss the subject. (2) The militia was 
another kind of duty imposed upon the people. Duty implied rights. 
Therefore, the people mi^ht be riven more riehts in the administration 
of the country in return,The rlfhts mith be ?iven with sg view to 
maklnf the Indonesians to join the forces cheerfully and enthusias-
tically. The people mlpht regard It as their btrth right and 
previlepe to jo3n the militia. And these could only be satisfied 
by the conversion of the volksraad into a full-pledped parliaaaent. 
1. Ibid, p. 92 
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The militia should not be Introduced by way of the C-,G.»s 
ordInane©.1 
Mr.Patfoto of the retired people's assoclstlonCP.F.I,) a 
moderste nfitionsllst, said only a small number of well-to-do, the 
arlstocrstlc and povemraent's servants were for the ordinance, while 
the netlrnellsts, the intllectuals »ere sfalnst. The former WAS 
supported by the Dutch numbers whose number In the volksrand was 
very miich oflt of proportion to the size of their conaaimlty. Those 
Dutch had, besides, no rlpht to discuss a subject which did not 
affect thesi but rether the Indonesians.2 
Dr.S^amsuddln of F.N.I, in the volksraad, sll rellplous 
bodies under the Mlal, rejected the Introduction of Indonealen 
ollltia in the said manner. 8 birrest political parties awelpeffieted 
under the Gepl also rejected It outrlrhtly. All labour or)ranls ntions 
under the P.V.P.N, hed the same attitude. The Indonesian women 
oruanlsation also rejected it. And the entire press evinced the 
Same attitude. Dr.Hindroaartono, the president of railway and tvsm 
union spoke in similar tens. 
TYWI Mlal under the supffrestion of the Gspl along with the 
Indonesian press and many Indonesian orpanisatlons, male and female 
wired «bA authority of the Netherlands in London to cancel the 
decision of the volksraad rerardinp the Indonesi«in ollltia. The 
executive bderd of the P.S.I.I, sent wire to Her Majesty, Queen 
Wllhelmina in London deitjsndinf th«t the decision of volksiaad should 
not be put Into force. The leaders of the parlndrs walked out of 
the volksraad during the discussion of the mllltlal bill.3 
1. Ibid p. 9^ 
2. Ibid 
3. Ibid p. 101 
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Inspite of all above mentioned sur^ iestl ons pn6 arpuments, the 
Dutch eoverna^nt who had sole authority In Indonesip, parsed the 
militia bill and consequently the compul?;ory mllltie service was 
enforced to the younp Indonesians, But the result ws?? not so 
satisfactory and all Netherlands forces were badly defeated by over-
i^ lAlminf powerful Japanese forces in 19^, 
PA&T Bt INDOHESIAN FtBEIOli BJSLATIOHS 
CHIM 
Indonesia and China were linked together many centuries 
psBt. The Chinese were the largest alian irroup in Indonesia, 
numberinr 526,000(1900); Vl ,1 57 (1928); 36,000(1921) ;1 ,23^,000 
(1930); 1,500,000 (19^) and over 2 million in 1950. They originated 
principally in Kwanpttinr and FuViien ana their arrival in Indonesia 
lr>np antedated that of Europeans^ In 1930 nearly half of all Chinese 
(5B2,*+3l) lived in ^ave and Hadttaa, in the municipalities they foraed 
about 10 ,1 of the urban pcpulrtion. On the other islands theCLargest 
Chinese colony was to be found in Sumatra (M+8,^3l) where they were 
predcminently iiamirrant labourers, especially in ti» tin-mines and 
the IsTfre rubber and tobacco plantations and some were agrlcultxirists 
market ?r?:rdeners and fishermen. The Chinese of Borneo(over 108,000) 
were lEsinly descendants of all insaigrant families and were engaged 
in agriculture, lumbering and the like. In the outer islands as a 
whole only 11 .- of the Chinese population was urban.1 
In the early datA the Chinese community was orpjanlatd under 
its headmen who were responsible to the i^ utch authorities. The Chinese 
had established ?;chools and hospitals in 1729 and the Chinese Muslim 
1. V.Purcell* The Chinese in S.g.A.London 1951, p.805 
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built a mosque In 1786,and consequently orpanlsed a Chinese 
MusllB party of IndonesiaCP.T.l.l.) They intermarried with the 
native poptdation* It was a petty republican coiuamnal organisation 
of the Chinese and reactionary towards the prevallinpr authorities. 
Tenmuck pointed that the Kontrsis were democratic communities formed 
with the object of exploiting for their benefit the gold and diamond 
mines. They were divided Into public associations of which 3 
8Cco\aited for the greatest number of members and these three kongsis 
occupied the leading position and exercised control over the smaller 
ones distributing through the interior. All Chinese belong to the 
kongsis shared In the gains and losses of t>w mining enterprises.The 
Lanpong kongsi In the Sambos residency (Borneo) had an armed force 
of 6,000 fighting men; the Taykong and the Lara Slnta-klou kongsis 
In the Sabas residency had 10,000 and 50,000 fighting men respectively, 
After the termination of the great Java wa»: In 1926, the fi'uteh 
supported the Sultan Abu Bakar Tadjuddin 6f Borneo against the re-
actionary Chinese organisation and ultimately defeated them in 
185J*.1 
In 1870, there were only about Javanese labourers employed 
in estates in the east coast of Sumatra, the majority of the ^00 
labourers being Chinese. Between 1888 and 1931 there were some 
305,000 Chinese at Belawan. The great majority came from Swatow or 
Hong Kong where the association of Deii planters(B.P.V.) had 
recruiting officers. Between 186^ and 188 the labourers were 
obtained through coolies brokers in Singapore. From 1890 to 191^ 
1. Schlege, Prof.G.L.J Organisation de kongsis a Borneo, revile 
coloniaie inaternationale, Amsterda, de Bussy, Tone 1, 1885 p»^50 
1 ^ ^ 
G«raan shipping eoaapanles transported Chinese labourers baok-
wards and forwards between Belawan end south China but from 191**^  
to 1931 ships of the K.P.M, brought the labourers to S^ aiatra.The 
number of the Chinese field labourers wiployed by Simstra tobacco 
estates were 21,000(1930); 19,000(1931) and 8,000(1939).1 
Upto 182V In Java the civil affairs of the Chinese were dealt 
with by the European eourts of Justice (raden van 5ustltie)| their 
criminal affairs by the l«ndraden(courts of 5^ »stlce) for the natives 
In the inner territorj^ es and in the districts of Jakarta, Bemarang 
end Stirabaya by raden van justitltes. The private law applied was 
In the case of the raden van justite the B.uropean law (with a few 
exception as to Chinese law of lnharitance)and the ease of landraden 
customary. But the Chinese did not bring their marriage and divorce 
before the coiu'ts.2 
By an order of the CO., Van Der Capellen, In council in 
I82*f, it was ordered that the Chinese all over Java in their 
criminal and civil affairs should be judged by the native courts. 
Those who complained of this were not the Chinese but the I>utch 
merchants who were of tJM opinion that their disputes with the 
Chinese were better dealth with by the raden van justitlte than 
landraden.3 
Under the FOfemment act of 1 8 ^ foreign o r i e n t a l s were 
placed on the same footing as nat ives* The act did not a l t e r t l » 
pos i t ion VBS confined by royal degree on the p r inc ip le s of law. The 
1. Karl Pel«er:Arbeiterwardengun in sud08tasien,Hu«burg,1939f 
pp.90-96 
2 . V.Purcell* o p . c l t . p.506 
3 . S taa t sb lad , govt, Gaatette in 192W, Jaka r t a . 
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degree was extended in 1917 to allow a person to submit himself 
to the whole of European civil law. 
By an ordinance of the G.G. of 1855, made at the request 
of the i>ut«h merchants of Jakarta, the Dutch law property, as laid 
down in the Indonesian civil code, was declared applicable to 
foreijm orientals. From 1855 onwards the ordinary jurisdiction in 
Chinese civil matters was the raden van ,justitie.1 
The Chinese never complained of this ordinsnce of 1855 but 
they did complain on criminal matters which bed to be Juflped by the 
landraed and not br the raad van justitie. After 1918 the criminal 
law for iiuropeans, Chinese and natives was substantially the same 
thouph the law of property differed. 
The recognition in 1899 of the Japanese as iiuropeans 
in their legal relations, while the Chinese In most of their 
activities were left under the native courts, the Chinese received 
was 
a slight upon themselves. The judicial organ which^the special 
object of the Chinese dislike was the politie rol (police roll), 
a court havingpurisdiction over minor offences and hearing 
preliminary examinations. The local civil service served as the 
Judge in violation of the principle of the separation of the 
executive and the J\»diciary.2 
The landraad, th« intermediary court for native and 
Foreign Asiatics, was also the object of criticism both from 
orientals and i^ i^ uropeans because it was composed of a legally 
auelified chairman, usually iiuropean, 2 native active or pensioned 
1. Ibid 
2. A.Vendenbosch: op.cit. p.3^6 
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officials, & native officer of justice, a Chinese adviser and 
a clerk. The non-jurist character of the layman and the recr\iltlng 
of his service from the official class subjected the court to much 
the seme criticisa es teas brought against the politle rol. 
iinother grievance of tt^ Chines© wes that like the natives, 
they often subjected to along confin»n»nt before trial and in 
house search and criminal pleading the i^ uropean had far protestaticm 
against arbitrary actions.1 
Chinese apitation assisted by the unification policy of Van 
i^ eventer gnd other Dutch liberals led in 191^ to the abolition of 
the politie rol and in Ij'l? to a measure which permitted individual 
non-Europeans to submit themselves to ^^ uropean law, thus participating 
in their benefits. 
subsequent legislation from 191? to 1925 had the effect of 
removing the Chinese completely from the civil jurisdiction of the 
landraad but by the tiae of Japanese invaiion their demand to be 
placed on the same footing as Europeans in criminal procedure as 
well had not been granted, in 1928 a new regulation passed by the 
volksraad abolished the jurisdiction of the Chinese headmen.2 
In 1900, the Chinese could in principle live only where there 
were Chinese quarters. For every trip he wished to make into the 
interior a Chinese merchant had to obtain a pass. The system was 
relaxed in 190h by the prant of passes valid for a year instead of 
for a single joiamey and in 1910 the right was conceded of free 
passage alonp the aaln highways without a permit and Chinese nobles 
were exempted from the obligation to obtain a pass. 
1. V.Furcell: op.clt. p.508 
2, De Kat Angellnos op.clt. p.15^ 
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In 1887 the Chinese fovernment had sent a cosBBlttee to Indonesia 
to study the cora»rclal reletions of China with that country. 
Permission to send t>» coffiRittee was obtained through diplomatic 
channels by way of the Bague and the Indonesian government, received 
the members as visitors from a friei^ly state. Then in 1891 the 
Peking PovemB»nt requested permission to collect funds amonjr the 
Chinese in Indonesia for flood relief in 6hina. Again in 1906 a 
Chinese made a protracted visit to Java for the purpose of bringing 
about uniformity among Chinese commercial societies. In 1907 the 
assistant secretary of the department of agriculture, Xang Shih-Tshi 
visited Indonesia to discuss comnercial problems and as result of 
his visit mai^ addresses and petitions were sent to Peking from the 
Chinese in Indonesia.1 
In 1908 Wang Kang Ky, secretary to the Chinese legislaticm 
at the Hague, travelled in Indonesia for several months. At 
u^raj^ aya he held a semi-official census and recommended that 
Chinese residents in Indonesia chote between Chinese and Dutch 
nationality. In 1909 two Chinese crusers appeared in the harbour 
at Jakarta, carrying Wa Tacheng, secretary of the department of 
education, who spent SOB^ time in Java for the alleged purpose of 
studying 4iommercial conditions. In 1910 Caho Tsung Fan, adviser to 
the department of agriciilture, industry and trade, came for the 
8«sie purpose. In 1913 the newly appointed minister to the Hague, 
Wei Chen Tsu, on the way to his post, travelled through Indonesia.2 
1. Van Ginkel* Overxlchtvan de intemationall rechlelijke 
betkkingen van Hederlansch indie, 1850, p.7*+ 
2, A.Vandenbosch» op.cit. p.360 
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Chinese In Indonesia were honoured with decorations and 
membership in Chinese orders. Directors of important coiraiercial 
societies in Java were invested in office from Peking.Scholars 
were selected from the society school to go to China for further 
study at the expenses of the Chinese government. Chinese warships 
on their call at Indonesian ports were received with great festivity 
end on Chinese holidays there was a riotous display of flag. In 
1911, the '*^ lanf Hwee at Purahaya and Jokjakara and other places 
sent out ballots for the election of members of the provincial 
council at Canton.In 1912, the Slang Hwee in Indonesia sent a 
committee to Peking to participate in the election of 6 senators 
who were to represent the Chinese abroad in that body* And t>» 
Chinese in Indonesia contributed liberally In men and money to the 
cause of the republic revolution.1 
The Netherlands had obtained a most favoured natten claused 
treaty in 1863f riving It the right of diplomatic and consoler 
representation and giving Dutch subjects the right to travel in 
China without pai^orts. Nothing was said of the rights of Chinese 
subjects in the Netherlands or possessions. A consular conventicai 
with Japan had been concluded In 1908 providing for mutual rights 
of consular officials in each other territory. This aroused the 
envy of China, which now made strcmg demands for a consular convention 
Regarding nationality, the Indonesian government act of 
185^ provided that all persons living in Indonesia were termed 
inhabitants or Dutch subjects. This was in conflict with tte Chinese 
law of netionality which was based on the jus sanguinis and claimed 
all persons of Chinese descent through the male line as Chinese. 
11 Knobel* Kolonlall bestuur In verband net buitenlendsche saken, 
vragen van de Dag, 1915, p. 30 end 58^ 
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This fact delayed a consular convention between the two eoxmtrles 
and It was not signed until May, P,1910. China objected streneously 
to the Dutch nationality but had to accept It as the price for tlT« 
right of consular representation in Indonesia.1 
In 1900 a bureau of Chinese affairs was established by tyi® 
government e£ Jakarta. The personnel of the biureau underwent a 
long period of preparation in Halland, China, and Indonesia and 
had a thorough acquaintance with the languages and customs. The 
bureau which kept In close touch with movements In China and among 
the Chinese community In Indonesia furnished Information and advice 
to all branches of the government, prepared a bi-monthly report 
on the Chinese and Chinese Indonesian press in Indonesia and gave 
special attention to Chinese schools.2 
Politically the Chinese held a favoured position in Indonesia* 
Of the 61 members of the volksraad n© fewer than three and no 
more than ^ might be Chinese and they held about the same number 
of seats proportionately In the provincial, regency and municipal 
councils. The Chinese were not allowed to join military service in 
Indonesia. In 1 9 ^ there was still very strong Chinese nstionalist 
sentiment, although among the Indonesian- Chinese there was a tendency 
to align themselves on the side of the Indonesian nationalists.3 
Chinese were admitted to native shcools on the same 
footing as natives and the erection of government schools for 
Chinese called Dutch-Chinese schools, was b^yun in 1908 and in 1909 
private Chinese schools were granted subsidies. The curriculum of the 
1. V.fKffcells op.cit. p.51^ 
2. Ibid. p.520 
3. Ibid. p.518 
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Dutch-Chinese schools was the same as that of the European 
elementary schools, with Dutch as the language medium. English 
was also introduced in these schools. 
According^to Br, Van Diffenlen, of 200,000 Chinese children 
between the age of 6 and iM- in 1936, about 98,000 received education 
of some sort. Of these some U^ 5,000 were education n^ schools 
conducted by the Tjong Hwa Tong? 23,000 in public snd suabsidied 
Dutch-Chinese schools; 13,000 in native primary schools and 
Indonesia-Chinese schools; 2,500 in the European schools(6 in 
grades); 13t5^ ^" t^ ® special Dutch-Chinese and other wild cat 
schools under private arrangement.That is to say that about 50 % 
of Chinese youth received education. John I-»auws and others gave a 
total of only 5,8M Chinese Christian throughout Indonesian 
archipelego.l 
The Chinese schools recruited large nvuober of teachers 
from Canton province. There were three happenings which had strong 
repurcussions among the Chinese of Indonesia. The first Iras the 
revolution of 1911» the second was the rise of Kuomintang and 
the purging of its left-wing elements in 1927 and the third was 
tfeouble between China and Japan which began a new in 1931« The 
Chinese and Indonesian communists came together for a time in an 
uneasy alliance in 1925. After the purge fcn 192? there was a 
permanent split between Chinese coirajunlsts and nationalists. At this 
period the Chinese were coming to Indonesiajat that rate of about 
50,000 a year and this ave some anxiety to the Indonesian government.2 
Tl^re was much propaganda originating in China; the 
kuomintang controlled a considerable press in Indonesia. The Chinese 
1. Dr.B,Van DiffelenJ He onderwijs voor Chlneezen, koloniaale stuflen 
Nos.5 and 6, 1936, p.^J 
2. V.Purcell* op.cit. p.5Mf 
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press in Indonesia reflected all events In China. There were all 
disciplined branches of K.M.T, such as the So Po Sia(reading club) 
the Ten Hen League, the Boycotte Pickets and Iron and blood 
brigafles. W)wn Canton was still revolutionary under the leadership 
of S\ai Yet San and under the influence of Borodin, Chinese conflicts 
were transported to Indonesia and soae disturbances broke out. The 
boycott against the Japanese was observed with varying degrees of 
rigidity In different parts of Indonesia and in some was maintained 
through terrorisation. The Sino^Japanese feeling run through the 
Chinese community. The government warned several Chinese papers 
against articles to violence and took precaution against outbreakes 
against the Japanese in Indonesia who were so small in number. There 
%fas a considerable nuteber of Chinese non-cooperation who through 
press and public meetings claimed for freed from Butch cltljsenshipi 
they wanted Chinese neitlonelity and yet wished to retain previleged 
position in IruSonesia.l 
The renewal of the war between Japan and China in 1937, bad 
its repurcussions in Aniidonesia. 200 Indo-Chinese students stronded 
in Shanghai were brought hosw. The Chinese government immediately 
called for financial aid from Chirjiese abroad. The Indonesian governmin 
permitted the purchase and sale of Chinese bonds, but it did not 
permit public action or porpaganda for the sale of war loans.The 
Chinese In Indonesia bought war bonds to the amount of 1 ^/k• million 
florins during the first year alone, in addition to this, hi 
million florins were contributed for Chinese relief- As secured 
1. A.Vandenbosch: op.cit. pp. 367-368 
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at the tioMt of the outbreak of war in Manchuria in 1931» the 
Chinese engaged in extensive boycotfceof Japanese to supply the 
?oods because of the shift to war vconomy, the import of Japanese 
golds fell markedly.1 
The imperial government of China had awakened towards the 
end of its existence, to the advantages of cultivating China's 
iettlement overseas and the nationalist iovernment intensified 
these efforts to obtain sympathy, support and money from Chinese 
exiled children, it sent nmmerous missions to the Nayang with 
variously described objectives^but with one unvarying motite. in 
1930, it was demanding a consular treaty with the Netherlands which 
should ensure the assimilation of Chinese to Etffopeans in Indonesia. 
A point of friction betvraen the government was the registration of 
Chinese overseas, i^ very new consular arriving in Indonesia received 
instructions from his government sent circulars to the residents 
prohibiting the practice and repeatedly informed the con^ulars that 
this was not permissible under the consular treaty. Such protests 
regularly brought for the apologlstic explanation that a misti&e had 
been made and that they had intended to :^ gister only the Sinkhens 
(newcomers) and not Indonesian-Chinese bom (peranakan). Another 
source of conflict between the governs^nt and the Qhinese consulars 
was over the display of flags at half-mast on the anniversary of the 
21 demands. The Indonesian government had prohibited the display of 
flag at half mast on these and similar days on the ground that 
would constitute giving of to Japan, a power with which it was in 
friendly relations.2 
1. V.Purcell* op.cit. p.5Mf; Ibi. p.370 
2. ibid, p.5^ 
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The Chinese ver© to bo foimd in ©very economic structiire 
of Indonesia society, as large capitalists, bankers and africultural 
cosBBissioners as wAlI as the btamblest labourers, but their function 
in econoaic life vaa for excellence that of middleisen* Of the total 
Chinese poptilstion of 1,233, million U85,000 in trade and coaoerce, 
1*70,000 In raw material production, 9^,000 in industry, 3000 in 
government service i^nd ^3»000 in other occupations. The Chinese in 
Java i#ere most nuiaerous in trade; those of the outer islands as 
fflinlnr or plantation coolies. Apart from their peculifirity, carpentarj 
and with the Arabs, the extension of smell loans, usually a lUjplhious 
rate, were some of the occupation which were almost ecclusively 
theirs. In outer islands they were to be found in large number stB 
contract labourers in the mines of Banjrka and Billiton and the 
European plantations of the northeast of Sumatra and in northwest 
of Borneo as indpendent farmers,1 
TYm recruitment of Chinese coolies labour for Indonesian 
mines end plantations ceased In 1^3^ and by 1939 of the 332,^39 
coolies employed on i^ uropean estates in the outislands, only 25,067 
were Chinese and about a lyO of this were contract labourers. In 
1930, there were about 9**f000 Chinese smonR the 2,200 industrial 
workers of Indonesia or **.^ of the whole. 
The Chinese had also fouiw! in European firms Hn6 as 
assistant in European shops and later becasw more prominent in 
professional work as teachers^dentists and doctors and in the 
technical frrades of mining industry. In Journalism they had fslned 
a large share and this included a .-^ hare in the control of native presi 
1. Ibid. p.537 
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Timber trade was mainly In Chinese hands. In 1938, the total 
value of timber products exported amowited to over k million 
guilders. The capital Investment of Chinese In the country was 
about 1|0 million dollars In 1937 and total Income 37,000 and 32 
million guilders In 1936,1 
The flow of new Chinese Immlgratlcm into Indonesia from 
1932 to 1938 was as follows* 12,000 (1932), 9000(1933>, 12,000 
(193^) 15,000(1935), 19,000(1936), 31,000(1937),200,000(1938). Of 
the 1938 figures, 3,000 were males below 12 and 8,000 over 12 and 
2000 females under 12 and 6000 over. 12. From 1920 to 1930 the 
imsilgratlon of Chinese Into Indonesia had been at the rate of over 
»K),000 a year. In 1921 it was about »f3,000 and in 1928 about 
M,000. The average from 1900 to 1930 was rather over 28,000.2 
3ndone8i«< had long the most honourable relations with 
Japan. Since 1600 on the Netherlands ha« had continous official 
relations with the Japanese government. Japanese came to Indonesia 
about the same time as the Sast Indian company, Japanese armed with 
bows and arrows were in the service of the cofitpany as soldiers in 
1612. By 1623 tl»re was also a large non-military colony of Japanese 
for In this year they could muster 13O armed men. f>ome were tax 
farmers and others engaged in trade. A few held the highest offices 
under the East India Company and in the church. I^ot a few of the 
Japanese were Christians, .3 
After I6W0 no Japanese were permitted to leave their 
country, nor those abroad to return. The last reference to the 
1. Ibid p. 535 
2. Cator, W.J.t The economic position of Chinese in the Netherlands 
Indies, Londctti, 1936, p.38 
3. Cud Batavis Geden-book unlgegeven ter gelegenheld van het 3OO 
laring-bestasn der stad In 1919, pp.^5-^6 
Japanese In Sakarta was of 1682. The first notice of Japanese In 
Indonesia in the new period was an adyirtiseaent to Java paper in 
1867 of a troupe of Japanese magicians, in which ware two Japanese 
women, the first ever permitted to their land. 
The Bast India company was allowed llalting trading rights 
with Japan through an agency which it was permitted to maintain on 
the island of Deshima in the harbour of Nagasaki* The station was 
in effect a ccfflblnation of a diplomatic post and a trading company 
agency. The Dutch on the post suffered ill-treatment. 
When the Dutch government took over the E.I.C., it succeeded 
the company in the trade monopoly. The amount of trade was not 
great. An item of 20,869 florins appeared in the Indonesian govern-
ment budget for 18W^ 7-W8, which represented the profits of this trade 
As port payment of salary 6he officials at Deshima were permitted 
to Xk sent out '•000 florins worth of goods each year. When the 
Netherlands was a part of Napoleonic France, Beshima was the only 
place in the world where the flag continued to fly.1 
A great amount of western seie^ce and learning infliterated 
into Japan. Through this J^tch aperture the Japanese were able to 
learn much about cartography, geograpl^, military sciences, medicine 
botany and astronomy. Sometimes they submitted to the Dutch officials 
on Deshima cjuestions of a military political nature. An instance of 
this was the questionnaire submitted at the time of the Anglo-
Chinese opium war of 18^-^2, In which the Japanese asked a series 
of pertinent questions about British naval strength and tactie8«2 
1, A.Vandenboscht op.cit. p.392 
2, Boxer: Jan companies in Japan, 1600-1817 
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The Cutch pBr^.l8ment declared In 1852 that it would Ckollov 
toward Japan a policy of warning, counsil and stimuletioni thereby 
avoiding everything: which mipht give the iii5>reasion of seeking ovr 
own advantage. On February, 15, l8Mf, King William 11 sent a highly 
significant letter to the emperor of Jepan, demanding it to abandon 
its policy of seclusion, suggesting friendly cormercial relati<wis BM 
the best method of preventing conflict Bn6 advising a softening of 
the lews against foreigners, in 18^5, fhs G.G. of Indonesia atteaq?ted 
to induce Japan to desert her policy of exclusion.1 
The Japanese government was warned of the coming American 
expedition and was advised to conclude a treaty including the 
following provision* the opening of Nagasaki to the commerce of all 
nations^ the leveying of only moderate import and export taxes; 
the admission of consuls; the designation of coaling station in the 
north and south of Japan and most favoured nation treatment for 
Dutch nation also. After the establishment of diplomatic reletions 
between Japan and other countries, Eutch was the common medium of 
communication both orally and in writing. 
The Dutch were afraid of the Japanese expansion since the 
Sino-Japanese war. By the peace treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, 
Japan obtained the Pescadores islands and Formosa and a party in 
Japan began urging southward expansion overseas. In 1912, a Japanese 
government subsldied boad line running to Indonesia began operations 
and organisation called the south sea-society encouraged trade and 
other relations with the south-sea islands.2 
In the course of the I'Usso-Japanese, war, when the Bussian 
Baltic fleet on its way to the Far 5ast approached Indonesia, the 
1. Van Kleffen* op.cit. p.32 
8. Bakker; De inteemational© positie van Nederlandsch-Indie in 
de laste 50 jaren, de Indiesche gids 11, p.32-^3 
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Japanese ^overnoent sent a note to the Hag tie In which the Dutch 
government was warned against permitting the Russian fleet to sake 
unnc«»tral use of the Indonesian ports or territorial waters. Shoi^t 
the Netherlands povernment fall in its duties, the note stated 
the Japanese government would take such measures as it might deem 
necessary. 
Immediately following the first %#orld war, the Japanese and the 
U,v*i,fovemraents demanded from the Dutch colonial authority some 
concessions for the exploitation of oil fields In Indonesia. Tlw 
demand was granted. After the war, the Dutch government took part 
In the Washington conference (1920) and eonsequsntly became a party 
to the nliu power treaty but not to the foxa* p«wer treaty and the 
rights of Dutch possession in the Pacific area were respected as 
desired by the foreign minister. Van Karnebeek, the head of the 
Dutch delegatlon.1 
The Japanese commercial Invasion of Indonesia, long feared 
by the Dutch, became a reality during the world depression. The 
Japanese share of the Indonesian Imports before 1913 was over 1 % • 
The five year average from 1925 to 1929 was considerably higher, 
slightly ovt;r 10 ^ . In 1933 the Japanese percentage of the Imports 
readied 32^. The Dutch share of the Indonesian Imports was arer 
32 % In the year Immediately proceeding 19B» but had declined to an 
eveTBfe of s^out 18 % for 1925-1929. In 1933» the percentage declined 
to 9.5 %• The Japanese were aided in their trade invasion of 
Indonesia by the DutdBb policy of maintaining the golden flordne 
while Japan depreciated the Xen nearly ^0 %, Beside trade, Japanese 
1. A.VandenboschJ op.clt, p.397 
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also tried to capture the shipping and distributiidn of business.1 
^he Indonesian povernmant took action to combat the Japanese 
trade invasion. It did this just to save a certain proportion of 
tlm Indonesian market for Dutch goods, to protect Indonesian 
Industries and the existing distribution system as well as the 
market for Indonesian exports. The i>utch felt compelled to depart 
from the open door policy. By mean of imposition of quotas and 
import licenses the Indonesian governmfent was able to recover a 
great data of the market for the Netherlands and other western 
countries. In 1937 the Japanese percentage of the Indonesian 
imports had fallen back to 25 ?> while the Dutch percentage was 
upto 19, which was 2 % higher than that the average for the five 
year period from 1925 to 1929.2 
I'^ urinf this period the two countries were also engaged in a 
war for shipping rates. The Japanese comp4nies took advantage of the 
very liberal Indonesian shipping regulations and were extending into 
inter-islonds shipping business. Japanese rates were so much cheaper 
than I>utch rates, that Kobe was becoming the maritine centre of 
the western half of the archipelago. 
Since Japan was the chief sufferer from the trade restric -
tion measures, it naturally proposed to the Netherlands to hold a 
conference to seek a solution to the difficxaties which had risen 
between them. The conference was to be held in Jakarta. The Japanese 
delegetlon was led by Nagaoka. The negotiation dragged on, the 
conferenc sJrittlng intermintently from June to December, 193^»It 
finally broke up in complete failure. A year later a semi-official 
1. Ibid p.398 
2. Ibid. p. 399 
199 
shipping conferenca met at Kobe. This conference nevar everfot 
under way. Both the delegates quarelled the langueee of the 
conference, ftifllsh or Japanese. This led to no result lit all.1 
The shipping contravery was suddenly broi^ht to an end in 
July, 1936, vhen a leedinp fifure in the Japanese shipping business 
made a visit to Indonesia. An erreement was reached, whereby the 
Hanyo Kazun Kaoushlki Kisha, the company in which sll the Japanese 
lines with Indonesia had been raerped ??nd the Dutch *^8va-China-
Japrn line dlvldinr the shippinr bu8ines«=: between the two countries. 
Of the transport from Japan to Indcnesls the N.K.K.K. received 62 
and J.C.J, line 38 % rmt of the traffic in the other direction the 
pe centare were 60 and WO respectively.! 
On the surface, Tutch-Japanese relations bepan to iaprbve 
after the conference. Contract between the Japanese povernnent and 
the advisers of the indcnesian p:overnBient was never broken end 
peaceaaeal a number of issues were adjusted. Debouchl honoured 
ndonesla by a pood-will visit in 1935 and a new able younp man by 
the nafflfc of ishzawa was made Japanese consul general at Jakarta, 
who did much to improve relations. But 1^ 'utch fearf! of Japan were 
never allayed. 
New Guinea vss the first objective of Japanese 
inperislistic eio \M the scuth seas. The i^ ayo Kohatsu Kaisha, a 
subsidiary of the oriental development company, had ^ concession 
of about 5J,000 hectares in New "Uinea which it took over from a 
Hsraan company. Hero the Jopsinese were experiment in? with frowlng 
cotton. lr\ 1935 this company asked for permission to import 1000 
1. ibid. p. HOO 
2. Ibid, p. ^1 
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Japanese families, but this request was denied. The economic 
velue of the Indonesian part of this Island was very doubtful 
but it mipht serve as a useful base In support of other Japanese 
nsval bases In the ©anclated Islands, pfirtlcularly in a war with the 
U.S.A. Not far from H©w f^ uinea was the Japanese settleiaent of 
I^ avao in the Philippines, Indeed, Davao was so near to Mlaneas, the 
north-east Indonesian islands, that some of the children of the 
Island were sent to Davao to go school, who knew Japanese but no 
Dutch. 1 
New Guinea hsd an indigeneous populstlon of only ^0,000 
Papuans, pyp^ mis and near pyfmis. it was undeveloped piea. In 1935 
the Indonesian governiisent undertook the workinf military nnd 
administrative penetrption and economic development. The Dutch, 
British and American companies explored pold and oil fields there, 
this foreipn concession was much criticised by the Indonesian 
nationalist, II.H.I'hprmin, 2 
The Japanese southward policy was advocated by navy and 
other prroups in Japan, ^'liiny articles had appeared In the Japanese 
press on the south-seo islands policy. To some it meant me«rely 
seeking more liberal trade opportijnities; to othar it Involved 
assertlnF the right to develop ftctual acquisition of territory. 
/.dvocates of the policy declared thst Manchu Kuo was a dlsappolnt-
mant as a course of raw rnsterisls as wall as a market for commodities 
that there was a dsnper In relying too heavily on the continent 
because Japan mieht some day be cut off from it by military actionj 
that expansion outhv/ard overseas would brlnr for fre?ter return 
1. Ibid 
2. Ibid. p.^2 
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at least cost; and that any way, expansion on the continent shoiald 
be balanced by overseas expansion, llhsra was in Japan a south-sea 
association, of which Prince Konoe, pzesldent of the house of peers 
was the hoad. Under its auspices dlstinsruished Japanese in all 
walks of life were broupht together to discuss the southward 
policy.1 
When the office of C.u, of i*or«osa fell vacant in 1936, 
Admiral Napona, minister of the navy, sufjested to the premier 
that since Formosa was a key position in the execution of the 
southward policy and In e safepuardinp Japan's scuthern line of 
defence, the practice of havinp a civilian as ti.G, should be dis-
continued ana a nsval officer should be nemed to fill the post. The 
nav7 minister's proposal called for vifoirous protest from thepeers 
and permanent officials. A sharp contraversy prevailed for a time 
but oderpi'e counsel came to prevail. The result was a compromise- a 
retired admiral was appointed,2 
in Karch, 1937 an interesting lntcrp»ellation took place in 
one of the coniinittees of the Japanese house of representatives. 
Hr.Hupororo '•akurai of the hinseito party, stated that New Guinea 
which was more extensive in area than the mainland of Japan, was stil 
left in an underdeveloped state and asked whether the povernment did 
not think it advisable as one a^ans of settling the population 
problem, to open negotiations with the Netherlands povernment with a 
view tc securing a perpetual lease of the country. In order to pre-
clude any suspecion of territorial designs, he supgested that the 
povernment should at the same time conclude a non-a^pression apreeaeni 
with the Netherlands povernment. General Hayashi, the primer and 
1. ibid p.'i02 
2. Japanese weekly chronicale, September 10, 1936 
forelpn Biinlster, said that on the whole, he shared the Interpella 
tlons view. Jpipsn he declsred, had no territorial deale-ns on 
Indonesia but the covernment recornlsed the necessity of Japan's 
economic developiuent In the scuth-seas. in shaplnr a course to a 
attain this end the government woiild hpve to tf?ke the position 
and sentiment of other party Into careful consideration. The 
question of the lease of New Guinea, the minister declared, had not 
yet been f^ tu«lled by the sovernrsent but the InterpelTator's 
eu??estion would be given careful attention.1 
it WP3 f^^ nlnst the backcro^md of a va^ue potcntLol Japanese 
threat th^t the Cutch viewed the rumour cf a secret; clause In the 
Japenose-Garman antl-communlst pacs of 1935, providinp- for the divi-
sion of In'^ onesla into s^^Mres of influence. Mr.THnichlro ^ foshida 
of the Japanese foreign office, came to Indonesia In ^snuary, 1937 
appr.rentl7 to seek to dispel Dutch fesrs of the existence of the 
secret prctocal. Since then events had moved rapidly and not In a 
direction favourable to the Dutch. The accu'-'atlon by Japan of Honal 
and the ^prstly Islands pave reality to the southward pollcy.2 
MABIAN ^W^i.S 
•^.VVH^tB^-^M Mil nil HI HI -^ ' > • fc • Umi^timr^^ft^af^^ 
The relations between Indonesia and the Arab world were of 
frept importanc*? for two reasons: 1. Indonesia is predominantly 
Mohammedan ond thousands of Indonesian make pllFrlmape to ^'!ecca 
every year as well as a considereblu' Indonesian students study in 
different educational s* Institutions of the Arab states; 2. Txe 
Arab comsmnlty In Indonesia (111,022 per^ o^'^ s in 1930, of whom 2^,000 
lived In Java) had played an Importsnt role in the country for 
centuries, 
1. Japanese Weekly chronicale, September 10, 1936 
1. Ibid: March h, 1937 
2, New 2Cork Tines, Rovenber 26, 1936 
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Like the Chinese, the Arabians had been in Indonesia for 
centuries and constitute the intermediaries in business. Soni of 
them had been very successful and mult-millionaires. %Ym houses of 
sultanates, Siak in Sumatra end Pontianak in Borneo, were Arabian, 
in 1931» ^^ r.Van Der iioulen, the former Dutch consul p^ eneral and 
charge d affairs at Jedah was sent to a mission to Xeawn and Hadramaut 
the latter the land of origin of the Indonesian Arabians, for the 
purpose of bringing them under the sphere of legation at Jedah and 
for reasons Muslim policy. Hr.Van der Keulen, accompanied by 
iJr.Van Wissmann, a German geographer, successfully completed the 
difficult mission and so doing they were the first westerners 
to penetrate the interior of Hadramaut.1 
The great number of Indonesians went bn the pilgrimage 
to Mecca, but the Indonesian government did not interest itself 
in the pgrilgrimaie, To discourage the pilgrimage the government 
in 1825, made passports and the payment of tax of 110 florins a 
requirement of persons undertaking the pllcrimage. In 192? this 
tax, the pr0o«ed8 of which went to the mosoues, was detlared 
illegal by the court of cassation, The number of pilgrims there 
upon increased rapidly from ^ 3 in 1825 to 3f862 in 1B58. At thit 
time the pilgrimage often took three years and was accompanied Xff 
great hardship and even misery,2 
The government policy with respect to the pilgrimages 
was now controlled by its policy of obsolute neutrality in matters 
of religion and h«nce it neither encouraged nor discouraged the 
pilgrimates, even though they destituted a tremendous drain on the 
financial reso\irces of the capital poor Indonesians. About half of 
1. Van de Meueln* A Journey in Haaramsut, the Muslim world, 
October, 1932 
2. Vender Plas« Des relations entre lesspays bas et let 
Hidjas, in Gritus, snnuaire inermationale, 1931»PP»116-lMf 
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the Heccs pilprlms from overseas came from Indonesia, In 1926-27, 
when "ccured the lf?rpest p l l r r lmr^e of Indonesians on record, there 
were 52,M2 Indonesian pllr^rlins. Curing the depression the number of 
pll?rlni<? declined to 2260 for the 1932-33 p ' Isr impge. The povernment 
had undertaken heal th pro tec t ion works of pilpriras against 
contingent deseases in Mecca by Inauculat ion s sa lns t cho le ra . , 
y 
typhoid and decently snd exercised a careful control over their 
transnort^'tlon. Upon their return bhey guaranteed for a period in 
order to protect Indonesians fro-c conti?rian. Those regulations were 
incorporated in the internaticnsl sanitary convention of 1926. In 
1936 the number of pllrriras was 5,M33. In additlo'^  there was a 
colony of about 10,000 Indonesians constnntly in «^ ecca, studying 
relipious subjects r-nd he Arab 1 «'n?'ugge.1 
The Dutch consuletp st Jedah was established in l872.Hlzaz 
was ther a Turkish province end the consulate was subjected to the 
Cutch le^Rtion at Constantinople. The consulate had manifold tasks. 
Besides replsterln^ the pllfrlms, lookinp after their interests, 
reportinr deaths and takinr care of their states, the consul also 
exercised judicial functions ov-r the aany pilsrims as the 
capItuarlations were recc'nised in Hijaz. Because of non-Husllm 
mipht not enter Mecca, an Indonesian Muslims was added to the 
consulate staff in 1920, to reside in Mecca during the season of the 
pil^rimare and in 1920 an Indonesian Ku«liffi physician was also added 
for the purpose of treatinp pilp-rlms, reportinp a hygienic conditions 
in Kljaz and "ifuppestinp prf;v9ative tnoasures for the protection of 
the pilprlros. The most difficult talk of the consulate was the 
protection of the pilgrims srainst exactions and even pillasre st 
the lands of Arabs.2 
1. A.Vsndenboschs o p . c i . p.372 
2 . i b i d . 
In 1915 tbe -harlf of Mecca revolted a?alnst the Turks and 
because of *he disturbed conditions of the colmtry, the Indlon«tiaii 
pilrrims ceased coming, '^ he 10,000 Indonesian colonies et Mecca 
were destitute, since? then they lived on funds brought by the 
pllpriras ^nd to be repstilated. The ?'etherl<;nds recognised the 
rovernraent of Kinf Husssin in 1920, yhr^, howev>-r, refused to 
recopnlse the cnpituirlatlon?'. His povernmcnt WRS vjesk f-nd the 
pilprimB sufff-red. "^ e^ '^etherlpnds in 19^6 recofnlSf=^ d the povernraent 
of KinF 3bn Baud, whow«s kins' of ffejd, defeated Kinp Huseln and 
then unitf-d the two countries, Kin? Ibn ^eud r^-estsbllshed peace 
find order ;md brcup'ht r.hout *» 5t«te of security such ss the 
country hsd never becore kno%m. "is ^^ovemment at onca joined the 
international postsl union p.nd part let rnterl in the In^ternaticnal 
hyplenic conference In 1926. The progressive ibn Beud was tryinf 
to modfrn1?:e the country ^nd in this work h,nd sought the collebora-
tion of the Dutch. A Dutch^ian set up a Isibor^ itory for vaccines and 
serums for his frovernment snd in 1932, y^T.^nn Leeuwen, s former 
offici.^1 of the Ketherland?! trading company stationed for some time 
in the company office at Jak?irta, became King Ibn Saud's financial 
adviser,1 
The r-?lationg between Hijaz and the ^etherlonds were considered 
so l!inport»nt they the consulate et Jedah was ra,«de a legation in 
IB30 '.'rt.th ,? charsie d sffairs at its head. The povernment reletions 
existing between Kin^ ? Ibn baud's government anf^ the I^etherlands 
povernment was not entirely free from embJ^ irassraent for the former 
as king was chief of the refonalst Muslim ^^ chool of the Wahabls, 
whereas the pilgrims were nearly all orthodox. 
1. Ibid. p. 373 
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For a tiaie after the first world war there was an active 
pan islamic movement in Indonesia, under the leadership of 
H.A.Salim. -^'he advance of Christian missions and of religiously 
neutral nationalist movement caused a defence in the Muslim 
community. i-t;veral pan islamic conferences were held and delegates 
were sent to the world Islam conpress convened by King Ibn Saud 
Bt *-*eccE in 19'i6. But the kinp put a stop to all political aspects 
of thw congress as he feared would Involve him in political 
difficulties especially with ('rest EritifaAn. Hljaz was quite 
dependent upon the profits of the pilgrimepes and the king probably 
feared that the Indonesian schools mipht put obstacles in the way 
of pllfrimagttS if the congress should take on a political character. 
A.Seliffi ©ought to impiove the Indonesian schools at Mecca but in 
this he failed. Later a group of Kinangkabau succeeded in establish 
Ing a good school at Kecca without political er^s.1 
The i^ utch consid, now charge c' affairs at Jedah was caro-
f\illy chosen and received a special training. We was chosen from 
residents or assistant residents in the Indonesian civil service 
and before taking up his work he spent a year in study at Leiden, 
pursuing courses in the Arabic language, Muslim law and similar 
studies. Hti was appointed for a period of five years, after which 
he geaerally retvirned to Indonesia to serve as an adviser to the 
government in Muslim end native affairs.The s/stOTi had produced a 
number of vary able men, experts on Islamism and the near eastern 
situation, i'he Indonesian vice consul in Mecca (H.A.Salim and 
A.Kadir; had been piven a widejjurisdiction over the Indonesian 
pllpriffis in Kecoa. A unique feature of this agreement was that the 
1. Ibid. 
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Hi;Jaz government enforced the vice consul's decision.l 
The ArHb community in Indonesia had also orfsnlsed an 
organisation called the Arab i'srty of IndoneslaC?'.A.,i) in 193^1 
under the leadership cf a revolutionary young man, Abdur Rahman 
Baswedan. Though the party was confronted with numerous obstacles 
created by both the i>utch impari,3list and orthodox Arabs, yitt 
because of Its undylnr spiiit of sacrifice and courage it contributed 
such to the ever-g;rowlng fraternity and brotherhood as well as the 
development of the Indonesian national movement. 
The Indonesian students 3tudyin??^Calro formed in 1923» an 
association called Jamio Chalria, under the initiative of Muchtar 
Lutfi, iibdul Kahar »»uzakir anC oth-^ rs. The name of the organisation 
was then changed to the prester xndonesisn par>y( F\l,F) in 1930, It 
was so octive not only in the /;rab world tut also it had established 
close contacts with n-^ tional oipani sat ions in Indonesia such as 
the ?.~,l.i., psrindra, F.ii.i. etc. In 192?, the Indonesian -Malay 
Youth Association Crerpinuoffii, the indonaaian i^alay psrty(Pertlndo) 
the Indonesian student's linionCC.P.S.) in iiecca in 1939 and the 
i^ 'alay Indcnesian association (Knkindom> in Bagdad in 19^j were 
established and functioned very satisfactory in various national 
and international fieIds,2 
HCLLA!Cr 
The relations between Indonesia end Holland had undergone 
important modification!? durlnr the 20 years in the direction of 
Increased colonial autonerny. ^noer the present system there had been 
an excess cf centralisstion? 'The C.G, st Jakarta had minutely 
1. Ibid, pp.373-37^ 
2. Luissn revolusi rskjat, Jakarta, 19^5- p.37 
controllec^  the whole i^ overnBont of the empire end he in return 
had been under the strict supervision of the pov«'rnment of 
Holland, "^e ftforms gave the colonial povernsient the power to 
re^ulpte Indonesian Internal effrlrs, subject to the ultimate 
control of the povtrnment of Holland which had also charge of 
imperifil interests and foreign affairs. All ordlnences passed by 
the Indent:sifm rcverniBent could be suspended by the crown acting 
en the ??cv1eo of its mlnlstei- -no the states penersl retained the 
rirht to veto them. The former very wide power of legislation 
possessed by tho crown wos greatly restricted» the states general 
retfilne''. th rl?ht to lepislete; but it V.'DS renulrec first to 
consult tV'e Indonesian le?lsl-ture. The rirht to craw up the 
budget v;ps trs-nsferrec from the p'overnment of Holland to that of 
Indonesia, hut the approval of the states general was required 
before could he put Into effect, 'ihe C,C.continued on his adminlstra 
ticn In sccordence with its InstiuctlonF. He remained completely 
responsible to the minister for the colonlt^ s who in return was 
responsible to the stBtes peneifil. Under the new reriJSfe the minister 
would l^y down the bropd outlines of policy snd exercised a general 
supervision, but he would not interfere in the details of the 
adnlni«?tr-tlon which woiil.d be left to tha C.G. A strong demand has 
arisen.^  in Indonesia for grsater degree of iadependance and the 
conquest of Holland by f'ermany had strenpthened the development.1 
The constitution of the I«etherlsnds ch-^ rjred the crown with 
the Supr.jme admlnistrr.tion over Indonesia, wltle it entrusted the 
penersl ndralnistration to the f.n. The ero'^ m h-^d f large number 
of powers, it appointed nnd removed the C.""., the vice-president 
and members of tYm coimcll of the East Indies, the chairman of 
1, l.Iaerson and his associatesi Govt, and nationellsiB in S.jc.A,, 
S, Xork, 19^2, Chap. Vi, p.98 
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tl^ volksraad, the cominander of the navy, the president of the 
high coui't, the chairman and members of the auditing chamber, 
and the commffindtr of the army. In accordance \^ ith the rules of 
orders of the coTmcil of min?=ter = (cabinet^, these sppointments 
with the exception of the chairman of the volksraad and the 
comirisnder of the army, might be made by the cabinet. In case of 
disap-reerrant between the G.c. and the council of the Sast Indies, 
where such f-rreeraent was necessfry for specific adrnini^tratlve 
acts, decision was nade by tht; crown, the crown had in addition 
to these a number of other minor adminlstrstive functions,1 
The Dutch cabinet was both individuslly -no collectively 
responsible to the parliament. The minister of colonies hsd to 
retire when he had lost the confidence of the states f^eneral. The 
kinf and the rovernraent were H unity of wMbh the king was 
irresponsible and the ministers the responsible heads. The exchanf* 
of views between the kin^ and his minsters the latter mipht puard 
in secret. 
The relationship of the ministor of colonies to the ^ .C. 
had been changed by the 1922 constitution revision. The minister 
miPht exhibit himself and yet kept a controlling hsnd on the bread 
outlines of the •i-noonesion policy. This woiJld be done not so much 
by the issuance of direction to the >'"•.€,, nor by the suspension 
of the Indonesian ordinances ond their recommendGtion to parliament 
for veto as by the choice of a p-;r5on of pprticiilar viev/s ?^nd force 
for position of the C.C. in first place ryv/. his continuance in 
office in the second. Since the '".n. rd'-ht tf^ ke corniz'^nce of the 
supfostion of crown, the fround was alic for a secret inter action 
1 . A, Vandenboschi op.cit, pp.85-87 
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between minister and .^.G, in which apreoment on policy could be 
reached. In case of alnor diffeiences of policy, the H.G, 
undcubtecly continucQ in office .-^nd loyolly carried out the 
minister's wishes. If the two M * differed radically in views 
of policy tho C.C, rtipht be expected to resign. The minis tar 
might lonper be held respon^ tible for detailed sets of the C.G,, 
but for his statesmanship, ihe now constitution required the 
minstor of colonics not onl' th?Jt he exhibited himself but that he 
also restx?».in0G parliament from unnecessRry meddling in Indonesian 
affsirs.l 
The minister of colonies mifht pive his loyral support 
to the >.r,, end defend him arainpt attack in parliament. If the G.G, 
coamittisd acts which the minister feld he could not defent or if 
the formal Insisted upon h policy which the latter did not approve, 
the lainistar tai^ ht come befoie --ha cabinet with a recossnendstion 
for his removal or himself resigned. But the minister hsd felled 
on several occasions to come t' the defence of the C.G, when 
attacks had been made upon hl'i? lay members of pRrliement and one or 
two occasions had joined in the attack himself, ^ ore recently the 
aiinister had ruled over the heed of the C.G, and openly rebuked 
indentsian officials from ths floor of parilaments,2 
Holding the central key position in the department of 
colonies was the ministt^ r's cabinet or office of his private 
secretary. All iaatt*-r3 of a secret, confidential or peneral nnture 
the expeuition of such matters, the control over tyK* archives of 
thes«j documents for the last jO years, Jiupervlsion of the cable 
1. Ibid, p.88 
2. Handeinlinp-en van de tweede kfmer Kay 23,1923, p.Z^kO 
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connection with the colonies, the preparation of the annual 
colonial reports, personnel of the department and the granting 
of distributions were within the sphere of this beaureau.Aside 
from general secretary and a library the department was divided 
Into 7 divisions. These divisions dealt respectivily with 
jitficial affairs and international law questions{ finances, auditing 
and disbursing, matters which in Indonesia belcmpred to the sphere 
of the departments of education, internal lidminls tret ion aid workshop 
and agriculture, industry and commerce, matters with in Indonesia 
fell in the departments of public works and government Industries 
defence and miscellaneous affairs.1 
Commissariat for Indonesian affairs was set up in anticipa-
tion of an agency of the Indonesian government in the Netherlands. 
It dealt with different services of the Indonesian government such 
as the recruiting and sending out of personnel and the purchasing 
of suprlies. During the provisional period the head of the 
commissariat was given as much as an independent sphere of action as 
wa» consistent with his position as a subordinate of the minister. 
Within the commissariat were also found the bearuefor supervision 
over students which also gave aid and advice to Indonesians studying 
in Holland, the information bureau for the Indonesian service, the 
medical council for the department of colonies and the boreau for 
orphanage court.2 
The Netherlands constitution of ^B^h and 1815 conferred 
upon the king exclusive power to direct the administration of the 
overseas colonels and possessions of the state. This meant a 
complete freedom of the states general to control the authorities of 
r.~AJ Vandenbosch* op.clt. pp.93-9*f 
2. Ibid. p. 9^ 
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of the colonial countries. Many attempts to limit the power of 
the cro%m were unsuccessful until ISt^Swhen a new constitution 
was adopted. This constitution required that the Indonesian 
government act, the monetary system and the auditinp system of 
the colonies be established by act of the states general and that 
all other subjects were to be regulated by law when the need Cor 
it might appear* 
The constitution of 18U6 had definitely set up a parliamentary 
system. Dhder the auditing act of 186^ parliamentary approval of 
the Indonesian budget was necessary from IB68 on. The minister of 
colonies submitted the budget to the parliament and was prepared to 
answer all questions regarding all sorts of information and of 
administrative detail of the G.G.I 
The G.G, in 1918 came before the volksraad to make 
announcen»nt in which far reaching reforms were promised. In ful-
filment of this promise, a commission for the revision of the 
governmental structure of indonesiaa was appointed. The ccMnmlssion 
in Its report on June 30, 1920, urged the need of the transfer of 
the centre of gravity in both administration and legislation from 
the lletherlands to Indonesia. Three objections were advanced 
against the then existing relationship* 1. The possibility that the 
Indonesian interests might be slightened in favour of Dutch 
interests; (2) The lesser acquaintance in the Netherlands with the 
need of Indonesia and (3) The excessive delays caused by the 
continued meddling of Dutch governmental organs in purelue Indonesian 
affairs. 2. 
1. Ibid Chap. V pp. Ih-l'y 
2. Versleg van de staatsinrlchting van Nederlandschidie,1920, 
P.9M-
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The revised constitution of 1920 removed the words possessions 
and colonies from the constitution. Art.1 of the constitution now 
read; the klnpdome of the Netherlands comprises the territory of 
the Netherlands, Indonesia, BurAnam and Curacao.1 With regard to 
peneral administration the G.Ct, was invested with an Independent 
sphere of authority, while crown was left with only special powers. 
A larfe amount of legislative authority was granted to Indonesia. 
The go»«rnmental organs established in Indonesia was delegated the 
power to regulate Indonesian internal affairs, while to the crown 
was reserved the right to regulate only subjects and on such occasions 
as the law might specify. However, the crown received the right 
to suspend all ordinances passed by Indonesian organs when judged 
in conflict with the constitution, the law or the general interest, 
while the ripht of vetoing Indonesian ordinances on the same grounds 
was left to the states general. And finally though parliament retainid 
the right to legislate a colonial subjects, it might first 
consul the representative body of the territory concerned.2 
Under the Indonesian government act the crown was given the 
power to legislation in case of dead-locks between the C,G, and 
the volksraad. The act further empowered the crown to regulate a 
number of subjects even the internal affairs of Indonesia. But tl^ 
regulation of these subjects except In case of an urgent nature, the 
crown might give the volksraad a hearing before issuing the rules.3 
Furthermore, the Indonesian government act provided the 
states general might regulate purely internal affairs *f it deemed 
this necessary. However, the states general was under the obligation 
of submitting the matter to the volksrasd to ascertain its views 
before legislating. This was required for any revising of the Indonesli 
1. Art. 1 of the constitution of 1922 
2. Art. 60 Ibid 
3. Arts. 89, section 3 end 90 of the constitution. 
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government act or drafting a new one. Primary control over the 
budget had been shifted froa Holland to Indonesia and now was in 
the hends of the G.G. and the volksraad. But if the latter two could 
not reach an agreement on a section or subs-section of the budget, 
the dis-agreement %rent to the states general for settleaent. The 
states general retained secondary control over the Indonesian 
budget through requlreasent that the budget might have the approval 
of the Netherlands parliament before going into operation. While 
the crown had the power of suspending i^ lMionesian ordinances, the 
suspension fell if not approved by the states general within a 
year. Other non-legislative powers which lied within the competence 
of the states general were the charting of circulation banks, the 
authorisation or ratification of agreeo^nts between Indonesia and 
third powers, the floating and guarantinp of indonesian loans and a 
few other matters.1 
The question of internal affairs and ministerial responsibility 
to the states general were re-eatedly discussed in end outside of 
volksraad and states general. Prof.^an Vollenhoven concluded thst 
complete responsibility of one or more ministers to the chambers 
for the C.G*s lets and ommission that is the system was desired and 
which %ras created and that is system which still prevails. For all 
that occured in Indonesia in field of control government there 
existed no responsibility other than to the states general. That 
responsibility rested squarely upon the minister of colonies, elthe 
alone or collectively with other ministers, depending upon whether 
affairs touched the conduct of administration as a whole.2 
After the general election in Holland, Mr.Colljn, the very 
able leader of the antl-revolutionaire party, formed twice nationa' 
1. Xbld A^t. 99, 189 and 1lV 
2. A.Vandenboscht op.cit. p.81 
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cabinet in 1937 and 1939, consisting of representatives of the 
Catholic party, the Christian party, liberal democrat parties and 
the socialist party. The entrance of socialist leaders In 
ministries would bring a great change In Dutch colonial policy toward 
Indonesia.l 
Though preat dependence of the Indonesian poveminent in the 
states general had largely disappeared since 1925, yet the states 
general could still through the minister of colonies force a certain 
co\jrse of action upon a reluctant G.G., but It ran the danrer of 
arousing bitter opposition in the volksraad. A skillful G.G,could 
lean on the volksraad for strength in a contest with the minister 
of colonies and the states general, should the latter attempt too 
much interference in Indonesian affairs.2 
In 1922 it was suggested that since Indonesia, Surinam and 
Curacao were no longer colonies but constItutent parts of the empire 
the G.G. and governors of these territories ought no longer to be 
subordinate to the minister of colonies or the cabinet as a whole. 
The volksraad petition of 1936 for dominion status embodied a 
somewhat similar proposal. In order that the three overseas parts 
of the empire might be accorded in conformity with their new 
constitutional position they should received complete administrative 
and legislative autonomy. The G.G. should Immediately be made 
responsible to the whole Netherlands rafaiistry. TYmse should be 
created in an imperial council, composed of representatives of tl» 
k parts of the entire, at first clothed with only advisory power 
but ultimately endowed with legislative power for ia^erial affairs 
with an imperial ministry responsible to it. The G.G. would no longer 
be an official of the Netherlands but of the empire.3 
1. Ibid, p.83 
2. Dayx The Dutch in Java p. M 3 
3. f.A.Elgaman: Indie en de ministeraad, 1929; and Vandenboscht op.cit 
p. 8^ 
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The number of colonial experts in parliament was very lame. 
Kany retired Indonesian officials and other former residents of 
•i-ndonesia "became members of parlianent. Two former povernors 
general of Indonesia, i^ r.Fock and Mr.Idenburp, were leadinf meTEbers 
of parllamGnt. Since 1933 a Javanese Mr.Rusten Effendl, had been 
8 member of the second chaisber of the Dutch parliament. Be was 
elected on the cominianist ticket. L.N.Palar was also elected to the 
r>utch parlleiaent after the world war, P-urinr the second world war 
Farengen Adlpatl Ario Sujono, a Javanese noblemdn, appointed a 
minister vlthout portfolio In the Dutch cabinet In London under the 
preraiership of Prof.Gerbrandy. Satledjit, a moderate Indonesian 
socialist, spent the war in the I>utch underground activities In 
Holland against the German fascism, edltlnp the resistance newpaper, 
Vry NederlsndCfree Netherlands),1 
economically, the prosperity of the Netherlands considerably 
depended upon Indonesia, "^ an Deventor declared in his favour glds 
article of 1899 on s debt of honour that the welfare of the 
propertied classes in the Netherlands was very closely related to 
the retention of our colonies In Indonesia. A weekly journal stated 
that the number of persons directly or Indirectly employed in Dutch 
Industries exporting to Indonesia totalled about 80,000 and that 
yearly approximately ^ 160,000,000 profits flew to the Netherlands 
from Indonesia, that 80,000,000 more people were employed in the 
consumption of this profit and that the retention of Indonesia 
was matferial bread and butter for about »^00,000 Netherlands2 
The Dutch invested a larpe capital in Indonesia totalling 
in I93B about 2,63^ rallllon pullders, out of 3,800 million guilders 
1. Ibid p . 85 
2 . P o l l t l e k econoralsch weekly b l a d . May 7 , 193O 
^1 
of all foreipn capitals in the country. The Dutch capital was 
Invested in sujrar plantations and refineries, (UOO million 
guilders), rubber (^ 50 F*), other plantations (350 m) banks (27^ ^ m) 
tin (10m) shipping UOO m) oil (500 m) , industries (50 m.),railway 
and tramways(l50 m.) f^ovemment enterprises(100 m) and ralscallaneous 
(250 mJ. 1 
Annual profits and interests accrued from Dutch investments 
were estimated as followst sugas* 25 aillion guilders, rubber and 
other plantations, ^ @ m. banks 16.5 m, tin, 0.5 m, oil 30 m. shipp> 
inf, 6 ffl., railways and tramway, 9 m. gas and electric industries 
6 m., industries 1.5 m., miscellaneous, 15 m. interest on N.i;.!. 
bonds(incliidinp: interest paid by N.E.I.povemment to the Netherland 
kingdom), 35 m., total 191.5 m. 
To these 191.5 m. p-uilders should be added unpaid dividends 
of various corporstions, which amounted to about 10 m, guilders per 
year. Thus the annual yield on Dutch Investments in Indonesia 
amounted to 200 m. guilder8.2 
Netherlands reports from and exports to Indonesia from 1928-
1939 in million guilders were as follows* in 1928, IUO and 175 
mllllnn pullders, 1929, 1 ^ and 172 m. 1930, 92 and 136 m., 1931|72 
and 89 tn.; 1932, 50 and h7 m. 1933, 51 and 3I m. I 193**, 58 and 30 m 
1935, 57 and 32 m.; 1936, 79 and Uh m,; 1937, 126 and 9** »., 1938,102 
end 200. j 1939, 91 and 101 m. Total exports of Indonesia and 
the Netherlands J 1928, 1580 and 1989 million guilders; 1929, tti 
lMt6 and 196^ m.| 1930, 1160 and 169^ m.; 1931, 7^9 and 1291 m| 
1932, 5^ and 836m. 5 1933, ^ 70 and 723 m., 193^,'^9 end 70k m. 
1935, ^7 and 673 m. 5 1936, 533 and 7»*3 m., 1937, 9^ 5 and IIU8 m.| 
1. Indonesian news-service published by the republic of Indonesia 
office, Singapore, May 13, 19'*9, pp.^f-5 
2. M.Sosteln: op.cit. p.1180 
I9S84" 55? and 1039 ro; and .939, 7 ^ nr\A 956 m.1 
Culturally the }>utch had preat Influenced Indonesian culture 
and tT?5d1.tlons In many respects. The Dutch system of educrtlon 
W9S sdopted in Indonesia* Dutch mlsslonnrles were very sctlye in 
different perts of the country. Over 30,000 Indonesians had been 
llTln=' In the Netherlands ?»nd niRny Indonesian students studied 
In the I^ utch universities. They established various orrenlsstlons 
there s-aoh ss the Indoneslsn association, the Indonesian labour 
union, etc. 
Moreover, Indonesia had set a stronr cont?»cts with the ^utch 
West Indies. There were about M},000 Indonesian netlonals In the 
Dutch Surinam. They were tsken by the THitch to the Island from 
Indonesia as indentured labour to work In the Dutch planfcatlons 
pnd mines between 1^9^ find 1931* ^ l^e Indenture was for the term of 
five years after which the I5utch undertook to repatriate them to 
Indonesia. ?Jcw they worked ss manual labourers, smsll merchants and 
procers but due to raclf^ l diSBrlmJnntlon they were very ill treated 
end oppKKPessed so much so thst they were often ousted from their 
iobs.J 
On '^ecembor ^, 19^7, a group of 978 Indonesian labourers 
were belnr repatriated frore ^ urlnsme, arrived at Parakan, Kedu and 
r^ emaranp. There was also an Indonesian rseoT^ le's association, organised 
by the Indonesian people there, under the presidentship of Mr.idlnjr 
Sumlte. He was recently elected meTiber of the leflslative coimcll 
of the s'ovrmment of aurlnsme. The Dutch authorities in Surlname were 
now folnf back on their word to repatriate the Indonesian nationals 
and forcln? them to adopt Suriname n-^tlonallty.The Indonesians would 
I.Indonesian New service vol. 3, No.110 Singapore, May 13, 1 9 ^ p.^ 
2.Ibid p.7 
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resist this Kr.Iding Sumit has requested the republican authority 
to intervene and take lip this question in the round table conference 
at the Kepue in ^^k9. As a result, Mr.Ablkusno Tjokrosojoso, a 
member of the J-ndonesian delegation to the round table conference, 
visited --urinaiae in October 2?, 19^ +9.1 
•^n 1939, the lietherlands povernffient in Holland had granted a 
big amount of 25 million guilders of Indonesia for the purpose of 
economic developutent of the country . This amount included about 
6.5 2dllicn guilders for irrigation works, about j,,h m, to speed 
up land settlement, about 3«3 m. for roads and bridges, almost 3 m. 
for building purposes, almost 2 m. for sanitation, 6 m. for 
forestry service, 1 m. for relief of mutu, urgic industry, 1 m. for 
the advancement of agriculture and cattle breeding, 1 m. for native 
industry, 1 m. for release of debt bondage, 0.8 m. toward a Madura 
welfare fund, 0.3 m. for fisheries and 0,2 m. for various objects 
in those districts of Sumatra and Borneo, the lie outside the rubber 
producing area.2 
As regards the Indonesian ancient golden links and close 
relations with Indie and her national leaders, the president -idcarno 
vividly described "You are our brothers, in the veins of every one 
of my people flow the blood of their Indian ancestors and the culture 
we possess is steeped through and through Indian influences.And just 
as we are your flebtors in culture so too are debtors in political 
faith, -ince 1 908 \»w h?ve given no little attention to your 
aspirations and yoiur political movements, ftad Mahatma Gandhi and 
Nehru are names to conjure with in Indonesia. Gahdhiji's civil 
dis-obedience movement and the action of the Indian national 
congress attracted great interest. 
1. Ibid p .6 
2 . Merdeka, So.25 , New Delhi February 1 1 , 1 9 ^ p .5 
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The indonusian non-cooperation movement vms much Influenced by the 
politicel currents in InUo, said forrapr Prime ^'lniste^, All 
a^strcajnid;Jo3o, D.IIatta, former vice-president, expressed the saae 
view.l 
There wete over 650,000 Indians in Indonesia, where they worked 
CHI plantations and were employed as overseers, clerks or police 
officers anl still others were business -snd labourers in other 
occupations at various parts of the country. They establiahec* 
schools, mosques and organised sssoclstlons. They came mostly from 
Madras, U.F, etc. They also intermarried vjith the native population/ 
There had been r: considerable number of the Indonesian 
students, studying in the various universities of India, such as 
i^ usliin university, Aligarh, Jamia Mlllia, Delhi and others. They 
also formed their own organisations like the Indonesian student 
unionCPersindom) in 193C at Hew Delhi, the Indonesian-Malay Assoeia-
tionCBI.l'*,) in 19^1, which published a mapazine, pustaka Indonesia 
P.i^ .l.I. in 19^5 and A.F.I, in 1952.2 
All Indonesian women congress sent a delep'^ -tion to the 
Asiatic women conference held at Lahore in January, 19-25, 1931. The 
delegation consisted of Hrs. i'antoso, Mrs.-ukemi ?nd I'iss Sunarjati. 
The conference was organised by the All India women ore-enisatlon 
under the presidentship of Mrs.-ircjonsldu with the object of 
promoting friendly relations, mutual understanding amon? the koiaen 
in Asia and making them more conscious of their taSlts to uplift their 
countries end peoples. In 1935, the Indonesian fovernment sent a 
cxiltural mission to India under the chairmanship of "^ uska, forjMr 
press attache of Indonesia at New Belhi. in 1939, an Indian vomen 
1. ibid 
2. Suara A.P.I .N.Delhi , 1956, pp.2if-27 
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d e l e g a t i o n went t o Indones ia t o a t t e n d the women conference a t 
J a k a r t a , In 1927, Hsbaindramjth Tsgore , pn outstancUnj* e d u c a t l n l s t 
nnci founccr of t he S a n t i n i k e t a n ' ' Jn ive r s i ty , a l s o v i s i t e d indones la .1 
The pre-war yea r s I n d i a imported from Indones ia l a r g e 
q u a n t i t i e s of sugar Cv-^ ne, la lnerol o i l , p n r a f f i n wax, t e a k , quinnlne 
spec i Pinrl t i n . Ind ia T.ainly expor ted Ju t e poods, c o t t o n t e x t i l e s 
vype tab le o i l s FHO s e e d s , C O B I , and s h e l l a c . Ind ia e x p o r t s were 
viovth about F s , 2 c r o r e s and imports I s . 2 c r o r e s . I 'hls t r ade ceitie 
t o s t f ' n d s t l l l dur ing the var y e a r s . 2 
AOS?r,AlbIA 
The r e l a t i o n s between Indones ia end A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand 
had been 3c c l o s e i n r e c e n t y e a r s . Formerly the n a t i v e i s l a n d of 
Kew Culnen belong to Indones ia t u t l a t e r on some p a r t of i t v?as 
occupied by German end B r i t i s h f o r c e s . No boundary afTeement vas 
concluded with Ceimany while i t was s t i l l a col ioniel war, V/hen the 
f i r s t world wnr was ovc?r an A u s t r a l i a n fo rce occupied the i s l and 
on 5*-€ptember 1 2 , 1 9 1 ^ . '^ o boundary t r e a t y had been made with the 
A u s t r a l i a n poverniDK;nt. The mandate from the league of n a t i o n s was 
dated December 17t 1 ?20 and M«?y 9 , 1921 , the A u s t r a l i a n povernsent 
e s t a b l i s h e d s d m i n i s t r e t i o n In the c o u n t r y . The m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g 
of the nr . t lves except fo r l o c a l p o l i c e p u r p o s e s , vvas p r o h i b i t e d and 
no naval pnd m i l i t a r y base or Buy any f o r t i f i c a t i o n s nig-ht be 
8Stablish3d, 
-ha non-indipeneouE popu ln t i on on June 30 , 1936, was 5 , 8 8 1 , 
of which the B r i t i s h numbered 3 ,332 , Chinese 1532, I^-utch 153 , ^-ennan 
^77 , Japanese kS and Am. r l e a n s 1^6.J 
1 , fesrpajtjk A.K. Prinf 'Fodlpdo: o p . c l t . p .139 
2 , K,K,r;ewlt &n<6 G,G.SinphJ Ind ian economics , r*elhi , 1915, p»^^ 
3 , r e p o r t on New Guinea i n 1952 
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Regardlnf econoDle sphere, trade between Indonesia and 
Australia was already considerable. In 1937 Indonesia exported 
to Australia 30,000,000 florins worth of poods and imported 
12,000,000 florins worth. With the Industrialisation of Australia 
this trade would greatly increase, the two coimtries exchanflnf 
manufactured foods and raw materials.1 
The occupation of Indonesia by any great powers would 
constitute a rrave dsnper to the security of Australia and 
New Zealand. The Japanese mandated islands had already brought 
Japan within 500 miles of Australian territory, A secret clause of 
the antl-Comintern pact signed by Germany and Japan on November 25, 
1936, was alleged to have provided for joint spheres of influence 
and possible annexation of Indonesia between Germany and Italy. 
Representatives of Australia and New Zealand as well as Great 
Britain met in secret session at Wellnfton in l^y 1939 to plan the 
defence of the two dominions and adjacent colonies, mandates and 
protectorates of the governments represented. Australia was also 
represented at the Franco-British defence conference hal6 at Singapore 
in June 1939 at which the position of Indonesia was one of the 
subjects of discussion. In 1938, Lord Cowrie G,G, of Australia, paid 
an official visit to Indonesia and a return visit by the G.G, of 
Indonesia, was planned«2 
The British occupation of Indonesia under the governmnt 
Baffles In 1818 was altogether terminated by the London treaty of 
l92Jf, thereby the British transferred all their possessions in Indo-
nesia to the Netherlands government. By the Sumatra treaty of 1871i 
1. A, Vandenboschs op.clt. p.379 
2. Ibid. p.390 
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JSnglRod F8VP up I t s elslms over Achin. The t r ea ty of 1891 
establlPhed the boimdary l i ne between the Dutch t e r r i t o r y and th« 
Br i t i sh u ro tec to ra t e s of nor th Born«>o. Th«» boundnry between 
B r i t i s h and Putch t e r r i t o r y in north Wew ri\i1ne» was drawn In e 
t r e a t y In 1895. A botindary l i n e between Csertnan nor theas t New 
Oulnea ?»nd Br i t i sh south e s s t New Guinea was agreed upon by a 
t r e a t y of 188^. With the forra«tlon of the Australian cojmnon-wealth 
souteast New fjulnea was t ransfer red to the new corononwealth 
'government. 1 
The B r i t i s h rovernaent had es tabl ished a dlplofflfttic r e l a t i o n 
with Indonesia, There was B r i t i s h consul General a t Jakar ta . Ther« 
were a lso consular off ices of Brltlraln a t '*^emar8nf, Surabaya, Kaceasai 
Medan and Fadan?. S imi la r ly , the Netherlands maintained consular 
r ep resen ta t ives in Great B r l t l l n to preserve the I n t e r e s t s of the 
kingdom of the Netherlands and colonies l i ke Indonesia. In 1937, the 
Dutch envoy and minis ter and consul general in London were Jankheer 
Dr.F.de Marees van fiwenderen and T.H.de Mee8ter.2 
Bconomlcally, Great Br i ta in had invested a hupe cap i t a l 
In Indonesia and es tabl i shed re^a la r t rade Bnd missions with the 
Indonesian rovernTnent. There were hundreds of the Br i t i sh people 
l l v l n f in Indonesia and serving in d i f fe ren t posts end occupations. 
Similar ly a rood number of Indonesians l ived in Enplend and i t s 
co lon ies . 
The t o t a l value of t rade between U.K. and Indonesia in pound 
s t e r l i n p was as fol lows: U.K. exports to and imports from Indonesia? 
in 1900, £ if105 and £ ^ 2 9 ? 1913, ^ 7,302 end £ 3 ,91^ ; 191»f, £ 628 
and £ 13227; 1932 £ 2,if5B,252 and £ M-,717,278; 1933, £2,1»+7,617 
1. Vlekke-. op. c l t . pp. 139-1?0 
2 , M.apsteins o p . c l t . p i I?** 
and :^ 3 , ^1 ,061 ; 193^*-, ^ 1,B32,^95 -nd ^ ^ ,222,079; 1935, ^ 180,58»f 
snd >: i+,302,65^; 1936, ^ 1,98:^,76? and i: 2,573,186. Ke-exports to 
Indonesia from U.K., in 1932, - ^+6,688; 1933, ^ ^5,213; 193^ 
i: to, ^oB; 1935, £ 3- ,F22; 1936, ^ h•^,h^k.^ 
Ihe S r i t i s h invested a hure cap i t a l in o i l pnd rubber, in mer-
chandising and banking and in the pr&duction of a p r i c u l t u r a l crops. 
The t o t a l B r i t i s h cap i t a l invested in e s t a t e a r r i c u l t u r e was 
estimated to be 278 mil l ion gui lders in 1929. Almost 2/3 of t h i s s i^a 
was invested in rubber, they had a lso la rpe i n t e r e s t s in the produc-
t ion of sugar, coffee and t e a . Br i t i sh investments In production 
in 1937 were estiniated at ^ 26.5 mi l l ion . Total enterpreneour or 
business invesrfclrtaits amounted to ^ MD mi l l ion ; holdlnr in "npland 
of Indonesian government bonds a-nounted to ^ ^ mi l l ion .2 
The t o t a l value of the Indonesian imports frotn nnd exports 
to U.K. cind U,-.A. from 1925-1932 in mi l l ion gui lders was as follows 
in 1925,8181 and 17B5 mil l ion gu i lde r s ; 1927,^72 p.nd 1625 si.; 1929 
10/2 &n6 ^\M ffi. ; 1930,655 nnd 1160 m.; 1931,752 pnd 7^9 m.; 1933 
318 end hSB m., U.K.'s exper ts to and imports from Indonesia In 
1937-1939 were: in 1937, - +^382 and ^7062; 1938, £ 3,605 ?-nd £ $352 
and 1939, i^  3,390 r-n l '-^ 5,935.3 
The B r i t i s h shipping companies in Indonesia falned a 
huge p r o f i t s J in 1929, ^ 209 mi l l ion ; 1932, £ IO3 m; 1936, ^105 m 
and 1937 ^162 m. Total value of d i s t r i b u t i o n of trade Carried In 
B r i t i s h Vessels exporting to Indonesia was In 1936, ^ 277 mill ion 
(32.3 A of Br i t i sh ships) and 1937, ^- ^35 I P . ( 2 9 . 6 %)^ Enfltish 
banks opened branches in Indonesia, where Investor55 were pa r t i cu l a r ly 
1. b.M.nullp B r i t i s h eco. I n t e r e s t s in the Far .>.st, London,!9^3 
per t 1 1 , p.133 
2 . Ibid 
3 . Ib id . p1»40. 
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Invested In tea nn^ rubber. About 1912, 50 out of 101 rubber estatts 
in Java end Suastra were Brttisb.l 
The Port'ipuese colony in Indonesia consisted of a part of the 
island of Titsor and s few small surroundlnsj Islands. l)lsput«s 
betvreen Portugal end the ^Netherlands continue?! for centuries. To 
put n^ end to these disputes the Neth-r^ rlands government lonr sought 
to buy the PortUFUese ro?sej?sicns In the Timor sPBblpelRP'o but 
FortUFflT would nf->t sell, B^ a treaty oflP59, sorae of the boundary 
disputes were settled end Fortupal rellnnulshed her claim to certain 
islands no^th of Timor upon psyraent by the Netherl*^ nds of 200,000 
florins. A nuraber of the troublesome enclaves snd to brine more 
oeflnite boundpry line. It wos until 1897 th?>t the two fovemroents 
reached f?n «^ preQjnent on the reful'^ tions \^ 'hich vere to i^ overn the 
coT^ iBlPsion of experts \&iO were to fix the Rctual boundary lines. 
in the meanwhile, the two povernm'^ nts by an exch-'npe of notes asreed 
not to extend to third powers the ri^ht to establish cosl or naval 
bases in the Timor archipelsro. The workd of mixed coHsmisslnn led 
to the conclusion of a new treaty in 190lf. Under the tersis of the 
190^ trcsty each of the contracting powers arreed to pive r»reference 
to the other in the event of partial or total cession of Its 
territory or sovereirnty in the erchipelapo of Timor md Solar.2 
A boimdary eere^ -njent with either Spain or U.S.A. with respect 
to the small islands south Sindanau was never concluded. In 1906 a 
diswproemen^ arose over the ovmershin of the snail Island of Palmaa. 
The dis3freement fell under the terms of an arbitration 
1. Ibid rape 167 
2, A Vnnaenboschs op.cit. p.378 
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treaty of 1908 betvaen the two countries. The coBtprcH&lse was 
agreed In 19^5 and the case submitted to Mr.Max Huber, then 
president of the permanent court for intematlcmal justice, as single 
arbitrator. His award in April, 1928, was in favour of the 
Netherlands.1 
From the point of the view of the Netherlands in world 
politics the rise of Japan as a world power was upset to a 
considerable degree by the rise of the Ifeited States as a world 
power and the extension of her sovereignty to the far east in 
the Phillippines situated between Indonesia and Japan.2 
The Cutch government was invited by the big powers to attend 
the Washington conference to discuss the disarmament problems. Tim 
Dutch government wished to involve in political questions as little 
as possible and to avoid accepting any political responsibility 
if it could. The Netherlands did become a party to the 9 powers 
treaty but not the four power treaty. The fact thst neither was the 
Netherlands a party to the four power treaty nor was Indonesia 
covered by the treaty disturbed foreign minister, Van K^mebeek, the 
head of the Dutch delegation. He and with his him the head of the 
Portuguese delegation, qultely approached the heads of the delegations 
of the four great powers in an effort to remedy the situation.He 
argued that with the heads of these delegations that if the object 
of treaty was to promote peace and tranquility in the Pacific area, 
the failure to include the l^ utch and Portuguese possessions in that 
regions was botaad to defeat its purpose, for this would increase 
rather than ally distrust. The heads of the delegations agreed 
with this view and the danger of breeding distrust was thought to be 
1. Philip C.Jessup* The Palmas Island arbitration, American Journal 
of International law, October, 1928 
2. A.Vandenboscht op.cit. p.379 
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removed by identic notes from the British, French, %ited 
States and Japanese governments. Whereby the principles of the 
treaty were extended to the Pacific possessions of the Netherlands 
and Portugal. 
The note of the United States fOvernB»nt to the Dutch government 
was as follows: The U.S.A. has concluded on December 13, 1921, with 
the British empire, France and Japan, a treaty, with a view to the 
preservation of the general peace and the maintenance of their 
rifhts in relations to their Insular possessions and insular 
dominions tn the region of the facific ocean. They have agreed there 
by as between themselves to respect their rights in relations to 
these possessions and dominions. 
The Netherlands n<)t beln? signatory to the said treaty and 
the Netherlands possessions in the region of the Pacific ocean 
therefore not being included in the agreement referrp*! to, th** 
government of the U.S.A., anxious to forestall any conclusion 
contrary to the spirit of the treaty, desires to declare that it 
is firmly resolved to respect the rights of the Netherlands in 
relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific.1 
The U.S.A.also established diplomatic mission at Jakarta and 
several consulates in big cities of Indonesia and thousands of 
Americans were living in the country, working In various occupations 
and services. 
Trade between Indonesia and U.S,A. hlid increased rapidly 
during past few years. The value of trade between the two countries 
for the first half of 1938 was ^  W8,195,000; for the some period 
of 1939, ^ 57,523,000; and in 19^0, ^  77,8000. For the six months 
1. U.S.Senate Doc.No,128, 67^h congress 2nd sess. pp.922-923 
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of I9M, the U.S.A. Indonesia trades reached the value of ^ lU6,62qOOO 
The value of trade between the two countries for the first half 
of 19M was 10 % larger than the value of the trade for the ^ole 
of 1939 and 50 ^  larger than for 19|6. From Janusry-June, 19M,a.S, 
expcnrts to Indonesia amounted to ^ ^9,i?2^,000 and Imports from 
Indonesia, ^  96,896,000. In 19^, more than half the exports of ten 
leadlnr Indonesian export conmiodities and more than l A of the 
exports of 9 other cotmtries went to the U.S.A.I 
After the first world war, the Indonesian government had 
fiven economic concessions to the U.S.A. to exploit oil fields and 
to establish industries in tlM country. A huge capital of i^erica 
had flown to Indonesia. Of the foreign capital of about ^ 1 t 
and 3 killion dollars invested in agriculture, it had baen estimated 
that 75 % was Dutch, 13.5 ^  British, 5 Frsnco-Belgium 2 %$ 
American, 1 $ German and 1 % Japanese. Nearly all the foreign 
capital invested in the Javanese sugar industry was Cutch ?3nd if 
the investments in this industry were excluded the Dutch fell to 
60 while that of other nationalities rose »omewhat. On the other 
hand, the Dutch held most of the Indonesian public bonds. An 
American company produced a third of the petroleum output of 
Indonesia, while Dutch-British and mixed Dutch and Indonesian 
government companies produced the remainders. The American standard 
vaccum company had put its huge capital of / 100,000,000 at Sunfai 
Gerang oil refinery in Falembang,Sumatra. The California Taxas oil 
company also increased its capital and produced crude oil in growing 
quantities. The American good year tire factory in Buitenzorg In 
Java increased tts production of automobile end truck tires and tubes 
1. A.Vandenabsch* op.dt. p.M3 
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and bvcycle tires. The Anerican general motor overseas corporation 
expanded its investment in Indonesian key industries in Jakarta and 
other places. Export-import firms, shipping company, air transport 
lines etc. had been operated by the Americans.1 
Indonesia imported from Ceylon U6,38l c%^ of cacao and raw 
at the value of fs.7,030,87^ or 1 5 ^  of total valiJe in 19^. There 
was also an Indonesian colony In the Cape town in Suth Africa.This 
colony was started during the great Sri Vijaya empire. 
Trade relation between Indonesia and New Zealand was in pood 
progress. Indonesian imports from New Zealand between 1931-193^ 
averaged only Some £ 6,000 a year but its export to New Zealand 
ranged Just over £ 10(X>,000 a year. The main items of exports were 
mineral oils, chiefly gasoline, sugar, and kapok. From 1930 on 
Indonesia exported sugar in great quantity. Between 1932 and 193^» 
exports of Indonesia averaged over £• 500,000 a year, equivalent 
to nearly 80 $ of New Zealand's total imports of sugar.2 
Since 1932 the export of gasoline from Indonesia to New 
Zealand had increased considerably, chiefly at the expense of the 
U.S. in 1930 Indonesia exported it to some £ 550,000 and in 1935 
imported from New Zealand valued at £ 650,000. In 19B^, imports 
of gasoline alone frcan Indonesia reached over £ 1,OCX) ,000 amounting 
to nearly 2/3 New Zealand's total supply. 
Percentages of the total New Zealand imports supplied by 
Indonesia were as followsJ in 1930, 1.91 5^ ; 1932, 3.53 >\ 193^ **«^ 1 
1935, 3.96 ^; 1936, 3.90 J» snd 1937, 3.99 ^.3 
1. Van OelderenJ B^he recent development of economic foreign policy 
in the Netherlands iiast Indies, London. 1939 
2. F.F.Mlinert N.Zealand Interest and policies in the far iSast, 
New Xork, 1939, p.^5 
3. Ibid p.46 
230 
The total value of Indonesian exports to ai^i imports from New 
Zealand was as follows: in 1931, ^  3|288 and ^ 933,038; 1932, 
£2262 and £ 873,012•, 1933; ^ 1^ +17 and £ 999,22^^; 193^, ^  136^ - and 
^ 1381,97»t; 1935, £ 1^12 and £ 1 ,^ 36,96»f; 1936, £ kB2 and £1772,6*^ 
1937, £ 1999 and £ 2,238,^3! 19^8, t 7667 and £ 2150,1 
iithnologlcally, cvilturally, geographically and economically 
Malaya and Indonesia were one and laidlvided but politically, by the 
treaty of London in 182^ - the former was separated from the latter. 
Since then it was ruled by the British government, '^he people of 
Malay state In Jambi founded Melacca and the people of Mlnangkabau 
in centrsl Sumatra established T?egeri Sembilan in the I8th century, 
fiupis from Celebes crossed the peninsula in 1550 and founded Modern 
Selangor in 1700 Bnd in 1722 it was under the kin^ r of the Johore 
empire. The Sri Vi^aya ruled Malaya till it was over-thrown by the 
Kajopshit empire in 1**03. The latter was then defeated by the 
Portuguese in 1511, who occupied Mal^ca. Xn 16^, Malacca was 
rested from Portugal by the Dutch. In 1278, an Islamic kingdom was 
established In Malacca which was founded by a prince of Pelembang, 
Pararaeswara in IW03. In 1U^5, Muzaffar 3hah, rider of Malacca 
succeeded by his son, Mansiir who governed Kedah, Patanl, Rokon Kampar 
Indrapiri, and Siak in Sumatra. Iskandar M\ida of Achln ruled the 
whole western parts of Malaya for quite Ion? time until the 
European nations came to Asia. Singapore and JohOTe were also 
foxinded by the sultan from Siak Indraglri, Svuaatra. 2 
According to the census of 1931, the Indonesian settlers 
in Malaya formed 2^ ^ % of the population of Johore and 8.7 /» of the 
federated Malay states and altogether they numbered 317,8^ or 7i2 % 
1. Ibid p.121 
2. L.A.KllisJ British rule on« eastern Asia, London 19'*2 
pp. 10-55 and Sanusl Pane* op.cit. 
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of the whole population of ^,385,S'*^. it the figures of the entire 
Malay races were combined they made up Mf,7^ of the total 
population of Malaya? 39 % Chinese and \k,2 % Indians.1 
The Indonesian people in Kalaya had possessed different 
occupations and professions, Rome of th©Kjoined the government, 
military and police services. Some started all sorts of business, 
Journalism, restaurants, and hotels. Others cultiavsted lands in 
various estates in the country. In 1932, there were 15,000 Indonesian 
labourers employed in rubber estates. 
When the labour shortage became acute in 19^ 1 , the colonial 
office acceded mmm to the proposal made by Malaya employers to 
import more Indonesian workers to fill Malaya huge tin and rubber 
export quotas. But the Japanese invasion prevented to carry out 
the plan. In 19^3» the Japanese authority in I^laya imported over 
35,000 Indonesians to construct roads, build fortifications etc. 
in Halaya and in 1 9 ^ they were all repatriated to Indonesia by the 
republic of Indonesia. 
The rising Indonesian nationalism, the Japanese pan 
Asianism as well as Indian nj^ tional movement had greatly influenced 
the K«iay national movement. Most of the i^lay nationalists and 
conscious leaders were Indonesians. As a result, they set up 
different organisations such as brotherhood of pen-friends, the 
Malay union foianded in 1926 in Singapore with a branch in Malacca 
in 1937. 
The l<alay union organised the first and second conferences of 
1939 and 1 9 ^ respectively. Inspited by the Indonesian modernist 
movement led by K. A.Selim In 1926 »5nd the Turk Calif at movement 
1. Ibid. p.25 
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In 192'f, the pan Islamic movement was a lso organised by the 
Malay educated modernists In the country. When the Dutch colonial 
author i ty crushed the na t ional revolut ion of 1926-1927, nimierous 
Indonesian revolut ionary leaders such as Tan Malaka, Aiimln, Musso 
e t c . f l ed away to Malaya and es tabl ished the Indonesian youth 
organlPstlons there to f ight against the Dutch Imperialism. Besides, 
there were toe other Indonesian organisat ions l i k e Javanese, Bugls, 
Bandjarese end Minangkabawese assoc ia t ions and other o the r s . A 
considerable number of the Malay s tudents had been studying in 
various educational i n s t i t u t i o n s in J-ndonesla.1 
In the economic f i e l d , Indonesia had es tabl ished commercial 
r e l a t i o n s with the federated s t a t e s of Malaya and -Ingapore. The 
following were the percentages of the t o t a l Malay's exports to and 
Imports from Indonesia: Exports: 1923, 12.3 ^l 192»f, 11.8 ^ ; 1925 
9.3 ^l 1926; 8.0?b; 1926, 9.9 ^ ; 1928, 10.85&; 193^, i9.0 %; 1931, 11.5 
1932, 11.9 ^ ; 1933, 3.9?b? 193^*, 5.5 ^ ; 1935, 5.8 ^ ; 1936, 5%2% ; 
1937, 3.8 ^ ; end 1938, 6 . ^ JC, Importss in 1913» 18.0 ^ j 1921,19.75^ 
1922, 25.0 % 
1927, 27.7 $ 
1932, 35.2 % 
1923, 3 3 . * * ^ ; 192if, 33.6 $ 1925, ^ . 0 Ji^ ; 1926, 27.7$ 
1928, 26.2 ^5 1929, 2M..3 ^ ; 1930, 36.2 ^ ; 1931. 3B.1^ 
1933, 30.9 %\ 193*<-, 3'+.7 %\ 1935, 31.2 ^ , 1936,32.05^ 
1937, 32.»f > and 1938, 27.0 f,t 
The t o t a l value of the Indonesian imports from and 
exports to Malay s t a t e s and Singapore from 1932 to 19^ *0 In thousands 
gui lders was as follows: Imports* 1932, 257,000 gui lders (Malay 
s ta tes) - , 7,233,000(Penang); »+6,275,000 (Singapore) ? 193*+, 170,000(M); 
V,190,000(P) I 32,M06,000(S); 1936, 209,000(M); 28,251 ,000(r,) 5 
3,332,000(P); 1938, 296,000(M); J+,283,000(P); 36176,000(S); 
19»K3, 5,765,0O0(M). 12,685,0O0(P.;; and 18^793,000(S. )3 
1. Bir F.lwettenhenJ B r i t i s h Malaya, London, 1 9 ^ J Lord 
S t r a b a l r i : Singapore and a f t e r , London ly'tfi 
2 . L.A.Mllis* o p . d t . p.131 
3 . R.EmersonJ The Netherlands Indies and U.S . , N.York, 1 9 ^ , p.>*7 
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The r e l a t i o n between Indonesia end Indo China was lonp" ago 
before the establishment of the Sri Vjaye empire in Asia. Since 
then the c u l t u r a l and economic t i e s were developed rap id ly . From 
1913 to 1931» Indo-China expcrpted d i r ec t to Indonesia amounts of 
r i ce vsrylnp from 30,000 tons in1923 to 377|000 tons in 1931 end 
averaceinp to 136,000 ton? . Because of the economic depression 
in 1933» Indo-Chlna*s exports f e l l to an annual a»«rafe of 33,000 
tons in 1933-1937.1 
The t o t a l value of Indonesian tmports from and exports to 
Indo-China from 1932 to 1 9 ^ In thoixsands gui lders wss as follows; 
in 1932, 5675 and 1187? 1 9 3 ^ 11^9 and 1189? 1936, 898 and 1076; 
1938, 2112 and 192? and 1 9 ^ , 2596 ^nd 18,106.2 
Direct exports of Indonesia t o Indo-China consisted of 
mainly mineral products - a small quant i ty of cannel coal and 
chief ly hydro cabines of which Indonesia was Indo-Chin??'s pr inc ipal 
supnl ie r . Indo-China »l80 exported eroods via Singapore to Indonesia. 
There were a lso about 15,000 Indonesians l iv ing in Indo-China, before 
the war. Ty»y were mostly a g r i c u l t u r i s t s end souie were t r aders and 
so on. 
The commercial r e l a t i o n s had been se t up between 
Indonesia and Honj? Kong. The followlnfir were the percentages of 
lionsr Kong's exports and t rade In merchandise '>dth Indonesia* in 1 9 ^ 
2.8> and 13.3 /**: 1931, 2.6 > and 10,95!^ •, 1932, 2.2 > and 9 . 9 . ^ ; 
1933, 2.»f^  and 7>B%\ 193*+, 2,6Ji and 8.3 >; 1935, 2.3 % and 6.2 >; 
1936, 2.8 % end 8,5 ^ ; 1937, 3.3 ^ and 7.6 % and 1938, 2 % and 6.6 P 
1. i b i d . p,h6 J^.Ch.»oberfuan; the eco.development of Fr . 
Indo-China, Chap. VI I I , p.330 
The t o t a l value of the Indonesian Imports frora end exports 
to Bcnfhcnft frora 1932 to 19^ +0 in thousands gui lders was As follows.' 
in 1932, 7763 and 23,^77 sruilders', 193^, M?65 and 1^310; 
1936, h5h5 and 12,790? 1937,6»*67 'ind 13,293 »nd 19^0, »4220 and 
18,106.1 
Indonesia exported to Honfkcnr su re r , petroleum snd o thers . 
/.n important branch of t rade had been the t ranspor ta t ion of 
paraff in wcx froK Indonesia for the moniif©cture of carwJles for 
the ter.ples in China. 
Burma also exported cor;niJ>dlties to Indonesia valued at 
0.12 «nd 18.09 lakhs in 1933-1936? 2,86 and »f.M lakhs in 1936-37 
and -S.33 pnd 1 .P3 iPkhs in 1937-38.2 
A close contsct between Indonesia end Ceylon was fstabllshod 
lonf PFO. Descendants of Indonesian so ld ie r s in the service of the 
Jutch ii^^st Indies company in 1656-1668 end 1096 const i tu ted the 
C^lon-i^'Rlay popxilstion. According to the censur cf 1 9 ^ , there 
wtre 3^3,000 Ceylon Moors and Malays (Indonesians)? in July 1,19^7, 
there were about 23,000 Indonesians and 3B0,000 Moors.3 
Accordinf to the anthropologis ts and e thno lo f l s t s l i ke 
A.L.Kroeber, Felix M.Keesing, Fay Cooper Cole, e t c , t h s t soiwi 
6000 yepis p.a^o the Indonesians arrived by bogtts and colonised the 
Phi l inpines i s l a n d s . T i l l 1377, the Sri Vijaya ruled over a l l these 
i s l a n d s . About the middle of the 13th century, 10 Borneen Estus lad 
by Tatu Putih l e f t Bronei and colonised Pansy, Ksmtik(Antique), 
Aklan(Ceoiz), I ran? Iron? I l l o l l a , Bsntanas Lsnpuan de-Bsy, Bicol 
T. A.Mills 1 op. 'c i t . Chap. XI I I , p,khQ 
2 . Chris t ian* Modem Buriaa, Bangroon, 19^7, p.3^+6 
3 . Notos on ti,ii,k» sect ion 1, p .8 
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Peninsula and other places in the Philippines islands. In 136^, 
the Sri Vijgya was overthrovm by the Majopahlt which was itself 
also sub^apated by the Hohsnanadan Malay under Jlaja Bonanp in 
1^78. Thus the Indonesian influence came to an end with tlw 
cfflBing of Spenlards in the 16th century and advent of the 0.3,A, 
in 1888, The Spanish rule in the Philippines lasted for UOO 
years while the Araerlcen imperlalisai started from 1901 to 19^ +6 • 
Only about ^50 years aeo th^t Indcnosis was separated from thB 
Philippines. 
According to the official censur of 19^ +8, that out of 
19,23^, 1R2 inhabitants of tha Philippines, 200,000 were 
Indonesians, llvinp in north I-uzon, r4idoro and Visa/as, Palawan 
and 30 on. The Flli^inowes were in fact Indonesians by race, 
numbering vover 15,000,000 people, ''^ost of the Filipino leaders 
like Kr.Adres iio«rnifsco, Dr.Joze ^izal, Mabinl, etc. were all 
Indonesians.l 
The patriotic stHUpgle of the FiiiDinotiS apv^ lnst the 
Spanish enn American colonialism under the leadership of Andres 
Bonifaco hnd exceedingly influenced the nstional movement In Indonesia 
When the 1926-27 heroic revolution was crushed by the I-utch 
ingjcrialists, a lot of Indonesian revolutionaries like Tan Walaka 
end others fled away to Manila. UTiere he contacted many Filipino 
leaders like Cr.Karlono Santos, -r.Apollinrio i)e Lgs Cantos and 
others, w^o sympathised and supported the Indonesian national 
stnupfle apainst the Hutch domination end exploitation.2 
He<^ ardinp the economic sphere, Indonesia had set up 
coHUBerclal ties with the Philippines. The total value of Indonesia's 
ijaports fror. and exports to the Philippines from 1932 to 19**0 in 
1, G.F.Zeldl: Philinplnes Political and cultiiral history 
vol.1 Manila Oct.1950, Chapt.11 p.28 
2, Tan iHalak* Darl Fend jars Kc Fcndjara Bandunjr, 1 9 ^ 
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i n thousand g u i l d e r s was as fo l lows* In 1932, 289 and 35**1 
g u i l d e r s ; 193^ 28»f and 2386? 1936, if79 and 2»fl5; 1938; S86 
and 59^5; and 19M3, 915 and 628^.1 
in^he S l« ld of i n t « r n a t i o n a l t r a d e , Indones ia had In 
b r i e f t r aded v l t h both A s i a t i c and Europaan c o u n t r i e s i n c l u d i n f 
UiS.A. Tl^ va lue of the Indones ian e x p o r t s t o the chief c o u n t r i e s 
of d e s t i n a t i o n i n 1000 f l o r i n s was as fo l lo i^ s : Ne the r l ands ; 
1935, 100, 2 0 1 : 1937, 1 9 1 , 583 ; 1 9 ^ , 32»+C5»5>); ^in^n^ore, 1935, 
66 ,620 ; 1?37, 179 ,0^3 ; 1 9 ^ , 1PA,793C20.9W^^); U . ^ U . 1935,63 ,70^; 
1937, 177,B59: 1 9 ^ , 2 9 5 , 0 5 9 , O.K. and I r i s h Free s t a t e 30 ,5^7 ; 
50,22^.; 53,738C6.03>»); Japan 23 ,970 ; ^ , 3 ^ 5 ; U8,521 (5.50 ? 0 ; 
.•:?7ypt and udan, 9569; 3 0 , 2 2 5 ; 11 ,281 (l . 2 8 : ^ ) , A u s t r a l i a , 17,530 
2 9 , 5 3 1 ; 3 2 , 2 9 7 ( 3 . 6 6 ; * ) ; Oermany, :?110: 28 ,099 ; 1733(20^) ; F rance , 
1*f,5l3; 2 3 , 9 6 3 ; 255^w29>.); Denmnrk, 7 6 1 ^ ; 1 8 , 3 ^ ; 2 5 1 7 ( . 2 9 % ) ; 
Hon-konp, 8795; 1 3 , ^ 5 8 ; IB ,106(2 ,05 ^/*); China ,B ,925 ; 1 3 , ^ 5 ^ , 
160^9(1 .82^ ) ; and Penane, 5956; 11719; 12,685(1 . ^ ^) .2 
i h c r e a s the va lue of impor ts from the c h i e f c o u n t r i e s of 
oriprin i n 1000 f l o r i n s was as f o l l o w s : Japan , 1 9 3 , 5 , 8 1 , 1 5 ? ; 1937, 
12'+,^26; 1 9 ' 0 , 1 0 0 , 2 5 0 ; Nether lands 3 6 , ^ 3 ; 93 ,890 ; 5^,095(12.51^) 
Q . r . A . , 1 8 , 8 7 1 ; ^9,92^4-; 99,873(23.105*); Crmany 22,02+1 ; »f1,87»f; 
8587(1 .99>) ; U.K. snd the I r i s h f r e e s t s t e , 21 ,P22 , >40,898; 
36 ,0 9^ (8 .35 J i ) ; S ingapore , 2 9 , 3 0 1 , 3 6 , 5 9 1 ; 13,590(3.1WJ^); Indio 
9272; 1 2 , 8 8 7 , 1 5 , ^ 9 5 ( 5 . 5 8 / 0 ; A u s t r a l i a , 9 0 2 1 ; 12 ,126: 163^3 
( 3 . 7 9 ^ ) ; Ch ina , 50k6', B72h; 1 7 , 0 3 6 ( ^ . 0 0 ^ ) ; F i a n c e , 3161; 718$; 
te18(.98/:*); Honpkong, 3^+57; 6705; »+2i420(98^); I t a l y 153^; ^596; M79 
(97 i ) Penanp, 3697-- 3532; 1012(.233i); and Phil lppinGS i s l a n d s , 357; 
7H8 BXid 915( ,21 ^ ) . 3 
1 . R,i..li.merson: o p . c i t . p . ^ 7 
2 . A.Vandensboaah: o p . c i t . p.V36 
3 . I b i d . p.if35 
INTEBHATIOSAL BELATIOHS 
The rise of Jspen end the United States, the two naval 
powers besides Great Britain, weakened the position of the 
Netherlands in Asia. The possibility of a Pacific war always In 
the backeroumd of the public aslnd In Indonesia. V^iie th© 
result of the We shine ton confrrencp did sonethi'^ p' to colm 
thnt fenr, th«v by no means removed it. A section of Tutch 
opinion held thpt while the results of the vssbini'ton conference 
were to lessen the denser of W)?r in the Pacific. The position o\ 
indor^lp hec."?i!e less secure, since the Philippines BB S bulkward 
p«'a1nst «Tfipan was fone. 
This policy of the Nethsrlands In the event of a 
pacific conflict was repeatedly cxitlined by the Indonesian 
povernaent nnd Itsmllltery eci/l«ers. As tndlf?.ter1 in B statement 
by Ceptpln Van -""seds, director of the np'^ 5l ver cone?^e, the 
Neth'^ rlr«nds best defence was © policy of nt-utrsllty for herself 
and so sensrwt^n?? the defence of Indonesia that a violation of 
Indonesian neut^f^llty would Involve rrester dls?r'Tr.pnta'»es than 
anvsntafos. The Indoneslen defence forces should he of sufficient 
strenpth to b«s able to del^ y^ Invasion lonp onouc^h to pive th« 
opposin" narty time to come to the njd of the T'utch defenders. 
The stratpplc position of Indonesia v;?" dominated by 
the British n-val base rt "lnrar,ore. The T'utch m^vor 'isflned 
in:^ onR?>la against the British, no matter what other ereat power 
mlP'>>t comf to their aid fin6 h-nce all tall' of B policy of neutrality 
implied defence af'ainst some ^rsat other than ^reat Brltnln. This 
fact !5lpht necessarily «'-rve to deter any ?;nti-BritiEh tendencies 
of Dutch forelpn policy.1 
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Great Britain could navar parailt the occupation of any 
of Indonesian islands by any other power than the Netherlands, tha 
British authorities protested to the l>utch government apainst the 
Rirant of concessions of two small islands. Awl and Momol, to Jspanesa 
in 1912 for the purpose of rubber culture and deep sea fishinf and 
of the islands Pulau Bintanf, near Singapore, to the Standar 
oil company of New ifork inl911 . 
In the years following th«. first world witv there developed 
a aoveaent for a Franco-Dutch rapproachement in the far east, 
a aoveaent more active in French than In Dutch circles. The idea 
of a i*approacheiaent had been advocated by forawr minister of 
colonies, Audre Hesse in La Depeche coloniale, October 28, 1927. 
Senator Octave Hornberf had also advfccated it in the revue de 
Deux and in La Depeche coloniale and had lectured on the subject 
In the Netherlands. One of the moving spirit behind it in Paris 
was Mr.Van der Vluph, a Dutch man, the editor of le monde ncuveau. 
He was instrumental in gettinf Mr.Anjioiilvant to visit Indonesia and 
to publish a work on it. The C.G. of Xndo-China and Indonesia had 
exchanged visits and in October, 1931f Minister of colonies, 
Paul Beynaud paid Java a visit. In January, 1930f prime minister 
Tardleu and minister of colonies, Petrie made public statements 
that France desired to drow into closer relations with the Nether-
Ifsnds in the far east end was prepared to approve a custom aereeaent 
between Indo-China and Indonesia, should eovemor Pssquier recommend 
it. There was probably nothing more behind the movement than a 
peneral feelinr of desirability of an exchsnpe of ilHU* ideas In 
colonial administration.! 
1. De Locomotir, overiee editie, Auirust ^,1933 
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Indonesia was fradually devaloping an international personality 
and beglnninir to play en independent role in international relations. 
Ttm diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China, Japan and 
SiaB, were xmder the jurisdiction of the ministry of colonies, as 
the successor to the Netherlands East Indies, until 1862, when 
they were transferred to the ministry of foreifm affairs. Until 
thet year only the Indonesian povernment had relation with the 
Japanese {government. Before thet time and even after that date, the 
ptotection of i>utch citizens in the eastern countries remained with 
the G.G, Direct communication between the Indonesian povernment, 
find the Dutch diplomatic and consular officials in Asia had not 
been Infrequent since then. The G.G, had durinf the last decades 
corresponded directly with the I^ utch ministers at Tokyo end Pekln?.1 
The Indonesian rovernn^nt's power with respect to foreim 
relations were limited to asking for ej^adition in eastern 
countries, directly without woinF through the Hapue. The G.G, was 
also a co-slrnatory of exequaturs but the Netherlands pov*^ rnn»nt 
permitted no one to exercise consuler functions except on e treaty 
basis and the treaty provisions carefully circumscribed the powers of 
the consular in order that they mipht exercise no diplomatic 
functions whatever. While consular officials might if they wished 
to ccKT^ municate with the Dutch government, tiirn to their own 
diplomatic officials in the Hague, mifht injextreaities communicate 
directly with the G.G,Moreover, under the terms of several treaties 
the G.G. mijpht be empowered to wlthdrow exenuaturs. The appointment 
of the consular apents by constils already functionlnr there mletht 
received the approval of the G.G. rince 1927, all treaties in say 
T7 Van Asbeek» Onderzock naar den jurisdischen weredbouw, p.250 
2^Q 
way effGctlnp Indonesia w«rt sent to th« volksraad for advice 
bafore they were submitted to the states reneral for obtsinring 
its consent to ratification.1 
IhB desirability of attaching experts in internjational 
law and for eastern politics to the Indonesian povernnent be^an 
to be urged in and outside parliament about 30 years airo. It 
was pointed out that the H.G, found himself confronted with 
international probleins which were numerous and important. This led 
to the creation of a bureau for Chinese affairs nnd later a 
biireau for Japanese affairs. Since 1926, the G.G, had been assisted 
by en expert in international law. Special Indonesian representa-
tion in international commissions and delepations was also urped and 
had now become a regular practice. Hr.D.Fock, then G.G.elect of 
Indonesia, was made a member of the Dutch delepstion in the league 
of nations assembly for the first time In 192? and in 1928, Graaf 
Van Limburi? Stirum, Dutch minister at Berlin, and former n,6, of 
Indonesia, was a member cf the Hutch delcfation. The states general 
did not refard this form of Indonesian representation as sufficient 
and urged the appointment of an Indonesian delegate and there were 
even members of the states general who pressed desirability of 
separate league membership for Indonesia. The idea of an Indonesian 
member of the Outch delegation received wide approval, even from the 
•xtreaie right, since this would not only be an act in the interest 
of Indonesia but would at the same time serve as a capital peace of 
propaganda in demonstrating to the world the ties which existed 
between the Netherlands and the indigenous population of Indcaiesla. 
As a result, the practice of inclusion of Indonesians in the 
1. Ibid, p.259 
Nttherlfinds dels (ration to th« leBg\i« of nations sssumbly meeting 
and to the international laboxir conference was beirun. In 1922 
the lnter«parliamentary jrroupd of the volksraad for the first 
time sent a delegation to the conference of the Inter-parliament 
ary union.1 
The Indonesian povernment had for many years been a 
member of several international public unions such as the interna-
tional postal union nnd in recent years the demami for independent 
membership in the league of nations had been urged. An initial 
step in that direction was taken in 1929 by the establishment of an 
Indonesian office at Geneva, with an observer in charge. He served 
as a connecting link between the ministry of colonies and the 
league of nations and the international labour office. This movement 
seem in pert inspired by a desire to keep the world informed of 
conditions in Indonesia and Dutch policy there. With the existence 
of the league of nations, the international labour organisation 
and the mandate system, the Dutch felt that colonial policy and 
admlnistrfttion was no longer a purely national affairs and hence they 
felt the necessity both of keeping cai*efully informed whet the world 
was saying and thinking about these matter in general and Dutch 
policy kn particular and correcting false ideas ct Dutch policy.The 
Dutch had looked with some concern upon German end Italian propaganda 
for a mandate end there had been somCcomplaint that misrepresentation 
of the Dutch policy in Indonesia was « phase of that propaganda.2 
There was a general feeling in Indonesia that the Dutch 
consular officials in the east were not sufficiently Informed about 
Indonesian economy, financial and commercial interests and that they 
lacked an Indonesian orientation. This complaint was most velwmently 
1. A.?andenboschi op.cit. p.387 
2. Eindhoven* Aanteekening ult Genaya iloniale stu*en, 1928, p.28 
2^1 
advanced by the larpe western enterprises there nrho were looking 
for eastern markets for their products, in the volksraad session 
of 1932, the need of a separate diplomatic and consular services 
of its own In Asia was pressed upon the government. It had lonp 
been urp:ed that Dutch dlploiaetic and consular personnel In the 
far east :?hould first have had some service in Indonesia and that 
Cutch consular reports from eastern countries, pivinp; greater 
imphasis to the demand. It was very doubtful w^wther the Netherlands 
povernment would make any move In the direction of permittinf 
diplomatic relations between the Indonesian government and Asiatic 
countries, but some action in giving the I>^ Jtch consular service 
in the east a greater Indonesian orientation might be fully 
expected. 
The security of Indonesia was one of the chief subjects 
of discussion at th^ i*>anco-British defence conference at 
Singapore in the siunmer of 1939, the i^ utch premier gave public 
assurance to the public and the world that the Netherlands was not 
represented it the conference, as that was against the I>utch 
policy of neutrality and isolation. This policy she followed to the 
better end, A few weeks before the German Invasion of Hollai^, 
former prime tninistar, Coli.ln, warned his country through an 
editorial In Se standard that the Netherlands ou^ht to take sides in 
the disputes that is the allied powers.1 
All the iiuropean nations were officially represented in 
Indonesia either by a consul general or a consul. Oarmanyi, France 
Persia, and Turkey had their consul generals, while for the 
interest of Great Britain, America, Denmark, BelB:iua, Italy, 
Australia, Portugal, i^ ussla and Switzerland consuls were considered 
1. Report bt acting consul, Fraser, in January 6, t872 
In Altlng and Burning* op.cit. p.1195 
sufficient. Japan and Biam were represented by a consul and Spain 
end Sweden by a vice conaul. 
All these chi6f represent??tlves lives at Jakarta, the 
capital and seat of the G,G., who on special occasion such as 
the blrthdy of the Queen of Holland, received the consular body 
In audience as the corps diplomatique. 
At coast ports such as SemrnT^nft^ an-a Sursbsya, the 
principal nations were represented by cons\ils and vice-consuls, 
%»ho were under the authority of the consul p-eneral or coaaul as the 
case mi^ht be at Jakarte.l 
As far as Great Britain wa? concerned, It may be observed 
that when the English gave up Java and Its depediencles In 1818, no 
representative of the British nation or srovarnTnent was allowed to 
be stationed in Java. Sir St.Raffles in 1818 and apain 1820 uTfed 
upon the British East India company, the necessity of the Great 
Britain havin? a special afent at Jakarta with certain power but 
it was generally assumed that the king of Holland would not consider 
such proposal. Coamfirclally, the British E.i.C. was represented at 
Jakarta by Jessen, Trail and Co. from 1817 to 1825 and by Trail and 
Co. from 1825 to 183^. 2 
1. H«port bt acting consul. Fraser, In January 6, 1872 in Aiting 
and Burning J op.clt. p.1195 
2. Ibid. p.1196 
C H A P T S B III 
INDONESIA imu-cB THK JAPANESE RilGlMis;, \9k2^\9k5 
Japanese Plans for conquest of Indonesia* 
Indonesia played en important role in world politics before 
the secon<3 world war, economically, politically end stratarically. 
With the outbreak of the war in Europe in September, 1939, shortly 
after the establishment of Tapi nn6 the fall of Holland in May 10, 
19^, the tutch colonial government in Indonesia was at that time 
obliged sharply to curtail the activl tjr of the mstlonalist movesjent 
In the European war effort. The nationalist leaders such as Tjipto 
'••anfunkusiBno, Tukarno, Mohd. Hatta, Sutan ^jehrir and others were 
successively interned. 1 Hreat Britain and the U.S.A. were nakinfr 
urgent demands of strafeepic stock piles of the produce of Indiaiesla 
for rubber, tin, quinine, fibres and drups. To meet this emerrency 
requirements the tutch sought to place Indonesia on a semi-war 
footing. The people of Indonesia had to pay the increaslnp taxes. 
They contributed millions of guilders to the Netherlands governjaent 
in London and indcnesla to meet war expenditure.2 
^economically, Indonesia, rich in mineral snd aerlcultural 
resources like oil, rubber, tin and other raw materials, was 
considered to be extremely valuable to Japan. The supplies of these 
materials were of such trsnscedant Important to Japan, es»pecially 
for war purposes, thst the military snd other extremlli* In Tokyo 
1, W.F.WertheimJ Indonesian society in transition, New ^ ork, 
1956, p.72 
2. Viekke* op.cit. chap.Xlv p.197 
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had long since developed scheraes for seciarlng econoiaic, if not 
political control of these rich islands.1 
Even durinp the first world war there were indications thet 
the Japanese were bepinnine to direct their thoughts southward 
(Indonesian archipelapc). The acquisition by Japan of the fortaer 
German colonies in the south west Pacific as mandates of the 
Lews'iKJ of nations brought the Innci of rising sun nearer to the 
Indonesian archipelsfro. After the wnr first, the Japanese trovemaent 
demanded equal opportunity and broad concessions for the explolta-
tlcn of the oil resources in Indonesia,2 
rurinf the period of the expansion of Inter-Psclfic trade 
followinr the first world war, Jspan had been able to acquire a 
substantial position in the Indonesian import trade. Imports from 
Japan to Indonesia had increased from 1.25 % durinp 1909-1913 to 
10.2 % during 1925-1929. 3. I'he economic dlaaster suffered by 
Indonesia after the world crisis of 1929 provided ?. further oppor-
tunity for Japan to establish tier economic supremacy in Indonesia. 
A Victor Purcell remarks* The Japanese commercial penetration of 
Indonesia became a reality durinp the trade depression.^. 
Immediately after 1930» Jepan beean to flood Indonesia 
with her chef*p products. Before the economic crisis only 10 items 
were exported from Japan end in 193^» the imports of Indonesia from 
Japan exceed the exports to JBt>an by 7.5 million guilders, or 31 ^ 
of the Imports came frcTi Japan and only 5 % of the exports went to 
that country. 5. The i>utch share of the Indonesian total Imports 
1. The chellenpe to I solstion 1937-19^3; H.A.azlz: Japan's 
imperialism and Indonesia, the Hag\j0,1955, T),99 
2. A.Vandenboschs op.cit.p.396 
3. J.Van Celderan: The recent development of econoaci foreign policy 
In the Netherlands i-ast Indies,London, 1939, p. 17 
if. World In March in 1939* op. clt. p.98 
5. B.K.M.Viekkes op.cit. p.363 
2hb 
had dropped over 32 ^  in 1913 to 9.5 ^ In 1933» Thus the open 
door policy becsme the entrance to the Japanese house.1 
The Japanese coiwaercisl invesion of Indonesia, moreover, 
aimed at capturing the distribution business. Japan triad to 
consolidate her economic >iold in Indonoslo thrcurh hezjnationals 
who had aigrated there, numberinf 7,195 in 1930 «nd over 10,0CX) 
persons in 19^1, «s a result of the propapanda carried out by 
orpanisations subsidiod by the Japanese povernraimt. The nature 
and extent of Japanese peaceful penetration Into -i-ndorvesia durlnp 
the period of economic crisis was best described by Van Mook in 
the following words* In the thirties penetration became definitely 
organised and was pushed from behind by those semi-officials, 
poverrwjent susbsidled corporations like the Nanyo Kohatsu, whose 
ultimate alms were revealed by naval and military participfstlon. Tim 
risinp flood of imports carried Japanese poods of Japanese importers 
in Japanese ships, financed by Japanese bonks, to Japanese warehouses 
in the coastal towns of Java, to be sold directly to the consumers 
throupb Japanese retailers far in the interior. Japanese middlemen 
penetrate«d in eas Java, south east Borneo, and North Celebes to 
buy nntive products, matie, rubber, and copra- for export to Japan 
Japanese fisheries started operations in the stratepicelly important 
seas north of Jakarta and aroiand peninsular of Celebes, continually 
trespassing into territorial waters and cousinp several Incidents. 
Minin*!-, agriculture and lumber riphts, mostly of doubtful economic 
value, Av.re bought Or applied for in localities of military Importanca 
e.p. the East and West coasts of Borneo snd the northern part of 
1. A.Vandenboscht np.cit. p.398 
New Gxilnea. Saall craft began to penetrate Into coastal shipping.1 
Japan now hoped to follow up her commercial penetration by a 
political ones, A number of protective measujres taken by the 
Indonesian roremiBent to restore economic stability of the country 
2 
was described in Tokyo as the instruRients of an anti-Japanese policy. 
Ths Unsuccessful coinrasrclal conference of 193*+ nt Jakarta and as 
shlpplne: conference of 19M at Kobe were used by the Japanese 
Relegations for political purposes. All this was In line with the 
general schenes of expansions fostered by the Nipponese militaries.3 
As early as 1932, itoauke Matsuoka had expressed the view 
that New Guinea was to beceiro a New Japan.^ in March, 1937, Heiporo 
Sakurai of the Minseito party, stated in one of the coaroittees of 
the hovse of representatives that New Guinea, which Is more extensive 
in area than Japan proper, was in an underdeveloped state and in-
quired whether the Japanese fovernmant did not think it advisable 
to open nefrotiations with the Netlwrlands provernoent in order to 
obtain a perpetual lease of the territory.? As a result, the 
atomosphere of nervousness was created, rumours of espionage were 
in the alr«6. 
in order to remove the widespread suspicion of the Dutch 
Japan decided in 1936 to conclude a non-appression treaty in Holland. 
This decision was in accordance with the Japanese Dutch treaty of 
Judicial settliHnent, arbitration and mediation of April 19, 1933* 
Further, Japan also concluded a shlpplni^  agreement with Holland 
1. ibid p.20 
2. M.A.Aziz I op,cit. p.102 
3. S.H.H.Viekices op.ci. p.37** 
H, Van Gelderens op,elt.p.22 
5. M.A.Azizi op.cit. pp.103-10»f 
In 1936. In puisue of this policy In January, 1937, Tonlchiro 
Xoshlds of the Jnpanese forelpn office visited Indonesia. Japan 
further agreed to the H8r*-I<^hlEa¥a agreement of April 7» 1937»1 
Althoufh Japan ostensibly wanted to maintain friendly 
relstlcn with Indonesia, yet she deliberately piirsued a subversive 
policy in order to undermine the Dutch authority. The Japan's 
policy of exp-rnsicn tow.'^ rds the ^cuth was Intensified. A large 
part of the Japanese population in Indonesia, held closely under 
the control and supervision of the Japaness consular authorities 
throu^ fh numerous orfanlsatlons, took on nctiv® part in the 
pstherln?- of information of milit??ry and economic importance. The 
collection ??nd dispatch of this information to Tokyo was one of the 
main tasks of Japanese consuls nnd consular j^ e-ents in Indonesia. 
Japanese spies were attached a*? consular perPonnsl to Japanese 
consulates. Besides, the Japanese army rmd navy each had its own 
efents in the more important places in Indone?;la.2 
Jrpanese nationals who were en!?a4ed particularly in the 
flshln*' industry In Indonesia acted as forerunners of Japanese 
expansionism Bnd as auxiliaries to the Japanese navy.3. Those who 
operated at various key points throufhout the srchlrelapo, 'rfere , 
frequently foimd flshlnf in prohibited areas. They were found to 
be operatlnf in waters In northern Celebes r\efiT Klnadc, southern 
Celebes near Maccasar, New Culnea, east Sumatra, the west coast of 
a 
Borneo anti In the WIBBP of Tarkan. Japanese rovernment controlled 
developing eoapanies also started worklnr in the strateric areas 
1. Ibid 
2. Far cast Hill Tribunal records pp.116^9-11650 
3. Official report of the N,fc.i.fovernsient, New ^ ork, 19'*2, p.36 
h, M.Aziz, op.cit. p.lQlf 
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Of Indonesia.1 Th# aim of Inaugurating two oil tank Installations 
on May 21, 1939, In the Island of Moluccas (Paloa proup) was to 
expand the Japanese oil Industry in Dutch New Guinea.2 
An extensive propaganda was also at the saise time launched 
towards winning over the native population of Indonesia to the 
Japanese side. With the help of consular officials, the Japanese 
directed their attention to enlist the support of Indonesian and 
Chinese publishers and expended large sums in the form of advertising 
contracts to papers in the Indonesian, Outch or Chinese Isntruages 
that were willing to accept Japanese propaganda material.3 A plan 
was ever prepared by third section of the bureau for European and 
Asiatic affairs of the ministry of foreign affairs dated May 30, 
1938 for the publication by the Japanese of a paper in the Indonesian 
language in Indonesia. The plan envisaged that the capital advance 
of 31,000 florins was to be considered as lost funds and a monthly 
deficit expected. The paper %m8 to spread the Japanese propaganda 
among the native population.^ 
Many Chinese were brought over from the Japanese occupied 
parts of China for carrying on propagandawaong the Chinese population 
in the archipelago. Indonesian students were encouraged to go to 
Japan for study, so that they might be induced to give support to 
the Japanese pan Asiatic movement. Certain groiqjs in Japan even 
began on Islamic movement and the theory was advocated that Japan 
was going to save Islam.5 
Following the outbreak of the war in September, 1939 and 
1. Far East Mil.TrlbiBial records pp.116^9-11650 
2. Far Sast Mil.Tribunal no.1326 b» Time-table No.115 Ten years 
of Japanese Burrowing* op.clt. 0.32 
3. B.H.M.VlekkeJ op.clt. p.370 
*f. Far E.Mii.Trib.6xhibi.N( l a o.l326 A: Time-table No.9 ten years 
of Japanese Burrowing P op.clt.p.30 
5. B.M.H.Vlekkei op.cit. p.37 
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the abrogation of th« Japnese-Amerlcan treaty of coancrce and 
navigation of 1911 by th« Unitad States in July, 1939, Japan in 
January 16, 19^, had been on the lookout for streterlc materials 
of Indonesia. Japan th«refore, endeavoured through mingled 
cajolery and threats to drow Indonesia Into her political and 
economic orbit.1 
This attempt befan on February 2, 19^, when the Japanese 
j^ overnaent through her minister at the Ha^ue, presented a note to 
the Netherlands government, requesting the latter to enter into 
discussion for the abolit^ or modification of restrictions on the 
existing Japanese Import and export trade with Indonesia, on 
immigration, for granting Japan as greater share in the development 
of the archipelago and also for controlling the press and publica-
tions of antt-Japanese so as to create friendly relations between 
the tvo countries.2 
On January 12, 19^, the had already denounced the arbitra-
tion treaty of 1933 with the Netherlands which as result expired 
in August, the Japanese <jovemment declared that the action had 
no political significance.3 
As events developed during the spring of 19^, the 
Japanese government was deeply concerned over the status of 
Indonesia. In a statement Issued on April 15, 19M), the Japanese 
foreign minister, Hlchiro Arlta, saids With the south seas 
respectively Indonesia, Japan is economically bound by an intimate 
relationship of mutualljfy in ministering to one anothers needs. 
Similarly other countries of ^ ast Asia mflintaln close economic 
1. F.C.Jones J Jaoan's new order in i^ .Asla, its rise and fall 
1937-**5, Oxford Oniv.press, London 19^5, p.239 
2. Far.".Mil.Trlb.c;xh.No4l309 A; p.6? Timetable No.1>f| Van Mook 
op.cit. pp.2*f-26 
3. A. Vandenxboseh* op.cl. p.MD^ 
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relations with th«s« regions. That is to say, Japan, tlwsa 
coimtries and these regions topobher are contributing to pros-
perity af i'ast Asia through mutual aid and Interdefence.l On 
the same day the foreign minister inforn»d the Dutch minister In 
Tokyo, Van Pabst, of Japan's deep concern over a possible change 
in the political status of Indoneisa, This view was also expressed 
on April, 16 by the Japanese minister in the Hapue to Van Kleffend 
letherlands minister of forelp:n affairs.2 
The Japanese press now started a camparin against the 
Netherlands and Indonesia. In a letter published in the Kokumin 
Shimbun (the army organ in Tokyo) on April 2^, the Netherlands were 
called a rotten spot on earth and Hochi Shimbun of Tokyo even demand• 
ed that Japanese should take the initiative and invade Indonesia 
without any delay.3« 
The German invasion of the lower countries on i^ay 10,19'*0 
had its immediate effects on Far filastern affairs. The governor 
general of Indonesia, Tjarda S.Sfcachouwer issued a proclamation 
placinp; the entire country under martial law. He declared that 
the fovernment was able to guard its territory and that any help 
from other countries would be rejected as imwelcome.^. 
On Hay 11, the Japanese foreign minister, Arita, onee more 
reiterated the view that events in Europe had accentuated the deep 
Japanese anxiety over the status of Indonesia. Japan drew the 
conclusion that allied forces would occupy Indonesia and might 
jeopardise the flow of vital material to her.5* 
1. Foreign relations of the U.S. s Japan 11, p.28l; Far ii.Hil 
Ti'ib.&xh.No.128^ Timetable No. 15 
2. M.A.Aziz* op.cit. p.108 
3. Ten years of lapanese Burrowing* op.cit. p.58; Viekke» op.cit. 
p.375 
k. New York Times April, 18,19^ 
5, Herbert Feis: op.cit. pp.56-59: the Sharalege to islation 1939-19»K) 
p. 590 
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She now plainly asserted that she would not permit Indonesia 
to change hands^ On May 12, 19^, Japanese minister in the Hagtae 
demanded from the Netherlands government a guarantee that 
Indonesia would in the future continue to supply Japan with 
special war materials. 1 The povernraents of the U.S.A., treat 
Britain and France, fearinp that this raipht presage some Japanese 
military move, informed Tokyo that they «11 would respect the 
status quo in the arehipelago.2 
Japan desired to keep every body also tut of Indoneisa until 
she was in control of it. On May 20, I?**©, Arlta handed a note to 
the Emtch minister in Tokyo demanding a cateeorical promise that 
the specified minimum quantitities of 13 vital material should be 
exported to Japan annually from Indonesia under any circumstances 
that may arise In future. The 13 vital materials were as follows* 
tin including ore 3000 tons: rubber 20,000 tonsj mapanise ore 
50,000 tons; bousite 200,000 tons; nickel ore 150,000 tons; mineral 
oil 1,000,000 tons; walfrara 1,000 tons; scrop iron 100,000 tons; 
salt 100,OCX) tons, caster seeds WOOO tons, quinine bark 600 tons 
and moblybdenum 1000 tons.3 
Germany intended Japan to conquer Indonesia imaediately. 
She informed Tokyo on May 22, 1 9 ^ that she was not interested in 
the problem of Indonesia. Thus Hitler started publicly that 
Indonesia was to be the private hunting rround of the Mikado. U-
Japan, however, did not strike at Indonesia at once as 
was expected by Germany. She was not ready for any military action 
1, Fer is.Mii,Trib.Exh.No.1309 A:Timetable no.21 
2, Fur i!;,MiiTrib.£;xh.nos.1286 and 12B8; timetable nos.22,2»f and 2? 
3, Van i^ iooks o p . c i t . p.28 
h. New 5fork Times, May 29,19^5; Vlekke: o p . c i t . p.376 
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aralnst Indonesia. Sh«, therefore, demanded on May 28, 19^, for 
en Iramedlate reply to her note on February 2 end Hay 20. In Its 
reply of Jtane 6, the Netherlands offered to provide essential raw 
materials but refused to let the Japanese obtain a larper place 
in the economic life of In'ionesia or control of a larpe part of its 
resources.1 
That Japan did not feel satisfied with the conciliatory 
Dutch reply of June 6. J^ he also rejected the American proposal of 
June 2^ -, 19WO, Biaintalning the status quo of the Pacific territories 
of the li-uropean powers by means of a special pact. On the other hands 
the Japanese renewed their economic pressure on Indonesia, e.g. 
ioport of the specified quantities of materials.2 
The secret conference of the army, navy and foreifn office 
representatives of 12-16 ^une, 1 9 ^ , decided to take action and to 
inform the i^ utch ambassador in Tokyo on July 16, 19M), of the 
ifflperial •'ovemiaent desired to Sfind a delegation to Jakarta to 
nepotiate to a comprehensive settlement.3 ^he aiiu of entering into 
political as well sn econotaic talks in Jakarta was obviously to 
detach Indonesia froa the Netherlands fyovernment, In London and bring 
the islands under complete Japanese control by peaceful infiltration. 
This was born out by the fact that consul gen-^ ral Galto in Jakarta 
was Instructed by Hafuoka, minister of foreign affairs, on September 
3, 19^, that negotiations were to be enrtered upon directly with 
the Indonesian government and that all efforts of obstruction from 
1. Herbert Feisi op.cit. p.68? A,Aziz* op.cit. p.Ill 
2. Van Hooks op.cit. pp.36-37 
3. Far.i!..Hii.Trib.i:.xh,no, 1309 A? timetables no,365 H.Felsj op.cit. 
p.96 
h, Van Mooki op.cit. p.39 
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Great Britain and the U.S.A. v«re to be carefully observed,1 
Before the negotiation started in Jakarta in September 19**0 
the Japanese had already prepared on August 1^, 19**0 the draft of 
their demands to Indonesia which indicated their political aim over 
the country. Indonesia was to cut off all relations with, recopilse 
Japan's predoaiinant political and eeonoaiic interests and becoBse a 
member of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere to be established 
imder the leadership of Japan.2 
Japanese leaders wanted to brinf Indonesia into their co-
existence and co-prosperity sphere by aeans of short of war. In a 
telefrramae to foreipi minister, Matsueka on October 18, 19^, 
Kobayashi, leader of the Japanese delegation in Jakarta saids 
Because Indonesia should be inside the greater East Asia co«pvosperitj 
sphere under the leadership of Japan, it was necessary to provide 
in the budget for the next fiscal year, for instance, for the 
complete equipment of overseas orfanisations, the foundation of a 
traininp: centre for the southern areas and the propaganda amonp the 
Japanese nationals and the peoples of Indonesia, including secret 
fund.3 
The Japanese delegation headed by Mr,Ichiro Kobayashi, minis 
ter of commerce, had arrived in Jakarta on September 12, 19^. It 
brought with it a 15 point programe know as measures for the 
economic development of Indonesia which was approved by the Japanese 
cabinet on October 25, 19^3. The propramme consisted of the following 
1, ¥BT ii.Mil,Trib.axh.no. 131 ^ 5 timetable no.^5; M.Aziz; op.cit. p.112 
2, F8r.S.Mil,Trib.Exh.nc.1311? timetable no,k2^ August lM',19U0 
M.A.Aziz; op.cit. p.113 
3, far ii.K.I.Trib.no.13131 timetuble no.57 
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measures to be taken: 
1. To liquidate Indonesian econ<»Dic relations with i^ uropean 
and Aawrlcan continents so that she mipht becoeie member of the 
greater east Aisa prosperity spherej 
2. To remove the various existing restrictions on the econtaalc 
activities of Japan so as to enable hsr to secure perfer^ntial 
treatment for herselfj 
3. To arrange for the joint development by Japan and Indonesia 
in order to supply the empire with the necessary raw materials, if 
necessary to lease or to purchase suitable islands or repions; 
h. To increase the allotments of important materials already 
promised to the empire and to place the supervision of merchandise 
especially tin, rubber, quinnine etc. in Japanese hands; 
5» To purchsse as far as possible those ajtricultural products 
which were sources af income to the natives and to stimalate their 
purchasing power in order to translate co-existence co-prosperity 
into reality; 
d 
6. To increase the export of the Japanese raerchfinise lio Indoneisa 
7. To make Indonesia a part of the monetary sphere of the 
lerreater east Asia area under Japanese leadership. This arhol^ d be 
achieved not by absorption of the yen bloc, but by placing the 
exchanfre control under Japanese supervision and prantinp credits 
as well as other financial facilities by the In<3oneaian banks to 
the Japanese; 
8. To secure the followinp special richts and interests with 
regard to traffic end communication: (a) The ripht 6f coaltal trade, 
the ripht of entering unopened ports and the riphtjof administering: 
and using port facilities; Cb) the landintr and operating the ripht 
of submarine, cables, the ripht of participatinr in the management 
?3b 
of Inland commimlcation enterprises; (c) the inaufurstlon of 
regular air services and the rl(fht of Instituting air safely 
equipment; 
9. To build a stable fishery position in the south by increasing 
the number of fishing boats, abolishing restrictions at ports of 
imports of fish, establishing fishery bases and acquiring otlHsr 
rights and interests pertaining to the camducting of the marine 
product industry; 
10. To prohibit the estsblishment of new rights and interests 
of third powers in Indonesia snd to endeavour to oust those already 
in existence likely to obstruct the expansion of the Japanese empire; 
11. To make Indonesia institute an economic constructional 
commission in which Japanese would be Included and which formulate 
economic policies of Indonesia for streng^Voninp economic collabora-
tion with the empire with regard to trade, fin^snce, taxation, custom 
duties, economic agreements with third countries, enterprise, 
traffic snd communicotlcn, etc; 
12, To demand the strict control of anti-Japanese commentaries 
by newspapers end other periodicals at the same time ensuring fre&om 
to Japanese to publish newspapers; 
13» '^o exercise rlf^ id control over Chinese residents assuming 
pro-Chiang Kai •'^hek and nntl-Japanese sttitude. 
1^, To invite the influential natives to Japan to whom the true 
aspect of the empire would be propagated to ensure the etoonomic 
development of the empire; 
15. Lastly, the economic policy should be based upon the brosd 
view-point of establishing the greater east Aiin co-prosperity sphere 
and efforts should be made towards expanding the interests of the 
empire in harmony with the natives.1 
1. Far ii.Kiil Trib.exh.no.1317? Timetable no.62; Measures for 
the development of the N,E.I.October, li 25, \9^%^*h»kzlz'* op.clt 
pp.115.116 
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The plan essentially elmed at the expansion of the Japanese empire 
into Indonesia by ousting; the i^ utch. 
On October 2?, 19^, Oshlma in ^ o Mi\u-1 Shlmbun, stated that 
Tripartite pact was a clear recomitlon to Japan's mission in the 
south and that Japan must take concrete steps to establish her 
leadership in r^reater East Asia by expendlnr to the south. This must 
be done by diplomacy or by war, if dlplom?5cy fails. 1 That Indonesia 
foriaed ?! part of greater iSast Asia co-prosperity sphere was for 
the first publicly declared by Japan on Jantaary 21, 19M,2 And 
instructlrns u-ere sent out on Jsnuary 2P to the Japanese dele?;ation 
at Jakarta that in no cases should official statemants deny this 
fpct.3 
The joint conference of f'ovemmsnt end ffiilltrrv corsrsanders 
in July 2, 19M, 1r the presence of the e-r-peror dedlded to establish 
greater east Asia coepuosperity sphere end advance to southern 
regions. The prcloneed nepotictlons at Jakarta C9E'' Into a deadlock 
*ti June 17, 19M. The imperial conference of November ^, 1 9M , 
decided to start hostilities with the western powers for the 
creation of the greater east Asia co-prosperity. This conference 
also decided inter-alia, that after the occupfitlon, spnTt of Indonesia 
would be made Independent, the remainlnp \TOUld be directly incorpora 
ted Into the Japanese empire.^ 
The liaison conference of November 20, 19M, approved the 
fuldlnr principles which provided iBllltpry admlni5'trations in the 
occupied areas, including Indonesia. The puidlnp principles were* 
1. Far E.Mii.TribJ Kxh. no.1299 A| timetable no.63 
2. Ibid no.1300; timetable I0.695 Van Mook: op.cit. 
E-71 
3 . Fer 
K Time-table no.lOS; Aziz o p . c i t . p.117 
^ar ii.MliTrib. Bxh.no.1302| timetr.ble no.71 
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1• Military administrations to be 8«t up to restore order 
and saciure immediate control of resources; important for the 
war efforts, 
2, The maximum utilisation of the exlstlnst adminlstratiwe 
structure and minimum of interference with social end national 
customs. 
3. Control of transportation, coramunicstion, commercial end 
financial facilities by the occupation forces. 
h. Guidance and control of the local population vblch was to 
b«? mpdet to feel dependent on the militf^ ry admlnlstrwticn. Nstives 
will have to reconcile themselves to such ncouisltlon of resources. 
One significant note caution was struck* We mtst avoid r^ lvlnp rise 
to any pre-mature indepandence movement. 
5. i^ nforced occupation by the Chinese Itiralfrants who must 
renounced their allegiance to the <»ovemroent of Chlanp Kgi Shek end 
symp??thise with the military administration. 
6. The pradual withering away of military administration and 
its replacement by a new orpranlsntion, the nature of which would 
be determined a l^ter date.l 
The sixth Committee had In December 12, 19M, made an 
economic plan for Indonesia called the outline of the economic 
counter plans for the southern area. As to the future status of 
Indonesia, plans were prepared both by the ministry of foreifni 
affairs and the ministry of war. 
As basic policies, the ministry of forelCTi sffairs enviaa|ed 
the establishment of Japanese military bases in the areSf cooperation 
1. Far -.Hil.Trib. -xh.no.877; W.H.&ishrees Japan's role in 
S.L.A,, Asian nationalism, London, 19^7, t«.19 
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with Japan in foreirn policy and national defence by the statt 
newly to be founded, close economic collaboration with Japan and 
eliminntion of iiuropean and American influences from the vhole 
of the area. The right of the native population to independence 
was rather liberally recognised in this planCrespecting to the 
utmost the desire of the southern people for emancipBtlon and 
independence) but always with the reservntion of Japan's rifht 
to ann«x any region considered to be necessary for the defence of the 
empkre or the backwardness of the natives.1 
An Indonesian fcdorrttion vas to be set up, coinposed of three 
states; Java including Msdura, Bali, and Loiabok; ^ lasatra and Celebes 
including the Moluccas fmd the Lesser "^unda islands, but excluding 
Timor and threo dependent areass Borneo, New Guinea pnd Timor, but 
the povcmment of these areas was to be entrusted to Japan. 
Strategically import??nt islands such as 1 iauv and Linrga Archipelago 
the Anambos and latuna islands were to become Japanese colonies and 
administered by the Japanese rovernor general at Singapore.2 
The first of the two documents presented by the research 
section of the minlEtry of war in December, 195'^!, emphasised the 
expulsion of Anglo-Saxon rule, the eliminfetton of all British, 
American and IHitch influences in S,,., hsic and development of the 
nptuTPl resources of those areas by their inhabitants under 
Japanese «^ uidance for the benefit and defence of the Japanese 
empire.3• 
The second document which detailed the political division 
of the empire to be created, provided the establishment of nn 
indoneslsn kinrdom, embrncinp <^11 Dutch possessions snd the territorlei 
1. Hoover -bcument ^ To.1112 A. op.cit 
2. c-xhibite: 1333 A? W.H.iSlshree: op.cit. p.22; Aziz; op.cit. 
i. fi' .118 3 . Hoover l>ec.No.19B7 B; t o p . c i t . 
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of British Borneo, Labuan island, Bpra\'^ 8k, Burnei Concos island, 
Christamas islsnd, Andaman Islands, Hicober islands, and 
Portujruese Tiaor# thus Indonesia vas to be a part of the larger 
Indonesian kinpdom within the preatcr Fast Asia co-prosperity 
splwre. This independent klnfdoTn was it enjoy self-rovernment In 
internal affairs and Japan was to remain In control of defence and 
foreipn affairs. 1 
Ever since the establishment of the leafue of nntions 1920 
upto the year 19M, the lAeiu^ of matntalnlnp peace and security in 
Asia and in the Pacific ocdan In particular gnd all over the world 
in general had been advocated by (different international figures 
such as Dr.Iiu 3hih of China, Prof.P.F.Corbert of Canada, Prof. 
N.Peffl i»n«1 Holland of America etc. For this purpose they In 1939 
proposed to set up three kinds of Internfitlonal orrenisations; 
1. Indonesian union, comprislnp of Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Burma, British Malaya, Thailand and Indo-Chlne (2) Far Kastern 
union, conslstlnr of China, Manchiirla, Japan, the Indonesian 
union and India. 3« Pacific association, eabraclnf the U.r.A. the 
U.S.S.E., Canada, Australia, ^ ew 2;ealand, the principle countries 
on the west coast of south Africa and all units of the Far Eastern 
union. But this plan was never inaterlsllsed till the out break of 
the second world war.2 
About 16 months before the invatlon of Indonesia the 
shrewd Nipponese, in pursue of their policy of Incorpor^tlnp 
Indonesia with preater E.Asia co-prosperity sphere by the peaceful 
means, resorted to an Inffenpus technjfi«?ue of econojnlc nepotations. 
1. Art. 6 of Roover Doc. no, 19873* op.clt; Aziz s op.cit. p.119 
2. Brono Losker and W.L.Hollands Problems of the Pacific In 1933 
London and Chicepo, 19^3, pp.37-80 
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Th« Japanese delegation, composed of 2*+ tecTtmlclans including 
1 army, 1 air and two naval officers and headed by the minister 
of commerce and incustry, Ichiro Kobayashi, The Netherlands 
government appointed Dr.Van Mook, director of economic affairs, as 
minister plenipotentiary to lead the Indonesian delegation.1 
Durinj?: his first audience with the G,G,, J.Tjarda, Kobayashi 
stated the aim of his mission and stressed the necessity of clower 
cooperntlon between Indoneslr ano Jepan, which he refrsrdad as an 
inevitable consequence of the changed circumstances. In van he attemp-
ted to force the conversation tc the political field. Ihe Dutch 
had flways objected tc neFotistions of a moral or political nature.2 
Alonfc after a week of the dicussion?, the Japanese specified 
their detiri'^ids for the purchase of oil. They asked for 3,150,000 
tons annually, over and shove the ususl quotR cf 600,000 tons, A 
rueisntee of a repuler suprly of these minimum reauirements for a 
3 
period of five years was also demanded from the Indonesia povemment, 
it Sseaied ths?t the main objective of the Japanese delegation 
was to secure concessions and control of the oil conpsnies in 
Indonesia as revealed in s tele'jrsame of Ssptemter 3,1 9MD, from 
foreign minister, l^ atusoke to consul general, S?ito, in Jakar^ t- and 
another from Kobsyasbi to ^ iatsuoks on September 18, 19^» In a 
letter cf -e^ fepctember 2hy 19^ *0, Muksi, Japanese delegate in charpe 
of oil negotiations, requested the inionesien deleprtion to pive 
me and xy party information as toinutely as possible Bn6 provide us 
with useful pieces of reference and furthersiore, to afford us 
cpport\inlties for actual studies of oil producing districts and 
1, Van Mooki op.cit, p.39 
2, Ibid. p.38 
3, Ibid. p.'f3? ^ U A. Aziz J op.cit. p,122 
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reflnaries and to Introduce lae and tay porty to the concerned.1 
At the close of a prenaral meeting of the two delepatlons 
on October lU^-16, 1 9 ^ , a Joint comiaun^que Issued was followed by 
an afraament on October 18, which was finally signed on November 
12, 1 9 ^ , The oil produclnp companies agr^eA to supply annually a 
total cf 1,^00,000 tons of oil over the next 12 months. Of \^ hich 
1,-^,0CX) tons were to be crude oil and 760,000 ton? refined. This 
©Jrreement which prevlsionally run for ^\x months, was renewed in 
K??y, 19*<-1 ff^ r f?nothcr six months. The Jepones* cbtaln?cl no nvation 
ras under the nsreenient. The J^inanese h??d ^^ Tf'o epTond to re-export 
none of the oil to t«rmany,2 
B'alled in its attempts st securing f»dditlnn??l oil of 
3,100,000 tons for 19^3, the J?^psnese r^elepntion Insisted on ^ranting 
cil exploitation end exploration rights in the .Tea of Borneo, 
C>i!lc->^ 9s, T^ ew Cuinea, the Archlpel^ro an^ l ^chouten ercbi'^elaeo, 
•"iam?»trR PS . entioned in its noted of October 29, 19**0, to the 
Ind'^ n^ '-sian tyovernni'mt. The Indonesian roverninent was g?ked to 
scknowledre the whole of these sreas as Japan's snh^re of lnter«st»3 
In reply to the Japanese notes, the I-utch Tiinister In 
Tokyo h?^ nded on -i-^ ft messore on IJoveaber 15, 1 9 ^ , to Chasfci, Japan's 
vice 'sinlst -r of forei=?n affairs, statin? that the negotiations 
hpd coTBe to a standstill and be formally discontinued.^^. 
Japan, however, was net prepared to d^tilt defeat, i-n a 
note veibale on Sovember 20, 19**0, she announced the Eminent 
appolntrcent of a new spclal cnwoy who would continue the neeotistlons 
1. n . J .Vaa ;.ook*. o p . c l t . p.V? 
2 . A.Vandcnbosch: o p . c l t . p.V2l4. 
3 . K, J.Van ^ocks o p . c l t . p p . 6 1 - 6 3 ; K .A.^z iz : o p . c l t . pp.127-128 
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Kcnklshl Xoshizawa, a f o r n e r f o r a l (mar rn ln l s t e r and a awaber of 
t he house of P e o r s , was fo rmal ly appointed as the successor of 
Kobayashi who l e f t Indonas ia In October 2 2 , 19I4O.I 
teshizBva a r r i v e d In J a k a r t a on Decomber, 2 8 , 19^+0, 
a p o a r e n t l y t o cont inue the n d g o i t s t i o n s but wi th the same ob jec t lva 
t o Induce indonesi?i i n t o the economic and p o l i t i c ? ; ! o r b i t of g r ea t e r 
East Asia C o - p r o s p e r i t y spT^re . The ex t r avagan t deTiands of the 
•Tapanese d e l e g a t i o n for the e x p l o i t a t i o n *^ f In<.lon9?is, followed by 
f o r e i p n m i n i s t e r , Mstsuoka 's fissejrtion in the r i e t on January 2 1 , 
19^1 I t h n t Indon s ip v;n?? formed p. n a r t of the ? r e5 t f?=3t ^ s l a -
co -p rospe r i tv ' ^^phere. On Js^nur^T 31 t 19^1 % the "u tch prote?=:ted pnd 
J e j ec t ed p:ny suppeirtlon of h"v!n?' Indonesia incor-Dorsted in a new 
order In Asl£ under the l e a d e r s h i p of .^ my r;ower (J5tt>pnes9)*#hatso«war, 
Cn Januniy 27 , 19^ +1 i'cshizewa f i n a l l y sen t p. ^loowy r e p o r t i o Tokyo 
in w'n'i ch h-j aftde c l e a r the lndrnesl?jn tr?ndency to n e f l e c t e n t i r e l y 
J a p a n ' s frent c a s t Asie c o - p r o p p e r l t y '^'^here, s eek in r "^upnort more 
r-no mere fro-?, th'i U . H . A , snd Trent B r i t a i n . 2 , 
Jppan now np.6e nce^sriry p r e p a r a t i o n both m i l i t a r y end 
d i p l o m " t i c . In Janur-ry, 1 9 ^ 1 , i n s t r u c f l c n s w<*re ixsued for the 
p r i n t i n F cf cccupr.t ion paper money fo r Indones ia pnd the d e l i v e r y 
of which took plfice in M?>rch 1 9 ^ 1 . 3 . 
At the end of Fe"bru?-^ry, 1 9 ^ 1 , the f i epo t ip t lons were r e -
sumed, vhorc the Japanese d e l e m t l c n reduced the a r e s of coveted 
o i l f^oncesslons from 17.5 m i l l i o n hccts-rea t o 1.7 m i l l i o n h e c t a r e s . 
On the i n s t r u c t i o n of p r ' -ml - r , fC'-noya, on M'^rch 2 ^ , 19**1, 5foshlz8wa 
had to con t inue the naf^otiRtions to secure i t s o r i g i n a l demands. 
1 . H .} , Van MookJ C p . c i t . p p 6 ^ 6 5 
2. ibid. p,71 
3. i.f .a.-oc,->022; Far i.^ .i'-ill.Trib.x.xh.no.B'Oi timetable nos,72 and 
76 
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At this tine, the Jeppnese Increased their <3em!?nds for 30,000 
tons of rubber snd 12,5000 tens of tln.1 But the >utch re^ j-alned 
steadfest to their point of view i>ncl h«^ nce no profress was taede in 
the discussions. The Japanese 9t last presented their final 
memoranda-n on M^y l^ f, 1 9 ^ , detnllln^ the terms with reeard to 
the entry of the *^epanese into indonesi?>, In the -sphere of enter-
2 
p r i s e s en:: b u s i n e s s , t r a f f i c end communicrations, tr-^di^ an i^ cownerce. 
However, the two d e l e g a t i o n s met once trore on Jijine 10,19*fl* 
The Indones ian rovernment forrc^^liy refused to ncced t : the Japanese 
deaiends for g r e a t e r economic nnd n o l i t l c a l p r i v i l e g e s wi th in her 
t e r r i t o r i e s and so the <ieler?»tions pa r t ed i n © subdued, thourh 
f r i e n d l y r;Ood,3 On June iM-, 1 9 M , Matsuok?i Rsked YoshUava t o break 
off the n c r o t l R t l n n s ^nrt come hack t o Japan, ^m June 1? , ^^oshizawa 
had »n RUdlence with the - .G . ©f Indcne<^is. -•- J o i n t communique was 
Issued s t p t i n r thf= break off the ipc-nomic n e r o t l T t i o n between the 
Dutch f^n6 Jepanese d e l e p ^ t l o n s in J s k e r t » A , 
The m*?ln csuse of the f?=llure r f the conference vr^s the 
Japanese dsm!='nds which were of such np tu re and mapnltude t h ^ t the 
Indrnesi?^n Fovernwient could not comply with them without j eopa rd i s i ng 
the I n t c p r l t y of the a r c h i p e l a g o . A Japanese view of causes of the 
f a i l u r e of the ne«^ot}'^t1ons was, however, plven by KshtRro Chya in 
co-t.emporarY Japan in the fo l lowin? words: This unsuccess fu l pa r l ey 
1 . Van Mocks o p . c i t p .80 
2 . Japanese ajeujorandtiia of Hay lU-, 1 9 M , T>ublt*l»M lo Van Books op . 
c l t . pp .81-87 
3 . Van Mooks o p . c i t . p .97 
k. Ibict f - r ^ . i i s i s > i l l r i b . c x h . X o . i 3 0 9 ^. , ^ . 3 6 t i m e t a b l e No.90 
o^ -jfl-
was almost constantly hanperad davalopiaant of political quastlons 
which wiaxptetedly obstruwd themsalves on the coiincil board in spit* 
of the effort made from tiM> outset to confine discussions to purely 
eeononic matters* When tlw international sttuation is so full of 
a 
complexities as at present, it is extremely difficult to dr^ w distri 
butions between economic and political issued or to keep them apart 
end separate. To this fact more than any thin{^  else should be attri-
buted the failure of the Jakarta conference. 
It should also be noted that sentiment in Indonesia underwent 
a drastic change against Japan after the conclusion of the tripartite 
treaty In September 27, 19*«0. That Japan was regarded almost as an 
open enemy cannot denied. This attitude was shown when Japan became 
allied with Germany, with whom the Netherlands were at war. It may 
also be said on the paycholopical aide, that Indonesia depended on 
Bri tains fifhtingr power and on the aid and support of America which 
was becoming an arsenal for the democracies, it may errually be said 
that the attitude of Indoaesia stifferened when they underrated the 
power of Japan, which was mls^udped to be on the verpe of military 
and economic exhaustion after more than four years fighting. The 
Dutch opposition to the co-prosperity sphere of east Asia was no doubt 
due to the political construction wrongly placed on the econcoic and 
peaceful desijms of the Japanese government in consequence of its 
Joining the Axis countries, as well as to the strong reliance placed 
by the Netherlands on Bri tain and America. The &utch argument that 
Japan might re-export to Germany v*iat she imported from Indonesia was 
only too spacious. What Japan sourht from that source was to meet bar 
2Sfe 
expandinf industrial nee^s.l 
With the formal breakdovm of the Jakarta conference, a 
resort to force remained as the only alternative method of brinpinp 
Indonesia into the co-prosperity sphere, the pveparations for which 
were already under way. Before Isunchinp milltery action, the bsses 
in southern Indo-China were to bs secured, since thy were regarded as 
essential for an easy attack on imlcnesia, i'atr'uoka admitted this to 
the German ambassador in Tokyo, ©tt, on •June 21, 19M.2 
Therefore, the liaison conference between the povernme-nt and the 
,peri8l headnuarters of June 25, 19M, whJdt set up, especifilly in 
connection with the return of the Japanese delepstion from indonasia 
the proyraTtme for the south, decided thft as the first step towards 
the soutV'em drive, Japan should hasten to obtain air bases, the 
use of specified harbours end the rifht to station troops in southern 
indo»China. This decision was endorced by the emperial conference of 
July 2, 19^ 1 , ond once more it was reiterated that Japan should speed 
up her south-ward march and remove all obstacles,3 
The occupation of southern Indo-Cb.ina by Japanese troops 
accordingly beran on July 29, 19M. As a result, on July 28, 19M, 
the Indonesian authorities, following the example of the .^'"., forest 
Brttsln and the Sritish dominions, issued or'er freezing all Japanese 
assets in Indonesia and suspending the Dutch-Japanese financial 
agreement. By the edifct of July 28, the Indonesian povernment now 
stopped all applies of oil bouxite, rubber, tin and other rater 
material to Japan.^. 
Henceforward, direct relations between Japan and Indonesia 
1. A.Vsndenboschx op.cit. p,h27% Appendix 1, Ibid pp.M"29-H^ 31 
2. M.A.Aziz? o p . c i t . p.137 
3 . Far a. 1**111,Trlb.iixh.no.588 s t imetable no.93 
^ . Van ^ook: op . c i t 103s fa r E.Mii.Trib.Kxh,no.1321 A; t imetable 
no.97. 
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virtually cam* to an end. Xn August, 19^1, the Japanese ambassador 
in Berlin, General Oshima, called on General Christlanson, consnander 
of the German occupation forces In Holland, posslblfr to collect 
further material on the military and political situation in Indonesia 
from docuawnts in the Dutch department of colonies in the Hapue.1 
In order to facilitate the military campaign arainst 
Indonesia, the Japanese increased their subversive activities. 
Special attention was paid to influenclnir the Chinise nationals in 
Indonesia, which totalled some 1,250,000. On September 2, 19M, 
consul general, Ishizawa at Jakarta in a cable to Tokyo requested 
that more pro-Japanese Sgents from the occupied repions of China be 
sent to Indonesia, in order to counter snti-Japanese feellnp among 
the Chinese naticnsls there.2 
It was revealed from the secret report of the office of 
iiast Asiatic affairs in Jakarta that as many as four bif Japanese 
spy orrenisations were operaing in Indonesia in October 27, 19M.3 
As the Japanese threatened Indonesia, so the Indonesian 
povernment strenthened Its defence, to resist the Japanese aggression. 
The Indonesian people fully cooperated with the government and 
served side by side in the hOTie guard and in the civil air defence, 
though they lacked of modern aaaounitlons and weapons. The Indonesian 
government ordered all male German and Japanese nationals of 
about 7,OCX) persons »mi some Chinese pro-Japanese to be rounded and 
interned, while the women and children were allowed to leave for 
Japan and Germany. In September, 19M, 1000 Japanese women nn6 
children were repatriated and in November, 1600 incli»9ing many men 
1. B.H.M.Viekkes op.clt. p.393 
2. Far i^ .Kiii Trib.exh.no.1327! time-table no.99 
3. Ibid no. 1325, time-table no.107 
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l«ft Indonesia for Japan. But th« Japan«s« povemment warned 
Indonesia. Dutch voiaen and children bepan to move out of Japan.1 
At th« end of October, 19*^ 1, after General To jo had become 
premier, a general re-exaoinstlon of all possible questions 
connected with the prospective war against the Netherlands, the 
U.S. and Great Britain took piece. The iiaperial conference of 
November 5, 19**'1, decided to laimbh war on Indonesia with the 
following detailed instructions. An order was iriven, for instance 
to attack ^^ utch ships and airoplanes in special ccses even before 
the declaration of war. On the day of the declaration of war the 
southern area force would destroy the hostile aavies in the territory 
of Indonesia and cooperate with the Japanese army in the occupation 
of the archipelspo. It was further instructed that the beeinninit 
of the operations the stretetic areas of Celebes, Dutch Borneo 
and southern Suaatra would be occuped. Also stretetic areas in 
the Moluccas and Timor>;. Necessary air bases would be prepared 
in these areas. After the completion of these bases the air force 
would be pushed forward in order to destroy tho enemy air force 
in Java. After that the main body of the invasion rroup of the 
army would land in Java for its occi^)atlon.2 
Ho%«ver, the final stage in the preparation of Japan for the 
conquest of Indonesia was reached towards the end of November, 915 
I9M f when consul penaral ishizawa at Jakarta, acting? on orders 
from foreign minister., Tojo, Instructed the Japanese constils in 
various places in Indonesia to report telegraphically all movements 
of merchant men and warships in the Pacifies, the Indian ocean^the 
south China sea zones, giving full details of destinations of all 
1, A.Vandenbsch* cp.cit. p.528 
2, Far li.Mlii Trib.exh.no.1252; time-table no,102 
3, Ibid no.1330? Ibid, no.115 
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outr-olap ships ,1 
While th« Japanese povernment, states Vlkke, boldly assert«d 
that it had never mora than 35fOOO men in indo-China, It wss 
really messing strong forces alonp the boiandery of Thailarrf and 
ne^T Its new nsvnl bases in the neighbour hood cf Saifron. it was 
massinr air fleets at the bases north-east of Indonesie in the 
erchlpeleiro of the Caroline islands. An imposlnp force wss concen -
tratlnn: for th€ attack of Indonesia.2 
In view of this threat of war, Indonesia economically 
increased its production of raw rasterlnls siash as rubb r, tin etc., 
essential for war psroductlon in the U.S. A lerre niimber of new 
fsctorias had begtin op'-retlons. In March 19M, the volksracd, 
approved a fovernment proposal to allocate 10,000,000 florins in 
support of essential new Industries, It also voted 530,000,OOO 
florins for the purchase of ermament^ ii \ The Indonesian armsd 
forces were too snail and lacked of modern weapons. Before the war 
they were 3^500 soldiers. This standing army liad been increased by 
8 few thousand men. It was furthermore re-aforced by about 30,000 
home and city ruords and by 6,000 men of the native milita. ^ith all 
auxiliary troops the total number of the enlisted tmn was about 
100,000. The anti-air craft ortillery was not sufficient to protect 
oven the most lo^ortant points. The whole Indonesian squeJtdron of 
the Netherlands navy consisted of three crushers, 5 destrcyt^rs, 
15 sub-marines and a number of small crafts and ouxlliery veisel8.3 
By December 6, 195F1» it had become clear thet war would 
break cut in the next few days and the Indonesian povcrnment decided 
1. Ibid no.1330; ibib no,115 
2. Viekkes op.cit. p.393 
3» A.Vandenbosch* op.cit, pp.M2-M6 
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to allow Austrlllan flyers to join th» Dutch at t>» baso of 
AiBbolna and to admit Australian troops on to Timor. Whan the 
Japanese attacked the Pearl Harbour on December 7$ the G.c, of 
Indonesia, Tjarda, after Inforainp the Queen Wllhelmina In London, 
announced a stapre of war with Japan. A bomb on Pearl Harbour is 
a bofflb *n Java, was a Queen*s cotn-^ .ent.l The Dutch had cooperated 
with the U.S.A., Creat Britain and China in forminf the A.B.C.D, 
powers(fronts). On January 10, the first Japanese landing took 
place In the Island of Tarakan. On February 20-22, the Japanese 
troops landed on both Timor and Bali islands. On February 2^, March 
19^^, they defeated the allied forces end occupied Java. On March 
8, the Dutch cotaraander in chief. General Ter Poorten, capitulated. 
In June the Japanese however successfully conquered the entire 
Indonesian archipelapo except f^ e^rauke, capital of ristrlct of south 
west New Guinea, where the Dutch flar was still floating.2 
T ^ JAPA8£.S£, HlLUkt.1 ADr.iNiSTB.nTiON. 
Soon after the capitulation of the Dutch in March, 19^, the 
Japanese military authority was established in Indonesia. Indonesia 
was divided into three administrative zones: t. a military administra-^ 
tlon for Java with head-quarters at Jakarte; (2) a military adminis-
tration for Sumatra and Malaya with headquarters at Singapore| 
(3) a naval administration for Borneo, the Celebes and the Laser 
Islands, with headquarters at Maccassar. Coordination of these three 
zonal administrations could only take place at Tokyo by consultation 
between the ministries of war and navy. In order to promote 
cooperation between the army and navy a liaison office(Bukanfu) 
was set up at Jakarta \inder the supyirvision of Vice Admiral Maeda.3 
T7 Ibid 
2. Ibid p.222 
3, M.A.Aziz: op.cit. Cxhpp. H I p.153 
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In accordance with ordinance of March 7% 19*«2, the oilitary 
administration as set %sp in Java on August, 19^, showed no 
striklnir formal changes from the administrative structure of the 
Dutch repime except at the very top level. There the G,C, the 
government secretariat, the cabinet, the council of state for the 
Indies and the volksraad all disappeared from the scene. The rejkgns 
of all authority, executive, lepislstive, judicial end administra-
tive In -the new set up were feeld by a C'unselkan, the chief military 
administration, and tha Japanese coamander in chief for Java who 
was the local links in the chain of command of the southern areas 
to Tokyo. The key body in the military administration was the 
general affairs biireau which Wc-iS the policy maklnp apency end which 
supervised the whole administrative structure. This bureau (soroubo) 
and the proparnnda bureau(sendenbu) were the only new departments? 
the other seven departments in the administrotion followed the 
pattern of former repime with slight modlflcstlon. These departments 
were as follows: 1. Internal affairs(naimtibu) which now include* 
public h<ialth and educntion and labour, formerly independent depart-
ments; (2) finance (zairaubu); (3) JusticeCshlhobu); ik) police 
(kelsubu); which was formerly under tha interlDO department;(?) 
public works(kotsubu); (6) audit (kalkc kantokubu) and (?) Industry 
Csangyobu)* Independent bureau, of which the most important was 
religious affairs bureau(shsubu).l 
Similarly In the field of local administration, there was no 
revolutionary chanpe in structure. The former provinces of west, 
central arid East Java vern abolished and the top and most important 
unit became the shu(provlnce) which corresponded fo the former 
1. Ibid. p.1^5 
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residencies and of which there were 17. The foia* siatanates in 
central Java were continiied with their current rulers and Jakarta 
a special nmnlclpallty. Below the shu, the Japanese administrative 
pattern of perfecture, sub-pirrfecture, district, vlllaj^ e and city 
teas Instituted and provincial, regional and municipal councils were 
•liBdnated, The head of the shu, the counter of former residents, 
was the most important figure in the local administration for he 
had the power to issue ordinances supTjlementlnp those of hlpher 
authorities and repulatlons on subjects not yet covered. These 
powers of appointment and dismissal rave him preater authority 
over his subordinates than the resident had enjoyed but on the other 
hand, was more directly dependent on the central admlnii^ tratlon.l 
Borneo, the Celebes and all the Island east of a line running 
north and south through Bell and Kaecassar straits were under the 
jurisdiction of the Navy. 
Gunsei (military administrctlon) in the«;e areas was called 
mlnsel(civil administration) whose headnuartcrs(minseiu) was at 
^lacassar(Celebes). The whole area roverned by the nrvy was divided 
into h administrative regions - Borneo, the Celebes, the Moluccas 
and the Lesser Sunda Islands - each administered by a branch office 
(minselbu). The mlnseiubu at Maccasser was under the comxand of 
the officer commanding the second southern fleet at Surabaya, which 
araln fell under the officer/the 7th southern fleet at Singapore. 
The navy ministry at Tokyo determined the policy for the territory 
under the naval occupsticm.Z 
A Japanese military court was established to deal with 
violations of army ordinances, while In Ser^ teraber, 19*^ 2, the existing 
1. x:.xhlblt 1335 and 1351 
2. Dec. n9.2g50, p.3**^ t ^ ^.A.Azlz* op.cit. p.161 
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judicial syateas orpanised on tha Japanese pattern end in 19Mi-
on new and severe penal code was promiilpated, Durlnp the session 
of the court only Japanese end Indonesian lanpuares were allowed. 
Trials by the courts martial proper were conducted in Japanese. 
The police departnent was siadlarly reorganised and an auxiliary 
police force(keibutan) was set up In the towns and villR?es. As 
happened in all Japanese occupied territories the chief power in 
police and judicial affairs was wielded by the Kempel or M.P. nnd 
exercised with their us\ial ruthlessness. To fascllitpte their 
operations they trained and orpsnised a Javanese branch which 
became an object of special hatret and fear on the part of populace 
in jreneral.l 
An 8pricultural industrial central board(saibalkopyo kami 
kodan) was founded ««rly in 19^, connected with the former depart-
ment of economic affairs, with numerous powers to handle over 
all financial procurement snd requirement for sprlcultursl Industries* 
The S.K.K.K, was also empowered to deal with storage and distribution 
of the produce of these industries and to ^ear estate production 
to the needs of wpr f?ffort. In June 19^3» the powers of the S,K,K,K 
were extended still further to Include not only large estate 
industries such as rubber, and cinchona but also the small estate, 
particularly those enpafed In the production of febres and cacao. 
Political measures includlnf propapenda and limited 
concessions to the nstlonallsts were rerarded by the Japanese as 
means to schleve the main economic posl snd to enlist popular 
support for total economic mobilisation. Quinine, tin, petrolelum 
1. i-tatement of De 'ieerd, ^ -xhlblt, 1351 
•^7H 
products, febres, textiles and fcod products specially rice and 
cassava remarkably required; th« Japanese ruthless conecrlped 
Indonesian Isbour In the hel hoCwork cort>A) to increase production. 
Actually In the case of production except quinine which was 
Increas-sd by 16% Rareusha increased output considersbly under Japanese 
direction. According tc both Ji^ panese and Indonesian st?.tlstic 
covering Java, rice production dropped by 25 % durlnr the Japanese 
occupstlon, corn by 36 5^ , csssava by slmost 50 ^ , rub' er by more 
than BO % In both Javn and Sumntrs, tee by cv^r 95 ^ , coffee by 
bout 70 % nnd p?5lm oil by Imost 75 >. 1 
The hel ho consisted of conscripted Indonesian labourers 
(ramusha) were incorporeted Into the Jnpanese army or labour 
brtteltons n^d sent as far as Burma, Sla®, -?nd K-alaya to work on 
roads, fortification, etc. The casualty rata of these psmnshas 
was exceedingly hirh i=ind of the many thoun.-^ nds who left J-^ vs only 
a small porportion returned, Larpe number did not leave Java and 
were used by tho Japanese to vork plantations or roads and fortl 
flcatlons, etc. Consequently a social service orpanisation headed 
by Otto Iskandar Dlnata was established to help the suffering 
families of those roaushas. 
Throughout 1 9 ^ all political parties nnd. even political 
meetings and propaganda were banned by the Japanese authority. The 
Japanese officials pointed out thpt we should If possible, at proper 
time before rresentinp the aCore mentioned requests, cause an 
independent movement to stir up, amon!? the native.2 One of puidlnft 
principles of the military authority said! We must svold pivln?: 
rise to any premature Ind-penclent movenn^t. Because the Japane»« 
wanted to Japanese Indonesia, The so-called a triple a movement 
1. Ch.v.'oolFrThe Indonesian story, London, 19*f7, P»7 
2. in the •xhibit 628, Tentative plan for policy toward the 
southern region, Oct. M-, 19^; W.^.tlshrees op.clt. p.18 
(perperekan 3 A) launched In April 29, 19^2 under the slofran" 
Japan the leader of Asia, Japan the protector of Asia and Japan 
the lifht for Asia and Asia for Asiatics bore down heavily on 
the theme of Japan as the saviour of the Asiatic peoples from 
the western influences which hod corrupted the eastern soul, ^'he 
objective of the rovstient was to mofclli"© Indonesian sup9)ort 
for Japan war effort and the greater -^ ast Asia Co-prosperity sphere.1 
In order to lnflt:tencs the Indonesian people, the Japanese 
made friendly nppraach to the four leaf clover(empst seranpkai)of 
the Indonesian leniersf Dr.Sukarno, Hatta, Dewantsra snd Has 
'^^ n3u^ . These four men pretend*ito support the Japnnose but actually 
they wanted to carry on the firhtinp for n-itional independence.As 
-hahiir clenrly e-'presaed" It rives the n- tlonalist strupple a 
broader lepal scope and to prc-rss the Japanese for political 
concessions. The fonsaticm of a united natlonelist aovemont which 
would Include all i-roupfls was of particular concern to Sukarno 
for example.2 
The pusat tenaga rakj^t or putera(central people's power) 
was orpanised by the Japanese in March,19**-3» It was founded with 
the attention of mnkinj^ it n body to attract as many Indonesian as 
possible for the p'irpose of cooperation with the Japanese, it aioed 
for it to replace all the national political orpaniSBtlons that had 
been In existence before the Japanese conquest. Dr.Sukarno was made 
president of the organisation. Other tt mbsrs of its working coiamittee 
consisted of Indonesians like i^s Adipati Ario Kusurao Utoyo, vice-
president. 3 
The most Important result of the putera was the tretaendous 
1. W.H.iilshree* c p . c i t . xj.79 
2 . Sutan Shahrir* Out of oxile J aka r t a , 19H6, p.P2 
3 . exhibi t 135t; W.H.iSlshrees o p . c l t . p.82 
276 
Increase in political conaclousnaaa of the Indoneaisn msases snd 
In particular their will to Indapendence. For the putera not only 
allowed but even encouraged the contact between nptionalist 
leaders and the aaases with the repressive operetua of the Butch 
repime had so aeverley llBsited. The objective of thia contact from 
standpoint of the Jaapaneae was to Indoctrinate the massea to aupport 
them and to hate, If necessary to fi^ht the allies; to recruite 
labour battalions »nd rear area troops for the Japanese army; and 
to mobilise raw jasterial resoiirc«s. In a limited measure this 
was accomplished. But in much greater it resulted in the awakening 
of the national consciousness and desire for independence of the 
indonasian peasant.1 
In September, 19^3| the Sukarela tentara pembela tanatfliir 
(peta), volunteer army of defenders of the fatherland, was also 
organised by the Japanese. This was a Japanese trained but Indonesia 
officered adlitary organisation formed to help the Japanese defend 
Indonesia apalnst the allied invasion. At its peak straight in the 
middle of 19^5 it numbered about 120,000 armed men. It was the 
peta which was to b«coi»e the backbone of the indonosian republic's 
arsoy. The continuous objective of Sujcarno, Katta and other peka 
leaders was to indoctrinate the peta's raemberw with a pro-indonesian 
point of view and only outwardly a pro-Japanese and anti-«all4id 
orientation. By 1 >^ -^ , the averape peta maaber was consciously 
strong nationalist, sntl-Japanese and Dutch but for the most part 
favourably disposed "^ ©wards the other allies, particular the United 
1. ibid 
Sukarno and Gatot ^^ a^nflcupradja, the Indonesian h«ad of the peta, 
were able to insure the reliability according to nationalist 
considerations of most inportant pota officers. They arpued to 
the Japanese and effectively, that in an araiy dedicated to defend 
of the motherland, it was necessary to have strong nationalist 
officers. In addition Sukarno convinced ths Jasanesa that the 
peta could be a ?ood defensive orcranisation only its rank ^nfl file 
as well as Its officers had aroused national consciousness. Thus 
allowed hi and oth>:?rs to speak to the various peta units, inflaming 
them not ssralnst the allitjs alone but against imperialism in general. 
Many peta members had no difficulty in ecuatlnf Japan's activities 
with imperialism by themselves.1 
The Japanese propafanda service (the sendenbu^ kas established 
several youth orpsnisritions. They wore given political Indoctrination 
plus some military training. The first of hem, the seinenosn was 
established at the end of 19^2, as a mass youth orpanisatitm based 
particularly on the villape. its members were trained in simple 
military exercises, masss drill and anti-allies ideas by a member of 
their village who had attended a Jacsnese school for instructions. 
In 19^3, was orp.anised the r-akutotal, im oreenlsetion of students 
from the seventh prade throueb hiph school, its {BetEbers were »lao 
riven intensive Indoctrination apainst the allies end some military 
traininp. Finally was established the baris^n pelOT>or(Pioneer column), 
the most heavily indoctrinated of all youth corps.2 
The Japanese military command dissolved the pu^era and repla 
eed It with new organisation called Djawa hokokai(perhimpunRn 
1. Ibid 0.83 
2. -xhlbit.13i?1*T I>oc.no.2750, p . 5 1 , i^i.A.AzizJ o p . c i t . p.225 
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kebaltlan rakjat or people's loyelity orrenlsation) in March 1, 
19Mf. To help neutralise end limit the force of the nationsl ists, 
the Jfftpenese insisted thst It represented the Chinese, /^ reb and 
iiurasian coramunity as well ns Indonesian nnd forced it to submit to 
a much closer supervision nnd control than had been the case v?lth 
th© putera. Thcurh nominally chrlrtnenned by ^tikprno, who vms assis-
ted by Hnttr? as vlce-chslrHian, the nev <^i <»pnisaticri ^tood directly 
under the control of the C-uns* ikan, the ''"apanese commander In 
chief. The highly developed or^ snls?-^ ti on of the hokokai with a 
br-^nch in every vJllf^pe, was roalntolned compulS|*ny.It did not win 
popular IftCklnF. By many indcnesls'^ .s "^ iikarno and its other lepders 
were felt to he prlson»»s of the Japanese; and in fret they retained 
very little latitude for maneuvering the rdvencecient of the national-
ist movement. 
In addition the Jspanesp attempted to win the support of 
Indonesian Isl«>mlc leaders, ki.^ s nnd ul?:mas. They verevlocal 
Tjosltlon*^ ., honours pnd importance. The attempt was made tc enroll 
their support In a propaganda compap-in nlmed at arousin? resistance 
to the Allies on the basis of defence of Islar^  a?^pinst infidels 
bent up-^ n ar-eln enslaving the Kosllm populcttion of Indonesia, To 
facilitate the or^'anisatlon of tvils effort, the Japanese established 
towards the ^TiA of 19^3 a larjre Islaiiic organisation, subsualnfr all 
existing ones of non-political nature. Including Mohamuiadlah, 
-^ a^hdatul Ulama and K. I. A. I. (council of Indonesia ^-uslia association). 
Although throu^'h this orrnn'S^tion did tc hsve Increased the 
spirit of n-.tl^nall sm atcon?' the masses, they did not appear to have 
had much ?;uccess In hulldinr pnti-allied ss distinguished from antl-
1. Kan po no j p.7 
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Japanese sentl^jnt. Nearly all of the kiss of ulemas refused to 
lend themselves as instruments of Japanese alms, in fact the 
majority of them had already been outreped by the clumsy handllnpr 
of the Hohsmaiadfin rellpion by the Japanese. The people beinp 
forced to bow towards Tokyo rather Mecca ?»nd the exaltation of the 
ciffiperor on a rellplous place \«re particularly important In this 
respect. The antRPonlsm towards the Jepanese brought to emphasise 
Indonesian independence above all else nnd. this was tnor*? frequently 
accompj^ nied by anti-JsKpanese than ?,nt4-allied overtones, 1 
One other political orfranisptlon called the committee for the 
study of former customs end political system was set up in November 
19^, Its purpose was declared tc be to survey And study the 
customs and former poveimraental systems of the country ?^nd contribute 
towards edsainistratirn of Java. Its roeisbers were composed of 10 
Indonesians, Includinr Suj^arno, H»tta, Oewantara and Mas Msnsur 
and nine Japanese and was divided Into 2 coiamlttees of welfare and 
survey which suuposed transmitted pertinent Information to the 
military admlnistrptlnn. The coffitaittee vn^- dissolved the followine 
October when the central advisory council was established.2 
J^ uiinp the first period there was little chnnp* iA the position 
of the Indonesian in the Fcvernnwnt service. The Japanese assumed 
thet loyal officials would be respected ond that ell Javanese adminis-
trative p'-rsonnt>l would be retained, Some i~>utch officials in the 
lower ranks were kept it first but for a flew months. The Pumatran 
adn'lnistretlcn frora Singapore announced the Dutch adm1nlstrpti»» 
system had been found suitable with only minor changes but vith 
former official conipletely replaced by experienced Japanese officials. 
1, Kahinx o p . c i t , p . I l l 
2 , u-xhibit 195^1, Cf.piopramnie in Java p.61 
2 ^ 
Accordinp to official Japanese figures of Septenaber 1, 19^ +5, 23,2U2 
Japanese nationals weie employed by the militcry edministrrtlon 
of Java.l 
Key position down through the provincial or former residency 
level were held by th@ Japanese, below th?-t Indonesian personnel 
prevailed olmost entirely. Such appolntE?ents of Indcncfsiens did 
not Involved pny large Tiembcrs cf importsnt posts. Ona w^ ts appointed 
fi .ludre of th® supreme court, ^ aden SupcTO pnd 60 Riembers ve~e 
added to the judicial branch of Jakar 15« p; oyln-ial court. ?ome 100 
othais wt:re named to rovernmcntDl posts, mostly «t the prcvtncial 
lev^l in «ey, 19^2. 2 
In 19^^-, 3 Indonesians-Sutprd^o, ^ ulro one rurcscjwere 
ftpnrinted bv the Jeranese militf^ ry authority as residents(pclltical 
head of residency-' -nd in the Hiir-glninr residencies of Java and 
i-'i^ dura, indon«.!Sians sub-residents were appointed. These Indonsslan 
sub-residents rather than Japanese superiors, who were only nominal 
residents, actually ran their respective pdndnistratlons. The out' 
side Java and Madura the Japanese adminlstrr^tions did not allow 
Indonesians to occupy civil service posts hlrher than that of 
district head. 
After fhe Tokyo approval, the puterp movement was organised 
In Kerch,19^. in June, 19^3» Tojo in s speech to the :>let promised 
measures that he would jrive the peoples preater participrticn in 
their frovemcients. He referred to Malaya, i>um8tra, Java, Borneo and 
Celebes but sinplod out Java for specisl attention. If our attention 
to po fUTthar and in pursuance on the aspirations of the nations, 
to take ineanurea stap by step envlseriufr the perticipation of the 
1. '"honp 8himhun, iMarch 22 and 21+ and .^iay 11,1952 
2. Ibid. April 28 and May 1, 19^2 
native populations with def^res of thsir sblllty in ti^ course of 
the year. In pertlcular we intend to realise this state of affairs 
as early as possible in Java In view of4bs advanced conditions 
of the Islands and in response to the d«slre of the people there.1 
The promlf^ c ennounced in To jo Diet speech wss repeated k^  
the prime minlstc?- dorinf his vi^it to Java in summtn of 19^3* in a 
speech before a i slly at -emblr Fr^ rk in J??karts on. July 7, Tojo 
seic It was his Intention that the poo,: 1 of Javs rhould taka pert 
over th€ msnas-easnt cf political affairs.2 
The first concrete steps tc carrv .--sit thl,*? proctlse were 
announced in Jave fen September 5, 19*+3» An edvisciy system was 
introduced wherety indontJ^ lens were Fptolnted as advisers to the 
various departr:.en*-s '•fitr- rovernment, ccviscry councils established 
end vice-governors nppointed in 8 of the provinces. Two types of 
councils were set up in Jsve; locel councils, of wVrs ch trhere was 
one in eech provi')c^  and one for the sped si municipality of 
Jakarta rnd a central advisory council for all Java. The local 
councils were composed of 10-30 members, cf whom t were appointed 
by the rovernors '^nd | elected by the villafe headnen. In peneral, 
their function wns tc ansver nui stlons posed for them by the isjovernor 
BS and to furnish suggestions on subject referred to them,3 
^ImilRr Icrol councils were founded in Sumfitra, Borneo, 
Halsya at the same tiiae end In the Celebes a few Eonths later, but 
th^ ; central advisory council was confined only to Java for the tlBW 
beinp. This seic H^rad, the Japanese chief coiaisellor of the Java 
admlnistrstion, was csused the more c>6vpncoc character of the people 
1. Jepsn year book, 19^3» p.202 
2. Osaka Askahi, July 13, 19^3 
3. ibid. Septeteber 7, «^nd July 13, 19^3 
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Jsva vantsd a more cen t ra l i sed and complex forE of p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n , in 1-islays the na t ives were not quel i f ied for such 
s c t i v i t y and the loce l councils would be headed by Japanese mayors 
and rove m o r s , 1 
fhe cen t r a l advisory council of Jave se t up in Ceptember 5, 
W8S composed of ^3 memters, 23 cf vl;.o'.ri v/ere pprolnted by the ' 
conanender In chiff cf Jeve, IP e lec tee by the IOCKI councils end 
2 appointee by the su l tpna te s . Ihe purpopx- cf s e rvmr so laRny 
eppointr.ents to th.- cormande.r in chief vas net only to onnuxe g 
ss fa ly pro-Jep8nfcr,e Cia,1ority but alGo to prov'dt. l ep resen ' a t lon 
for such sp t c i c l ri''"ups such nS- thu Chinese nnd representa t ives of 
re l lF ious orgnniGr:tions, Tc no choose &.:Tnbers tn^t public opinion 
would be riven as -n vrlde representr t lon rF po?ssible waF pn nvoid 
nim cf the whole rdvisory council progrpnme. Ins t i ' i c t ions to 
provincial rovernors in ''ursr.tra, for ins tence , v.-ore t c appoint sen 
of pood reputnt icn .?nd members cf r e l i pious and ether or-sni sa t ions* 
The l i s t of appolntiiK^nts to the cen t ra l c- unci ls issued l a t e r in 
Saptember resd l i ke K ichc'S v/ho of Jsvanesa public l i f e r-no 
Included three Chinese, i""usliin leoders such as Ajjus Spliinand 
I Ensur, as well BS leading p o l i t i c a l fifrui'fes l i ke Sukarno(chsirfflan) 
H©tt8, ;»w£ntarsn nn(\ Subardjo. 2 
Jepenese i/ere careful ly excluded from mesbe: shir except in 
the local councils where Japanese served c-^ s chairman and in penerel 
the appointment of ndtninistrs t ive o f f i c i a l s was dlsccurafrecl in order 
tc r e t the voice of the nat ive inhabitrints ref lec ted gs w»uch as 
possible in the nsili tory adminis t ra t ion . 
1, Harad wroto sn e r t i c l e in the Osaka - s r h i , Oct .5 , 19^3 
2 , Prog"!amme in J ava , p . 9 
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The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a l s o cons idered I t food p o l i c y t o adopt 
s e v a r a l of the p r o p o s a l s put forward by the co imc i l s i n order t o 
secui© t h e i r genera l c o o p e r a t i o n , in another words , plve the 
n a t i v e s a b i t more rope t o l ead them more e a s i l y . 1 
The r e a l c e n t r a of powers in the c o u n c i l could bo de t ec t ed 
e a s i l y i n the f i r s t anno tine ement of th© i n s t i t u t i o n . To the 
counc i l thfcie wa? a t t a c h e d a secrc ta r iF^ t which was s t a f f e d by 
s e v e r a l exper ienced pnd " k i l l e d J '^penese, v?hose dn*-ies wf^ re to be 
those of s s s i s t n n c e and r u i d s n c c . / 'Ctusl ?^.ireivision rnd d i ' i cc t lon 
of the counc i l -WPS c r r r i e d en by the o f f i c e vrh! ch provided the 
ques t i on f.nd msiny of the r.nsvers r.s w e l l , v^it-' vhlc'" the mexr.Yers 
were to c e s l . The spme f u n c t i r n rcrfcrTjec'' in th-.? l o c a l counc i l s by 
a Japanese s e c r e t p r y a t t ached to the o f f i c e of the p r o v l n c i n l 
r ove rno r , 2 
At the sarae time t h e t the counc i l s were in^^ t i tu ted , the 
J'-psneKe ra^ -'de sex'^-rpT rpT^olntmcnts r f indcne^ians to r-osts in 
the c e n t r a l and l o c a l rTvernffi'.-nts. To implement t h e s^lvl sory syptem 
7 Indones lens v^ert nt^ asefi t o r-osts in the '3'?p??rt!i!ents of 'ha m i l i t a i y 
8dffi inistrr . t Ions, "-^r.-?uk5?rno vss appo1nt'?n t o th^s c e n c r s l r^ffslrs 
depr.i t ' aen t , Dew»ntpr« t'" thn? educat"5cn bureau , -^aden ^upomo t o 
J u s t i c e nno i-r.^amin t o the nrnpa-^'^.nd^ d e ^ T t m e n t . /m indon- s l an 
was named heiad cf thn r e l i f t o u ^ a f f a i r s bureau and o tho r s rece ived 
p o s t s In the i n d u s t r y depar tments rnd pub l i c works. TwvO Javanese 
p r o v i n c i a l '"^ovmors were appo in t ed , i n i o n c ^ l a n a-r'ts-^r;'; n«»med t o 
the pr-^vlnclf?! f^ov^rnments and rece ived posi t ion;? in the departments 
of n r o v l n c l a l a d r n l n i s t r n t i o n . 3 
1 . Osaka -^s^hi, -ept-nibor 7,19^6 
2 . Kxhibl t 1351 
3 . "honan "Ihirrihun Octcb-r 7 , November 1 1 , 19^f3 
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In September I9M+, under increasing pressme both from 
the Indonesian nationalists $in6 deterioiftinp militsry siturtion 
in the Pacific, the Tojo cebin^t was replaced by a new cabinet heeded 
by General Koiso who was rfccalled from Korea. The Prime Minister 
made the first fornirsl pioralse of Independence tc the Indonesian In 
September, 19^ *<-. Th: cormnand^ .r In cblof of J^va in his ar^nooncement 
of Koisc's speech of prcislsine independanes for Indonesia said th# 
final victory vss not von, then there would be no erestar east Asia 
snd without the latter, as a matter of course, there could be no 
independence for Indonesia, It, ther&fore, behooved all Indonesians 
to devote themselves to the effort of ensuring a Japanese victory.1 
As far an political participation was ccncurned, the policy 
as adopted tn Tokyo stated that pre-msture enforcsmant was to be 
avoided and thst the political ability of the poople had to be 
first taken Into account. Specific mention was made only of Java 
v/here measures lef^din? toward independence wure to h'3!ein at once. 
There wss to be no radical chang-s in the militsry adainistration 
but psrtictpntion cf the people in the povernrr^nt vr-.s to be still 
further strengthened and expanded and tricy were to receive political 
tralninf.2 
Fur-ther, Instructions i?sued by the chief of staff of the 
7th rj-es arn^ y on -^pternber 7, repeated this wording of the anno\aice-
ment on political psrtlcipr.tion but sdded some instructions which 
throw B p-ood bit cf lifht on thi motives ana attitude of the 
.Tnpane?e gt 'he first p-riod. It specified the use of nationalist 
'^lor.'^ ns, scnrs, fl"c(r"9d nnd vhlt'."', sp^^eche* ?nd even outlined plan 
1. Quoted in exhibit,1351 
2. i.xhlbit,13^ 
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fo r the c e l e b r a t i o n of the promise of Independence in order t o 
arouse n?5tlonal s e n t l o e n t to a new p i t c h of i n t e n s i t y . i 'Spec i s l ly 
dur ing the execu t ion of t h e i^ar, t h i s n-^tional consciousne'?s must be 
u t i l i s e d to stranr ' i^ten defenc« coopt^rntion wi th the m l l i t e r y 
'overnment snd t o mske Japan and Jnva on^j end insepareb le»1 
The BBilitsiy a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Javs f a i t h f u l l y followeu the 
i n s t r u c t i o n s . In i'»over£b-;r, the coTinfindcr In chief rnncunced the 
c r e a t i o n of the ^ c s t s cf provmcirai v ice rovcrnor which wera t o be 
f i I l e a by fixp>.-=risnceu locsil per«?'^',nf;l --.nri I f t e in the month,11 
such s!npolnr:r'!:;nts w-jre rmnounced. Xhe seven l e s d l n p •^ndone'^lan 
a d v i s e r s to thf; ra l l i twry a u m i n i s t r - t l o f vjer-i n-raec to » Di-iimBnent 
counci l of scivisoi-y 'Ofiy t c ths; af^rninlTtrotlon wh..m the c r n t r a l 
counc i l \'SB not In S(iS3lon. F rov i s ion •.;•• •r '.nde for the t r a l n l n p 
of youn? ind'"'n*''Sl an o f f i c i a l s , the c e n t r a l ^uldinp powsr of the 
people {'no ih^i number of r e p r e s e n t r t i vc? in the c e n t r a l counc i l wes 
• l i g h t l y increfjS'-d.S 
Because of t h . Ftronj? <5em??no3 cf ';>^ c Indones ian n a t i o n a l i s t 
l e a d e r s for Indepen icnce , on J-nu-^ry 3 , 1 >''+5, the Japanese rcilitpry 
ft'i'^inistr-t: ion ann-'^unceds 1, V^lth re>-!?rd t c trietgr.'vtio'-"? foi 
in<ion«si«n Independence the siniy wi l l i m r e d i a t e l v enforce *:h<-i follow-
In? messur^s ; va) - i l&rpe the scope of the i n s t i t u t i o n of n o l i t l c a l 
pf;rt lcip»>ticn bv the n a t i v e Cb/ E s t a l l i s h a f';ner?3l a f f a i r s bureau 
end a c e n t r a l counc i l Cc) ^trQn^ki^>> snd inc reps* 'nsrnb^^rship of 
provincli^l c o u n c i l s (d) Flsn t o expand the scop of apt>ointments 
to the m i l i t a r y s d m i n i s t r ^ t i o n and to s t r ivf i for s*pnolntre'-nt of 
n a t i v e e-nnloyeesC^ ) lnc>-u\cete S p i r i t cf n - ' t i c n a l r u l e . (2) Train 
personi^l i t i t iS w t i * vho pre to become in fu tu re l a s d e r s and i n t e n s i f y 
1 . e x h i b i t : 1352 
2 . Thonr-n 3himbun, NoviirsberV, 1 9 ^ 
present system absolutely essantial to educfitlon of future 
citiiensh.l 
In May the mllltBry administration of Jeva proclaimec! its 
dissstisfectlon with the distressingly large number of native 
officials end •aaior government officials were name specially, 
v'^ c^ Ificked sincereity nnd who had cast off the ecsy poinp way of 
the povernment cfficisls of the former ^etherlan-is administro-tion. 
Tc remlty this sed sltir-ti^n tbf Japanese authorities systeisticslly 
combed the J-n}ts of rr-r.^ tnted n^ -tive officials to wr^ ed cut those 
not sufficiently Inbuec vlth the spirit of the new order. Those old 
line officials i>?crc; iGplr'Ced by t^">e cnpsble younj'er men such as 
the Rokokal ?nc1 nuTr.erous .'ioho"mr.f3ftn political leaders.2 
IHirinp this perict^ there was no mark-d change in the work 
of the central council which was primarily concerned with mobllisaton 
of the people for the war effort. In a speech delivered to a 
session of the ccunci' vrhich Tset just aftei the announcement of 
Koiso spe*jch, Hattfl discussed the work of the orpanlsation. In the 
past ha said it had been concerned chiefly with the better discipline 
and Increj^sad phsyeical snd spiritual tr^dnine and to production 
increess and dJiefence. The people should underst»^nd that this work 
had been tha prequisitas, had been uade tc the council to deal 
directly with matters pertaininr to independence? The answer was 
no, for he proceeded to speak of the promise of Indepen-'^ence as 
payable on vlth tot^l nsobtlisatlon. If Indonesia failed to provide 
that, its nf'tionsl rairas of independence v;'11 evaporate into the 
thin Pir.2 
1. Froprsn'.me in Java, p,7 Cf, F.C.C.iaalc report, No.*+5, Hay 11, l9Mf 
2. V/.H.Slsbrefl'f op.cit. p.92 
On March 6, 19^5 the cowmtn6eT in ehief for Java announced 
that three farther steps should be taken to realise Andonesian 
independence*(l) A coBmlttee of inqidry Into preparation for 
Independence(Badan penjelidik usha perslapan keenBrdekaan); (2) A 
national tralnlnf Institute would be founded and (3) Public opinion 
repardinp independence would be stimulated. The coamlttee of 
inquiry, In the words of orders, ^ ras to be an instrranwnt for the 
achievement of cooperation between the officials and people in the 
study of preparatory problems for independence. The three measiares, 
he said, nre the embolllment of the feeling of confidence the Japanese 
forces have toward the people of Java, who under their direction 
have enthusiastically cooperated with them for three years. 1 
Before it became a flesh and blood organisation, however, the 
Java administration had to win the approval of the area command at 
Singapore, As a result of podding by the forawsr, the 7th area army 
held a conference of all heads of tl» general affairs departments 
under the auspices of General Kagoki, the commander in chief at 
In 
^Inpapore on April 30« Though Kagokl at first was not/favour of 
this and tol Marshall Tereuchl that the time was not yet ripe, yet 
he then agreed to the representatioes from Java who described the 
extent to which the national consciousness of the Indonesians had 
been aroused Btui stressed the fact that the confidence of the 
population could only be won if the promises of independence were 
fulfilled.2 After further exchanges and meetings, the Singapore 
command pave its permission and the coranlttee for the study of 
preparation for independence instituted on Kay 28. The committee 
was composed of about 60 members, Japanese Eurasians, Chinese and 
T. "^honan Shlmbun, March 6, 19^5 
2. Exhibit 1351 
Indonaslans, appointed by the silltsry adnlnlstration, chaired 
by Dr.BadJlfflan lediodininfrat. 7 Japanese laet with Lt. as 
special members and one of them, Ishalbanpase Yoshi, served as vice 
chairman. An Indonesian, Suroso was appointed as vice-Chairman.1 
it had power to make decisions but discussed such matters 
as the principles to be incorporated in a constitution, defence and 
economic problems. Besolutions adopted by the comoiittee and presented 
to the conmander in chief expressed disapproval of allied landings 
in Morotai, Halmahera and the nei^hbourinf islands; declared the 
firm opposition of the Indonesian people to a mandate; which it said 
the allies were planning for all of Asia; such a form of rule, the 
committee held, was for uncivilised, not free peoples and it reitera 
ted the determination of the Indonesians to fiyht to death for 
their independence at the side of the Japanese.2 
After its second session in J\ily 10-16, the ccMjmittee was 
outmoded by the rapid course of events. The decision of the 
supreme war council of July 7 to the effect that the Indonesians 
should be riven their independence as soon as possible that a 
coimoittee to prepare Independence should be established had provided 
that the details of this arrangement should be worked out by the 
headquarters of the southern area army at Saigon. As usual the 
latter was considering independence only in terms of mid 19^, 
but after another conference of the chiefs of tl» general affairs 
departments at Singapore, on July 30, the date was moved forward 
to the following spring. A few days later, telegraphic orders 
from Tokyo instri»ted Marshall Terauchi in Saigon to speed up 
1, G.W.Overdlkjkins De Indonesische problem de ferten, 
The Hague, 19»^, p.33 
2. G.W.Oderdi^kink! oplcit. pp.3^35 
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preparation for the new state so that it could be launched 
in September. Consequently on August ?» Terauchl issiied the degree 
establishing a conmlttee for preparation of independence(dokurltsu 
Jufflbi lin) which was to accelerate all measures concerning the 
preparation for the installation of th© government of an Independent 
Indonesia.1 
Two days later, Sxikarno, Hatta and WediodlnlgKrat were flown 
to Terauchl head-quarters at Dalat in Salmon to receive the 
imperial degree directly from him, the main points of the degree 
were as follows: 
1. A coOTiittee for preparation of independence (panitia persippan 
keraerdekaan) was to be established? 
2. The territory of the new state was to Include all of the 
former Netherlands Sast i.ndies| 
3. The date upon which independence was to be proclaimed in 
any territory would be decided at the discretion of th Japanese 
government, as soon as preparations were completed; 
h. The new government first could be instituted on the Island 
where preparations were first completed and would be extended to 
other area as they became ready; 
5* All Japanese military demands were to be met; 
6. Suicarno was appointed chairman of the committee which was 
to include representatives of areas outside Java and the members of 
which were to be appointed on nomination by the local Japanese 
fflllltary commanders.2 
The delegation arrived back In Jakarta on August 1^ and the 
1, W.H.Eisbree: op.clt. p.95 
2. Terauchl's proclamation of Augxxst 7,1 W 
2^0 
coflmitte* consisted of 21 appointed mtmbers; 13 from Javai 3 from 
Sumatra and 5 from tha other Islands. These members were Dr.Sukarno 
(chairman), Dr.Hstta (vice-chairman), K,H.T.I adjlraan Wedlodlnlnprat 
^.Otto Iskandar Dlnata, Ki A Washid Hashlm, Kl Bafrus Adlktisumo 
B,K.P. A.SurjohamidjoJo, B.P.H.PurbaJa, K.Sutardjo Kartihadlkusomo 
i.P.Suroso, Prof.i^.Supomo and t.Abdul Kadir for Java; Dr.Amir, Mr. 
Abdu Abas and Tenku Moharamsd Hasan for Sumatra; I>r,G,S,S, i^ atu 
Lan^le, Andl Penpreran for Celebes; A.A.Hamldhan for Borneo; Mr.J. 
Latuhahary for the Moluccas and Dr.Tjuan Blnf representln- the 
Chinese conmunlty. The first tneetlnf of tltese representatives was 
scheduled on August 19, to discuss preparations for independence 
fixed by Terauchl on Aupust S^ f. The surrender of the Japanese on the 
1*+th however, speeded up the political developments in Indone-^ la 
and the committee was summoned on the 15th snd Informed the 
surrender.1 
All members of the coBaaittee were compelled to take the oath 
of allegiance to the secret person of the Japanese emperor. T\jey 
had to follow five principles (banjododai) read as followss 
1, Tofether with the other east Asiatic nations we shell live 
or die with Dai Nippon end we will offer our sacrifice wllllnfly, 
knowmp that the present war is waged to vindicate peace nnd 
Justice; 
2, We shall establish a united, independent, soverelffn, just 
and prosperous nption which will endeavoiu" to be worthy member 
of the frreat east Asia co-prosperity sphere under the noble and 
benevolent leadership of Dai Nippon; 
1. KahlnJ op.clt. p.12? 
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3. W« shall endeavour vrtth utmost enerjry to attain ovtr glory 
by preserving: and developlnjr our regional culture and cltilisatlon 
by promoting Asiatic culture in f^ eneral; 
^. By preserving the brotherly spirit with the other east 
Asiatic nations, we shall serve our fatherland with the utmost 
strength and devotion for the almighty; 
5. We shall strive with zeal for eternal world peace based 
'>n the hakka principle.1 
The Committee had two co^secretaries, Abdul Gafar Prlngfodipdo 
and a Japanese. It held two plenary sessions on May 2B-June 1 
and July 10-17 and reached basic agreeia^ nt concerninp constitutional 
and economic questions, 
Durinr the closing state of the war, there was a marked 
increase In the number of adminlstretlve posts hid by Indonesians, 
fixecutlve positions in both the central and provincial or local 
administration^? were «?lven to them and in general, they assumed all 
posts not directly connected with the war effort, in Sumatra and 
the Celebes there was a corresponding increase in political partici-
pation although the general level of activity remained below that 
of Java. Central and provincial councils, sn^advisory system and 
training institutes for eovernraent personnel were established and 
there was a steady increase In the number of Indonesians appointed 
to posts within the government and in public organisation.2 
Special sessions of the central advisory council were 
held in Sept-ember and November 19Mf, to deliberate a measure of 
cooperation with the Japanese In the defence of Indonesia. A stateownt 
1. Prof.M.P.Gerbrandy; Indonesia, London, 1950, Chap. 3i p.67 
2. Programme in Sumatra, p.l; Khonan Shlmbun Feb.22, May 30,19^5 
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by th« Japan«s« commander In Sumatra indicated that the local 
administration there woiild keep in step with that of Java. In 
January, 19^5, it was annoianced that a central advisory council 
would be established in Sumatra. On July 25, 19^5, a committee 
for preparations of independence was established in Sumatra, headed 
by Mohd.Phafei, a founder of the national sc^ o^ol of Indonesia in 
1926 at Kaju tenam, central Siimntra, chairman of the "umatran 
central advisory coimoil and Mr,Adin^ero, as secretary.1 
The Japanese naval coi^and at I'^ accassar was much little 
Interested in the national movement there. The Indonesien flaj? and 
national anthem, Indonesia ra.le, were prohibited by the Japanese 
8Uthor(ti*4rs in ^ulaweisi. But the Japanese allowed the nationalist 
leaders such a? Dr.i.ntu Lsngi and others to carry on a nationalistic 
propapranda and to invite Sukarno for a visit to Macassar. During 
Sukarno's visit the ban on national flar nnd national anthem was 
lifted and then the formational orpanlsatlon w«s possible, in July 
Dr.ratu Lanpi, Andi Panperan, a prince of Bone and Andi ^ultan, 
a prince of Bulukumba went to Jakarta to attend the independence 
conference In Aupust 9.2 
In February 19^5, the naval administration established an 
advisory council (komon) of 30 members for louth Borneo, the 
Celebes and the l«esser Sunda Islands, Andi Panperan, a raja of 
Bone, was appointed tha president of the council, Dr.hatu Lan<^ i, as 
vice-president, who was also chief Indonesian affairs of the 
MinsenhuCoffice of the Japanese governor). The naval command 
proceeded to appoint more Indonesians to administrative posts.3 
Wlwn the Japanese emperor's broadcast of 15 August, 
annotmcing the decision of surrender, was fimblished, Sukarno and 
1. Shonan Shiabun, January 6.19**-5 and March 26, 19'4>5 
2. Ibid. No,72, Kay, 18, 19^5 
3. Ibid, 22, February, and 30 May,19^5 
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Uatta %»r« arprued by th« Indonesian youth corps which was in toiach 
with widerftround movaments flKhtlng the Japanese imperialism, to 
proceed with the declaration of Indonesian Independence. They on 
August 16, Consulted with AdmiralKoede who apreed to present their 
case to the rallltary euthorlty. The Ij^ tter was at first reluctant, 
pointing out that he had received no Instructions from Tokyo,But 
his opposition was overcome at least to the point of tskinr no 
active oefiSures apalnst "ukarno's proceedlnps. Re end his colleagues 
made hastly alteration to the draft constitution which they hpd 
drawn up in ^ *ay «nd 17 Aupust, the Independence of Indonesia was 
proclai^d from Sukarno's house.1 
CONSt^ QUi^ NC&S OF THc. JAPAKi^ SE OCCUPATIOHS 
The outstandings development durlnp the Japanese occupation was 
the tremendous Increase in national consciousness and the will to 
political independence which it fastered. The harsh end arbitrary 
rule of the Japanese affected almost the entire population. In 
comparison Dutch rule had been moderate and was "nuch lest felt by 
most Indonesians, Japanese rule aroused a ccnscicusness of common 
suffering and humiliation and a common resentment apainst the 
Japanese that enormously strenptheaed already exlstinpr national 
consciousness of Indonesia.! 
The indirect rule of the I>utch administration in connection 
with the peasantry was succeeded by a direct and .larrinf instruetion 
by the Japanese military administration which was slightly 
cushioned by partially opsratinr throuph the puters and Java 
hokokai. As iultan "hahJrli has observeds Turinp the 3t years At 
Japanese occupation, the foundation of rural society teas shaken 
and undermined by forced fcittTilations, kidnapping from homes from 
1. F.C.Jones: Japan's new order jn East Asia 1937-^^'»^ondon, 19^5, 
p.381 
2, Nahlnt op.ci.p128. 
from conscription as labourers abroad or as soldiars, compulsory 
surrender of harvest crops, compujtlsory plontlnp of designed crops 
fill imposed with limited arbitrariness.! 
In many areas villafre societies were severely wrenched and 
forced to realipn their structures because of the Heavy demand of 
their labour supply made by the Japanese. The conscription of 
hundreds of thousands of theii/most able workers into the hetho, 
peta, etc. meant that traditional patterns of work snd laid 
apportion had to be altered. Tbe cr\2elty of the Japanese, their 
exorbitant demands for labour and crops and their repayment in a 
worthless currency which would huf almost non of traditional needs 
such as cloth, arricultural impleij^ ents, etc. arouded in most 
plreasants an intense bitterness against them, it is true that 
because of the tremendous monetary Inflation that developn«nt during 
the last two years of the Japanese occupation, the widespread 
monetary indebtedness of the peasantry was reduced in proportion 
to the value of this land. But this Incidental result of Japanese 
rule could no lonper be C8pitalis«?>d upon by most peasants because 
the severity of J'^ panese exactions left them on resource but to 
incur new debts from Chinese money lend«rs. By 19Mf these money 
lenders had generally stopped advancing credit in kind(seed, cloth 
and a^ricultureal implements) for payment In the Increasins^ ly 
inflated currency. Instead they agreed to make such advance only 
for a stipulated percentcpe of the peasant's crops,Thereby much 
of t?^ benefit from the inflation by passed the peasant.2 
As a reaction to and in order to resist the heavy demands 
of the Japanese, the peasantry became much more politically 
1. St.Shahrirt op.cit. n.11 
2. Kahin: op.cit. pp.128 
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conscious than It had ev«r previously been. This and Its 
feellniF seainst the Japanese was attested to by the wide-spread 
and frequent local peasant revolts that accrued, particularly 
during the last year of occupation, indoctrination by the under 
pround plus the skill of the nationalist leaders in the putera and 
hokokai, particularly Sukarno and Hstts, who by radio and personal 
appearance were ?lven an almost unlimited contact with bke peasantry 
by the Japanese trnnslsted this political consciousness and will 
for national lndepenfi«»nce such as peasantry had never previously 
possessed. In particular this was due to the speeches of Sukarno, 
broadcast as they are to almost every lar^e villape of Java and 
Madura. His sblllty to douBBianicste with the peasantry in terms and 
concepts imder^tandsble to them allowed him to establish such 
rapport with them that when the revolution broke it was primarily 
to hira that they looked for leadership.1 
There were very few important posts in the indonesian haiwJs. 
Native adffiinistrotors were more advisers without real powers and 
were strictly controlled by the Japanese hipher authorities. But 
tlwir experiences in the*during the occupation had jrreat advantages 
and usefullnsss In the formation of the republic of Indonesia. As 
Dr.Hatta correctly pointed out: While under the Japanese, we laid 
plans for achievlnp our independence and when on Aupust 17» the last 
Japanese suirandered nnd were unable to act effectively, we declared 
our independence. There was no hindrance from the Japanese, the 
reason belnp th^t all posts with the exception of few at the top 
were in our hands. Then our civil nervants and other officials 
declared they would take orders only from the republic of Indonesia. 
T. ibid p.129 ^ 
Th« ^utch vho described themselves a dtmociatlc people, art 
blemlnf tht '3?»pan«s« for not isakln? Indonesia liKlepenrtent 
Impossibl©, Indead, the ^mtch should b» covtrad with shama In that, 
ths Japanese vent further in r«cofnisln8r Indonesian independence than 
to the Democratic Dutch.1 
By employlnfr scaae Important Indonesian leaders in the admlnistra 
tlon, the Japanese thouj»ht that they could control ?3ll Indonesian 
people -^nd root out western Influence. The Japanese were tsuch irapreasat 
with the poatent vlth the potentialities of education as a means of 
schievinp their goal in the word of a JBetsber of thajmillt^ ry adminis-
tration of Cingapora: The most profound of «11 nwan? available to 
prop8pp.nd« is education. This can b«3 shaped end altered at will to 
suit tyie politic to be proparendised. From esrly childhood the 
child*s mind can be m?ide to asaimilBte toechinps which nre donducive 
to the creation of a feellnp of loyallty and to the ewok ninp of 
p nstlonal consciousness.S 
In view of this attitude, the Japanese established special 
schools for treininr of political leaders. This was in fsct tralnlnf 
for service in th« ^overmaent and from its praduates the occupation 
authorities hoped to secure reliable native officials for political 
affairs. These schools which were established in all of the occupied 
territories, varied in length of training and in general objectives. 
Some were very short sni were intended for those nlreedy enrafsd in 
rovern!S«nt work. For example, district y^ads in Java vmre brought 
to Jakarta for three weeks of study during which time they were flven 
complete courses In Japanese history f»nd lanpusfe, oriental history 
snd th» development of the greater east Asia war as leaders in their 
respective districts. Others such as a special training institute 
i'. Ubani and associatest op.clt. p.188 
2, W.H.Elsbree: op.cit. p.99 
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in Jakarta pave meny courses notably In such subjects as language 
nnd history but also in roilltary and defence training and agricul-
ture. 1 
The Mosllms drew special attention. A permanent training 
institute vms set up at Jakarta to give three weeks courses to 
kias and ulemas were brcupht there from all pests of Java. This sort 
of training enabled the Japanese to pick out those who were willing 
to cooperate with them and who were promising propagandists. More 
over, it provided a method of checking of the effectiveness of their 
own propaganda atnong the people because of the rapid turnover and 
the important position of the kias and ulamas in the Indonesian 
comnunity.t 
In 19Mf, shock brlfades, Hizbullfifh nuraberlng 50,000 were 
organised among Musliai youthCl 1-25), lar?»cly the pupils of Muslin 
schools and a special training centre wan instituted for the leaders 
of the orpsnisstlon. The purpose of the Hizbullah was two fold. It 
was a allitary organisation, trained as reserve for the hoiie defence 
army and It was also a resrllplous vanguard to propagate Mohanmadan 
doctrine ?^nd lead others In accoBpllsfcng the Muslims duty to exert 
full energy for the protection of religion as well as Indonesian 
Mohamraadans, thus contributing to the successful construction of a 
new wSBld order in conferralty with Allah's will.3 
The most ambition-"? of the institute was the national 
foundation trainlnp Institute established in Java in April, 19^5» 
when plans for Indonesian independence were accelerated, its purpose 
was to train the men, upon whose shoulders will rest the responsi 
blllty of conducting the affairs of Indonesia, for whether Indonesia 
l". "Propramme in Java p..33 
2 . i ixhlbl t : 1351 
3 . F.C.C.Hadio r e p o r t , No.61, December 22,19Mt 
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depends 
after independence/entirely upon the quality of the personnel it has 
in its service. Asrama Indonesia merdeka (domitary o£ free Indonesia) 
was founded in 1944 by a group of Japanese naval officers headed by 
a Mice Adimiral Maeda, Its declared objective was to train leaders for 
an independent Indonesia and all leading nationalists were invited to 
give lectures.1 
Most coBBnon were three to six months courses for native officials 
and proiaising students. Such Has the one conducted by the Sumatra mili-
tary administration vdiich provided classes in special education, greater 
East .isia history, military administration, military training, increased 
production, Japanese language and other education traininf. Members 
were nominated by the heads of administration an4 after three months of 
classes were sent out to local districts to gain first hand experiences. 
At Macassar, the navy administration established a special middle school 
for 6U students whom it characterised as the ablest of the native youth 
of the region under navy control and the able sons of influential men 
of the capital au<. of the islano, vs 6he result of the training they vere 
to become the leaders uf the native inhabitants.2 
The Japanese also organised the intenaational student*s 
institute in Japan in order to Attract more and more hifjily distinruished 
Asiatic studentB to make further study there. The institution itself 
feas not an educational institution but acted as a clearing house for 
loreitjn students, providing them with living facilities, aid and advice 
una conducting language classes for their orientation. It provided 
a dependable leadership for the South East Asia, In 1942 many 
of foreign students returned home 
1. Ibid March 6, 1945, "-H, Klsbree: op. cit.p 104 
2. Proiiramme in Java, p.71 
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upon th« advice of tYm Japanese, Of those who remained about 200 
cam* from the countries of South iisst Asia, but this number was 
more than doubled by the arrlvp.1 of stud«^ nts durinp the war. Of 
ty^se 213 foreign students, B3 were Indonesians, Mf of Java, 16 of 
Sumatra, 11 of Celebes, 9 of Borneo pnd 3 of Geram.l 
These students were chosen directly by mllitrry administra-
tion or in collaboration with the local government where such 
existed. They were disappointed to find the number and type of 
schools, no technical knowlsf^ e^ and esfp-^ rlence were riven to them, 
•hlle the J^ r^ anese history occupied a malor role. The history 
taufht w=s characterised by the students as largely mythology 
desimied to strengthen pro-Japanese propaganda by representing 
the Japanese as a chosen subject and therefore historically nlestlned 
to leadership In Asls. 
Besides the mllltjory training schools at all level and 
national schools (prtras>ry and secondary) there were several 
technical and normal schools to train Indonesian teachers and then 
to replace the Dutch te-chers. The Japanese had in consequence 
redtfcced the rate of illiteracy to a certain extent. According to 
statistics of the day, attendance at priraery schools in Java was 
listed at 1200,000 in AuFUst 19^3 nnd 1,000,000 in 1 9 ^ end 
attendance at National schools were as 650,000 in 19Mf and at 
middle schools as 117,000 in 19*^ 5. i-n the areas of Celebes, Borneo 
and Cersm, the Japanese claimed U00,000 students as compared to less 
than 350,000 under the TJutch. They declared that the literacy in 
Java had risen from 7 to 3I+ ;* by 19Mf.I 
1. Foreign stirfents In Japan reported by the ministry of foreign 
affoi 3 p.22 
2. Programifl© in Java, p.275 
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The policy of Jspen In Indonesia effected •ducat«d youth 
especifilly the secondary school and collepe students so 
remerkably. The forcinjr of Japanes'. lenpuajfe on Indonesian students 
coupled with their harsh snd autocratic admlnl^^trptlon of the 
schools very quickly antefonised the students. Heny of the more 
spirited of them were either forced to leave school because of their 
open resistance to the Japanese Rchocl nuthoritles or resipned In 
protest. A numter remained in school only tc hide better the 
anti-japanese underground ectivities thr^ t absorbed mr^st of their 
time. Those who left school hcd to find cut soire sort of jobs to 
maintain their lives end found no time to pursue further studies. 
They established f»ood contacts with the underground movements led by 
Shahrir v^nd his colleafues such as Djoh^n Sjp.ruzah, Huslan Abdul 
^^ani(former forelpn minister pid present vice-chairman of the 
national council), ^ubadio, "r.^-ubandrloCpresent foreir-n minister) 
nno ur,-udsrsono(forreer lndon':i^ slan amabs^ ssador tn India), ^ ''inally 
the deep anti-lTiperlallst, pro-communist imprint left upon these 
stiidents attending the asrama schools. Hence they received thorough 
political education throuph these underf?;round ffiovemonts.l 
The development and spread of the Indonesian language(bahasa 
Indonesia) during the Japanese oncupption meant the strenphenlnp 
of the n-tionsl conf?clousnosr of the Indonesian people. Under the 
Japanese it became the official lanpua?e for administration and for 
all above the third prade. Indonesian vhc had held the top-positions 
open to natives unier the Eutch administration and who spoke flowless 
Dutch but little Indonesian were compelled to I'sarn the latter in 
1. Kahln: op.cit p.131 
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short order. The same was true of school teachers whope 
vehicle of Instruction has been Dutch or Javanese, Sudanese of 
Madurese. 1 
Takdir Alishahbana observeds Because the Japanese were determined 
to enlist the enerrias of the entire Indonesi^^populntion in the 
war effort, they penetrated Into the vill??pes in the remotest 
backwater of the islands, usinp; the Indonesian lans-uap© as tYmy 
went.Thus the lanfuapre flourished and Imbued the people with a 
foelin? new tc the most of them. As !Bore anci sore of them learned to 
speak it freely, they became aware of a ccffison bond. The Indonesian 
l5n??u^ e'9 bucsrae a symbol of national unity in opposition to effort 
cf the Jpp«snese ultimately tc implant their own laneuas'e and culture. 
By the tin?«, therefore, of the Japanese surrender, the position of tJ 
Indonesian lanpuafe bed imnroved enormously both in strength and 
in prestlc"? over not only ^utch but also the verlouE regional 
lenpuapes of the f?rchipelaPO which hnd no opportunity to develop 
durlnp- orcupation.2 
The ^tudy of Japanese was prcs=:9d on several fronts, by mass 
comrauntrration media, by special Japanese lanrucre training courses 
?»nd by training In primary and secondary schools v;here It was made 
p ooRpul sory «!ub3ect. Inspitc of these efforts, however, there was 
little inten'=?ive development because of the superficial nature 
of the tralnln? coursers(2 weeks or t raonth duration) and because the 
rroimds toward whom thr- prorramme was cluififly directed, teachers 
pnd rov?*rnFient officials, spearheaded the movainent to develop a 
national Iftm^uape.S 
In the iseantlrae, Indonesian war: develop!n* Intensively 
as well as extensively. One of the activities of the Java central 
1. Kahins o p . c i t . p.132 
2. Takdir Alishahban* The Indonesian laneua^e-by prociuction of 
na t ional i sm, in Pacif ic a f f a i r s , V.22 no.h December 19'<9 
B.Ubani B.A.: The Indonesian lanjruage Merdeka, no.2 December 15,19^7 
Kahlns o p . c i t . P.132 
council was to sponsor a course in Ind6nf3Sian for yoimp ?rien 
enter ing the povernment service sncJ such t r a in ing schools as 'he 
Indonesian lanpuare course, TTie mi l i t a ry orpisnisatlons ss well as 
the school were useful vehlcl^^s in spreftdlnr the lanfUfjfe and 
Indonesian ed i t ion of th.- co6o BH d i i l l re^-ulntions of the defence 
Br.iiy opened up a v i r t u a l l y new f ie ld to the lan?riia»e. /n important 
contr ibut ion of t h i s period wns the work of the rndonesian language 
coro^l'-slon i^et up by the Japanese a t the 5u«^ f?, s t lon of the Indoneaiaf 
IM Octoh'-r, 19^^, composed of o o l i t l c n l leaders such pss Sujcjjrno 
and Hgttf^ us well as l i t e r a r y f i pu re s . The comriisslon ncded to the 
1^nru?'<^» s^svaral thousand n-iw terms, ifeany of thetnin the technical 
fi{5ld in which a l l the lanirwices of t h i s ar««iwere ve?>k.1 
The increaR5d use of mnss communication medio by the J?tpanese 
vfp.s ano'.her pnon c -n t r lbu t ion t*^  "-.he proeress of the Indonesian 
l^nruofe* in the newspaper f i e l d , the dis?ippsar?'nce of the Dutch 
press led to n shsrp r i s e in the c i r cu l a t i on of the indrnesian 
pres- , from '0 ,000 to at l e s s t 66,000 t^no the number cf papers 
increased to t:h£ point where most towns of any size had an Indo-
nesian pnpt-r. in a d d l t l ' n to the newspapers there were several 
Indonesian p e r i c i l c a l s , two of the most itaportant helnf Peradjurl t 
(w?rrlor) pufcltihefl for the Hiemb^ jrs of the home defence nrmy and 
f^inar (l1 rh t ) published by the relit?!cun af fn l rs deDartroent for th« 
Musli-n k i a s . i 
Th:.' us© of radio eveJwhere was very common. Anxious to reach 
the ^ra^itest possible numbar cf the people in t h e i r propai^anda 
compafepn, the Japanese re l i ed hsavi ly en i t to make to contact with 
the tocr:! p o p u l ' t i c n . For example in 19*+^ ,^ the CDrOTunlcrtlon bureau 
of the -umstra ai i l i t - ' ry ^dininlstrntion bepsn the taUlt of providing 
1. T,Allshahbana: o p . c i t . ; W,H.Elsbree« o p . c l t . p.123 
2 . The press under the Japanese Merdeka, May 15, 19^7 
radlof? for pub l i c i ty purposes, for every town and v i l l age throiiph 
cut the Island and announced tha t i t s poal wss one redlo for every 
3000 i n h s b i t e n t s . 1 Public r?=<?io stands were se t up in schools , 
parks end ©t every Importsnt crossroads of the towns, so tha t e 
larpe pudience, much of i t h i t h e r t o untarped, w»s bmurh t v l th ln 
the reech of the JepaneF.e.2 
fls v l th the ne»sr!?pers, Indonesian was the chief l^inpuiire 
employed thout^h repion^l d i e l e c t s were not neglected. In 19*+ ,^ for 
exif»ffiplf», the Sur?bpya rs'dlo stuition befsn dAlly proprarrme in 
J^sdurese, three hours in l e n r t h , these programmes cconsisted of 
nevs, l e c t u r e s , music snd occffSlon?»l speeches by proiniirent 
M?idurePe. The Japanese hrsiled t h i s as the f i r s t reful*»r propraome 
in th^t Ifn^'Uftpe in hl '^tory, •'~eversl of the nevspr?pers also 
Carrie*-' supplements in c e r t s i n d i a l e c t s , 3 
TheT'^fore, the press and redio served as vehicles for the 
expansion of the Indonesian lanpuape and hence conveyed the 
ni?tion*=^11st messare to a wider sudience. The prcpofonda depsr^ent 
vJth head-qxiarters In Jskprlia was In dirr^ct cnnt??ct with the esse of 
n?»tionolist movesient which was most i n s i s t e n t on the need for th« 
nntionsi l inl ty. -peeche5 and statements by -'^ukernc, Hattp, Dewantra 
snd other lend€»rs w<?re net confined to !^  smaller area of Java but 
were spraad throuphout Indcneslp .^ 
There were numerous aeans of the propapsnda catrpalpn 
crnducted by the Jj^panese a u t h o r i t i e s . There wes for example oral 
pub l i c i ty courses in which younp Indonesisjns were- t r a ined in the 
substance rnd techninue of prop^fends in Jakarte «nd sent out to a l l 
pa r t s of Jeva to enl lphten the m-^sses re<^nrdin«' the RIBIS of the 
iBilitpry EjdBiinistrstlon.5 
1. Prorrannse In J^uaatra p . l ? 
2 , Sulsrkos Miisic In ^'lerdeke*, Jsnusry 3 1 , 19**8 
3» Propraame in Java p.82 
^ . S'Ulsrka: L i t e r s tu ra in Merdaka, January 15 , 1 9 ^ 
5. Shonen Shlmbun, October, 26, 19Mf 
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Travelling theatrical groups which toured the islands putrolllnp 
stvvles end skits provided by the propai^ endft department proved en 
effective means of cowaBsimlcstlcn vith the people sund thanks to the 
support provided by the military administration, the theatre marked 
progress at least In Its technlcsl aspect during the occupfitlon»2 
The Japanese adopted th?; devlde and rule policy In Indonesia. 
They developed a policy of decentralised administration based on 
the so called historical and cultural difference. They intended to 
estaMish e federal povomment of Indonesia Instead of unitary one. 
Thoy therefore set iip three separate administrative unitss 1 Java and 
Madura administered by the 16th ftrmy with head-oiiarters at Jakarta; 
(2) iniTt}«<tra tmder the 25th army was combined with i^ alaya with 
headquarters at Singapore? 3. The Celebes, Borneo and the lesser 
Sunda Islpnds were under navy jurisdiction with headquarters at 
Macassar.2 
a 
The .joint edminiRtratlon of m^matr.? and wa]^ ya was maintained on 
the ground of defence and economic policy, Sxjaatra's location so near 
to Slnpapore which was regarded as strate(kic and commercial centre for 
the whole ??outh East Asia f^ reas. The Japanese stressed the anthropolo-
rlcsl and linguistic ties between Sumatra and Halaya, ties which had 
been severed by I>utch and £npllsh imperialist activities, it was 
claimed that the econcwies of the two areas supplemented each 
other, that unification in such a field as transportation would 
provide more efficient service and the old rivalry oveijSinrapore 
would end now that it would serve as a common centre for both. There 
was also an appeal to the local people of Sumatra. No longer they be 
the Victimes of the Dutch system which made Java the centre of 
admlnlpti^atlon f»nd concealed the characteristic superiority of 
Sumatra, -^  
1. Suiarka! L i t e r a tu re in merdeka, January 15,19^+F~ 
2 , W.H.iiisbree* q p . c i t . p.1J2 3 . Prot^ramme in ^taiatra p .8 
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in 19Mt, Suffletra was mf»de a sepaffite Biilit?»ry admlnlstr?^tion. 
The Indonesians in Ki^ lpya In the tcasnwhile identified themselves 
with Indonesia and wer® ?lven the opporuntty to express their pro-
indonesian sentiment.l in 19^5, wh«n the military administrntlon 
of Sruaatra was announced thnt It was takin? ajessures to extend 
participation in {Administrative affairs to Eurastians, the nove ^ ss 
hailed in Jr-va as an important step toward complete independence. This 
announcament was followed by the estabUshrment of a 'hiBiatrs 
central advisory council under the chairuinnship of Hohd S.iafei with 
its hftpdqu/frters at Padanp, cen*^ r^al Sumatra. Its Tembership consisted 
of 30 persons; 1j elected and 15 appointed by the Japan se military 
edrainistr'?tion» Mohd •'^ a^fei was a nationalist leadei and pre-1 
educationist and declared thfjt the council would help mould the 
thoufhts of Indonesians as a whole and consolidate Indonesians ss 
united nation.2 in north Sianatra, provincial council wos clso formed 
in Medan conslstlnp of 210 members, 90 were appointed by the Japanese 
military administrrtion and 120 were elected from vr^ rlous districts,3 
In 19^5, the Japanese allowed S'ujcarno and Hatta to carry 
appeal for Independence and national unity outside Java, in June 
Hatta toiired Borneo and returned with the report that the independence 
movement was actlv- end the people especially upper and middle 
classes were thorouf'hly race conscious, pivinr full cooperation to 
the Japanese and preparing for Indonesian Independence, Similarly 
3\ikarno made tour of the Cel?»bes where he ur^ed the people tc be 
ready for national liberation in cooperation with the Japanese 
5 
poverniaent. This tour of leaders h^d stren^ thenr-d the unbreakable 
1, -'hon?n Shimbun, Sep ember 10,19M<-
2, iJfWBHaii w.H.iiisbree: o p , c i t . p , l l 5 
3 , Shonnn Simbun, Jnnuriiy 6, ?!nd March 26,19^5 
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bond between Java end o t h e r I s l a n d s of Indones ia .1 
Ccntnct between the a r e a s of admin i s t r / j t ion vm-^ ? f u r t h e r 
ex tended . There was soEe exchfinrs of off l e i e l pe rsonne l or s h i f t i n f 
of o f f i c l s l s of Java anmlnlPt r t i t ion t o oth-:;r a r e a s , .'/hen rumatre 
was sepa ra ted from ^ine-Bpore, n -^izGable proup of Indones ian 
o f f i c i a l s a t t a ched t o the Java at l ' r . lnlr- tr- t ion vns t r a n s f e r r e d t o 
Sumatra, 2 Ihe nsvy wa^ mor* ?1 oof i n nre?>s tmcVr i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n 
but in "^nrly 19^*4, rr,R.'-tta Lanpi who had V'j^ d a S'^rni-officlal p '^s i t lcn 
in J a k a r t a , went t<-' the C--::'lebes t o orj^fsnlse Indcnesl'-ms for c l o s e r 
co l l abo r^ t ' . on v l t h Japan pnd prenpre for n a t i o n a l independence and 
no t tonn l u n i t y , 3 
The Japanese hnd ellTdnnto^"; th •; p r o v i n c i a l I s o l a t i o n and 
t r s d l t l o n ^ l v/ay*; of l i f e of the Indcn^si '^n p»©ple. The old western 
t r a t j l ' i o n s o c i e t y disap-nroved and the severance of ecr>nomic r e l a t i o n s 
b^t^-rcsn the i s l a n d s and o u t s i d e world pave cormson su f fe r In^a to 
n i l fectionf ' of c-^imunltie'^ and hence led t o breakdown of p r o v l n c i a l l s a 
and sec t aT ian i sm, This was hovev,'5r an impor tan t f a c t o r in b u i l d i n p 
of a s t r o n g e r canity amonp the v a s t popul^- t lon ,^ . 
The neiffhbouT'hood aSi^ooipt ionsCtonari ?umi) wore Introduced 
thrcunh-^ut th-/ c o - p r o s p e r i t y ?7phr?re '^n 19^*+. ^^ 11 coTs^unitles were 
d iv ided In to rroups of 20 households (a kuinJ.) and t h e s e in r e t u r n 
fcriEcd s p o r t of hi "h'ir u n i t . The l e a d e r of the Icurai appointed by 
hlf^her body t o h i? p x e c i t i v e dutie*^ was t r a i n e d by t h e ^sjipn^^® in 
the t c sk of e x p l a i n l n f to the rae'?:b'»rs of h i s u n i t the aims of tha 
Japan ise and '•h-? irnni-^diste measures which they Involved fo r the every 
6B'7 l i f e of the p o p u l a t i o n , d i r e c t i v e s to ?uide him in t h i s l^ob were 
provided \y the propsf?^nda s e r v i c e . 5 . SeBidcs i t s r o l e as the basic 
1. W.K. I s b r e o s o p , c i t . p .116 
2 . f^honan Shlmbun, June 1^ , 19Mf 
3 . Propramiae i n Java ; D.Woodman o p . c l t . 167 
E. iyHltellbl-iB o p . c i t . pp. 125-126 
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link inltht transaisticm b«lt by mtma of %^ieh tho Billtary 
ftd«inlstr«tioTi sourht to •xplaln its ragulations to th« paopla and 
to ranerntt support for Itatlfi the kwad. w«re supposed to astuaw 
such civil duties as flra protaction, nir raid defanca and polica 
support* in th@ rural areas, thair role In Incraaslne food production 
vas eaphasised and they were also made the agant for dlstributi<^ 
of feed and other si^plies.l 
fha ruai beeaaw the lower unit of the hcAiakai(patriotic service 
omnlsation). The hokoka- which replaced putera was retarded by the 
Japanese as an InteriEediary orran cf the ailitery adminlstretion 
for purpose of transulttinf instructions to tltm people and teeurinf 
their cooperation* Intended as a mass noveaent, the hokokai vms 
concernerl with st«jh diverse subjects as sanitetiem instruction and 
character developawnt, the elimination of western Influences snd 
cultivptlon of the spirit of thrift* Brigades %«re fora»d for labour 
service in the factories and on the land for all kinds of defence 
work tc aid in the introduction of new techniques and corps. Both thi 
hokokai and the ruM quickly disappeared after tho Japanese capltuida-
tion*2 
In Java shock brigades were formed every connunlty as the 
vanruard to iruide the activities of the hokokai. '^o provide leader-
ship for tl^se brltrades, the Japanese selected persons with prcBislng 
quallficfitions from all ov^r Java and rave them a short tralnlni? 
course at Jakarta after which they were sent out to orfanlife local 
unit8*3. Viiiaire shock brigades had about 50 aieiabers, districts and 
provinces, larger unlts« In » sptich deliverer to them and to the 
provincial chiefs of the brigades In Septenber 19Mf, Sukarno who 
1. w,H,£l8bre€< op.cit* p.127 
2, Pro^ raiBffle In Java, p*o7 
3* ProfraBase In Java, p.91 
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s«nr«4 as cM«f of ell shock brigades, ftirrmd to than at tha 
native power of Java's total war effort which wera a pre-raqul*ta 
for translption Indonesian tndepandanlsa Into reality and the director 
general of the Military adrainistretlon declared they were responsible 
for lesdlnf the mass to victory and indepandence.1 
In ell of their sctlvities, the hokokel and the brigades did 
not lose sifht of netionslist objectives. Their code included the 
followinr articles; CD We will firmly adhere to the principles for 
the imion of the whole of Indonesian race into a sinple nation with a 
sinrle lanfuafe, (2) We will offer over all for the realisation and 
maintenance of independence for Indonesian, (3^ We will defend with 
glory r-nd honour our national flap of the red end white sun and our 
nstional sonp, Indonesia raja.2 
The youth corpsCsenendan) was set In 19^3 on B vertical 
basis much like that of hokokal, although in some instances, sections 
were formed in the larger factories, Young mend^25) were eligible 
to volxmteors or to be drafted if volimteers did not appear in 
requisite number.3. A central training in the corps heavily 
emphaslszed military drill end physical educ^tlcn with Japanese 
language and music thrown in for good measures.^ Besides their 
military training, the membi^ rs of the corps were often organised intD 
labour battsllons for both industrial and egricultural work smd they 
were the chief course of man power for the home defence aray. The 
latter, established by the Japanese In October, 19^3, upon the 
request of Indonesians, was a military umlt with its own officers and 
distinct for the Japanese army although under the command of the 
Japanese coamiander in chief. The officers themselves were trained, in 
1. Ibid p7l28 
2 . Exhib i t , 1351 
3 . ProprafflBe in Java p.92i W.H,r^isbree: o p . c i t . p1«28 
h. I b id , p.103 
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speeiel thrtt« months courses by Jepenes* instrtictlons who stafftd 
th« ceivtr«8. Th« sray wss oifenlsed on the basis of one battalion 
(about 1000 men) ptr province, a goal which was attained by the end 
of the war and was assljmed various types of ruardcftaty.l 
The effect of the army as a unifying afent by produclnr a 
coaoKjn experience to different social groups was described as 
follows by a Japanese training officer assigned to it. Since the 
army Is made up of volunteers from all walks of life, it had resulted 
In the \mifiC8tion of the Indonesian social strata towards the realist 
tion of Its deals, in fact, the Indonesian race had never s«en such 
a hupe comprehensive system to promote its ovn racial well-beinf, H« 
added that the promise of independence had inspired the members of 
a full pledped modern, independent Indonesian arBiry.2 
Similarly a 'Uaatra defence ermyCpiurun) was founded slmulta 
neously with the one on SBVP and youth orpanisrtlons there under the 
command of Chatib Suleiman, Dahlan Cjombek, etc and in thiifCelebes 
paralleled those on the central island. 
Indonesian labourCromusha) was enormoi^ly affected duiring 
the Japanese occupation. The Japanese exploited rltthlessly the man 
power of Indonesia, especially the labour reserve-r of Java, The 
Javanese served as coolie labour for tl:» construction of defence 
works and means of communication and also were trained by the 
Japanise for more technical work in ship yards and factories. They 
were shipped by thousands to areas outside their land as local needs 
and the exirvncies of the military situation dictated. Many of them 
were sent to Burma for the construction of the Burma and Isthmus rail 
reads, '^ iem end t^ alaya for the buildinf of roeds, fortlficetlons 
1 . flixhlblt, l!^5l 
2 , Quoted in Shonan Shlmbun, October 1 1 , 1 9 ^ 
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end other purposes. ^cm« of them (1*00,000 persons) were fwiployed in 
Lopes for th© construction of railways between Peksn Baru snd Sawah 
Lunto In central Pumstra, fortifications, etc. and consequentlv 
6R000 men end 17000 women died of starvation, in 19^3, thousands 
of Javanese lebourcrs shipped to Borneo to work In local Industries 
as timber and larpe natb-jr of them were sent to other areas of 
indonesle.l 
Thouph the prow-more food campajkpn wa?? launched everywhere, 
yet fiood productions were still Insufficient. Wages decreased and the 
payment was made in the Japanese Inflated currency. Because of rapid 
rlsinp cost of llvlns thay were fuprlemented by allowances, medals 
and words of promises by the Japanese. Labour leplsl^tlon was passed 
'>nly In negative measures of replmentation and outlawinp of strikes. 
The Indonesian trade union and orpanisations were banned by the 
Japanese military administration. 
Due to bip number cf the Chinese comm-unity in Indonesia, the 
Japanese established kn office for Chinese affairs called Kakkio ha(in 
Chinese hue chiuo pan) in Jakarta, This was directed by a slnple 
Japanese, one Toyoshima; the remainder of the staff were Chinese, 
In Jakarta every other Chinese settlement there was a hua chiao 
tsunf hui( a Chinese association) which was responsible to t!» local 
Japanese commander and which through its headquarters in Jakarta was a 
channel for the communication of orders to the kakkio han.2 The 
Japanese used this orpanlsatlon to cover their new regulations which 
includes 1. The re-introduction of the internal passport systwaa which 
taeA been abolished by the I>utch; 2, the payment of a replstration fee 
of ^ 100 for Chinese males and / 80 for Chinese females; (3) Tl» 
t . M.A.Azigs o p . c i t . p . 2 ^ 
2 , Shonan shimbun, November 10, 19Mf, ; W.H.iilsbreex op.e l t .pp. 
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establishEwnt of th» Chinese guards(police) for protection of their 
conuBiailty ageinst possible violence on the part of the Indonesians j 
and ik) collection of money from the Chinese for war purposes. The 
Japanese had controlled all Chinese organisations and appointed their 
e. _ 
dlrjctors. A similar course was adopted with faui-aslan, Arab and 
Indian cosamunities during the occupation*! 
Durinp the occupation, the Japanese put the screws on and 
shovred their real iron hends. Then certain shops, theatres, restaurant 
hotels and many kinds of goods and foods were reserved for the 
Japanese. They robbed Java of rolling stock and shipped it abroad, 
they let plMKtations decline, the^gobbled up thousands of catles, they 
upset the rural economy by arwitchinp rice field to production of 
maize, cassava, they acted with increasingly cruelty and, demorali'^ e 
society and tl»y caused not only a little distress by their failure 
to import cloth and rice. They made themsetves feared and hated.2 
At the time of the Japanese surrender in Aiigust 1^, 19^5, the 
number of Japanese(army^nevy gnd civlllani in Java was approximately 
70,000; in Sumatra, 75,000; Bali, 2271; Lombok 1500, In Borneo end 
the remaining islands of Indonesia the approximate numbsr of Japanese 
was 3'+^ ,000. 
The total amount of ammunition in Java and Sumatra in the 
Japanese hands was considerably big nxiffiber. In central and east Java 
alone there were over 38,000 boyonets, over 26,000 rifles, rifle 
ananunition over 11,000,000, pistol 3,6^6, light machine runs 60^ with 
ammunition over 26,000,000 hsndranades over 95,000 nnd many other 
freapons including mortars, anti-tank gun? and tanks, A certain amount 
of ammiinitlon and weapons was taken by Indonesians from the Japanese 
1. V.Purcells op,cit. Chap.XI,VIII, p.551 
2. David Wolf I op.cit. p.2 
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*l»oufh flghtlnp.l 
The total nuaber of Allied prisoners of var in Jave and 
Sumatra W9S 25,OCX) persons, wblle the Dutch prisoners were 65,000 
iB«n, The Japanese concentr?»ted the i^ tarppeen civillsn population In 
Internment camps undar J^p^nere, Korean r'?nd Indnnesian(heiho)^erda 
with a Japanese camp commandant in command r^n'l over esch camp. Hen 
and boy were coneantrated In separate camps, from the women, pirls 
and children. The camp? mamb«red about 12 in Esst Indonesia, 21 in 
J^ uaetra and 25 In Java.2 
Conditions In Internment camps were very serious. Consistent 
under feedlnpr was policy of the Japanese authorities. Although 
a. 
ample food supplies were a^llab^e, they allowed to the Interned 
civilians was Inadeauete to maintain normal health and by the summer 
of ^^^5^ many of the aien and women were lapslnf Into a condition of 
starvation. Foo^ l parcels sent from the U.S.A. were stopped by the 
Japanese and a parcel for erne reason was finally released for 10 
persons. 
ro 
Overopiilnf In the camps was extremely bad. At Macassar 
camp and Jpkarta 3300 women were crowded Into bamboo sheds of which 
the walls only partially erected. At Semaran?, a kamptmp that bed 
been declared unfit for native Inhabitants was used as a carap for 
10,000 women and children. In Tjldenp camp, Jakarta 10,000 women and 
children lived In such overcrowded conditions that one small bungalow 
would accOT.modate lM3 women and children with the bathroom as llvlnp 
and sleeping place for six persons. Dressing, cleaning, all had tc 
be done outside as there was no room inside.3 
Sanitary conditions in the camps were appaling. In central 
Java the latrines consisted of holes in the ground tovered with bamboo 
frames. The wcMoen internees were forced to clear these out every day. 
1". "Ibid71p73 
2. Ibid, p.5 3 .»f
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In some of the camps the sevafre disposal complet«ly broke down. 
Melutrltlon among the internees had befim as early as the 
siaamer of 19^. By the beginning of 19^ -3, malnutrition diseases 
such central neutrlte «nd burning feet, became common and as the 
food becfime worse thei^ e weie outbreak of pollagera end beri-beri 
end very serious outbreak of dysBBtry. The food value fell as low as 
1000 cal. The daily death rate in the caaps due to maltrition averafed 
33. 
iven, women and children above the are of 11 were piven almost 
every form of manual labour such as cleaning of the latrines and 
takinp the contents out of the field to be used as manure etc. and 
were received all kinds of brutal punishment by tlw Japanese officers 
In char^e.^aa cross parcels were confiscated. No medical supplies 
were available to the sick, i^omiunlcation between tiusbands and wives 
was almost non-existence and when it did come it took the form of 
a printed card with set Japanest; phrase. By the summer of 19^5 deaths 
in eonsequtence had become so frequent.1 
f'uch were the conditions in which over a hundred thousand 
men, women end children lived for over three years of the Japanese 
occupation, with fear, hunper, disease and death as their fellow 
internees wsitinp for the day of liberation by the allied forces. 
In Sulawesi, the Japanese introduced new methods of hart-
culture, even new veptables such as the Japanese raJtdish in the 
fertile lands of the Minahasa; they taught new methods of planting 
upland rice and produced two harvests in the year; they reclaimed 
land and increase production of flax and cotton; they imported 
Japanese cows and improved the stock; they built small ships and 
canal boats, they developed communications, building a new hlphway 
cutting across the equator and introducing the torandjas in central 
r. "ibid 
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l^ uleT«*i|to stream rollers and the preparation of asphal; they 
started schools for trainlnr pcvemment officials, for post office 
work and epriculture end treined engineers to becoiae the managers 
of Industrial concerns in Mecasssr and sent batches of students to 
Jep&n, This was not phllantrorhic work? the Japanese Increasingly 
needed food, raw materials and alnerals as people in Sulawesi realised 
when they saw well-loaded ships leavlnr their harbour on route for 
Japan. But meanwhile, Indone3i;ans were poin^ experleces and even they 
were forced to bow three times to Hirohito startifengr their dally work. 
This slilproent of products was followed by the peasant revolts in 
the country,1 
Aprlcultur^ p-al platiations and estates products nu-9>erlnff 900 
estates in J-nva and 300 in ''^ umatr??, decreased reffiarkably. Small scale 
industries spranp up throughout Indonesia. The number of Industrial 
plants however increased from 339 including 5l super industries in 
1 9 ^ to 5 ^ in 19^5. Tbe textile sector rot special attention. 
Industries were set for manufacture of arricUltral isiplements, glass 
ware, nails etc. The Japanese took care of cotton plantin«r for the 
textile industries. Cotton plantation was ?re?»tly expanded- 33000 
hectares in 19^3, 60,000 hectares in 19Mf and 127,000 hectares In 
19^5. Tboupb .the plsntln? was freln«^  well, yet production was very 
slow.3* 
Blve stock also fejl short, for the Japanese depended on the 
live stocks of Indonesia for the provision of meat to their occupatior 
forces. Meat ^^ ms also ext^ orted to Japan. 
Fishery was bady affected by the .Tapanese occupation, because 
the Japanese demanded fish in the sea at a very low price(l/3 of 
the T^rket prices) and shortspe of fishlnp boats decrease from 25000 
1. D.Woodmens op.cit. p.186 
2, M.A.Aziz: op.cit. p.188 
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biats before the occupation of 21,000 durlnp tha occupfition. l^h« 
fish caught in the sea decreased also from about 70 million kg. in 
19^-19^3 to h^ million k. in 19M+-^5. Fcr-st products also declined 
considerably. But the mine productsi^exceedlnfly, for the Japanese 
started explc*lne old mines end buildinp nev ones to meet their VS,T 
needs. Boceusc of \mlimited issue of peper currenty by the Japanese 
authority inflation was the order of the dey. The Dutch pullders 
disappeared from circulation. Prices of poods rose up, while the 
wapes of If^ bourers and salaries of governiaent civil servants were 
very low. The Jtjpanese restricted the operation of Indonesian 
intersulfir shipping system. On the contrary, they encouTRped to build 
small ships of 150 to 300 tons. To this end, they established ship 
yards end nnvipntlon colleges In different places in the country 
to train Indonesian youthsters in the matter of noviJT.tion.l 
In 19^2, the Japanese orppsnised the fu d^inkaiCwomen association) 
as the sole orpanisaticn p«rBjltted to exist and allowed some freedom 
of moveffient. Actually this fu djinkai was the Japanese irmy's branch 
to attend to social work, such ns the spinning of weavinp yarn, 
tilllnp the fields, the mendinp the clothes of the Japanese soldiers 
Htc, rather then real guidance and improvement of the lot rf woMm.2 
Tha elimination of western influence was accofflpanled by a 
policy of Japanisation. Kerenseki, the Japanese calf^ nder replaced 
the western one. "o 19^2 becoa© 2602. The land of risinr sun hence 
forth be called Nipponor Tai Nippon. The use of foreipn names such 
as Japan was strongly prohibited. Dutch names of places, streets 
and squares were chenced Into Jfipsnestt and Indonesiaa. Java was 
named Djaws and Batavia, Djakarta, Karmonie plain rnd Oranre Bonitvard 
1. Ibid p.192 
2 . Indonesia ^eview vo l . l No.2, Febr Kerch,1951» J??karta p.125 
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r«8p«etiT«Iy b«c«M taaato basi and syoo%ra doorl. SaMS of ecuMrelal 
concerns, trademarks, shops snd evan hotels were changed into J^ apanesa; 
hotel de Indies for instance to be called oyako hoteru. The use of 
Japanese words was also introduced for the desi?naiiicm of official 
services, office!, their chiefs, schools and their teac^rs, so that %h» 
Sim was no longer rose at 6 O'clock but only at 7-30 in the Boming.l 
A^public neetings and gatherings were consenced with the obligator] 
bow in the direction of Tcaiyo. All Japanese days of celebration such as 
the tt^eror*s birthdayCtentyoosetu-i^rll 29), maji dayCmeijisetu Hov,3)f 
the enpirc's birthdayCkigensetu-February 11) were declared to be days of 
public rejoicings. The displays of any flag other than the Japanese oa, e 
was forbidden. On the above laentloned days of celebrations the Japanese 
had to be flown on all oficial and private biiildings. New days of 
celebration were also introduced; the reaemberence day of the out-break 
of the great Asiatic warCDeeember 9); the reneabrance of Japanese songs 
and gaa^s in the Japanese language were prescribed everywhere,2 
With the intemaent of European population, the Japanese put an 
end to the old serial status enjoyed bji them. The Europeans were deprivec 
of their socisl position in the judicial branch of administration, in 
civil affairs arwS their right of bringing criminal cases before the 
superior courts of Justice. Their preferties were pxleced under the 
control of takisan kanribuCeneay psojiprty admlnistratlcm bureau).Payment 
of pensions was discontinued. Their bank accountr. were blocked. House 
rents were re uced to half. Their incase taxes were greatly increased. 
Cars were requisitioned. The European sch&ols were closed down. Dutch 
was no longer permitted to be used In correspondence. The censorship 
established by the Japanese 
1. Decree No.l5, April 29, 19^2, ^ .fi.Zoreb: op.clt. p.7^ 
2. H.A.Azizi op.clt. p.175 
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allowed only Japanese end Indonesian to be written languages. The 
postal and telegraphic service followed this example and prohibited 
the use of Cutch and fcnplish in the telephonic communication. It was 
even forbidden to preach Dutch. Total war research institute had ind-
eed prescribed that the use of western Ipnpuepes should be bfinithed 
from the southern sea sreaR.I The possession of books In vrestern 
lanpuafes also constituted s punlshnble offence. All colonial monu-
ments vol!? jiemoved. The statute of Coen, "on H^utK pnd even the 
lion of sterloo dis-rpfeered from the piOlc snunies. 1 
The Japanese wanted Indon-iSie e territory of low v/a?es ond 
prices within the preat '^slstic sphere ?nd f-ood s'.ip^ :lier of raw 
mst^rlsls for the Japanese inctu?.try. They, ther€»fore, imposed a 
strict v;gre snd pries control and ths lowerinp' of the standard of 
llvln"' of the European p^pulstionCthe Indo^ 's).T>T» T?rice control 
*rai ?*nfore- ;^  ^o 3ev<-sr8ly that It estsbllsh'dd the solution for about 
3 7*«r in srite of the InfL-^ticn •.-hicli vras th® result of excessive 
ccn'?equence upon thsj stoppa?? of Imports pnd pro uotion. The Japanese 
also attempted to ^bscrb surplus money by means of donation to war 
funds, lotteries, encouTRFlnf Chinese remittance to Hfikln? ?!nd 
varloa? s«vinp csinpolfns. But the inflation continued to Increase 
ft an ever faster rate until the middle of 19^+5, the paper money 
only hrd about r. 1/^ fO of its original purchpsln^ value.2 
Btrtct control over brmking* was a r'-qulslte for this policy. 
Until Decen^ .ber 1 9M, there were three J&panese banks that were 
active in Indonrsie; the Yokohfiaa specie bsnk, the Taiv/sn bank and 
the Mitsui banks. After all the non-'Tapaness bank?! U n Java there 
II M I I. I I • • •• • • I II I -J iiiiMMW • m w — I I w i m 1—I—m—i—r~-Tr-f- i 1—rwrtr n r—fi- -n— ' 1 -.«w«HiMMM><WMaM<-niM«HMM'MMM»aMPNHM^naMaMHMMMni««^ 
1. Aibid p . 8 
2 . i b i d p .189 
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wer« four Dutch banks , 2 l inii l lsh banks and som« Chinese banks) had 
b««n ifflJMdietely c losed down t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s were con f i s ca t ed end 
placed under the Japanese c o n t r a | i n October 2 0 , \9kl. Their 
a c t i v i t i e s w«re taken over by the re-opened Yokohama s p e c i e bank 
and the Taiwan bank and t h e Mitsui bank in Surabaya. The p e o p l e ' s 
c r e d i t bank which had l a r g e l y Indones ian c l i e n t s , was re-opened In 
October , 1 9 ^ In 70 p l a c e s under the Jr:p?^nese d l r c c t i c n pnd n 
Japanese nnmeCsyomln Flnkoo) ,1 
Ths br?3nch r . f f lees of ther-e Japanese bpnks were s c a t t e r e d a l l 
over Jav- pnd furapti '". Above their?, however, wrs the southern deve lop -
ment b'-nkCn-impo kf'i^^«t^l k inko) whlc"b opened B branches ®n Apri l 1 , 
19^3 in Jpvr, r>nd ^urartrR RTI'J bepon to func t ion as the c i r c u l a t i o n 
benk. Throu-^-h t h i s b^nk, c r e ' ^ l t s vere furniPh^d only t o t hose 
industriiff? which were IniportRnt fo r the Jppanose war e f f o r t , while 
runn in r cieditf^, "Incc befor*? Kerch 8 , 19^2, were f radr ia l ly paid 
back, in Borneo ^^ nd *-hQ ' ' r e s t ^ 'sst ?nd TsivRn bank sc ted a s the 
a pent of norr.po.2 
The nampo bsnk vr'-s thtr- *>=• !n? t ru r r rn t by v'^lch the government 
In Tokro cculd contro"' the vhol'^ econoinlc l i f e of I ndones i a . I t a l s o 
servafl as & Keans of b r i n r l n r the wes ter p r o p e r t y - i n d u s t r i e s and 
p r i v e t e ?50o€s untf^^r tb*; c o n t r o l --f the nev Japanese owners. The 
super in: 'ustr ie;= In 19^2 nnd snf'^s of we«t-~irn b^'nks-;1ewelR .»nd 
p rec ious r se t e l - ? l s o corr.o in pcss-«9?ion of the Jr^nsn^se h?>nds, TIM 
i n s t i t u t i o n for tho cus tody of enewy movable p r o p e r t y ( t e k l ? s n 
ksnribu- ' vn?? therefore- l e f t i n the chprpe of only sm.?ll pmo\jnts, which 
vcTe d e r c s l t e " In the nr^mpc i^? proceeds of the sj ' le on hehalf of 
the o r i f i n ? ! ov.-ners. Th« sdmin l s t r^ ' t lon of liRROVPbl?? p rope r ty such as 
1 . Ib id p.191 
2 . H.J.Manschot* o p . c l t . i«ziz« o p . c i t . 192 
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ground, housesi etc. was conducted by the hudoosan kanri koodan, 
•stablished by Osarau seirel no.10 in October ®0, 19^,1 
In the economic sphere, the various secticms of the population 
were organised in corporations with obligatory iBembership, unilater-
ally binding regulations, uniform ob;Jects, and Japanese executives.To 
mention only a few* the corporation of textile producers(ortonono 
koogyo kumi In 19^3^, the united corporation of sugai' merchants in 
Javs (Djawa satoo hambai rei^ ngoo kumia)^ the united coiporotion of 
retail shop-keepers(warong kumia rengookai, 19^ 3'' etc. The activities 
of these booies often overlapped but from the Japanese vltw-polnt 
of highly policy, this set up had the adventste of enablinc- them to 
maintain effective control ano of promoting Nipponese leadership.2 
i'he Japanese also intended to make a nation-wide massacre of 
the Indonesian political, social and relifious leaders in order to 
make Indonesia second Korea, ihey prepared tm & plan called klpas 
hitamCbiiiick fan> end lis hitam(black list) under the direction of 
Hitlshi Shimisu, in which all the names of the Indonesian leaders 
were written and who were to be massacred immediately. The plan had 
been executed in the Treat fiast Indonesia, in the island of Java and 
Svuaatra it could not be carried out due to sudden Jovmfall of the 
Japanese eBQ)ire and the tlack list itself was burnt by e Korean 
officer in charge at Bukit Tlnggl at the beginning of ^ugust i9k5 
who had profoundly syi^athised with the Indonesian struggle for 
independence. This was an opportxinate event, otherwise all leaders 
of Indonesia would disappear altogether from the surfoc- of the earth. 
The Japanese immediately after the occupation of Java, 
abruply put an end to all political activity, i^ egree no.2 of the 
1. ibid 
2. Ibid 
3. A Secret report in Bukit Tinggi, 19^5 
320 
of th« eoBffiander of the 16th army in Harch t, 19^| banned all 
ffleetinps, associations, publications and listening to foreign 
broadcasts snd degree no.3 of March 20,19^, announced that to 
discuss, enpafe In activities, encourage or aake propapenda 
conceminir the orrenisation and structure of government would be 
considered illegal. By degree no.23 of July 1?, I^ Uit, this prohibition 
w»s not only explicltely ssintaincd but else ossocl^tlons were 
ordered to be dissolved. As a result of prohibitive rerulations 
several Indonesian leaders were arrested in April, 19^, prohlbiticm 
was not only explicitly maintained but also associations were ordered 
to be dissolved. As a result of prohibitive regulations several 
Indonesian leaders were arrested in April, 19^. Later in December 
19^, and in January 19^3» severe action on a much Inr^e scale was 
taken by the kemp-etai aj^ ainst the suspected underground ectivitiel 
of Ind-^nesians, Capital punishownt was resorted to ns the best 
method of suppressing anything that mlfht possibly be constnwd as 
being anti-Japanese, if the prisoners escaped this fawte in the 
first instance, death still awaited them inside the prison wall, 
many confined till the liberation in 19^5.1 
The Japanese realised, however, that an outlet must be created 
for absorbinp the political tensions and passions, within 2 months 
after all political activity had been prohibited, a people's movement 
was initiated in April 29,19**2. The A, A,A,movement (pergerakan 3 A) 
led by B.Ssmsuddin was intended to tmlte ell political forces into 
one powerful movement, directed towards the eliminetion of pernicious 
western Influences which had corrupted the eastern soul and the 
Indoctrination of the entire population of the archlpel^ f^o with the 
i^ deaa of Asia for the Asiatics and Jopan the mother of Asia. The 
1. Document no.2750, pp.13, ?5-%*, M.A..4zizs op.cit. p.208 
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ultimate object of this movement was to mobilise Indonesian support 
for Japan's war effort end the greater i^ ast Asia Co-propperlty sphere 
with Indonesia as a part. The A.a,A, movement stood for three slogans 
Japan the leader of Asia, Japan the protector of Asia and Japan the 
light of Asia. The Japanese seemed to have launched this campaipn for 
tYm glorification of Japan with the apparent belief that the 
liberated Indonesian people would willingly accept th&lr ell-powerful 
leadership without any real opposition and that they would be able to 
attain their objectives without having to make concessions to 
Indonesian nAtionalism.l 
Mr.Van Mook, former Dutch G.G, in Indnaesia summarised the 
effects of the Japanese occupation in the following words? The 
official and civil servants mostly swallowed their discontent. They 
were more and more Impoverished by inflatlon| they were pushed back 
to lower posts by an increasing number of Japanese officials. Many 
of them were genuinely concerned about the slow ruination of their 
once excellent services; others gave up and retired till better 
days. Qujte number of incompetent upstarts filled their places. 
Those who suffered more were the conmon people. Japanese 
economy was frightful, Japanese communication a force. Tl^ country 
has been sub-divided from the beginning into three almost water-tight 
compartments; two Java and Sumatra under army commanders and a third 
the rest under the navy. But as food and other commodities became 
scarce even the traffic between districts and islands was provibited 
in order to facilitate pillaging by the military. The system of 
finance consisted of a number of piinting presses, tmrnlng out 
crude sovernment notes; Inflation acquired disastrous proportions. 
1, W.rl.j.l3brees op.cit. p.79; K.A.Aziz; op.clti. p.299 
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Trade and export production were dead because Indonesia was cut 
off from the world markets and Japan, her shipping folng the 
blows of allied 3ut»iarlnes, preferred to fetch the products she 
needed from Xndo-China, a thousands mile nearer h(»B6*?he r«Bained 
interested in only in oil, nickel and bouxite. fstates and 
factories rusted end decayed; plantations %fere uprooted to increase 
the food acrage; means of communications that broke down were no 
longer repaired! the import goods were gone or hoarded| clothin? 
became almost unobtainable.Kain tarap, gimny and tikar pandon were 
commonly used in the co\mtry side. This meant un-employment for 
hundreds of thousands; It meant poverty, poverty for all but a few 
henchmen of the Japanese and a number of black marketevrs (saudagar 
kilstl). 
In short, the fasclstic and imperialistic political econcMoic 
and cultural as %iell as social consequences of the Japanese occi^a-
tion during the last 3t years were correctly summarised by Suitan 
?hahrir in his political manifesto in 19^5 as follows* 
When the Netherlands indies government surrendered to the 
Japanese in Bandung in March, 19^, our unarmed population fell preg 
to harshness and cruely of Japanese mllitarlaHB. For 3i years our 
people were bent under a cruely which they had never before 
experienced throughout the last teveral decades of Netherlands colo-
nial rule. Our people were treated as worthless material to fee wasted 
in the process of war. From the law lay stations of these who were 
forced to accept compulsory labour end slavery and whostcrops were 
stolen. To the intellectuals who were forced to prepare lies, th» 
grip of Japanese militarism was universally felt. For this Dutch 
imperialism ts responsible in that it left our 70,000,000 people to 
1. Dr.Van Hooks op.cit. p.1**8 
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the mercies of Japanese militarism vrithout any means of protecting 
themselves since they had never been entrusted with fire-arms, 
or with the education necessary to use them. 
A new realisation was born in our people, a national feeling 
that was sharper than ever before. This feelinpr was also sharpened 
by the Japanese propaganda for Pan Aslanlsm. Later attempts by the 
Japanese to suppress the nationalist movement were to no vail. Our 
national feeling also made Itself felt toward the Japanese in 
illegal ways as well as openly through sabotage and other ways as 
he proved from the fsct that thousands of our movement's adherent 
were sentenced, totured and prosecuted. The revolt of Taslkmalaya, 
Indraraaju, Blitar on Sunatra, West Borneo and many other places 
were best testimony to these facts. 
Others of our nationalists triad to show their nationalism 
through legal ways and had of course to cooperate with the Japanese 
to march and shout with them in their ranks. How strong nationalism 
actually was, is proved by those who were working with the Japanese 
as they continued to support their democrstic ideas, even though 
they were forced to march in the Japanese totalitarian ranks. 
During 3i years of tlw Japanese occupation the whole state 
organisation which had been controlled by the Dutch, was handled by 
the Indonesian?^ under the authority of Japanese. Our nation acquired 
greater confidence and far national awareness grew tov/ards the 
Japanese as towards otlwr nations. 
The millions of people lost during the occupstion, and the 
miseries under which the rest of the population lived must be 
attributed to the inadequate preparation which we were given by the 
Dutch. Because of these facts the Dutch at not the moral tight to 
32^ 
to accust us of having coop«rat«d with Japaness.l 
A COHHOStfaALTH FOR IlfDOtlBSiA 
The Setharlands colonial p;ov«rnment had been evacuated a 
few days before the capitulation of Java to the Japanese forces in 
19^, It was headed by Lt.G.G.Van Kook with its head-quarters in 
Campcobumbia, Barisbane, Australia,. It had to Maintain agencies and 
liaisons in London, United States(Weshlnpton and New York), with 
General Mac Arthus(Holland1,Leyte and Manila), with Admiral 
Kounthatten(New Delhi and Kandy) with the headquarters of the 
Australian army and navy and of the eastern fleet(lelbourae and 
Coloaabo) and in India and South Africa. It had to take care of 
considerable Indonesian assets, distressed cargoes end lend-leases 
affairs. It had to provide civil affairs detacbments and some 
troops for Dutch New Guinea, Horotai, Tarakan and Ballk Papan as 
they were invaded by the al31ed forces; it had to do the advance 
planninr and to make whatever purchase were possible for the so-
called rehabilitation and exploitation of Indonesia.* 
The Netherlands rovernment in exile in London directed the 
Indonesian international relations and planned the political future 
of Indonesia. The plan provided for the formation of a Netherlands 
Commonwealth, eonsistinp of the kingdom of tl» Netherlands Common -
wealth, consisting of the kinirdom of the Netherlands and Indonesia 
as well as the Dutch West Indies, based on obsolute equality, fra-
ternity, mutual cooperation and mutual underatandlnp and goodwill.The 
coi^lete schemejof the future Indonesian Politics was broadcast from 
London by Queen Wilhelftlna on December 5, 19**2 as follows* 
1. Sultan Shahrlr's political manifesto, Jakarta, November 1, 19^5 
2, Van Mooks op.clt. p.180 
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It Is ray intention after tl» liberation to create occasion for a 
joint consultation about the structure of the kingdom, end its 
parts In order tc adopt to the changed circumstances. The conferences 
of the entire kingdom which will be convoked for this purpose, has 
been further outlined in a roverniaant declaration of January 27, 19'«2« 
The preparation of this conference in which prominent representatives 
of the three overseas parts of the kinpdom vd 11 be united with those 
of the Netherlands at a round table, had already begun in Indonesia, 
Surinpme and Curacao, the parts of the king^ dom which they still 
en,1oyed their freedom. Especially in Indonesia, detailed material had 
been collected for this purpose and it was transmitted to m» in 
December 19^, by the G.G. The battle of Indonesia disrupted these 
prcwiising preparations.! 
Althouph it is beyond doubt that a political reconstruction of 
the kinfdom as a whole and of the Netherlands and the overseas 
territories as Its parts is a natural evolution, it would be neithisr 
ri?Kt nor possible to define its precise form at this moment.I rea-
lise that much which is great and food is prowlnf in the Netherlands 
despite the pressure of the occupation; 1 know that this is the case 
In Indonesia where our unity is fortified by common suffering.These 
developing ideas can only be shaped in free consultation in which 
both parts of the kinjfdom will want to take cosnJ^ ence of each others 
opinions. Moreover, the population of the Netherlands and of Indonesia 
has confined through its suffering and its resistance, its right 
to participate in the decision regarding the form of our responsibillt 
as a n»tlon toifwards themselves and one another. 
1 am convinced and history as well as reports from the 
1. ibid. 
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occupation territories confirm me In this, that after the war it 
will be possible to peeonstruct the kingdom on the solid foundation 
of complete partnership, which will mean the consmraistion of ell 
that has been developed in the p?£st. I know that no politicpl unity 
nor nationel cohesion can continue to exist which ere not supported 
by the voluntary acceptance and the faith of the great majority of 
cltlzentry. I know that the Netherlands more than ever feel their 
responsibility for the viforcus frtreth of the overseas territories 
pnd that the Indonesian recofnlse in the ever-increasing collaboration 
the best guarantee for the recovery of their peace and happiness.The 
war years have proved that both people posseSP the will and ability 
for the harmonious and voluntary cooperation.1 
A political unity which tresta in the this foundation moves 
far towards a realisation of the purpose for which the united nations 
ere fiphtlnr as it has been embodied, for instance in the Atlantic 
charter and with which we could Instantly agree becQUS© it contains 
our own conception of freedom and justice for which we have sacrificed 
blood and possession in the course of our history. 1 vl??ualise with 
out anticipating the recommendations of the future conference that 
they will be directed towards a common-wealth in w>-ich the Neth^rlaid s 
Indonesia, '"^ urinarae and Curacao will participate v'ith complete self-
reliance and freedom of conduct for each regarding its interna!]^  
affairs but the readiness to render mutual assistance. 
It is my opinion that such s ccwabination of independence and 
collaboration can pive the kingdom and its parts the Strength to 
carry fully their respohisbility both internally and externally.This 
would leave no room for distrimination according to race or nationa-
lity; only the ability of the individual citizens and the needs of tY» 
1. ibid p.181 
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various groups of th« population will determine the policy of th« 
loveimoient.1 
As soon as the southern part of the Netherlands was liberated 
in September-October, 19Mf, call was issued for voliaiteers to 
serve in the armed forces both against C«raiany end against Japan.it 
reet with an enthusiastic response, Itecruting for civilian assistance 
in Indonesia also brought most satisfactory result. 
In order to restore the Dutch iaperialism and colonialiss 
in Indonesia on August 2V, 19M, the British and the Ihiited States 
governments concluded the civil affairs agreement with the Dutch 
government which run among other things as followss-
1 • In area affected by military operations it is necessary to 
contemplate a first or military phase during which the supreme 
allied cemmander, to the extent necessl^ lse by the military sttuation, 
de facto possess full authority to take all necessary measures. During 
the phase, in order to assist the supreme allied commander in the 
exercise of his authority, the Netherlands povernment will attach to 
his forces sufficient Netherlands Indies civil affairs officers to 
conduct the administration of liberated Indonesian territory under 
the general control of the military coimnander of the allied 
forces in the territory in question. 
The Netherlands indies civil affairs will wJ»never possible 
be employed in all matters concerning the administration of the 
clvilian|populatlon including the control of such subjects for the 
exploitation of the resources of liberated Indonesian territory as 
military necessity may require during first phase. It is understood 
that the Netherlands Indies civil affairs officers will be fully 
competent to take all necessary measures. _ 
1. This text was published by the Natherlands information bureau, 
New York, 19^5? H.R.Isaacs: op.clt. pp.189-192 
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2, It is ppreed that the Hetherl^ndsjindies o^vernnient will 
Tfsvimi 8s rapidly an practical full responsibility for the civil 
administration of liberRted Indonesian territory. I'ha Supreme 
allied commpndtjr will ss soon Bnd as fully as th® military situetlon 
in his jxadretnent permits, notify the Lt.C^ .Ct, of the extent to which 
responsibility for the civil sdmlnistrctlon wotild be resijmed, 
3. Th« Netherlands Indies Fovernment add the Netherlands Indies 
edrr.lnlstrstlvc and .iudlci*»l services will be re-estsMlshed as 
rapidly sa possible. Apprintments in the ^ Netherlands Indies administra 
tlve ?>nd judicial service will be made by the comptent Netherlands 
or NetVi- rlnnds Indies authorities In accordance with Netherlands 
Indies law.1 
COOPERATION AHD !tOW»COOPEyATIOH MOYfiMEMTS 
The Nazi sffgression In Europe and the Japanese f a s c i s t 
invasion of China found nn immediate reac t ion in Indonesia, "^ he whole 
Indonesian n?;tionsl movement bec?>me a n t i - f a s c l t a . The l e f t i s t s 
espec ia l ly w re cle^r in t h - l r p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e . The ©nti-Japsnese 
a 
a t t i t u d e of the 'HrebyB sect ion of the Certndo formed in 1937 in 
Jakarta under the leadership of Amir ' - jsr l fuddin, former prime minister 
of Indonesia end Dr.i^.K.Gani, was very c lear ?>nd a t t r ac t ed guch 
a t t en t ion 
Indonesian newspapers were filled with anti-fascist articles 
every day. Dr.Sukarno and Dr.Hatta's articles w»ttten from their 
place of Internment, strengthened the common ^nti-fasclst feelings, 
£ven as early as 1935, -uksrno warned against the spread of Japanese 
ImperialisTB In the P'^ .cific ond dem-nded th^t the Indonesians should 
be trained and arined to defend thiir country. In 19^, when Holland 
was attacked by Germany, he pledred Indonesian's support for Holland 
in its fifhting against enslavement and repeated his warning against 
a Japanese attack on Indonesia* 
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Before tf the Japanese has been the last warning of Dr,Tutomo to 
his followers. The leftist Gerlndo party neatly labelled the Great 
iiast Asia Co-properifey Tphere a fabrication of and for Japanese 
fascists and in its statement of August,^, 19M it said the greater 
east Asia idea as propagated by the Japanese is exclusively 
desifned to deprive other peoples of their freedom by Japanese 
danination as happened in ^ -anchxilcuo, China and indo-China.l 
Cn l-'arch 8, l9Mf, the Netherlands povernaient in Austrilia 
annoimced to the world inter alia the Japanese whenever they have 
aroused extreme hatred in the hearts of tht- people and the desire 
tc be free from their yoke. This was absolutely true. Xbe Japanese 
on the other hand, tried in their broad-casts to announce that the 
Indonesian people wanted to cooperate with theaa and the Indonesian 
leaders have discussed many problems inside and outside advisory 
council made in Japan. Notwithstanding this recently the Japanese 
considered it essentlRl to dissolve the high central council.2 
Dr. '-nikarno along with other colleagues and leaders chose to 
cooperate with the Japanese only to turn the battle against them 
because he knew very well that the Japanese iaperialism was no better 
than the Dutch. We had hated JapariBss^ said Sukarno, and all totali-
tarian system but 1 admit we are so determined about our independence 
that we were ready tc accent it even from dirty hands.3 
The Times «/«/» correspondent reported bis interview with 
-ukarno said, Indonesians, however were anti-Japa and from the very 
bepinnine nationalist leaders had strived to obtain independents.A 
formal promise of independence hnd only been exacted in September 
last, 19^ 4-, by which time the Japs had resigned themselves to losing 
1. Ubeni and Associates op.cit. p.106 
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parts of th« co-prosperity sphere but equlvocstlen j?nd delay had 
continuBd rlg^ ht to the time of Jpppnese surrender. It vas only 
after surrender thet Independent Indonesian republic could be 
pr^ laimed.l 
In 19^3 Suksrno vent to Tokyo to offer thinks at the Yasukunl 
Shrlna to the spirits of the Japanese who fell In the course of 
Indonesia's liberation. He WRS decorated by Hlrahoto with the 
order of secr^d treasure. He mifht h&v^ made ststements *?^ alnst 
allies under the Japanese pressure ond threat. He then fpced the 
alternative of ostensibly colloborptlnp vith the Japanese and secretly 
orpenlsing underground resistance inoveBjent.2 
The vutch nelonlel power accused Siaknmo as un-prlnclpled 
ppo-Japonaese collaborator. In aerly 19M*-, substantially the saiae 
charge vss nipcle by the Soviet spokesmen, it belnp spplied by them 
to Hjstta as well. In 'eptember, 19^5, ^ r.^ ^^ n Kook declared th«»t the 
republic of Indonesia vas msde in Sr^x^nn, He advised /'^ Irsl Mount-
batten the supreme silled commander for South East Asia, It Is 
obvious that the republican movement Is 9 restricted one and thst 
its pattern Is p. dictatorship nfter the Japanese model. It Is to be 
seriously doubted th-t the pupptt Fovomment bed much of a following 
and it is of particular importrnce that this extremist organisation 
not be recopnised 4n any way directly or Indirectly since it is 
simply R Jf^ psnese creation.3 
It was true thct Suk^^rno, Hatta, Mgnaur and Dewantara and 
other leaders cooperated with the Japanese. Public opinion in Indo-
nesia refs-rded them net as havin? been pro»Japanese but as the 
leaders who cheated the Japanese by political cunnlnr and who brought 
the republic at to life as a result. 
1. Ibid p.lll -^ ^ 
2. V#n Mock* op.cit.p.10^ 
3. D,Wolf J op.cit. p.10 
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Dr.Van Mook finally vithdrew his early hasty ap;ralsal of the 
republican leaders by admittinr at Pangkel Plnanp conference in 
October, 19^3. Our knovlwdee of tha happnein«rs and conditions In tht 
occupied territory of IndoneslsJifEs deficient ^nd incomplete (""urinp 
the war. This was particularly in respect to '^ ava and Sumatra. Misled 
by outward eppeaiances, we originally reporte'^ the republic too aiwh 
as 8 Japsn'sse invention and when in C-ctober --^nd Hoveabtr the movement 
developed with the ppee' of tropical growth into a sort of popular 
revolt compr^reble to the -epterber days of 1792 in the French revo-
lution, it was difficult to ruoge properly the inherent Icstinf 
powf r of this phenomenon. V.'hen we look back into history, it is 
apparent thet the republic forces were nt work which signified more 
pnd were rooted deeper then e more suTfe of terrorism. Regarding 
Sukarno, Van ^^ ook apain stated in 19*+6, froTi documents later discoveret 
it is very cleei thet in r-ll hi?; objectionable activities he (Sukarno) 
was always governed by the objective of en Independent Indonesia, 
-hahiir who was an ??nti-«Tapanese regarded the Japanese as 
pure fascists and felt that we "ust use the mosts subtle counter 
methods to pet round them stich as appearance of collaboration. Both 
•-ukarno ??nd Hatta, h€ continued, sfreed tc do everything lepally 
possible to five the nationalist strucPle a broader le^al scopes and 
at the ssme time secretly supr^ort the ravcluticnary roristance. It 
was expected, he 5)^ ld, that the Jap^-neso would attempt to capitalise 
on Sukarno's popularity for propaganda purposes nnd the three ae;r««d 
••hat the political concessions froas the J.^panese must be pr'.ssed fcr 
In return.1 
With res:ard to Katta, 'IJiahrir state that ttatta never made 
1. -t.Sjshrir: op.elt. p . 2 ^ 
332 
coBfflon caus* with those Indonesians who want to work for the 
Japanese because of either material designs.or political sympathies. 
Hatte accepted his position under the Japanese at the behest of 
Sjahrir's iinderprowid rroup. By then he was given the tasks of seeur-
Inp f\mds and facilitating the travel of its nembers. Accordinf to 
Sjahrlr J» acnuitted himself of those teks capably md faithfully. 
He also received our reports and warned us when heard sofflethlng was 
brewing on the Japanese side. I heard from him everything that took 
place amonp the Japanese and among the collaborating Indonesians.! 
Through two exceptionally skillful aaderground workers at first 
Djohan Sjsruzah and later Dr.Abdul Heiim, Hatta was able throughout 
the Japanese occupation to keep in contact with principal Indonesian 
underground organisations. 
Hatta because of his relationship with the underground, had 
come to be considered to be dangerous by the Japanese authorities in 
Java, it was their plan that for safety's sake he be Interned upon 
prrlvln? in Japan and not alllwwed to return.For there he was assumed 
to be member of the commission of thmiks and along with Sukarno 
and Ki Barus was presented a decoration making him free from arrest 
by the Kempetai and then returned to Java with others in November,19'»3• 
Non-collaborationists carried on the resistance movement 
against the Japanese. The anti-Japanese underground orranisation 
headed by Amir Sjarlfuddln was established in part teder the Nether-
lands &ast Indies atoipieires » few week before the Japanese landed, Ttm 
'overnraent ?^ tippiied 25,000 guilders for this purpose, it was being 
eiven to Sjarlfuddin by Dr.Charles Vander Pies. This enrolled various 
1. Ibid p.2if6 
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p«opl« of strong anti-fascist fettling, th« most •normoxis among 
whoa were the m«mbers of the underground coianiiinlst pertyCthe 
illegal P.K. Dcontact with them beinr established by Sjarifuddin. 
During the first month of the Japanese occupation mnny of its 
members were caught end under torture ^ave the names of others in 
the organisation. Consequently in 19**3» Sjsrifuddin and some 300 
leaders were arrested by the kempetai(Japanese secret police) snd 
on February 29,19^i he and more recently apprehended leaders were 
sentenced to death.oukaano's intervention was responsible for 
coiamuting Sjarifiiddin's sentence to life laprisonment, but h of the 
otber arrested leaders-Faaud^i, Sukajat, Abdul hziz and .Abdurahim-
were executed and 8 other jailed,1 
Sutan •^ 'jahrir also orpanised underground resistance movement. 
He wont to Tjipanas in the mountains of west Java ostensibly to 
cultivate pine-apples but actually planned for future strugple.He 
and his colleagues established branches in Jakareta, Cheribon, 
Semarang, and ^ursboya. All of which secured full support from the 
educated youths and intelligentsia. In the vicinity of Cheribon 
under th*? leadership of Dr.Sudarsono, It established a wide net-work 
of efficiently functioning peasant cooperatives, sanctioned by the 
Japanese and behind this facade gradiaally organised integrated but 
intenmive revolutionary ore4nt«Q peasant base. Consequently, the work 
of Sjahrir's growing of hands of followers roused the cimiocity of 
the Japanese police, many were arrested and imprisoned, i'he long arm 
of the police was probing very close tc > Jahrir when the war abruptly 
ended.2 
1. Ubani and associates op.cit. p.121 and £iine:sons 
Govt. p.n^' natlon??lls^ i in ".li. n.T^ ew ynrk, 19^, p. 197 
2, KahinJ op.cit. pp.112-113 
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Ti» Indonesian communists who had a reprtsentatlve In th« 
Dutch parliament, Ro«t\im Effendl, cleclered that they were prepared to 
defend Indonesia against the Japanese fascism and upon the announce-
ment of Japan's alip^ naarat with the Axis the anti-Japanese demonstl^ a-
tions took place throughout Indonesia. In district Biruen in 19**3 
orthodox and fanatic religious organised e revolt nreinst the Japanese 
forces. Many other uprisings eccoured In -Inpaparns, inlramsyu, 
Biiter, Sumatra and West iiorneo. As a result, Dr.Soesils and 200 
Indonesian intellectuals who refused to collaborete were te-headed by 
the Japs.1 
'«hen they came down to Indonesia in 19^, the Indonesian 
students were deadly against the Japanese fascims end colonialism. 
They orpanlsed the badan perwakilan peladjar(council of the Indonesian 
students). Ihis org-anisation tried to help those students who were 
stranded because of th& break of coimunicatlons with parents end 
supporters. Jobs were found for them in business centres or in 
educational institutions. An esrama or hostel was founded where the 
students were given political training in ordar to make them conscious 
of the national problem that was facing them. 
l^ he pcrsatuan mahasiswa(student union) was made up of the 
university students in l^karta. The Indonesian students used every 
opportunity to fight tl^ Japanese and often resorted to strikes and 
boycotts and spread anti-Japanese revolutionary sentiments among the 
masses. They had maintained close relations with Ukarni and S^ahrlr's 
underground movements. As a result, the Japanese arrested their 
leaders. Then soon strike after strike took place and ruthlessness 
t^eyplXed in %fif secQMgry schogls. The JeH#r|» medi^rt MUtR» W8J» 
1. B.iiBierson: op.cit. p.179 
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responslblt for ell these patriotic actions. The students who joined 
the hc»w guardCtentara prembela tanah air) sponsored by the Japanese 
later organised revolts and mutinies against the Japs in Bliter and 
in other places. 1 
Another small nucleus of underground strength was headed by 
Sukarnl and included among its leaders Adam Malik, Pandu Wiwiguna, 
Chairul Ssleh and Horuto Nitniihardjo. Through Maruto it maintained 
failly contact liaison with Sjahrir's group. There were also 
numerous small groups of young intellectuals and students who formed 
study clubs, such as headed by Mohd- Natsir and Sjafruddin Prawirane-
gara, former premiers of the Bepublic, which operated partly under-
ground and above and were important in dissiminating anti-Japanese 
nationalist idea and in collecting information which they passed on 
to the much larger organisation.2 
Djohan Sjaruzah, while serving as Hatta's secretary in 19*+2-*f3 
maintained contact %?lth all principal underground movements and was 
for|a time their chief means of liaison. He Jia6 particularly close 
relations with the underground of Sjehrir and according to Adam Malik 
was a time co-chairman with f?ukerni of the latter groups. In 19**3 he 
along with his colleagues organised undergrounds among the youth of 
Surabaya and the oil workers of Tjepu. 
Infiltration of the pete and the Japanese sponsored youth 
organisations was the chief objective of the underground orpanisations. 
The objective of this infiltration was two fold* 1. To establish as 
much aontrol as possible within the units of these organisations 
through reliable men holding key positions and 2. Tc influence their 
membership in en anti-Japanese and pro-al^ lied direction, espeiftiilly 
to preapre them to rise against the Japanese whenever the expected 
1. Merdeka, No.27, 19^, New-Delhi, pi6 
2. Adam Malikt Sedjarah dan Perdjuangan berkenan dg.prok Lamasi 
Indonesia merdeMka, Jakarta 19^7t P*^^ 
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activity. However, th« work of these men within the anpkfltan muda 
generally resulted in maklnp its rank and file members more anti-
Japanese fflnc more-pro-allled as well as conscious of their national 
emancipation.1 
The peta revolt In Blitar was followed by an tmprisinff apalnst 
the Japanese at Indramayu in the middle of 19Mf. in June 19^5, the 
demand of the iondeslan students for independence was more stronger 
and the anti-Japanese sentiment wns enormous. The A.P.I, movement 
was so active In orpranislnr revolts afainst the Japanese foree8.2 
Ostensibly the madJells lalam Tlnffl(th« Supreme council of 
Islam) formed in 19^ at Buklt Tlnprl, central Sumatra, under the 
presidentship of Shsh Sulalmen Arrasull, cooperated with the Japanese 
authority but It actually worked to spread the spirit of ho^y war 
apalnst the dls-bellevers(th«j Japanese) and for this end it organised 
Muslim youth orjrsnisstions such as Hizbullsh,lashkar -ak.lfst. H.Karlm 
Amarullah, founder of the islamic modernism in central Sumatra, had 
been adopting a policy of non«cooperatlon with the Dutch nnd Japanese 
authorities. Because of this, he was interned by the Dutch in 1939 
and passed away in 19^3 in Java, Although the PusaCAll Achln Olama 
League) first welcomed end cooperated with the Japanese, but later 
on the sentiment^f anti-Japanese was developed, for the Japanese, 
according to them were violating their religion end customs. As a 
result, many revolts against the Japanese took place in several 
plaees.3. 
In Australia, the Indonesian nationalists who sought shelter 
there alongi.political exiles who escaped from their prions, Joined 
the army, navy and air force of the Dutch government to fight side 
by side against the Japanese fascism and imperialism.^^ 
1 , Kahin: o p . c l t . 112 
2 , Ibldi p.115 
3 , Atjeh 1000 tBhym 
If, D.M.P.Drahaaant op.clt.p,? 
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In New Guinea very many people took up arms and fought against 
the Japanese either openly in the armies of the allied powers or 
members of the remarkable wide-spread and effective resistance 
movement. Becruitlnp; to these raoveaients was encourefed by broad-
casts and by leaflets spread from the air, promising a hipher 
star^ard of living after the defeat of invader. The resistance and 
fuirella groups were so successfull that the whole coast of Inatn 
between Manokawari and Mandaraen was clear of Japanese troops by the 
end of 19Mf 
One of the leaders of the resistance movement in New Guinea 
was Silas Papere, an Irian and a member of the Indonesian parliament 
and leader of the partai kemerdekaan Indonesia Irian. Mr.Papare §8 
well ieadinp resistance proups acted as guide during allied landings 
In Irian and as a centre for collection of informrtion. He fought with 
the Ajaerlcan army for 8 months and then joined the Australians for 
the attack on Morotai in February, 19^5. For his activities during the 
war, Mr.Papare was decorated by the allies.1 
Kin Kalimantan(Borneo) the people revolted against the 
Japanese authorities. When the Japanese troops landed in Pontianak, 
they blazed the slogan Asia for the Asiatics. At that time there 
existed 13 organisations, social, political, and religious.Their 
leaders met in secret and decided to watcb events with a view to 
winning their independence. LOCBI sultan join*d the movement.Within 
a month feBe Japanese ordered the liquidation of P.A.K.l.D.h. and other 
political parties. The leaders met again In secret and decided on 
their programme of action. The plan was to have a legal front which 
was named Nlsskinkai and the former president of Parindra, Not Sudjcmo 
became its president. This too was soon liquidated. Another organiaatic 
called Pemuda Mohammadiah was then formed but the people were tha|SaBft. 
1. West Irian and the %K>rld issued by ministry of foreign affairs, 
Jakarta,!95s P-25 
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M«anvhlle tn southeast Borneo with Bandjaramasin as its centre, a 
similar resistance proup was formed and its leader, Mr.^'usllo, made 
contact with Pontlenak and together they formed a general revolt.But 
the Japanese discovered their plans In southeast Borneo and Dr.Susilo 
and his friends were arrested and executed. In Pontlanak preparations 
were continued; arms and affiraunltlons were procured for the flifting 
prourss called s\d:arelas and plans made for a revolt on uecember 8, 
19^3t ^o befin with sn attack on the head-quarters of the kempetal. 
The plan also included arranferoent for the future adajinlstretlon of 
the Island and a provisional ministry was selected. Tl«ise plans %»ere 
never carried out because the Japanese discovered them. Arrests began 
with 12 sultans who were meeting in Pontianak* A regin of terror 
followed and thousands were carried off in trucks-wagons of hell to 
the marches nearby and executed in butcher. It was not until the 
sumaser of that year the Japapenese paper, Borneo Shlaabun, announced 
the success of the kempetal in destroying the underground movement.In 
the course of several months they had executed most of the leaders and 
20,<X>0 people had been ro\anded from the village and shot.1 
In Mlnado, 7 H»n were executed In 19^3 for plotting against tJM 
government and all wireless sets were confiscated. This was followed 
by an espionage week. On the first day, July 12, 1 9 ^ , the Japanese 
went round In cars to distribute pamlets telling the people how to 
disable spels In their work. The second day, students in Japanese 
employment distributed propaganda in the art of cotaiter-espionage 
sealnst the U.K., U. ?.A, and Holland. Day 3 an occasion for a 70 
minute speech by a Japanese official, the next day songs were provided 
Celebrating the destruction of spies and on the 7th day, music was 
1. Darothy Woodman: op.ci. p.186 
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used to impress th« sceptical pop\ilatlon. Bends played 
spiritual music to Increase the spirit of the people 
to destry the spies of U.I., O.S.A. end Holland.1 
1, Ibid p,ie8 
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C H A P T E R II 
THE REPUBLIC OF IRDONESIA, 19^5-1950 
Just aftar the capitulation of tha Japaness to the allied 
forees in 19**-5| the independence of Indonesia was proclaimed by 
Sukarno-Hatta on August 17, 19^5. The proclamation was supported by 
all youth oriranisatlons, underground moveaents, former civil servants, 
police, f^rmy except the royal A?nbone3e snd the vast mass of the 
population. On August 19, ^ u^karno 8n6 Hstta addressed a mass neeting 
at the central part of Jekarsta, although the meetinr was hampered 
by the Japanese authority. The Japanese also ordered tl^ disbandraent 
of peta, hel ho and all other srmed Indonesian organisations. 
As a restilt, peta units In Java resisted the Japanese orders 
to disarm, kept their arras, clashed with the Japanese and disaroed 
Japanese units tnd took over their weapons and controlled rovernaent 
official buildings, post and telegraph offices, alr-flelds and 
harbours as well as some big cities. The Indonesian flag was flown 
from all public buildings. The independence announcements and patrlo 
tic propaganda of national revolution with different slogans were 
conducted by the youth organisations and leaders throughout Indonesia. 
The cry merdeka(freedom), the words bung and «audara(brother) were 
heard every where, as a symbol of national revolution and fraternal 
content all over the cotaitry. 
At first meeting on Aurust 17, l9*+5, the IMependenee 
preparation committee added 6 people to its membership, Bubardjo, 
Kasuma -Ingodimadjo, Sukarno, Wikana and Chalrul Sal eh. The expanded 
committee elected Sukarno and Hatta respectively president and vice-
president of the republic of Indonesia. It appointed a commission of 
7- Siirkarno, Hatta, Prof,Supo!no,?ub«rdJo, Otto, iskander rinafea 
Mr.Mohd Yamln, and Mr,Wanesonegoro - to make necessary and final 
3»t2 
changes in the national constitution elrepdy written In July 
bttfore the Japanese cepituiation.Within a week of the final draft 
of the Indonesian constitution was completed,1 
The provisional constitution introduced a presidential form 
of jeovemnent headed by StjUcamo, The first cabint of the republic 
(August 31, 19^5- NovcjEber 1^,19^5) consisted of 16 ministers such 
as Kr.Ahmrd SubardjoCmlnister of forel pi affairs), r.A.A.W, KUSUBS 
(home minister), Prof.Supomo (minister of justice), TT.Samsi(finance 
minister), 3JafruddlnCinformation minister)and so on.2 
On August 29, the independence preparatory coiraaittee was 
dissolved by Suicamo and its place was established the Komite 
Nasional Indonesia Pusat or K,?},I.P. (central Indonesian national 
committee), consisting 235 members.This was to serve solely as an 
adviSDcy body to the president and his cabinet, undertaklnp no legis-
lative function. To this new body Sukarno, assisted in his selection 
by Hatta, appointed 135 members including those of the independence 
preparatory committee, under the chairmanship of Sutan Cjahrir. 
By a decree of the preparatory committee on August 19» 
Indonesia had been divided into 8 provinces! West Java, middle 
Java, ii^ st Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan(Borne9),Sulawesi (Celebes),Maluku 
(the Moluccas) and sund a Ketjil(the Lesser :"unda).Sukarno appointed 
a governor for each province from among its populption and the 
K.N,I,P. gave mandates to one of its own members from each of these 
to form provincial K.U.I, (Indonesian national cOBaaittee), to assist 
those <?ovemors in their administration.3 
ijome of these councils (K.N, I,) wer^ i in the district »nd 
towns. These local revolutionary c<wimlttees executed the real 
1, Kehlns op.cit. p.138 
2, Kabinet-kablnet republik Indonesia 
3, Peraturen pemerintah No,8, 19^5 
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adffiinlstretive power In th«lr areas. In accordsnce with the fcjvern-
Buent let of Novenber 23, 19*+5, the Tuiten of Jok;Jakerta on 
October 30, hed established K.N.I, in his own territory. By ^^^6 
many other K.R.I,'s were created on the basis of local elections,1 
By October 18, 19M-5, the K.R.I.P held its first laeetinp and 
decided to set up P working committee as s lepislative body, consis%<-> 
inf of 25 wenbers who would be responsible to the K.N.I.P and would 
participated in mskinp national policy. Every gt??te's regulation 
in the foria of laws and decrees should be submitted to the worklnf? 
for Its f^p-pi^ov^l who had special prodedural regulations of law-aaaking 
authority. i^Tien a bill was passed by it, it was sent to the president 
for his signature, .^ very member of the working committee had rlfsht 
to initiate, interpellate, enquentte and question, freedom of speech el 
According: to article 20 of the procedural repulations the 
and 
warklnp committee had five sections; 1, The forelpn/lnformation sectioi 
controlled the ministry of foreign f3ffpirj?(2) ?he internal section 
controlled the ministry of internal affairs, the ministry of Justice 
the police department and the ministry department. 3. The reconstruc-
tion section controlled the ministry of welfare, the ministry of 
finance, the ministry of communication, the ministry of public works, 
the ministry of labour, the department of food and supply, ih) The 
defence section ccntrollsi the ministry of finance, the youth affairs 
department, i^) The social section controlled ministries of education 
and culture, health, social affairs and religion 2 
-'orae members of the K.N.I.P,, youth organisations snd 
leaders of underfro\jnd movements were dissatisfied with the present 
form of government and demanded a chanee from the presidential to 
parliamentary structure of the Fovernraent. Sukarno agreed with the 
i. Kahinx op.clt. p.1^ *0 
2. Merdeka, No.'•5, issued by information service Indonesia, 
New-Del hi, October 5, I W , p.lO 
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proposal. For this ptarpose, he Issued a presidential decree whereby 
the Khlp was vested with full leflslatlve power jointly with the 
pres43 ent. He also appointed Sutan Sjahrlr to form a parllwtentary 
government, conslstinr of persons from opposition and two aenbersa 
from his cabinet, i.H.K.P, Surachman and Amir Sjarifuddin. At its 
session on November 25, to 27, the Khlp voted confidence in Sjahrir 
and his cabinet by vote of 8^ to B with 15 abstenslons.1 
The cabinet demanded that the working cownlttee should be 
enlarged frcaa l5to 25 members ^ o that the various political organisa-
tions would have representation in the Khlp.The demand was pranted. 
The members of the working cosmilttee consisted of P.N.I,, IO5 
socialist party, 5? Hasjuml, ^  Chrlitllm party, 1; P.P.I.(younf 
wonen party), 1 and non-party k, 2 
Bcfinnln? with the resolution of the P.N.I, confress on 
January 29-31, 19^, several political orpanisptions demanded the 
alteration of the ccMipositlon of the Knlp and the cabinet. The P.P. 
(national fronts)leeders includinf Tan Malaka, asked for the 
dismissal of Sjahrii cabint and its replacement by a national coali-
tion cabinet. Realisinp this, Sjahrir on February 28, 191+6 handed 
his resignation to Hukarno. Sukarno then asked Tan Malaka and the 
P.P. leaders to form a new cabinet. They failed to carry out the 
mission because of their diverse social interests anr^  personal 
ambitions. 
Unable to form a new povernraent by the P.P. leaders, 
Sukarno apain asked Sjahrir to form a new cabinet. The Knlp still 
in session, voted confidence in ffjahrir and asked him to broaden 
his cabinet so that it represented the chief political orj^ anisations 
1. Kabinet-keblnet Republik Indonesia, Kempen, Jakarta, p.16 
2. Kahln: op.dt. p.1/1 
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-^ tion with Sukarno and Hatta, Sjahrir announced the membership 
of his new cabinet. Ten of the 11 ministers of Fjahrir first 
cabinet stayed on in His second cabinet. One,Mr,Kulia, resigned and 
was replaced by Mohd. Sjafei. Two additional miniBterial posts were 
added one, agrlcultiire, went to Mr,AsaatCi'^ I'i.i). rnd the other 
wlth.-out portfolio, went to Wikana of the Pesindo. forae vice-
ministers added to the new cabinet, 3 were non-party, 3 were from 
Hasjumi, 2 from the P.N.i,, 2 from the Christian party and 1 was from 
the socialist party. None of the new cabint members, ministers or 
vice-ministers had been leaders of the P,P.1 
The cabinet programme included 1. conduct of discussion with 
the Netherlands authorities based on recondition of the Indonesian 
republic; 2, preparation for the defence of the republic of 
Indonesia; 3* establishnient of democratic basis for central and 
provincial governments; h, provision for maximum production and 
fair distribution of proods and 5^. finally the running of essential 
estates and industries under povernment supervision.2 
On «July 10, Sukarno proposed for revision of the composition 
of the Knip membership of 200, of which 110 members were to be 
elected by the political parties and only 30 members would be 
directly appointed by the president, Until February 19^7» the 
composition of the Knip remained the same. Out of 200 members there 
were 129 who were members of political parties. Of these ^5 were 
from the F.N.I.; 35 from the Kasjumi, 35 from the socialist party; 
6 from the labour party; h frcan the Christian party; 2 from the 
Catholic party; pnd 2 from the P.K,I, Of the remaining 71 non-party 
memberf, 5 representiA^ the Chinese commiinity, 2 the Arab 
community and 1 the Dutch,3 
r. Ibid p 176 
2 . David Wolf: o p . c i t . p , 1 l5 
3 . 0nd8ng2 no,12 1 9 ^ , Beirta banda Pekerflja I&iip March ^,19**6 
February,19'«6, pp,1»l-1*f 
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By August, 19**6, at its session at Jokjakarta, the Khlp 
decided to call for the revision and strengthening of the governnent 
through the establishment of a coalition government. For this 
purpose, Sukarno with concurrence of the Knlp had deslgnatecl 
S^ahrir as prime minister and cabinet formateur. On October 2, s 
complete list of the third Sjahrir cabinet members was announced, 
consisting of 31 members, representing different political parties 
and comraimitiesi 7 Mss.luml, h socialist party, h P,K,I., 1 labour 
partjr, 1 communist party, 7» non party, 1 Chinese ccaamianlty, 1 
Areb community, .-uraslan conmunity, 2 Christians end Sultan of 
Jok^akarta,1 
The supreme advisory council was established in December 
19^5, in line with the council provided in article 16 of the 
constitution of the republic to sdvi'^ e the president on questions 
of policy, econcfflsy of cultiure and of education submitted by him 
with additional powers to make proposals to the government. 
its members were appointed by the president and might be 
drawn from the ranks of those citizens who were acceptable to and 
representative on the community in general. They might be persons 
of good reputation, well educated and highly experienced. They should 
also be nelrtjer unduly yoi^ n^  nor unduly/old; the oldest B«mber was 
72 and no one woin.d be acceptable under fehe age of ^.2 
Being appointed by the president, membership of the council 
did not change with the fall of a cabinet and was thus able to 
function whatever the political crisis might be. During the national 
revolution, the supreme advisory council had plated Important part 
in assisting the president to act in matters best calculated to 
overcome the problem of the state with which he had been confronted. 
1. Kahln: op.cit. pp.19^195 
2. Merdeka no.72-73, P.1.November 27,19^, Kew Delhi, 22-23 
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Formerly, the supreme advisory coiincll met only when called 
by the president, but it han rec :ntly been deci<1ed that it should 
come together at repular piontJily Intervals, A board of five formerly 
mot constantly to outline day to day tates. Hug to the Tutcb aggreif-
ion, mony of the council mKnibers re turned to their homes and the day 
to day work was executed by the ChBirman andvive-chalrEsan v/bo were 
both permanent residents of JokJakarta city. 
F'urinp the monthly sessions, experts fron vrriouR fevernmental 
dc'^ .srttnents and crranisations attend«<^  io explain technionl matters 
within thai" province. The supreme notisory council msintatned close 
snd constant contact with the various orrnns of the povernnient. 
At present, there were 17 members of the Council. 2ut8rd,1o 
K!?rtohediiiu?umo and Kl Il^ djar I^ ewantara were respectively chaMfmen 
and vice-chairman. lirs.Suwsrnl Prlnp-godl p-do, Dr.i ad jimen, Hgri^ ono, 
Ijo^ Johakusunii, Viuijaninprat, nnd otherr, v/ire members of the coiJncll.l 
BBITI-'H FORCi;^ ' RE?rC2...D DUTCH IKP.^ aUALiCM 
The instructions of Lord 'ountbatten, the allied 3outh east 
Asia coianand, called for the surrender of the Jepnnese armed forces, 
release of al^ 'icn war prlsoneis and civilien internees ?3nd disarma-
ment rnd concentration,df the Japanese in readiness for transport 
bsck to Japan.2. In addition they called for the esteblishment and 
mBlnton?:nce of law and order in indonesic until the Hatherlands 
adaiinistrfttlon in Indonesia was able to function by itself. British 
officers in Java and Sumptre '^•nd Australia officers in rserts of 
Celabes snd the Lesser "unOn were bound by the instructions based 
on promises that were no longer valfcd as to conditions in Indonesia. 
In September 29, -esl Afimirai Patterson, commander of the British 
fifth cruser squadron, proclaimed that the allied troops consisting 
1. i'epubllcan review Issued by Indonesian ministry of Information 
no.2 Jakarta, October, I W p.23 
2, Prof.Cerbrandy: Indonesia, Lond9n, 1950, p.97 
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of 1500 Scotlsh hrd arrived to protect the people Fnci to maintain 
Ir.w sni order until the time that the la-wrfnl "ovornssent of the 
Metht.rlrnds ii.ast J-nriies is once nrrdn ftmotloninf. Netherlands lews 
voulfl be "ppller! end enforced, he snid, by Nr>therl?*nds ad'iilnlstrR-
tive officers In J.-^vr^  subject only to vhntover ccr.m---nds Adniiral 
I'io-iin that ten mlrht Issue, ^he spne day I-t.Generrl ^ir Philip Chrlstlnw 
rllic • commander 1*^  chief for indonesi.5, a^noimced that Japanese 
forces in Java would be used tempornrily t? maintain lav and order.1 
These announcomants were soon folloved '^ y the landinr under the 
British aover, of smll continrents of ~utch troops. Sukarno and 
other ?^opubllcen leaders were reedy to ccopemte with the allied 
forces in the execution of their trj&ks but they vera deadly opposed 
to the Ifindinps of -"^'utch troops to restore Dutch colonialism in 
Indonesia. In October, 19^5, two small cosponies of voluntaer 
combat troops from Holland arrived In In-lnosia and shortly Ifter 
vere followed by the Net--erl.-?nd3 indies civil adrGlnIr;trf5tlon(N, i.C.A.O 
which returned to Indonosis from Australia. 
The British forces occitplec Importr-nt cities of Indonesia such 
as 'lakarte, Bandung, ""ur«b?ya snd Serr.'^r.'^nr in J^ve, P^dan?, Medan 
rnd Pnlembp.n? in Sismatrs, vhsr-:?5 the Austrsllan troops invested in 
the £ast indonesien islands. '2?hey put into concentration cansps 283OOO 
Japanese troops snd liberated over 200,000 clliod prisoners rsll 
over Indonesia.2 
Lt.f^ovcrnor Cenersl, H.Van Mook, vrho in 19'+2-19M+, hepded the 
exiled Netherlands Indies adirslntstrrtl on in AustrMlls, now returned 
to Indonesia after the CQpitulr?tion of the Jspsnese. On November 10, 
19^5i he issued tn offlcifl stetement, ot Jf^ksrts, outlining a brosd 
1. New Mork Times, September 30, 19^5 
2. Nasir Thaib and Parwls: lavolusl Indonesia meletus, Bukit Tlnppi 
19»f5, p.16 
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policy of the so-celled newly reconstructed Dutch colonial 
government In Indonesia. Politically he repeated the policy of 
the Netherlands government in London announced by Queen Wllhelmlna 
in 19^, aiming to establish a Netherlands eoBanonwealth, after the 
liberation of HK^ therland and Indonesia* 
The general purpose of this policy was, therefore, the iiapid 
development of Indonesia as a partner in a kingdom which will be 
set up to guarantee the notional self-respect of all members. To 
that end the central government of this country will have to be 
reconstructed by legal process, in such a way thflt It wllllconsist 
of a democratic representative body, with a substantial majority 
of Indonesian members and a council of minister?; under the G,C, as 
the representative of the crown. This organisation will povern the 
Internal affairs of the country, assisted by subordinate organisa-
tions to take care of the regional and local public interests. The 
suffrage shall be a subject of further consultation but It will have 
to rest on the fotmdatlon of freely shaped public opinion and of an 
adequate representation of all important sections of the body 
politics.1 
Indonesia will be considered a full partner In the kingdom 
which will be organised as a comanon%realth consisting of the particlpi 
ting territories. The manner In which this basic idea will be 
realised is to be proposed at a round table conference and to be 
decided by the constitutional authorities of the kingdom. Problems 
like that of a regional flag, besides the flag of the kingdcm, will 
also have to be declced on the recommendations at the same round tabl 
conference. The admission of Indonesia end non-Dutch citizens to the 
1. Ubani: op.cit. part 11, pp.1*4-5-lM6 
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reneral services of the klngdoia can be systematically Increased 
forthwith. 
Regulations and Institutions based on racial dlscrimlnstion or 
considered as such shall be abrogated or reforoed, The distinction 
between a Netherlands and Indonesian civil shall be abolished; the 
unification of Penal courts and procedure shall be ccrapleted. The 
admission of citizens of non-Netherlands origin to the high posts in 
all public services will be vigorously extended pnd full mutual 
cooperation ensured. It will also be necessary to find a place for 
Indonesians and other non-Netherlands citizens in the staff and the 
Management of business. 
The education system will have to be reformed in such a way thai 
illiteracy is eradicated as rapidly as possible and that it can offer 
to the inhabitants every form of tralnlnp needed by the community, 
in order to broaden its base and exchanfe with the NetVierlands and 
foreign countries will be prcmoted. The development of Indonesian 
civilisation will retain full attention. Tj» organisation of honest 
and full public information can be maintained in this connection. 
The Indonesian language and other important native languages 
will be systematically developed for modern use in order to make them 
fiilly servicotble for the needs of cultural, social and economic 
life. The recosmition of the Indonesian language as the official 
language beside the Dutch will be made complete. The knowledre of the 
Cutch and of the main world langusges will be Increased.1 
The economic policy will have for its objectives the 
rehabilitation and the extension of the general prosperity of the 
population. It %rill be implemented under strong and systematic 
4 • ^ - ~ ~~ 
1, H.ii.IssaqsJ op.cit. p.190 
governmental guidance, by specially designed orgenlsatlons and 
efficient planning. Boom will be made for the development of 
business of every slase for all racial groups and the participation 
of Indonesians, Indo-Chinese and Indo-Arabs xxd in big business 
will be furnished. By all laeans. Including inituitffiallsation, and 
increased production «nd on Approved distributicn of Income will be 
pursued, end the expansion of native capital will be vigorously 
advanced. An efficient cooperation with the Netherlands and with 
other coimtries will strenxhen the bass of this policy without $1 
Influencinp its aim. 
As a result of the dlsorppnisation caused by war and ocaipa-
tion, a social policy extending to all classes will be more necessary 
than ever, The monetary situation shall have to be stren|thened out 
as quickly ?JS possible by provisional measures In order to establish 
it, due account beln^ taken of the economic and financial position 
of Indonesia. 
A stronp armed forces will be built up on a basis of a 
general integration of defence to which all races will contribute 
and in which they will take their part. 
The citizenship of Indonesia will be clearly defined on an 
foundation of racial quality without neglecting the special les'sl 
needs of the several groups. Problems like tlw^ agrarian questi<m 
will have to be solved within that frame-work. 
The reconstriKstion of Indonesia can only be attained by a 
real cooperation between its citizens of different race and between 
the Netherlands and Indonesia, who are far stronger together than 
apart. That reconstruction will have to be quickly taken in hand 
as otherwise the general improvement of lawlessness will grow to 
such an extent that recovery may hardly be possible. The continuous 
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deterioration and destruction must end. Only by followlnfr the 
legal path of reform the process of re-constriictlon can begin* The 
government, therefore, appeal to all the people who have the 
interests of this country to join their forces that end. 
Furthermore, the lawful possessions stolen by the eneay or 
by others must be restored to their rightful owners as far as 
possible. The problem of war damapes will have to be treated 
separately, taking into consideration the individual position of 
the victims and the collective capacity of the country. In solving 
this problem we must be guided primarily by the necessity of 
restoring general prosperity. 
Finally all the alms which hsve been passed over Illegally 
by the enemy or which have been stolen must be restored to the 
allies and the carrying of arms must be restricted to people 
legally entitled or licensed to do so.1 
This political plan of Van Mook was completely opposed by the 
{Republican leaders and people in general. 
The activities of Netherlands, the Nica and Netherlands 
colonial troops under the coBwaand of Lt.General Van Oyen, the top 
Dutch officer, who arrived with the British, made the situation more 
serious and difficult. The Nlca consisting of loyal Ambonese, the 
loyal iiuraslans, the Dutch and other agents created untold mischiefs/ 
They by force hoisted the Dutch flag over Important building, took 
down the Indonesian flag and ill treated men, women, children, 
officials, merchants and bther people and above all shot down public 
whom they considered pntl-Dutch. They arrested thousands of people 
and tortured them mercilessly. They issued false propaganda against 
the republic and its leaders. In short, the street was unsafe, life 
I 
was insecure and property was in danger every vipre said Mphd Hatta.l 
1, H.R.lssaqst Hew Cycle in Asia, N.^ o^rk, 19^7 pp.191-192 
2, Obanit op.cit. p 160 
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They also coapelled Indonesians especially rejas, minor 
chiefs and officials to cooperate with them trnder the protection 
of the so-called allied forces. On December 1, 19^5, a certain 
Australian Major, Heerman, issued the following decree to support 
the Hlca imperialistic activities in East IndonesiaJ 
1. Nica la a part of the allied military irovernment in South 
Sulawesi snd Is under ccimaand of the Brlpadier general; 
2. Officials of Nica therefore, act with the authority of 
the commander Maccasiar force; 
3. Any refusal to cooperate with the Sflca is defiance of 
the authority of the coTumander Macassar forces; 
h. Australian ariiy orders the populaticm of south Sulawesi 
to cooperate with the nica; 
5h. The Australian army will use forces if necessary that 
all the orders of the Nica will be|dbeyed strictly and immediately.l 
Because of continuoxis troubles and disorders created by the 
Eritlsh rnd Dutch troops or Nica, the Republic of Indonesia was 
shifted to Jokjkarta in November to carry on nntlonal revolution. 
The republican army, people's armies (laskar rakjat), b»enteng 
(bufallow societies), hlabulla and aabllullah armies, student corps 
and other pemudas(youth) organisations, orpanised bloody patriotic 
revolution a?alnst the ''>itch imperialists where they were. The first 
war broke out in Surabaya where in November ^, Brifiadier, Malaby, 
the British commander was killed and 2000 civilians were affected 
badly. The British troops used all kinds of n^dern weapons to crush 
the Indonesian forces xmdcr the command of f'.r.SutomoCBunp Tomo), 
former minister for youth, but the latter reisted them.2 
1. Notes about Sulawesi, issued by P.P.I., Bombay, February B, 1 9 ^ 
p. 10 
2, Charles Wolf: op.cit. p.23 
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Similar fighting took place In Bandung, Padang, Medan, 
•Makaaar and other British occupied areas. Consequently, thousands 
over thousands of civilians siiffered tremendously because of 
burninp their houses, looting their properties and kidnapping 
their youngsters, etc. by British and Dutch forces who extended 
their colonialism under the protection of the allied forces. In 
19'*6, Captsin Weaterllng, the Dutch officer, and leader of the 
rebjlllon against the republic, killed 30»000 Indonesians in 
Kacassnr. More extensive battle was going on especially when the 
Dutch fflilitary forces under the new coBamander, General S.H.Spoor, 
were re-enforced by the fresh troops from iiurope in March,19^.1 
On February 10,19^, a negotiation took place in Jakartt 
between the British represented by a top most diplomat. Sip Archibald 
Clek Keer, and the Cutch represented by the G.G, Van Mook on the 
one hand and the republic of Indonesia headed by the prime minister 
•^ utan Sjahrlr with whom the Dutch agreei to negotiate. As a result 
the military sitiiatlon was stablished and as more and more Dutch 
troops arrived from Europe the British made paians for wlthdra^l 
while General Hansergh, the new British commander in chief, increas-
ing civil authority was delegated to the Nice, now re-named the 
Allied military admlnistration civil affairs branch(A,M,A,G,A,B), 
This was done according to the civil administration agreement of 
August 28, 19'f5, concluded by the British and the I>utch governmeit s.2 
On Novembe 30, 19'*6, tl» last British troops left Jakarta 
A.F.N.ii.I, was officially disbanded and military as well as plenary 
civil control reverted to the l^ utch hands. Fresh 92,000 British 
I>utch troops, well equipped by the British arrived in Indonesia to 
1. Ibid 
2. Van Mook: op.cit. p.200 M.M.Gebrandys op.cit. p.97 
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replace the depprtea British snd the British tumea over all 
their weapons end Japrneae acimunitions end other surplus war 
stock to the Dutch,replncem-^nts. She British had retxirneci over 
280,000 Japanese to their cotmtry and released over 200,000 war 
prisoners and internaes and succeeded in restoring Dutch iiaperlalism 
in Indonesia, Thin WPS the idea of Mr.Churchil, former prime minister 
snd >ir.Noel Bakar, K.P. of Britain in October 17, ^9^5' Mr.Eevan and 
Mr.Attlee were opposed the idea and supported Indonesian cause for 
national liberation.1 
When Dr.Beel formed a new coalition government in Holland in 
xMay 1, 19^, a Dutch delegation consisting of V members, Schessberbom 
(chattman), ^ an Mook, Mr,Van Poll and De Boer, was sent to Indonesia 
to negotiate with the republican leaders. Consequently a Llnpgadjatl 
Afreement was concluded on Harch 25, 19^7. T'he 8!?reeiaent consisted 
of 17 paragraphs. Paraprpah 1 acknov;ledped the republic exercised the 
defecto authority over Java, Madura and -umatra. It Included a niaiber 
of ^olnt oblifstlons and promises in relation to cooperate iia the 
estsbllshisent of a sovereli^ democratic state on a federal basis, 
and recopnition of the right of self-deferralnation. The new state 
would be called the united states of Indonesia. There would be a 
union to consist of the Netherlands and the West Indies territories 
on the one hand and the tmlted states of Indonesia on the other. The 
republic would be a constitutent part of the latter and the whole, 
having their own or pans of government, would be united lender the 
crown of the Netherlands. There was also a provision that military 
establishment on both sides wou^d be reduced so that tYss way to 
pacification seemed clear.2 
rtany Indonesians particularly supporters of the MasjtOBl, 
P.^.I. and Tan Malaka and others had been critical of a number of 
1. Charles Wolf, op.clt. pp.2»f-25 
2, Gerbrandy* op.cit. p.1 
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points in the Linppe<!Jatl sfrcament, especially articles VI, Yil 
end XIV, providinp for & Netherlends-Indonesla Union \mder the 
Queen cf the Netherlands and the restorr;tlon to all non-Indonesians 
of their previous rights end goods. They were also doubtful of 
Van **ook sincer«lty to execute the agreement honestly. They w re 
too joined by ermy orfimisations such as the K.K.I,'-. (the Celebes 
prised orfanisatlon in Java) and the bentlng republic (republican 
fortress). Whereas the ssjsp kirideft kin?) a coilition of the 
socialist psrty. Fesindoilsbour party and the P.K.I, were also in 
opposition to the afreeaGnt. Supporting it were several small 
political proups, Including Christian and CathJKJlic parties.1 
In Holland, Prof.Aalberse, former leader of the fiatholic 
part^and a member of the council of state oproRcd thejbpreeaaent and 
declared openly those Netherlands v±%k who had initiated the 8frre«fflent 
were pullty of punishable violntion cf the constitution. >/hen some 
menibers of the cabinet, said Ourbrandy, prime minister, recognised the 
true character of the aocuraent th^ had to consider they were deeply 
disappointed. Other political leaders who studied tha document were 
shocked. The Ketherlsnds people were reduced to a state of complete 
pirplexity. Becuae, hfe contin^d, that the independence of Indonesia 
was to reduce the great empire of the Netherlands to a mere small 
state in Surope and rreat losses to the eoonomic interests of our 
country and its peopl<; in partlcxilar and to the whole Europe in 
iPeneral. Pr-of.fome, chalrraan of the Catholic people's party 
described the spreement as Ltnggad.latl in 'Sunday cloth,2 
In order to obtain sufficient support in the i^ip for the 
ratification of the LifcnrpadJotl agreement» Sukarno's presidential 
decree of December 2^, 19^, called for increasing Knip membership 
TTTbid p.'i'^ a 
2. ibid. 
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from 200 to l^**. Of the new members, 93 were to represent political 
parties, MD were to represent the peasantjrr? kO laboiir, 78 t!^  
regions of Java and Madxira(Simatra 50, Borneo B, Celebes 10, Maiueas 
5 and Lesser Siindas 5^ and 5 ethnic minorities; the remaining 121 
members were to be appointed on the basis of general social promi-
nence or as representatives of minor parties and lrreg\ilar armed 
organisations. 1 
Between Febrtiary 25, and March 5, 19^ 71^  at Malang, the Knlp held 
its first sessl(m to discuss the president decree and finally approire^  
It after the working committee withdrew Its disapproval to the 
decree at Its meeting on January 6 and 17, 19H^ 7» On March 2, 19if7 
Sukarno's new appointees were sworn In a? members of greatly 
expanded Knlp* Ti% old working committee was dismissed and March 3 
elections for a new one were begun by the new Knlp. The ccaposltlcm 
of the new working ccamlttee consisted of h? representatives; 5 
socialist party; 5 Masjiaal; 5 P.N.I,, *f P.K.I.; 2 partal rakjat 3 
3 labour party; 2 barlsan tanl Indonesia; 1 serlkat tanl Islam 
Indonesia; 1 peslndo; 1 Christian party; 1 P.P.I. 3 and 2 labour 
and peasant; 5 frc» Simatra; 1 Celebes, 1 Moluccas, 1 l>esser Sunda, 
1 Chinese conmiunlty, 1 Arab community, 1 Butch coaamunlty and 1 noo 
party. The working committee van under the chairmanship of Mr,Asset 
socialist party. Thus the Srilp held session ofi March 5,19^7, at 
Halang snd voted confidence In Sjahrlr's cabinet and then ratified 
the Llnggadjatl agreement which was formally signed by Sjahrlr and 
the Dutch delegate on March 29. 
The different interpretation charges aw3 counter charges of 
violation of the agreement by both tl^ parties rapidly Increase. T)» 
Butch were prepared to go to war to crush the republic. H|gallslnf this 
Sjahrlr, after a series of counter proposals to the Dutch, accepted 
on June 8 the principle of interim government and on J^ oie 20 agreed 
to the de Jure special position of the Dutch crowi*s re- • 
1. Presidential decree of December 2h, 19^; Kahfips op.dt. p.120 
2. Kehin* op.clt. pp.20»f-205 
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presentative in such povernnent and to what amount the Netherlands 
control of indonesia's foreign relations durlnp' the period of 
Interim povernaient. As s result of •'^ ahrlr big ooncesslona to the 
l>utch, ell of the ma^or politicsl partier; except the Kasjuial bepan 
to abandon support of S.lahrlr, They voted non-confidence in 
Sjahriri's cabinet. On June 27, "jahrlr handed his resiprnntion to 
Sukprno. Sukarno tiGclarad e state of eaerpency and asked the 
membars of \1ahrlr Ssbinet to reiaain in office until a new cabinet 
WRS formed,1 
On Jiine 30, -ukarno called upon the leaders of the k largest 
parties, the Kas,iumi, F.N.I, socialist party and labour to form 
a coalition cnblnet. ^'.n July 3» ^.larlfuddin was able tc form a coa-^  
lltion Foveriment, The initipl aembership of Cjarlfuddin cabinet 
consisted of 3^+ ministers; 6 soci^ l^ist pj^ rty, 7 P.N.i.; 6 F,S.S.I 
5 non partyf 1 P.K.I, ; k labour party? 1 Catholic party; 1 
Christian party; 1 yonth congress; 1 peasant leplon; 1 Chinese 
eof!HBunity,2 
Now the i^ utch demanded more nnd laore concessions from the 
Sjfirlfudiln cebinf;, thr^ t is acceptance of the de.lure authority 
of the Nethe:lands crown representative in the interim povemment, 
cr'ntrol of Indonesian foreii^ n relations, joint mannlnF of en 
Indonesian ferdarniery operating inside the republic recognition of 
rights of foreigners to estates, etc, 
Following the si?n(?ture of the Kcnville at^ reement on 
January 17, 19^, both the Xasjural and the P.N.I, would no longer 
support Amir Sjarlfuddin cabinet. Amir Sjarifuddln who was now 
supported by the sajap klri, on January 23, resigned as prime ministe; 
TT"ibid^p.20B 
2. Ibid p.232 
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irffisedlately following his resignation, president Sukarno 
appointed Dr.f<rhd.Iiattfi, •vice-president, tc fora R^ jraln n 
president!B1 cnblnt. On Jsnuary 29, 19^8, the national ceblnit was 
formed crnslstinf of foiar Mnsjuail, h P.N.I,, h nonpBrty, 1 Catholic 
party, 1 Christian psity, 1 sccialist narty Rnd 1 tej^ cher's union 
(P.C.I'.I.).I 
The proprarsse of Ratta o^binet Included; 1. implementstlon of 
the Benvlllc-rpreement end political pi'inciples pnd continuation 
of nerctirtions with the Cutch throurh the security council coicnittce 
of rcwl offices; 2. Accelerntion of the fonsntlon of 8 sovereign, 
democretic united stetes of Indonesia; (3) i^stiom^lisation of the 
p 
reublic's army rnd economy; (^ ) and reconstruction of dame^e cuused 
by the ver pnd the Jappnese occupation.2 
Immediately Hstta's cabinet be'^ an to carry out Henville 
agroement. By February 26, 19iW all repular rspublicBn aray units 
(T.N.I) 35,0(X) in nianber- hsd withdrawn froc their pockets end 
crossed over the Vfn Mook line into the republican held teriitory» 
There rerr:fiined only M3,000 Irrerul-^ r troops, mostly HlEbullsh, who 
refused to be evocuf^tad. But the i^ utch rjollcy quick}:y viols ted th« 
apreement, by establishinp several puppet states and by creating 
more troubles In the coTi!itry,3 
Fcllowlnf the breakdown in nef'otlstlon between the 
Netherlands snd the republic under the auspices of Kr.Merle 
Oochran, nei*' American representetive of the conraittee of pood 
offices, on 'epteinber, 19^, the Netherlands foreifn minister 
Dr.r.U.Stikker, srrlved in Indonesia on November 1, 19^, to talk 
Jlrectly -.'Ith the republican leaders. This direct talks soon broke 
dowi ever the vital nuestion of the powers of the Netherlands 
>lrh ropresentatlve of the crown during the interio period. On 
V. Ibid p.232 ' ^ 
2. Kabint 2 Kepublic Indonesia; op.cit. p.^3 3» Kahin* op.cit. p.23^ 
J^ecember 11, 19^+^, the Netherlands authorities informed the 
comaittee of '^ ood offlcesCC.C.o,) ebout the fruitless nerotiations 
pnd ststed '•o fo Phoa'-i with their plan of scitinp up en interim 
federal eovernment l+bout th'2 i epublic.l But Hstta asked Mr» 
Cochran to assist in resiimin? nepoticti^.ns, sendlnp him s note for 
transmltal to the Dutch delegation. Four days after receiving Hatta's 
note, *^ he *' therlends delepfition rejected it. On i^cember 12, the 
commltte ; informed the sccirlt'"' council of the military situstion 
in Indonesia. 2, On i'cceiaber IB, Cochrsn received a Ketherlands 
letter stotinp that the Netherlands was terminatinR the i^ enville true* 
arreeaent. The secretary penarsl of the republican delepetion in 
Jakarta received similar note but he was not allowed to communicate 
it to his 'Overnraent.S 
On iJQceTjber 19, ?3resident S-ujcaino was due to le?ive for 
Indl'5 tn response to the prime minister's invitation, Mr.Nehru. 
Cn Decoirber 1^, at 5 i^»^'»» the ^^ utch bHrbi^riously and hosvily 
attacked the republicfin crnltal, JokJakarta and employed all modern 
weapons rnd launched Q H their forces. The republican forces defended 
it hTriV:-ly snsi after blood fiFhtinp they had to retreat outside the 
city nnd Rtipublican lead'-rs like Sukarno, Katta, 3jahrir, A.Salinj 
rnd oth-jTS were cspttcred b' the Dutch. On December 22, the republic 
cr:n losdors were flown^to the island of B^ngka and Perspat in 
Sumatra, i^ urinp the next week, the Outch armoured colunins with 
of 
heavy ^ir suport had reached "nd sized control im/)£tm principal 
reraaininp republican hold cities in both Java and Sumatra.^. 
Althouph the republican capital was ceptured, yet the 
Indonesian forces carried on an intensive puarilla warfare ag'einst 
1 . a ,K .^ - . / l l i 7 , p.^ 
2 . Ib id 
3 . U.N.-".Council repor t on December 26, 1 9 ^ , from the C.G.&, 
on Indonesian question S/1156, pp. 5 snd 
h, K.ahinfc o p . c i t . pp.337-338 
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the Dutch throughout the country. The security council was so 
active and the Indonesian representatives and people sbroed %iere 
stru?pling so hard for the solution of the Indonesian problem as 
soon as possible. An enerpency fjovernnent was established st 
Bukit Tinirfi, central Sumatra, under the premiership of Bjafruddin 
prawiranegara, the former finance minister of the republic. Before 
his departure for Jsva, I^ r.Hatta gave Sj©rifuddin a mandate to 
form such government in case the capital of republic was captured. 
His cabinet members consisted of 11 ministers such as M8raiBis( 
(foreign minister), Dr.Lukmsn HakimCfinance minister), Dr.Sukiman 
ihcme minister) etcl 
On December 23, It instructed the Indonesian delepation to 
the United Nations headed by L.N.Palar and informed it that the 
republican government was prepered to order cease fire and enter into 
negotiation with the Dutch government on the basis ofs 1. the 
immediate release of the republican leaders; (2) formation of an 
ell Indonesian government by the Indonesian national itself and 
without i>utch interference; 3» the withdr©^ of the whole Dutch 
army frcaa Indonesia immediately after the formation of an All 
Indonesian government} M the de facto ^nS de jure recognition 
of the republic sovereignty over the islands of Java, Sumatra and 
Madura; 5. tlw *ithdr8>|l 6f Dutch troops to their original positions 
of December 18, 19^.2. 
The prime minister of India, Mr,Nehru, convoked en Asian 
conference on Indonesia on January 20-23, 19**9, at New Delhi, The 
conference wss attended by representatives of Afpanistan, Australia 
1, Kabinet B.I i o p , c i t , p.2$ 
2, Merdeka No,60 Ijtsued by I . S . i . , New-Delhi,April, 1 0 , 1 9 ^ p.16 
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B\2rma, Ceylon, ii^ gypt, Kthopla, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan 
Philllppines, Saoj^ i Arabia, Syria, Indonesia and Yemen, The 
conference bed passed the following reconmendations for the seciirity 
0 
coiancil's attention: 1. The return of the republican r^wemment to 
Jokja; 2, the formini? of an Interim government which would have 
a 
freedom of foreipn policy; 3» The wlthdraviil of all IHitch troops from 
the whole of Indonesia? *•. and the transfer by January 1, 1950, of 
soverelpnty to the United States of Indonesia. Prior to the conference 
Pakistan, India, Burma, Ceylon, Saudi Arabia, i^ pypt and other Arab 
states had withdrawn all their facilities both men and air from 
the ftetherlands.l 
On January 28, 19^, the security council finally passed a 
resolution submitted jointly by the U.S., China, Cuba and Norway a 
week previously. The resolution called upon the government of thd 
Netherlands to insure the immediate discontinuation of all military 
operation end upon the government cf the republic Simulataneously 
to order its armed forces to cease puarllla warfare? called upon 
the Netherlands to release immedlftely and unconditionally all 
political prisoners arrested by them since December 17, 19*t8, in the 
republic of Indonesia; and to facilitate the immediate return of 
officials of the povemment of the Indonesian republic to Jok^akarta; 
recommended that the Netherlands fehd the republic aptain undertake 
neffotistions ±m on the basis of Linpfadjati and Renville aprreements 
and proposals submitted by Cochran on September 10, 19^, In addition 
the council reconstituted its committee of pood offices as the 
United Nations Commissions for Indonesia, endowing it with more 
powers. Its membership consisted of U,S,^, Australia and Belgium.2 
The i^ utch were relucfcint to execute the security council 
1. John Coasti hescruit to revolution, Londolm, 1952, p.235 
2. U.N.S.C.S. I23»f p.2 
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resolutions. Due to strong internetional pressures, the Dutch 
a«!:reed to re-open talks with the republican leaders. So on April 
IH^ , negotiations were resumed between the Netherlands delegation 
led by M.J.H.Van Royen and the republic headed by Mr.Hohd Rum at 
Jakarta under the auspices of IdM Waited Nations QoBBBlssion for 
Indonesia. On May h, 19^9, the agreement was finally signed by the 
two delegations at the Hotel Des Indies in Jakarta. By it the 
republican government vlth Sukarno and Hatta was to return forthwith 
to Jokja, hostilities were to end as quick as possible and tlw 
republic agreed to attend the round table conference. In the Hague 
to discuss a full end unconditional transfer of sovereignty from 
Holland to Indonesia.1 
Soon after Hohd Natsir resigned from his post as adviser to 
the negotiating delegation whereas Sjahrir was still in doubt of 
the Dutch authority but he did not oppose the round table conference. 
On the Dutch side there were two major oppwients to the 
agreement. Bell, the i>utch high representative of the crown in 
Jakarta, resigned within 2^ - hours and was replaced by Mr.Lovlnk and 
Beel*s C'-'nfldent, General Spoor, was also naturally in opposition 
as he considered it a terrlbiie surrender and a betrayal of his 
policy in May 25, 19^9. 
Two days after the Sultan of Jokjakarta was officially 
appointed tYm security coordinator of the republican government. 
On June 25, Hatta fl^ew to Kotaradja, Achen, in attempt to confer 
with Sjafruddln and his government. He failed to meet him there. 
On July h Natsir actually i«et him In Bukit Tinggl and brought him 
back to Jogja. Sjafruddin ftdly supported the Bum-Royen agreement. 
1. John Coasti op.clt, p.25l; U.N.3,/1162, p.9 
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On June 18, the Sultan Issued a cease fire to all republican 
troops in the residency of Jogje. On June 30, all Dut6h troops 
withdrew from Jogja residency and republican ar»y took over. On July 
6, Sukerno and Hatta as well as other leaders returned to Jogjakarta 
trlu^lphantly. On July 1^, Sjafruddln handed back the mandate that 
Sukarno and Hatta then given him as head of the emergency govem-
helt Its 
ment In Sumatra. On July 13, the republican cabinfct/flrst meeting 
since the launchinj? of the I>utch attack 7 months ago. The working 
committee of the republican parliament was soon reconvened and then 
supported the Rum-Boyen agreement.1 
From July 19 to 22 In Jogjakartia and from July 30 to 
August 2 In Jakarta were held the Inter-lndoneslan conferences 
between the delegations representing the Indonesian republic 
and the B,F,0, (representatives of the puppet litates sponsored by 
the Dutch). As a result, the delecrates agreed among others, to 
establish a federal fovernment with bicameral legislature, whose 
official language is Indonesian, national anthem, Indonesia raya, 
and flag 6h* red and white; to build strong national economic develop 
ments, cultural and educational progresses and to re-ori??>nlse 
national armed forces. The all Indonesian youth conference of August 
1lf-.l8, 19^9, at Jogjakarta, attended by 28 youth organisations 
all wtet Indonesia passed a resolution calling for the wlthdra\^ 
of all Dutch troops from Indonesia, release of all youth detained 
by the i>utch, determining the future national state of Indonesia 
on the basis of the principle of Pancha filla.2 
On August 1, 19^9, a cease fire was finally agreed between 
the Netlwrlands and the republic to be issued simultaneously by 
both parties on August three and going into effect on August 11 in 
T. Merdeka no.60, 10 April, 19**8 and no,66 10 July, 191*9 pp.2-3 
2. Republican review. Jakarta, July 9, 19'*-9, p.27; Merdeka, no.37 
July 5, 19»^, pp,8-9 
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Java and August 15 in Sumatra. Thereupon the republican end 
B.F.O, led respectively by Mr,Van Mearseveen overseas territories 
miniater, Hohd.Hattai P.H., and ^ultan Hamid, president of the 
East Indonesian state, met together wnd with Important assistance 
from the U.N.CMialssion for Indonesia. The round table conference 
was opened by the Cutch prime minister, Dr.Wlllen Deprees. Finally 
the conference hammered out an agreement. This provided for the 
establishment of a federal state (republic Indonesia serikatJ", 
consisting of 16 states, Dutch-Indonesia union, union court of 
arbitration and cooperation in economic and cultural fields and 
others.1 
BEPqBLIC IHDOHfiSXA SERIKAT 
The Hague agreement provided for the establishment of an 
independent, sovereign and legal democratic federal state knowi 
as the united states of IndoneslaCB.I.S,). This federal government 
consisted of the following 16 states and autonomous territories -
1. The state of the republic of Indonesia, 2, the state of feast Indo 
nesia, 3* the state of iiast Pasundan, *+. the state of east Java, 
5. the state of Madura, 6. the state of east Sumatra, (?) the state 
of south Sumatra, 8. Middle Java State, (9) Bangka state, (10) 
Belltung state, (11) iiaw state, (12) west Borneo (special 
territory), (13) Greater r.'ayak i\k) Band jar territory, (15) ^ outh 
east Borneo and (16) iiast Borneo state.2 
The republik Indonesia serikat woiild have the following 
structure: 1. president, 2. ministers, 3» senate, h, hoiMte of 
representatives, 5. supreme court and 6 RUditlng coiaicil. 
1 Merdeka No.72-73 November 2^, 19'*9, pp. 1-15 
2! Ibid T>r).28-31 
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Ti» president alc»np with the ministers would canstltuti govt.He 
would be elected by Parliament, He ni^ht be an Indonesisn of the age 
of not below 30 years and his residence vrould be in t!« seat of the 
povt. On l>ec. 16, 19^ a joint aeetinp of the house of representatives 
and senate unanioously elected S^ftrno as the president of tlra U.S,I. 
Instead of 3, he appointed *f cabinet formaturs (2 republicans-Kohd 
Batta and the Bultan of Jogja and 2 federalists- Anak ftgiamj Gde 
AunJ from ^ast Indonesia Ind Sultan Banid fron West Borneo). On the 
recoimiendation of four the president would ollot portfolio to each 
minister, A minister or ministers without portfolio would also be 
appointed. £ach minister would not be below 25 years of age. The cabinet 
was headed by Dr.MoM Hatta, consisting of 11 republicans(^ tfasjumi 
2 P.N.I,, 2 Christian party and k non-party, and 5 federalists. Among 
of 
the important minister the Batta cabinet until September 6, 1950, were 
Anak Agunj (foreign minister) Hamaglu Bu%R>no (home minister) 
Sjaarlfiiddin (defence minister) and so on.1 
The cabint was sworn in at Jakarta on the morning of December 
20, 19^9, by president Sukarno, On the same day the cabinet announced 
the 7 point peogragme of the govt.of O.S.i, as follows: 1, To effectuate 
carefully the transfer of sovereignty and power throughout Indonesia 
to the Indonesian nation} to effect tl» re-orgai^isati<m of the Dutch 
East Indies Aray(K.N.I.L,) and to evacuate the Dutch ars^sr from the 
whole of Indonesia to their hc»Be land as soon as possible. 2. to pre-
serve public peace and order in order to secure the democratic rights 
and freed«ai of t>» people, and to guarantee the iiqplementation of the 
fundamental human rights and freedom. 3» To make preparations for 
enforemlng basic legal regulations providing for the people the ways am 
1. Ibid pp.*t-5; Kabinet 2x op.elt. pp.8-9 
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means to express their will in eccordence vith the provifi4ftnal 
constitution of the U.S.I, and to make arrangement for holding 
a penersl eelecticn for the constituent assembly BS provided in 
the provisional ccnstituticn» (^ ) To aajelioriste the conditions of 
economy, finance, coiEBiuniceticn, housing and health of the 
people, to moke arrangements for social security end to reinstate 
the power in society^ to frame regulations providinr mlnimuni wages 
md to <Tive effect to roverTsment's supervision on the the economic 
activities of the whole people, 5« To msks the universities 
perfect in accordance with the needs of the Indonesian society 
to set up a national cultural centre an* to intsnify enti-llllteracy 
catapagin escnfr the people. 6, To settle the question of New Guinea 
within a year in n peaceful way.7« To evolve a foreign policy that 
would strength the position of the U.S.A.I by promoting the idea 
of world peace and brotherhood among the nations; to strengthen 
moral, political and economic relations among the nations in 
-outh Sast Asia J to work on a deflnte policy in the Netherlands 
Indonesian Union, thRt would make the union advantagous to the 
U.3.1, and to try to make f--.?.l. a member of the U.N©0.1 
The president was the head of the state and supreme commander 
of the armed forces. He deelei'ed war, made peace and concluded 
treaties with other countries. He appointed and received diplCMnetlc 
representatives and consuls. He had the power to grant pardons, 
amenities, abolitions and rehabilitations. He had also the right 
to grant titles,to avard decorations of merit and other insignia 
of honour. He appointed aid dismissed the members of the high 
advisory council and of the supreme court. He held office for five 
2 
years snd was eligible for re-election on the expiration of that term. 
— « a S ^ - • II- .1 I. I. I I . • i  . i. ..~. I ...I. Ill - • - , 1 1 . . I 
1. Merdeka, No,72-73t November 29, 19*f9, N.Delhi, p.6 
2. Arts, 10, 11,1^,15, and 7 of the provisional constitution. 
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The office of president| vice-president and ministers were 
Incompatable with the exercise of Rny other public office inside 
or outside the republic of Indnesip, The president, vide-preBident 
©nd the ministers «?hould netthor directly nor indirectly pertlclpste 
in or stand surJty for any enterprises based upon '^n apreement for 
profit or ffaln, concluded vith the -.1. or any autonomous eress 
of Indonesia. They should not hold eny claims on the B.I, except 
public debentxires.l 
ihe senate would represent meiaber states of the B.I.S, Each 
member stete would have two representatives in the senate, ^ -very 
aetnbcr of the senate would hove one vote, Hembers of the senate 
would be appointed by rselDber states from a list submitted by their 
respective People's assemblies which consisted of three Cfindiiates 
for each set, Kvery member stste would frame the necessnry repulrttfcons 
to appoint the T!»mbers of the senate. Those who were to be merubers 
of the senate mieht be citizens of the nw.e of 3^ years. 
The house of representatives would represent the whole 
of Indonesia snc would have 150 members, 50 from the republic 
of Indonesia end 100 from the 15 Dutch created states according to 
their respective populations. The Chinese, iiurasisn '^nd Arab 
minorities would hpve 9, 6 and 3 rffli«bers respectively in the 
house of represent«3tivQS,2. 
Members of the house of representatives mipht be from 
cltissens who were not below the ^'iwe of 25 years and could not be 
f 
BBember of the senate . The menibershlp of the house of representa t tves 
could not be carr ied out •'lonpf with the membership of the senate , 
and a lso «lonr with federal posts of p res iden tsh ip , mini^Jtership, 
T";Tbid"l?F.*l^~" 
2 . Merdeka No,72«73- o p . c l t . p .5 
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chief of Justice(d.laksa arunp) chairman, vice-chairman or inembers 
of the auAitlng council and alonrr with the post of will naeara 
(head of member states, minl'^ ter or head of a department of 
member states). Sach of the 16 states was free to decide on the 
manner of selecting its prrepreaentatives, whether by election or 
appointment. The house of representatives had the rlpht to Introduce 
leflllatlon and the concurrence of at least half of its quorum 
(50 >) was required to pass any legislation. 
There was a supreme court of justice and Its powers were 
rep-ulatecl by federal law. The chairman, vice-cholrman and members of 
the supreme court were appointed by the president after hcarlnp 
the senste. This appointment was for life. Federal law could decide 
that the chairman, vlce-chairTnan and raembers of the supreme court 
would be honourably relieved fror their respective posts when they 
reached a certain afo. They could be discharged honourably and 
relinquished from their respective posts in accordance with the 
manner and conditions ascertained by the federal law. They could 
be relieved of their office by the president at their own request.l 
Structure and power of the auAitlnp council would be 
res-ulnted by federal law. The chairman, vice-Chalrmen and members 
of the financial auditing council were epnolnted by the president 
after hearlnf? the senate. They could be relieved of their respective 
offices by the president at their own r*?nuest and vhen they reached 
a certain age. 
The official flay of the R.1.5, was Sang merah putlh 
(red and white), the Indonesia raya, national anthem, Jakarta, the 
capitel of the state* The state was free to decide its owa official 
1. Ibid pp. 5-6 
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emblem* 1 
'^hB preat majority of Indonesians both in the old republic 
of Indonesia ?»n<i in pll the 15 Dutch puppet states, vmre 
profoundly dis'^ atlsfied with the federal system of government. 
They wanted to liquidate these states end merpa with the old 
republic. Open encoarafenient V?RS given these raovernents bv the 
poverninent of the old republic end by Si;^ Rrno end rither leading 
republics-ns in the republic of the United states cf Indonesia 
povermnont. As Dutch mllltrry no police authority were vlthdrewi 
from these stetes end as tho several thousands stron? pro-repiub-
llcen political prisoners were released from their .leils, the 
forces of the unitarian poverntsont became cverv/helrainply. 
As a lesult, on February 9, 1950, A'iranata Susuma, president 
cf the Pasundan state, transferred bis power to j^ewaka, the newly 
appointed the B.U.S.I, commissioner for Pasundan. ^n FebruRry 10 
the representative council of the state cf '^outh Humntra voted 
to transfer the powers of the stats to the republic of the U.f,4, 
rovernajent. On Harch, 9, the requests cf the poverninents of i-ast 
Java, Central Java end Kadura for dissolution end merpe into the 
republic of Indonesia were approved by the h,U.P.I, the request of 
Pasundan and other states followed in short order were quicklv 
approved. By April 22, the B.U.S.I, house of representatives 
endorsed by 50 votes to 1 the dissolution of the state of West 
Borneo. Cn April 30, the pre^ i^dent of the state of iiast Indonesia 
announced the dissolution of his state end beceffie a part of the 
republic of Indonesia. On May 13» the F.U.S, endorsed the decision 
2 
of the president 3ukawati for the establishnient of a iHiitarian state. 
1, i r a f t cons t i tu t ion of tte U.S, l , 
2 , Kahim op .c i t . pp,il60-^61 
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/ifter several weeks of nepotietionf5 between the leaders of 
the B.U.I.3, fovernLTient and those cf the republic of Indonesia, an 
ispreement on the formation of B UnitrrlBn stete was flnnlly reached 
on May 19, 1950. Amonp ^he important provisions of th*' ?'preemynt 
WGFQJ the senstr W8S to le abolished. A provlslonel parliament fcr 
the new state wns to b^- formed from the combined membership of 
K.U.S.I. house '-'f represent ativts anO the workinp coaiCTltteft of the 
Knip with such additional members as ralrht be appointed by the 
president, after considerstion by two r'ov-rnTntnts, .A provisional 
crnstituti'-n for the new stats was to be drawn by an sssenibly for 
chanpinr the constitution made up cf the house of representatives 
of tho F.U.fl.I, and working coaraittee of the Knip. A constltutent 
assembly was to be elected as soon as possible th reafter, on the 
basis of one motabvr for ev-ry 300,000 inhabitants vfit^^ due considera-
tion for 8 fair representation of minorities, which would frame a 
final constitution. Sukarno wo'ild he pr-ssiclent of the new state. 
The cabinet of foverninent of the nev; st?te would be responsible 
to its parliament. Fendinr the introduction of new lefisl«tlon by 
the unitf>ilan state existlnp acts end regulations were to remain in 
force with the understandInp that wherever possible the laws of 
the member states, the republic of Indonesia should be adhered to.1 
r-urinie e periodYtwo months the representatives cf the 
F.U.S .1, house cf representative?^ and the republican Knip met 
jkogether to work out draft for the unitarian constitution. By July 
20, they had completed *heir taakvpresented their draft to the 
F.U.w.i. house of representatives and senate end the workinp co^ilttee 
of the Knip for approval, iifter more than three weeks of discussion 
ceneral errceeent was finally reached on Au^ -ust 1*f, the t.U.S.I, 
1. Arts, 27, 29, and 31 of the constitution of F;.I, 
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senate endorsed the draft by a imanlimous vote and the B.U.S.I, house 
did so by a vote of 90 to 18. The working cofflmittee of the Knlp 
ratified the document by a vote of 31 to 2 with 7 abstentions. On 
August I5t 1950, presidr-nt S^ jicarno slened the draft bill and with 
the countersignature of Prof.Supomo, minister of justice of the 
F.U.S.I,, the bill was promulgated as the provisional oonstituti(»i 
of the republic of Indonesia. 
The provisional constitution provided for the establishment of a 
unicameral legislature known as Dewan perwakilan rakjat(house of 
representative), consisting^237 members. Pending general elections, 
these provisional nraebers had been chosen on the basis of geographic 
cultural and political representotlon with a representative ratio of 
one member for every 300,000 constituents. The parliament elected its 
o%m speaker(Dr.Sartono) and three vice-chairman.1 
The party strength in the present parliament consisted of Masjumi, 
39; P.N.I., k\, P.I.B., 22J P.S.I., 15; P.K.t. I.I. k; partal buruh 5; 
parlndra 6; keduulatan rakjat 1; S.K.i, if; B,T,I.2 ; partal raurba h\ 
persetuan progresslf 9| Bobsi 2; G.T.I. 1; perti 1; N.U,7 end non-
party ih,2 
The constitution also stipulated that the executive head should 
be president assisted by a vice-president. Sukarno and Hatta were 
unanimously elected resapectively as president end vice-president. 
Subsequent presidents «re to be elected by national vote every four 
years. The president oan dissolve parliament, call new elections and 
initiate new legislation. All legislations must get the president 
assent before becoming law. 
The government is directly responsible not to the president 
1, Art.77 
2. J.BadhakrlahnaJ Indonesia at a glance, New Delhi, 1955 p.^3 
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but to the parliament. In the case of the cabinet reslfnatlon, the 
president takes the Initiative in appointing cabinet formateurCl or 
more) who need not necessarily be th leader of the largest party but 
in his opinion, is likely to master majority support to form an 
altemstlve ss the Dutch system in th«j ?Jetherlands. The prime minister 
Bnci his ministers weie responsible for the entire policy of the rovern> 
sent adminlstration.l 
In addition to the premier and vice premier, there were penerally 
18 portfolios in the csbinet; the ministries of foreign affairs, 
hoiTO affairs, defence, Justice, Information, finance, apriculture, 
economic affairs, communicetions, public works, labour, social welfare 
education, religious affairs, health, general and agrarian 8ffatts,2 
Admlnlstrlitively the republic of Indonesia was divided into 10 
provinces. Each province was administered by a governor and local 
council. The governors were appointed by the president on the recommenii 
tion of the local council. The 10 provinces alonsr their capitals 
were as follows: 1. West Java (Bandung), 2. Central JavaCSemarang), 
3. East Java (Surabaya), ^ . North Sumatra(Wedan), 5. Central Sumatra 
(Buklt Tinggl), 6. South Sumatra (Palembang), ?• Lesser Simda island 
den Pasar, Ball), 8. Moluccas (Ambon), 9. Sulawesi or Celebes 
(Makasar), 10, Kalimantan or Borneo (B8ndJ8rmasln).3 
Besides these, Jogjakarta has the status of a self-roverning 
territory(daerah istimewa) under the Sulten Hamenliku Buwono who was 
appointed by the president and Fjaksrta Raya has a metropolitant 
adminlstrptlcn, headed by Kr.Sudiro. The administrative heads of the 
various departments were designed as secretary general.^ 
1. Ibid p.36 
2. Ibid p.37 e. Kahint op.cit. p.'•66 . J.r .Kadhfikrlshnan* op.cit. p.37 
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Each province was fiarther divided and subdivided into various 
rfgencles (kabupatan), districtsCkewedanaan) and subdistricts 
(ketjamatan), all of them are respectively administered by Bupati, 
Wedan end Tjamat who are appointed by the governor• The lowest 
orpan of foverniEent is the village council, consisting of 7-10 
electtve members, of whom the village headman(kepala negeri) is the 
chairman of the council.1 
With regard to judicial system, in addition to vl|Xlage courts, 
district, regency and high courts, there is a supreme court(makkamah 
apunp) established in 19'*6, at Jakarta, it has original appeallate 
and advisory jurisdictions. It has 8 judges and 2 secretaries* There 
are also a supreme court of islamCmahkamah afung islam), and a supreB» 
military tribune(mahkamah agung tentara)8t Jakarta, dealing with all 
religious and military affairs respectively.2 
On August 22, 1950, 8 week after the establishment of the 
new Unitarian state, president Sukerno Instructed Mohd Natsir,chairman 
of tYm Masjumi, to form a new cabinet consisting of 18 ministers such 
as Mohd Natsir, prime minister, Assaat, home minister, Mohd-'Eum, 
minister for foreign affairs, Abdul Hakim, defence minister, etc.This 
calinet lasted up to March 1951, and its ministers fead different 
political affiliations such as Masjumi, P.S.l.l., P.i.B. and others.3 
UHXT^D NATIONS 
The situation in Indonesia first came before the security 
council on January 12, 19^6, when tlw Ukrainian S.S.JR, charged that 
the military actions against the local population by British and 
1. Prof, Sunarko* Dasar Hukura tatanegara, Jakarfta, 1953t p.260 
Mohd.Djuana dan Sulvant tata negara Indonesia, Jakarta, 1956, pp. 
221.223 
2. Mr.Mbhadi: Beberapa dendl hukum di Indonesia, Jakarta,1952, pp,353-
•^20J Moh. Djuanas op.cit. pp.196-200 
3. Kablnet 2 K.i.j op.cit. pp.3^35 
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Japan«8e foroei threatened international peace and security* A 
Ukrainian pDoposal for an investigation commission was rejected as 
was an Egyptian resolution declaring that British troops should not 
be used against the Indonesian national movement and should be with 
drawn after the complete surrender of tlie Japanese and the liberation 
of allied prisoners of war and internees. The matter was then consi-
dered.1 
Various military and political disturbances secured every 
wheire in Indonesiat Negotistlons assisted by th« British medletor, 
Sir Archibald Kerr, were conducted for the Netherlands by Dr.H,J,Van 
Mook and for the republic by Sutan Sjahrlr, prime minister, of the 
republic. Finally a Linggdjati agreement was concluded hy the two 
parties on Kerch 25, 19'+7. The Dutch violated the agreement end on 
July 20, 19^7, launched their first police action and occupied many 
areas in the republican territory. In response to this aggression, 
Hr.Nehru, on July 2^, stated among Others, the spirit of new Asia will 
not tolerate such things. No European country, whatever it may be, has 
any business to set its army in Asia against the people of Asia, When 
it does so, Asia will not tolerate it.2 
On July 30, 19^9f Australia and India drew the council's 
attention to flghtinp? between the Netherlands and the republic of 
Indonesia, The securltji council on August 1, called upon the Nether-
l»nd8 and the republic (1) to cease hostilities forthwith and (2) to 
settle their disputes by arbitration £« or other peaceful means and 
to keep the council informed of the progress toward settlement.S 
Three days later, the parties issued cease fire orders, Some fighting 
continued however and on Aup-ust 25, the council called for joint 
1, tiveryraan's United Nations, published by U.N.O,, New York, 1953 
part 2, p,1^0 
2, Hew Xork Timef, July 25, 19**7, p.3? Kahin: op.cit. p.215 
3« S,C,Official records 2nd yr. no,6e, 1702-3 
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reports by the consuls of its members in Jakarta. It also offered its 
good offices to tl» parties and set up a committee of good offices 
for the settlement of the disputes. This committee consisted of three 
members of the council, one chosen by the Netherlands, one by the 
republic end third Selected by the two previously chosen* The Nether-
lands selected Belgium, the republic chcAe Austriliai and the tvo 
then chose the United states.1 
On Aupust 26, the council rejected a Beglan proposal to ask 
the International court of ;Justice for an opinion as to whether the 
Coimcil was coppetent to deal %rlth the Indonesian question. It then 
adopted a proposal which called on the parties to adhere strictly to 
the cease fire resolution of August 1 • 
The Committee of good offices arrived in Jakarfca in October 
19^7 and set about to assist the parties to reach agreement. HeaniAlle 
the consuls in Jakarta reported that hos^sitities had not ceased. The 
two parties were interpreting the cease fire differently and it was 
impossible to observe whether the council's order was being carried out. 
The council thereupon called on the parties to consult with each other 
directly or through committee of good officesCc.O.o) as to the best 
means of giving effect to the cease fire order. The parties were 
advised that the use of armed force to extend control over territory 
not occupied on Ausfust h^ 19^7» was inconsistent with the cease fire 
resolution.2 
This action of the Security Council(-.C.) was followed by 
the committee's calling iiqpon the parties to appoint special coranittees 
to meet tith its military and other representatives for preliminary 
work toward impleiMnting this resolution. 
T. U.N.S/jm 
2. S.C.Official record 2 d. yr.No.IO3, 2750 
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Soon the discussions were widened in scope and official 
delegations were appointed to investigate the economic and political 
questions involved. On December 8, lander the auspices of the C.Q.O., 
negotiations were begun aboard the United States navy transport^ 
Benville, anchored off Jakarta port. These negotiations culatinated 6 
weeks latter in signing on January 17» 19w, of a fenvljle agreement, 
At the same tiae the parties agreed to 12 political principles and two 
days later, to 6 additional principles; the 18 to form the basis of 
discussion for a final political settlement,1 
Amonf other matters, the truce agreement provided that 
a stand fast and cease fire order be issued by both parties with a 
demarc?»tion line dividlns: the areas which each controlled. It also 
called for the withdrawl of any republican military forces continuing 
resistance behind the forward positions of the Netherlands forces; 
for the maintenance of law and order; and for allowing trade end 
intercourse between areas 6n either side of the demarcation lines,2 
The S.C, on February 28, 19^, noted with satisfaction the 
sign of the Fenvllle truce agreement and acceptance of political 
principles as an agreed basis for the conclusion of a political settle-
ment, Unfortunately, the initch violated the agreement end renewed 
hostilities and the dead-lock was inevitable. 
During the susmier of 19^t the Australian and United States 
members of the C.C.C. attempted to break the dead-lock but the Rether-
Isnds did not accept their suggesed proposals as a basl!^  for negotia-
tions. The situation was still more worse. On Jiily 29, the coiancil 
called on both governments with the assistance of the C.G.O.j for a 
( 
strict observance of the military and economic articles of the Henvlj^ e 
1, Graham congressional record- U.S.Senate, April, 19^, p.3922 
2, peaceful settlement in Indonesia, U.N.Dept.of P.I, 
195t, p,8 
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truee agrsei^ BRt and for full and easily ImplajB^ntatlon of the 
P^nvllle political prinelpies. 
In Saptamtoer 29, the nawly appointed United States representatives 
on the conaalttee, H.iMerle Cochran, produced a new plan for breaking 
the deadlock, The Retherlsiris, however, declined to begin political 
discussion until a settlement was reached on Implementation of the 
fewvllle truce agreement. Finally in December, the Netherlands 
authorities informed the C.n.O, that there was no point for further 
negotiations with tVie republic. 
On DeceBiber 19, the Netherlands renewed military action* The 
reptiblican heads of the sovernment %fere captured in Jogjakarta on 
the first days of c^eratlons and finally succeeded in conquerlnf the 
republican territories both In Java and Sumatra* The C.G.O, reported 
to the S,C, that the Netherlands had violated the B«nville agreea^nt* 
As a result, the S,C. met immediately. On December 2^, the council 
called for an immediate cease fire and the release of president 
'^^ ukarno and other leading republicans. It repeated these donands four 
days, later.1 
On January 28, 19^, the S.C, acted decisively. It called 
upon the Netherlands to discontinue all military operations and the 
republic to order its armed adherents to cease guerilla warfare and 
both parties to eoc^erate in restoring peace and maintaining law and 
order. The Netherlands was asked to release all political prisoners 
arrested since December t?, and tojfacllitate the iraaediate retxum of 
republican officials to Jogjakarta. The council also recommended t}» 
parties to negotiate as soon as possible on the basis of establishing 
as interim federal ^^ overnment not later than March 15, 19^9; that elec-
tions for pn Indonesian constituent assembly be completed by October 1, 
1. Ibid p.12 
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19^1 and t'tmt the transfer of sovereignty take place Aot later than 
Jiily 1, 1950,1 
To assist the parties In these negotiations and to act as its 
Representative In Indonesia, the S.C,transformed the C.G.O, Into 
the United Hations CoMBission for indonesla(U,N,C.l,) The new 
coomlaslon was authorised to make recoBciendations to the parties and 
to the ''^ .C, on matters within its coapstence. It fmr empowered to 
consult with representatives of areas other than tha republic and to 
invite them to participate in negotiations; to observe elections to 
be held throughout Indoiwaiai and to assist In achlevlnir the earliest 
possible restoration of the civil administration of the republic. 
On February 26, the Netl^rlands informed the commission that 
it had decided to take the initiate to convene as soon as possible 
a round table conference at the Hague, to consider conditions for 
accelerated transfer of sovereignty to a representative federal 
fovernment. The o<»maisslon, the republic and the federal consultative 
body were invited to participate in tl» Hague conference. 
On March 23, the president of the security council wrote to 
the conmission that it was the sense of the council that the Coraftisslon 
participation In such as conference would be consistent with the 
purpose and objectives of the resolution of January 28, The cosKDlsslon 
was also instructed to assist the parties in reaching ap-eement as to 
both the iB^lementation of the January 28 resolution and the time 
and conditions for holdlnp the proposed conference at the Hague,2 
Arnsed with this directive, the commission summoned the 
parties to preliminary negotiations which began in the hotel des Indies 
Jakarta on Apttl 1^ -, The republicans were led by Hohd.Kum, while Dr.J,H, 
1, New ifork Times, December 20,199^ 
2. Peaceful settlement In Indonesia, U.H.O. 1951, pp.12-13 
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Van Royen haaded the Hotherlands delegation. .After three months 
Intensive negotiations, an agreement called i^ um-Van ^oyen agreement 
was concl\ided by the two parties. The agreement provided amonp others 
the restoration of the republican government to its former capital 
at Jokjnkarta, the issuance of cease fire order Bn6 participation of th 
republic in the forthcoming round table conference at the Hsgve, 
On July 5, the members of the commission flow to -Jogjakarta end 
the following day the coBanission's plane brought president Sidcarno 
and members of his government from Bangka. On August 3» the republic 
and the Netherlands authorities issued simultaneously cease hosili-
ties orders.1 
The round table conference convened at the Hague on /August 
23 and continued until November 2, 19^ -9. At the opening session held 
in the ancient Biddezell, the coBunisslon whole-heartedly welcomed the 
conference and assured the delegations of it? willingness to help in 
any case. The commission helped the parties in various difficult 
problems sruch as New Guinea, cooperation^union psrtner In the field 
of foreign relations, the rights of self-determination of people, 
consultation on monetary matters,the transfer of indemnities for 
expropriated properties, the most favoured nations treatment on the 
economic field, the disposition of the "^^ urabaya naval base and the 
withdrawal of Dutch troops, etc. Consequently the conference agreed on 
a chartar of the transfer of sovereignty on flovember 2, 19^9.The 
O.N.O, considered the results of the round table conference to be 
eminently successful. 
After the round table conference, the eomaiispion returned to 
Jakarta in order to observe in Indonesia the Implementation of the 
agreements reached at that conference. On December 29, Queen Juliana 
1. Ibid, pp.1»f-l5 
2, Round Table Conference, 19^9 
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transferred sovereignty to Dr. Hatta and the crown representative In 
Jakarta did tbe seme to Suiten Hemengku Suwono, the leader of the 
delegation of the united states of Indonesia. The members of tlw 
U.N.C. were also present in the ceremony. 
Since then the 0,3,0, for Indonesia continued to observe the 
implementstion of the agreement. One of its major task was to 
observe the v/lthdrav/l of Netherlands armed forces. When this was 
effected smoothly, the commission was able to reduce fmd then in 
April, 1951, relieved its military observers of an enormous duty 
in behalf of peace so well done,1 
i^anwhlle, the United Notions has continued to assist the 
people of Indonesia In other ways. Through the lailted Hations 
international children's emergency fund, food and medical supplies 
have been piven to hundreds of thousands of Indonesian children and 
expectant mothers and Unesco doctors have been working with specialists 
of the world health organisation to combat yawsj^alaria and other 
diseases. In the stttmer of 19^0, experts of the United Nations, K.A.O, 
Unesco end W.H.O, visited Indonesia and drew technical assistance 
proposals In such important fields as ajijrlculture and forestry, labour 
public health, civilian aviation small scsle industries, social 
welfare and education. 
As a result, by the middle of 19^1, a number of experts were 
hard to work on specific projects in Indonesia. The United Nations 
appointed Sir Mirza Ismail of India as resident technical assistant 
representative to coordinate the work of the O.N, end its related 
1. Ibid p.17 2 Ibid, p,l8 3 Indon. News Bulletin, No.l52, May 3f p O 
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agencies and to advise the Indonesian government in securing further 
technical assistence. By the end of 1951, a larjsre ntcnber of experts 
were to be work in Indonesia, sone deputed by the U.N., others by 
F.A.O,, l.C.A.O., X.L.O., Unesco and W.H.B 1 
At the reqxaest of the S,C, Sjahrir along with H.A.Sallm 
arrived in New Xork on August 12, 19'*^ 7. He appeared before the -'.C, 
to explain the Indonesian problems and the Dutch aggression in 
Indonesia. Since then, the republic of Indonesia had had a permament 
representative headed by N.L.Palar. On -eptember 29, 1950, Indor^sia 
becajEe the 60tli Tiember of the O.N, by unanimous votes of the General 
Asseaibly. it also beceme e mercber of the United Nations regional 
agencies such ss Qnesco, Ilo, l#io, Colombo plan etc. 2 
1 . Ib id p . 18 
2 . Indon.i 'ew b u l l e t i n , no.152 May 3 , page 3» 
E P I L O G U E 
FOREIGN POLICY. 
Ike republic of Indonesia had adopted an active and 
indepenaent foreign policy based on he Interests of the 
people and aixed toward world peace nnd security. The Inde-
nesian foreign policy was guided b^ the national pkilisophy 
of Panch Sila-Belief in I^ evine Oainipotence,huaanity,nationalxsifl| 
democracy and social justice. It wa a policy oi pe^ce and 
pacifisafa policy or £oo«i neighbours and international brother-
hood and fraternity. It was f aaed on the basis of national 
politics, aconoaic strength,ailitary strenght,geographical 
conditions of the country and the general outlooks as well as 
inspixation of the oatire populatin. 
The aain objectives of the Indonesian foreign policy 
were as followss 
1. To defend the freedov of the people and the safety of the 
state; 
2. To obtain froa overseas those articles of daily necessity 
required for increasing the standard of living of the population 
food especially rice, consueaev goods of invrious kinds, mejcines 
and so on; 
3* To obtain capital equipotent to rebuild wkht had been 
destroyed or damaged and capital for industrialisation, new 
construction and tne partial aechanisat/on of agriculture; 
4« To strenghten principles of intei^rational law and the aid 
in achieving social and social justice on an international scale, 
in line with the U.N.charter, with special reference to articles, 
1,2 and 55 in particular by endeavouriniC within the U.N.framework 
to help the people still living within the colonial system to 
achieve freedom; 
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5. To place speeli^ l emphasis on Initiating prood relations 
with neighbouring countries, the ma.1orlty of which have In the 
past occupied a position similar to Indonesia and} 
6. To seek fraternity among nations through the realisation 
of the ideals of enshrised In the Panch Slie ( five postulates) 
which contltute the basic Indoneslanjphlllsophy. In short, Indone 
-sia will pursue a policy of peace and of friendship with all 
nations on a basis of mutual respect and non-interference with 
each other's structure of governmant. 1 
The Indonesian foreign policy is net a neutrality, 
for 8 neutrality liad a precise meaning in international law, 
definint? p condition on impartiality twward belligerent states. 
As a member of the D.N., the republic of Indonesia can not adopt 
an attitude of neutrality. It is committed to International 
s-olidarlty. Indonesia is friend to all and enemy to mona and pa 
pays no favourites between the two opposed blocs, Russian and 
American and follows its own path through the various internat-
ional problems. This is an Indonesian active and independent 
policy, said Dr.Hotta. Fnrthermore, the Independent policy does 
neither sean an isolationist and opprtunist polity, nor a neutra-
lity policy, said Hadjosurrote,a member of the parliaarent of 
Indonesia. 2 
With regard to the present cold war between the 
Anglo-American bloc and the Russian bloc, the former prime minis 
-ter, Tr. Sukiman, stated before parliament in May,28,1951, 
1. Dr. Mohd.Hattai Indonesian foreign policy, I.I.S.,Hew Delhi 
195^,P.1 
2, Ibid, p.5.; Republican review, the ministry of information o 
of the R.I,, Vol.1,Jakarta, Oct. 19^-5,p.290. 
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that thB povernaent preserve friendly relations with all states and 
will dot aggravate conditions by taking^  part in the cold war, which 
is new raging between the two blocks. The Wilopo cabinet on Hey 22, 
1952 and A H Sastroadmidjojo government in Karch 16, 1956, eaphasised 
on the active and independent foreign policy and not neutral and 
positive ones as well as non-sligniaent with any of the two blocksf 
i^ven today every government of Indonesia is piirsuinp tl^ same policy.l 
In short, the former prloe minister, Ali Sastroamid^ojo, 
defendinp Indonesian neutralism in July 13t ^956, said "what aoes 
neutralism mean? It measn that we ere neutral, as meant in times 
of war like scaae European coiaitrles in the previous wr»r. We only 
do our utmost to prevent a next war which we beli»¥© will only result 
in tte extinction of htoian civilisation. We are not neutral in terms 
of ideology since the Indonesian nation believes in the Panch Slia 
as basic guidance for the execution of the national life.2 
In order to strengthen the ideals of peace and solidarity 
thB constitution of the republic provided that the povemment shall 
work for the inclusion of the republic of Indonesia in International 
organisations and shall indeavoup to solve its differences with other 
states in a peaceful manner and in that connection to aske for and 
accept international arbitration or the ivaHiaMictioa of international 
courts. 
1. W.L.Heiland: Asian nationallsa and the West, H.Xork 1953» P»178 
2. Indonesia, vol. VII, no.28, July 15, 1956 I.I. S.New Delhi 
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Hegardinr the last Korean war end Pallstine conflict, 
Indonesia maintained her independent policy and took no ali-
gnment with any bloc as well as endeavoured to lessen the 
danger of the disputes and reduced internstiohal tensions in 
general. Indonesia has offered her good officers to India and 
Pakistan to solve the Kashair dispute, Sgypt on the Anglo-
fipyptsin conflict ( 1953 ), the People's republic of China on 
the Sino-i^ericsn dispute over Taiwan ( 1955 ) and others. 
lioreover, Indonesia has been and is to strupple for 
self povemment of every nation every where In the world and 
considers impariellsia and colonlalisK pS an ethicsl evil and 
social plague, snd enemy npeher one and therefore it raucst be 
eradicated tlu>rDUghl7. President S^arno n\K5ted the words of 
Jeanpaures'* Inperlallsra Is the great biacknaller, imperialism 
is/the grtiat interguant. At the 9 th anniversary of the Indcmesian 
independence In August, 17, 195^, at Jakarta, he said that colonial 
domination must be swept from tJ» surface of the earth in whatever 
form, In whatever design, In whatever field it nay appear.The 
right fif self determination and extended to all nations, irre-
s-ectlve of colour, des'^nt, creed, political Ideology, social 
Ideoleg/-indeed vithout rPirard to the stage of civilization; 
every nation should be fully entitled to exercise its right of 
self determination. 1. Indonesia has been supporting the peoples 
of Morocco and Tunisia, Indo-Chlna-Malaya, PandicJiary and Goa and 
12 Sukarno: Be in harmony with t^ e will of god, I.I.S,, N.Delhi 
195V, p.21. 
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other colo&ial countries In their struggle for national libera-
tion and emancipation of foreign dominations. 
To achieve international cooperation, mutual understanding 
end world peace and security, Indonesia has endorsed in ieptember 
195^, the Sehru -Chou ^ in Lai doctrine or Panch SiiaCautual 
respact for each others territorial integrity «!nd soverelpnty 
non-aggression, non-interference, equality and arutual benefit 
and peace coexistence),1 Indonesia has also becoase aeiiber of 
the U.rJ.O, and its regional organisations like Uhesco, who, etc. 
It Joined the Asian African groi^ in the United nations forned 
In 1951 under the chairmanshir of L.N.Peiar, consistlnp of 29 
states at present. It attended a South E^st Asia conference 
held in Baquio, the Philippines in Hay 1950, The three man 
Indcmesian delegation headed by H.A.Salim participated in the 
Inter Asian relations conference convened by the Indian council 
of world affairs in March 19H^ 7 st Sew Delhi. The representatives 
of 15 countries including Indonesia took part in the Delhi con 
ference on Indcmesla sponsored by the priae minister of India, 
Mr.Mehru, in Jenuery 20-23, 19^, to consider the fast deteriora-
ting situetion in Indonesia. The former prlue minister of 
Indonesia All ^estroaraidjojo participated in the Colombo power's 
conference in Ceylon in Apr11-May,195^. The second conference 
of the Colombo powers took place in Bof^ or, Indonesia,d.n December 
28^29, 195^. As a result of this conference the first Asian 
African conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April, 
1. I^ess infonartion bureau. New Delhi,"June 28,195^ ~ 
3^ 
28-2»f, 1955, which was attended by 600 delegates fro® 29 
countries of Asia and Africe an6 $00 journalists from all 
over the world.1 
The main purpose of the conference would be » 1. to j^ offiote 
food will and cooperation asionf the nations of Asia and Africa, 
to explore and advance their muttial a? well as coaarion interests 
and to establish sna further friendliness sn6 neiphbourly 
relsticns; 2. to consider sociali econotBic pnd cultural probleos 
and relations of countries represented; 3» to consider problems 
of special interests to Asian and African peoples, e.p. problems 
affecting national sovereignty and of racialism and colonialisa 
h. To view position of Asia Bn6 Africa and their peoples in 
their po5?ition in the world of today snd the contribution they 
can make to he promotion of the v;orld peace and cooperation»2 
The confeience was inaup'ureted by president Sukarno and 
presided over by All ^EstroBSitdjojo, 5Et adopted the Dgsa Siia 
for promotion of world peace i^n^ cooperation: t lespect for 
fundamental human rlp'hts and for the piirpose and principles 
of the charter of the united nations. 2. Bespect for the 
sovereignty end territorial integrity of all nations, 3. Recog-
nition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all 
nations, large and small, h. Abstention from intervanticn or 
interference in the internal affairs of another country. 5»'R98'' 
pect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or 
collectively in conformity with the charter of the U.I?« 6.Ab3ton-
1, Indonesian review, oublished by oublishinr institute, 
Jakarfea, Vol,2, no.2 Jan-March,195^ pp.5-16 
2, Bof^ or, Issued by l.S.l., New-Delhi February, 1955, p.3t 
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• tion from the xase of errangenient of collective defence to serve 
the particular interests of the bi^ powers, b. Abstention by 
any country from exerting pressures on the other countries, 
7, BefiainAng froa acts or threats of aggression or the|use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any country* 8. ^ ettlaaent of all international disputes 
by peaceful means such as oe^^otiatlon, conciliation, arbltratiem 
or judicial settlen^nt as well as other paaceful means of the 
parties ovm choic in conformity with the charter of the 
U.fJ,(9) froffiotion of mutual interests and cooperation. (lOi 
respect for justice and international obligetions.t 
i^s Indonesia is pursuinp an active and independent policy 
so she is deadly opposed to any military pacts or alliances 
like 3eato(8 Sept., 195^^, the Anzus pact (V:^53), the Bagdad 
pact (1955) snd the B«'ato as well. She is also opposed to furtlwr 
production, use and tests of any explosive weapons like H, and 
Atomic bombs. And on the contrary, she sug-gested for the peace-
fiil snd constructive use of these weapons and not for destructive 
ones. In April 20, 1956, the Indonesian parliaaent passed a 
resolution requesting? the big powtsrs to ban all atomic bomb tests 
any where in the world. 
Indonesia has been negotiating with the Philippines povt. 
regarding the probleni of Indonesian iaimigrants to the Philippiiws 
numbering between 5000 snd 6000 people. A peaceful settlenent 
Is expected to be concluded forthwith. After the sipninp of the 
Japanese peace treaty In 1952 p.t San Francisco, U.S.A., Indonesia 
1. Asian African bulletin 2^ - April, 1955, p.6 
had deaiended from ths Japanese povernment to pay the wsr 
r epa ra t i on , amowitinf febout ^ 800 a i l ? i o n . Mr.Aichiro Fujiyaaa 
forel?"! M n l s t e r of Japan and rir,Sub8ry*lo, foreign minis ter of 
Indonesia, slgnod s peace t r e e y and reparat ion agreeraent ©n 
20 January, 1958 at Jakar ta , /n afree;nent on dual na t i ona l i t y 
of the Chinese coasstmityCsbf^ut 3 ai t l l lon) in Indonesia has been 
signed by the prime ainist??r, Chou -^n L?! ^n^'^. the foraoer foreign 
Hilnistf^r of Indoneslfs, I«tr.5unar,1o in April 22, 1955 at Jakarta* 
The poverniaent abolished the dual «5ystem of the Chinese 
n s t i o n a l l t y . l 
Indonesia has es tabl ished diplomatic re l ' s t lons with different 
net lons a l l o^er t!^ world. The following countr ies have foraal ly 
recognised the republ ic of Indonesia, e s t s b l l s ^ l n r the i r dlplo 
fflBtlc missions in Jskarta* Hraat Br l t s in (March 20, 19^7)? tJ.S.A 
(April 23,19^7) Burma itiovemher 2 3 , 1 9 ^ ) , • '^TPt (Juna 1,19^7) 
Lebanona (April 29,19^?>, ^yrla (July 2 , 19*^7), Iraq (July, 
16, 19^7) 4franlstan (Pejjtemb*?r 23,I9M?> South Africa (Deceaiber 
26, 19^9) Ceyclofj (T-ecember 26,19^9), The ^hlUppines (December 
2B, 19**-9), BelpliiE, Switzerland ^,n<} the Chinese n r t i o n a l l s t 
povernicent or Formose (T)ecember 30» 19^9) Indie (19^7), Turkey 
(tecember 29, 19'*9) Ireland (recember 30, 19^9) Pakistan (19^7) 
Canada (December 30, 19W 9^, Jordan and I t a l y (January 7,1950) 
I s r s i l (January 9 , 1950), U. >..^.i'. (Janur^ry 26, 1950), Chile 
(Ftjbruary 16, 1950), Jugoslavia (February 1, 1950), Hungary 
(Februi^ry 3,1950), Poland (February 2^-,1950)^ FuEnnsania (February 
^7, 1950), Brussel (March 2i+,1950), the Netherlands (Decaaber 
29 , 1950), the republic of ^udan ( January h^ 1956), Tunisia 
1 , Republican review, no .2 : o p . c i t . pp.87-90 
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(May 15, 1956), the republic of new China (1952) and Malaya 
(31 August, 1957) and others.1 
The republic of Indonesia has set vtp diplc^ iatie missions 
in over 35 countries siach as India, Burma, U.S.A. Japan, 
China, U.S.s.ii., France, Britain, Netherlands, etc. 4nd over 
33 foreign countries have established their ewbassies and 
consulates in Indonesia in 1957. J-ndonesia has also sipned a 
treaty of frltndship with India, (March 3^ 1951) Buraa (March 
31, 1951) Pakistan(1950), Syria and £;pypt(l950), Thailand 
December 1, 195^), Afjranistan(April 2lf,ly5if), Iraq (May 15, 
1956), the PhillippinesCJune 21, 1951) M8layaCl955) and others^ 
It also signed cultural treaties with India (I^ eceaber 29,1955) 
and i>gypt( October, 1955), etc. It has trade relations with over 
52 countries like India, U.S.A, U.iC. etc. and obtained favourable 
balance of trade since the transfer of sovereipnty in 19**9«2 
?he Bepublic of Indonesia has been s*ndinp numerous 
delegstions to participate in the i.L.O,conference in Karachi 
(tecember 27, 1950-Jan.2,195l) international youth conference 
(December 9-19, 1950>, the 5th iicafe conference in Singapore 
(November 11, 19^9), i^afe iron and steel depart, conference 
at Bangkok (August 30> 19^9), ^ nesco conference in India (19**9, 
1956 and 1957), the iicafe transport experts conference in 
Slngepore(October 11, 19^9i, Ind'an woB»n congress in Madras 
(July, 19U8), All Asian peasant conference In P-anpocn (October 
19^*^), The £c8fe conference ©t Baguio, Philippines (Noveaber 28 
1. Perwakilsn i.I. di luar negeri, dlterbltkan oleh Kemlu, 
J?,kart^, 1956, pp.3-21 
2 , Pcwarta Kemlu, t)^uli-Arustus dan Ojctober-Nopeabar, 1956; 
AlKrnek Kempen, ^^Jakarta, 1951, p.307 
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1 9 ^ 7 ) , i n t e r Asian r e l a t i o n s conference in !iow BelM(March 2 0 , 
1 9 ^ 7 ) , Asian crnf- rence on Indones ia s t New DelVvl, (March ^ , 
19^9 ) , -.t^^.A. for world peace end i n t e r n a t i o n a l f e l l owsh ip In 
CeylcnCJune 2 5 - 2 ? ) , 1 9 ^ > , the 'sth Icoc conference i n Canada 
(May 2 2 , 1950) , the world inoral ermsment conference in Caiix 
Sur rTiOntrux i^eptemhov 30 , 1950) , I s l amic economic conference 
in 7aher2n(0c tober 7 t 1 9 5 0 ) , 3.t.A.corifcrenoe|;Ln ColoaboC^'ecercber 
2 , 1950) , the Lon<3on conference en • uez Canfil C' .wust 1 '^-.2J+, 
1956 r/fid SO on inZ so f o r t h ^ l 
To f u r t h e r I n t e r n e t l o n c l unde r s t and ln r ani good w i l l , 
Indones ia has bemi de-^patchin? the c u l t u r a l nnri rood missions 
t o d i f f e r e n t cmintTies the vrorld ove r . I t sent a p l l p r i o nir>sion 
t o Mecca(Septewher 2 0 , 19V^ ond 1955^ foo . w i l l and p a r l i a m e n t -
nrv ml5^*^lens t o Moscow (Apr i l 16 , 1950 i^nc. 1956) , p a r l i a o o n t a r y 
miss ion t o U.K. (i'^sy 1 9 5 l ) , pocd w i l l r J r s i o n t o the P h i l l i p p i n e s 
(1950) , c u l t u r a l end p p r l i H r e n t n r y mi-jslon^ to Chin^ (1956 and 
1957) , ^'ood w i l l iT}is?.«?ir.n to IJ.'^'.A. end Ccnada i9UB and 1956) , 
p r e s i d e n t S-akarno missioTi to America and Can.^dri (1956) , t o 
t 'Uss la , f^astem Europe end China (Aurust 1956) sn wel l as S.E.A, 
and Middle Eas t (January 195B). S l j a i lo r ly v s r i o . ' r c u l t u r a l , 
good w i l l , end p e r l i a i s e n t a r y miss ions of f o r e l r n c o u n t r i e s were 
a l s o peyinp v i s i t s t o I n d o n e s i a . 2 
D^I^J.Otl.^Sj' OF POIJTICAI. l-Ai-:fii.S 
i'.n impor tan t movement in the h i s t o r y of the development 
of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , e x i s t i n g in f r ee Indones ia s i d e by s ide 
with par l i rBient was the i s suance of the ^'cvernment p o l l t i c e l 
1 . Indones ian rev iew, no . 1 J a k a r t a , ^annaiy 1951 , p.3C>7 
2 . Pewarta Kealu! o p . c l t . 
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manifesto of November 3» 19^5, This Politics! aanlfesto was 
like a trumpet »ncl trambone hereallng a general mobilisation 
of democracy in the form of the rise of political parties 
all over the country. 
On November 7, 19^5, there was the formation of the party 
Masluml(consultative council of indonesian Kusllras) on the 
continuation of the religious outlook. There are still other 
Islamic parties such as P.o.S.i,(Islamic association party of 
Indonesia), Ferti, I a;ul Islam Movement, Wshdotul Ulama, ^ erikat 
Tani i-slas indonesia, "frikRt 'ap-anf -inl«- Inconesin etc. The 
partai katl^ ite republic Indonesia Cr.K,i-,I,) rmd Christian 
protestent party came into existence in I9^ f5. •^he Sermi(Muslim 
party of indonesia) was formed In i^ outh Borneo in 19^5. Thus 
all ti^se parties were based on rellrlous principles.! 
On Oembmber 17, 19^ +5, there was also the ustebllshment of 
the partii eoclalist Indonesia led by -utan -^ a^lirir and partai 
ra,1et socialist Indonesia led by o^nir SjaJ'ifuddin. The pitltid 
komunis Indonesia (F«K.i.) was formed in October 21, 19^5, 
under the presidentship of iiohd. Jusuf oncl now Audit. The 
Femuda sociali!5t Indonesia(ffersind»)i-trlsan Tani lndone8ia(B.T,I) 
Central oi^anisasi buruh soluruii lnc";'"nrSiaCrobr>i), followed 
suit. The ^ moral Indonesian trade uion waa replr.ced in November 
u, 19^5, by the paitsi baruruh Indonesia (IndonGsian Labour 
party), under the leadership of vir.'-atladjit. '^he partai rek^at 
djelata (corniaoi^ epple's p'>rty) was formed in «^ ovembfcr 19'<-5, «lder 
the presidentship of iir.^ u^tan Dewanis. all thes-- parties were, 
however besed on the *»arxlst sociallsia.2 
1. y.L;I'olland' op.c t t . p.190 
2 . Kepartsin di Indonesia, Kerapen Jakarta 1955 
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On January 29 , 1 9 ^ , the p s r t a l n^sionel Inrloneslfi(P.N,l,) 
vas e s t a t l l shec; at Kec i r i , '>,st Java, Ksny other p a r t i e s based 
on nstionalisffi incliirlecl Pel satuan Inccnesia i cjeCr.-I .F . ) , par tp l 
J-n<3onvsia ra jaC^ar ind is ) , p ' r t a i rskjnt Indonesia (P. F<. I . ) , 
p e r t e i deaokrasi lek ia tCt ' , " . • . r i , psita^ k i b a n r ^ n Indonesia 
(Fa rk i ) , p s r t e i keunulfitan r a k j r t I r . K . I . ) , s-r-riknt kerakjstan 
InoonesiaC"'.K.I.} , Ikatan nai lonal Indone'^lf)(i . ' ' . I .) por ta i 
bur-uh Inconesie aie-rceka, xjprt-1 rrs^gat, r^btir^-pn r-^-kjst revolut-
ti'-rif iieCG.r.r^. )partyi muiDa p'-rtpi r k j? t n-'Clonal (? , I .N . ) 
fcongres vani ta Indcnesic j:.ncl o the r s . Iheie are also p a r t s ! 
^ion~hca(t' .T, ) , pa r to i .-"i}-3'-" Indonor^iaCl-. A, I . >, pa r t a i IndOj e t d . l 
In shoi't, there were In 1955, ^^ 2 partie?^ and p o l i t i c a l 
groups in tho prov is ions! p.-srliament of Indonesia. The strength 
of these prirt les in the parliament vos as follows: ."^aslumi 39, 
P^H.I. Ifl, P.I.I-.. 22, P,".l, 15, ^.?^.U r/^ -e^iorat 9, : \ i- .H. 9 
Kathr l ik , 8 , Parkindo, h, P . ' . i . I . k, par ta l buruh 5, p^-rindra 
6, kedsalfitan r a k | ^ t 1, i . K . I , l+, B.T. I . 2 , pcrsBtuan pror ress i f 
9, pa r t a l Eurba h, obsi 2 , C.T.I . 1 Pe r t l 1, 'MJ. 7 , non-
party 1 f^,2 
I 'rior to the general e l e c t i o n , loc^l el-.ctions were 
successfu l l / held In the ^linahs-a(June .1 951 ) in Jcf Jakarta 
( Ju ly , 1'^ 51 >, and In i''scaHsar$Aun2~t-''epteffiber, 1 951) • ^he 
Harshap cabinei. conducted the f i r s t fenersl e lec t ion for 
parliaraent (September 29) and for the const i tuent assembly on 
December 15* 1955* iccordinf: tn the ele.^ticn law enacted in 
April 1, 1953» by the provinional perl iamont, the general e l ec -
t ions should be carr ied on the h s s i s of the following pointss 
1. B,Abdul Ganls Parlemen dan keper ta ln dl Indonesia, Djakarta, 
195^ 
2 . J.Bedhakrlshna: o p . c l t . p .^3 
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1. All c i t i z e n s of 1** and ever «^ nd isgrr ied people of younger 
Ege have tYe r i r h t to v o t e i r r e s p e c t i v e of s ex , r?roperty, s t e t a s 
or r e s i d e n c e ; O) The e l e c t o r s e l e c t ^:^lrectly the me:nibers of the 
c o n s t l t u t e n t f^s'^er-tly rnd t>-::e pprlls'Tient (3) ^^e TotinF w i l l 
t e by s e c r e t b p l l o t ; V. Tb(» e l e c t i o n «?ysteir? nsed wss t o be e 
p r o p o r t i o n a l c l e c t o r n l sy? t rT 5 . "^ f^; c o i m t r r WP*^  r^vlded In to 
15 con.~tltu(-:ncies (3 for Jf^vr, 1 fo^ -T^kpr^P n e t r o p l i t s n t s r e s , 
3 for ^ u n a t r n , 3 for Kall '^.^ntrn, 2 for "-ulj^we*?!, 1 for Mcl;icca 
2 for I.':;S'"'er '^ imc'f' T -^i^ .n^*? ^^ nr^ ; 1 for '".'Gst I r ' -^ni* 6. T>Tovlsion 
va?- n--: •=: for Inr^epennent t'^ ?t5>ind ar c a n d i d s t e s a" v e i l ns for 
p o l i t i c a l -c^irtlsrs nominee"(7) 'The b-^sis of -trotln^ ^^s t h s t for 
every 1^3,000 r-'-onlo on.^  r?els?'-?ta shr-uld be e l e c t e d fo r the 
con5tltu='mt as3erii-ly (^ T'O •"'.rr;h--^rp) pnd for ••jv-^ rv 3-3"'}000 peon le , 
one dol;-f r-ta s'-ould be e loc tan for tbe iml-c*:tneral VBVliement 
(260 ^eab«r s ) .1 
To CBTTv out tbc ^f'oyroT e l e c t i o n s the fcll-'^wln? 
co-Tir.j t t e e s h':d be^-n ai^pofnto' ': 1. the c e n t r a l e l e c t o r a l coawl t t ee 
of I n d o n e s i a , .(S) the e l ec t c r^ . l d i s t r i o t e l e c t o r r l committee, 
(3) the lfC",bupa:nn r l o c t o T ? ! commit tee , ih) the vot ln? ' ccsswiittee 
end (5) the r o s s i t t o o for the ro«*iRtrf;tion of e lec t^c rs , 
There W'irii about ^90 p a r t i e s , or--'r>nls?!tir-r>s 5*r>^  inf^eT>endent 
can<il'3r tfcs c o n t o s t l n s the Fener?;! e l ec t l o r ; In 2B0 c o n s t i t u e n c i e s 
e l l ovtrr IndonsFia . •••est I r i a n h?>s been Hlloted 3 s e a t s . The 
Chinese , Arsbinn and •^•aropcan • n l n n r ' t i e s wculf' have r e s p e c t i v e l y 
9 , 6 .-no 3 member?? In the p»rtT isr ient ^nn 18,12! and 6 In the 
cons11 t uen t aS5-e 'ibly .2 
1. Indones ian r ev i ew , J a k a r t s , 195^^, r . ^ 5 
2 , In(3one3i?i, 1 , 1 , 3 , , New i)elhi ,1956 
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The result of the general election for parllaasient (Septenber 
29,1955) was ennoimced in March 6, 1956, by the central 
election eomeisslon as follows* Masjumi 57 seats; P.N.I. 575 
B.O.if55 P.K.I, k^ PantjB Siia Partal 2; P.K.N.2; P.P.P.h.I. 2} 
Murba 2j labour party25 P.fi.I. 2| P.P.I.M.I; Peratuan Dajak 1; 
A.K.U,1, 1- Fak^at Besa 2; Pertaai 1; Gerindo 1? Mr.Su^ono 1; 
reserved for vest Iilan 3? total 260 representatives.1 
Whereas tlw results of the election for constituent assemblf 
held in December 15, 1955, werei P.S.I. 119; Hasjumi 112; N.O.91 
P.K.I.80; P.S.I.I.16, Parkindo. 16; kathollk 10; P.a.I.lO; I.P.K.I 
8; Perti 7; G.P.P. 2; P.fc.N. 3; P.fl.I. 3; Murba »fj P. Buruh 5? 
P.t>.I, 2; P.E.I,M. 2; Akui 1; Acoma 1? P.P.T.I. 1; partal rakjat 
desa 1; B.SuJono 1; P.I.P'.(f8Ction)2; P.I.B. (f8Ction2; permai 2; 
baparki 2; Gerindo 2;p8rtai Dsjak 3; G.P.Sianda 1; P.T.I. 1; 
fi.Keprabonan 1; G.^anten B.I.I; P.I.B.CNHsatenr)1; i.M. Idurs 
2 
i^tm 1; and reserved for West Irian 6 total 520 representatives 
Chairman of tin Indonesian central election C(xs8iittee, 
iMr.S.Haikusurao, stated that an amount of Rp.^79,891,729,88 has 
been spent for the conduct of the general elections,.60 > of a 
populntion of 77, million, 987,879 or ^3,10^^,^6^ have j?one to 
the polls,87.65 % of the voters were valid. The new constituent 
assembly was scheduled to meet on June M-, 1956 at Bandung under 
the cha»4manship of Mr.Wilopo, former prime minister of the repub 
lie. The provisional pariiament would thus be dissolved. The 
constituent assembly has been in session to frame a nav permanent 
constitution of tfm republic of Indonesia.3 
1. Hews from Indonesia, issued by I.I.S.Harch 7 end 1U-, New Delhi 
1956, Jil p.1 
2. Indonesia Vol. VII Ho.29 issued by I.I.F., Hew Delhi, August 
1, 1956, p.1 
3. Ibid. 
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Soon after the general election, the Harahap cabinet 
formed in August 12, 1955, was repleced ly the All Sastroaaidjojo 
cabinet in March 16,1956, which consisted of 25 ministers (6 P.I.I.i 
5 Masjuai? h H.U.| 2 Kathollc party? 2 P.S.I.I.j 2 parkindo? 
1 Ipki; 1 Pertl; and 1 non party), Aaongb tl» isportant ainisters 
vere N(^ kd Bum ( dy. P.M.), i2slan A. &ani ( foreign minister ) , 
Mr. Sunario ( hooe minister), Mr. tvtsxxt Vfibisone (minister of 
economics), Hr. K.H.Fatah JasinC information 41nister) and others. 
This cabinet has 180 representatives in the parliament. 1 
Since the proclamation of independence in Atufust 17, 
19*f5, there have been 18 coalittion cabinets; Si&arno presidential 
cabinet ( Augtist 19, 19^5-Noveaber 1*f, 19**5)| Shahrir first 
cabinet (Nov.l^ f, 19^5-^ime 29, 1 9 ^ ) ; Shahrir second cabinet ( 
Jtme 26, 19*t6-0ct.2, 19*»6)5 Shahrir's thitd* cabinet ( Oct^, 19*»6 
June 23, 19*f7)| Sjarifuddln cabinet 'Jtay 3,19*f7-January 23,19*t8) 
Hatta cabinet (January 29, 19^-I^cember 19, 19**8)? Sjafruddin 
emergency cabinet ( December 18, 19*#8-July l^ f, 19*#9)fHatta secon-d 
cblnet ( December 19, 19*«9*Sept. 6, 1953); Setslr cabinet (Sept 
7, 1950-March 20, 1951)? Sukiman cf^blnet(March 27, 1951-April 
1952); Wilopo cabinet ( Aprill, 1953-June 3, 1953>l ^ H Sastroam i-
djojo fir«t cabinet ( August 1, 1953- July 2»*, 1955); Burhanuddin 
Harahap cabinet ( August 12, 1955- April 16, 1956); All Sastro-
amidjojo second cabinet ( March 16, 1956-March l^ f, 195?) and 
Djuanda Karya cabinet ( April 19, 1957- ). 2 
1 Indonesia, Vol 11, no.3, 1956, issued by the ministry of 
information, Jakata,pp. 1-3 
2. Proklamsi, diterbitkan oleh Kempen, JogJakarta,Augts t, 1950 
Kabinet 2 R.I.s op. cit.pp.l5«^. 
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Due to the shortoanings of the ^ n Sastroamldjojo govern«ent^ 
general regional dis-»satisfactions and discontents, strong demad 
for provincial authnooy, resignation of vice-president, Dr.Hatta 
on I>eceBaber, 1, 1956, imequal distribution of finance and national 
reconstructions between the centre and the various provinces and 
others, the provincial governnents in Sunatra, Broneo, fiast 
Indonesia and Java revel ted against the centraljgovemffient in 
Decenber, 1956, up to the present mcanentC 1 9 ^ )» under the 
military eoamanders \Ao took over the provincial and regional 
authorities. Besides, after the Mas^umi, Xpki, and perti vitl^sev 
their ministers froa^he A n cabinet, the prime minister. All Sas-
troaaldjojo, was ccHspelled to render his resignation to president 
Si;acarno on i«^ reh IW^ , 1957* '^he president accepted it and asked him 
to remain in office mtil a new cabinet %ras formed* On the same 
day he also proclaimed a state of var and siege over the entire 
territory of the republic of Indonesia because of the oritlcal 
situation. After unsuccessful attempts of tl^ general chairman of 
the nationalist party of Indonesia, Mr. Suwir^o, to form a 
cabinet, on April 7, 1957, president Sukarno, on April 8, appointed 
hlBWelf cabinet formateur. After consultations with 69 political 
leaders in Jakarta , he formal*^ announced the formation of a Karya 
cabinet headed by Dr.Djuanda on April 9, 1957» %is caliinet is 
called an £xtra parliamentary emergency karya caMnet with 2*f 
ministers. Among thet important members of the cabinet are H.fi«Djua« 
nda ( P.M.), Mr, Hardi ( dy.premier), B.K.Idhsm Chalid(dy.premier 
11), Dr.Subandrlo ( foreign minister) Sanusl Hardjadinata (Bbam 
minister), G.A.MaengkomC minister for justice), Sudibjo (inform 
atlon minister), Mr.Sutikno Sl«mat (finance minister), etc. 1* 
1. Kadiallah &>tapradJo| Kabinet karya terbentuk,B0.8, 15 April 
1957.DD.3-5. 
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The progranne of the new cabinet consists of (l) to form 
8 national coxmcil, (2) to normalise conditions In the republic, 
(3) to proceed with the effectuation of the abrogation of the 
round table conference agreements, ih) to promote reconstruction 
and (5) to fight for West Irian. 1 
The formaticm of the non-party man cabinet was In 
accordance with the president Sukarno's conception announced in 
February 21,1957 at Jakarta. An emergency law of tMay 8, 1957, 
esteblisl^d a national cowicll headed by president Sukarno hioself 
consisting of ^5 representatives of tl^ provinces, political parties 
and other organisations, vivil and military services, etc. All t-he 
aeabers of the coimcll were s%forn in on Friday 12, July, 1957.They 
were all appointed and removed by president. Buslan Abdul Gani 
was appointed as a deputy chairman and general secretary of the 
council. The coincil is to give the cabinet solicited and unsoli-. 
cited advice, on important natl<mal questl<ms«2 
The emergency laws set vo^ a Moluccas province on August 
10, 1957 and divided the central Stmatra into three provinces? 
Vtest Sumatra, Flaw and Djambl in August 8, 1957. ^ ach is governed 
by a provincial coimell headed by a governor. Different local 
elections for legislative assmblles and mmlclpal councils were 
taking place all over the country. On September 10-1^, 1957, the 
central govenuaent organised a national conference at Jakarta, %fhieh 
was attended by over 100 representatives of all provinces, central 
government, armed forces and other national leaders, to discuss 
the present national political crisis. It is hoped that the political 
1. Indonesia, Vol.Vili no.10 Junil, 195B, R.Delhi pp.U-5 
2. Merleka 13, July 1957 Jakarta? Statesman, June 16, 1957 Hew-
Dolhi. 
uoo 
crisis. It is hoped that the political instability will soon 
be solved by a guided desoeracy as suggested by president 
Sukarno on Roveaber, 1956. The present aiulti-party pystea which 
Is also responsible for the Instability of povernaent should be 
consolidated and aerged into a few parties based on the concep-
tion of nationaliSB, islaaism and Morxisin.There must however be 
at aost four or five instead of over 38 political parties as 
presenty namely nationalist party, Islaaic political party, 
socialist and others.l 
Begarding economic field, the republic of Indonesia has 
still great taldES ahead. It appointed a provisional economic 
planning commission headed by Dr.Hatta in March 20, 1998* It again 
set up a national economic planning commission under the chairman-
ship of Dr.DJuanda, minister of economies, to prepare a five 
year plan in ^ril 7, 1955. The followinp are the scope and 
costs of the five year plan* 1.agriculture, transmigratiwi and 
other projects for social imporveiMnt hp, 1,850,000,0005 
2. Transport, cc^smunications and radios, B/i.2,850,000,000; 3. 
industry end mining i<f. 2,850,000,000; h» Irrigation and multi 
purpose projects 2,850,000,000; (5) educati<ai, health and social 
projects Hp. 1,350,000,000. The total budget to finance the 5 
year plan (1956-1960), is Rp. 11,MX),000,000 or ^  1000,000,000 
of which ^  200,000,000 has to be spent per year.2 
Large and small scale industries are in pood progress at 
present. There are over 15,632 industrial plants and workshops 
with 526,797 employees throughout Indonesia in January, 1957. 
iiixtensive and intensive agriculture are being undertaken by both 
1. Press note no.2 issued by the i.i.P.Hew Delhi, 18 January 
1957, p.3; Hindustan times, August 11, 1957; «adion 
republic of Indonesia, Jakarta September 1*f, 1957. 
2. Bintang Ti«ir, September Jakarta 1956 
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the fOTernaent and private enterprises. Agricultural products 
both cooBercial and consttaption goods are increasing consider-
ably from tiB» to tiiae. Tl» nurrber of cooperative socielties 
increases remarkably that is 5,770(1950), 7667(1952), 8223 
(1953), 9CKX) (1955)» In 1956, many new cooperative societies 
caae into being'the various parts of the country.l 
Financially Indonesia is faeinR economic Instability 
because of inflation and constant budget deficits every year. 
These budget deficits are R^ l ,38»f,152,600(1950) %275,570,200 
(1951), Pp. 2,785,000,000(1952), Rp. 2,068,000,000(1953) Rp. 
3,602,000,000(195**-) Kp. 1,833, 000,000(1955), Rp. 1000,000,000 
(1956), Rp.»t.7 billion (1957).2 
In order to overccxse the financinl difficulties, 
Indonesia has to take loans frcMs v?^ rloug states of the world in 
millions rupiohs as follows? 
Years. 
1 9 ^ 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
195^ 
1955 
1956 
U.S. ^ 
79.5 
79.5 
77 .^ 
166A 
177.2 
198.2 
196.1 
188.6 
NFL 
770.6 
826.2 
990.5 
960.9 
918.3 
876.0 
82^.3 
77K9 
Can.ir 
15.5 
15.5 
12.if 
9.3 
6.2 
3.1 
«. 
• 
K. £ 
8.5 
8.3 
8 .2 . 
8.0 
6.9 
5.7 
K6 
3 . ^ 
U.P.fi.R. ? 
100. 3 
In addition, Indonesia is also confrontIng with the 
problea of ever-increasing populstlon. The Indcmesiavpopulation 
Since 1938 to 1956 is as follows: 6&.h million (1938)? 75 m. 
i. Ibid October 2""^;2~~"~ 
2. Ibid Gtatlstlk 1956 , 17 Agustus, Jakarta, p.l6»f 
3. Bintang Tinir, 12 October, Jakarte, 1956, p.2 
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(1950- ; 77.^ m. (I95l); 78. 6 rBCl952); 85 n. (1956). In Java 
the density is h%0.h per sq. km., on the other islands l5 or an 
average of ^3.2 per sq. km. The populetlon is cooposed of 
38 % of people under 15 years of age, 57 % between 15-60 years 
and 5 ^ above 60. In 1950, the birth rate was h >, the mortality 
2 /". This means an increase of 1.6 milli<ms. The poptflation 
increases at least It > or 1.2 millions. In 1970, Indonesia will 
have a populatiwi of more than 100 millions.1 
in order to over-come the ever-lasting increasing popul'^ titm 
the republic of Indonesia is endeavouring to carry out a plan of 
transmigration service, it has appointed the central transmigra-
tion service under the chairmanship of i^.Gudarno Sur jodlbi»oto, 
to deal with all transmigration activities. The budget for t>» 
transmigration programme has been increased since 1950 to 1956x 
in 1950, Bp U8,000; 1951, % 5,000,000; 195^, % . 55,000,000$ 
1955, % . 6»+,000,000| 1956, Rp 8^,000,000; and Kp, 3^5,000,000 
as estimated in the five year plan.2. 
In the field of social welfare, the health ministry has 
been attempting to improve the existing general hygientfc aimdi-
tions of the people all over the country. In 1950, Indonesia has 
69^ hospitals with 68,732 beds. In 1956, a new general hospital 
was to be constructed at Jakarta at a cost of Bp, 30,CK>0,000. 
The total personnel of the public health services consis -
ted in 1956 of 1200 doctors, 150 dentists, 80 pharmacists, 650 
assistant pharmacists, l¥t6 mid-wives, 3,500 nurses and 30 analy^ 
yists (bacterilopists). 
1. Ststistik, 1956! op. cit. p.11 [ 
2. NewSB from Indonesia, vol. VI no.tf7 ^ ec. 1*f, 1955, New.Delhi. 
page.^ 
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To face this shortage of nedical pers<miiel nai^ly 12(X> 
doctors for 85 ailllcm people, various attempts have been made 
by the governaent to set up more medical colleges (2 new 
medical colleges in Jotja and Surabaya in 1955), nursing schools 
hospitals and policillnic and to get more lids and medicines fro«* 
the U.N.0. (12 W.H.B, eswperts in 1955) and other states for t!w 
rehabilitation of the public health in Indonesia. The ministry 
of health Is desiring to institute one hygienic office or centre 
for every desa in order to «ave more than 90 % of the people, 
living in rural areas of 28,000 desas. The government has also 
established a cooaunity project development and national exten-
sion services, dealing*people's welfare. The amount of Bp, 
190,000,000(1955) and fip. 675,000,000(1956) have been alloted for 
the construction of houses and buildings to accommodate a large 
n\imber of the people .1 
Moreover, remarkable progress has been made in the field 
of education and culture. Since 1950, Indonesia has the follow-
ing types of schoolss 1. Kindergarten, (2) elsirontary schools 
(3) lower secondary schools (.h) higher secondary schools(5) spe-
cial colleges or academies and (6) universities. 
In 1952-1953» there were over 306 kindergarten (2*f, I8O 
students)I 26, 670 elementary schools(5,3l8,02*f students) 
1125 loirer secondary schools (205,532 students) ISO higher second 
ary schools(37, 395 students and 10 universities (1^,677 students) , 
Tltere were in 1956, ^ 5 higher secondary schools with 98,(XX) 
students and 23,98^ studentsi^ 21 ,71+7 government and 2237 private 
1. Ibid, p.6 
in the colleges and universities).! 
The fovernawit has adopted the following systea of combating 
addlt llliteracyJ 1. spell period; (2) local post literacy; 
C3) fseneral post literacy combined with penersl course and 
newspaper and (^ ) the connection with various so-called pros-
perity services such as plgrsical, cultural groins, youth organi-
sations and b<^scouts. Crnsequently, the ten year progrpmme of 
the aass education is going ahead; the official figures of 
literacy are nows Java, 5*f.3 ^ 1 Staaetra, 55.5^ Kalimantan 33*3^ 
Sulawesi, 5^.5 ^ Lesser J^ undas 55>5% and Molukas, 20 %, The govt 
is also working to build up more nnd more schools and universi-
ties and to progress national literature, languages, press and 
news papers, etc.2 
The republic of Indonesia has been endeavoizring to solve 
the west Irian dispute peacefully. The Ifest Irian is of coucrse a 
part and parcel of Indonesia with 1 million people and area of 
M3,000 sq. km. According to Art.2 of the round table conference's 
charter, that with regard to the residency of New Ciiiinea, it 
is provided that the status quo of tho residency shall be raainta-
ined, with tho stiptalatlon that with a year from the date of 
transfer of sovereignty to the republic of the United States 
of Indonesia, the question of tlic political status of Hew 
Guinea shall be determined thrcufrh negotiations between the rep\ib--
lie of the U.vS.i, and the kingdom of the Netherlands,3 
In 1950, in accordance with the Hague agreement, two 
conferences were held in Holland at ninistsrial level to 
determine the future status of Vfest Irian, But these confermices 
1. F.A.Canii op.cit.p.16^-; and Waspada 22 iepteisber f'I«d8n,1956 
2. Dept. of ffiass education, issued by P.P.K, 21 Feb,1953 
3. Thruth about 'litest irlan, published by the ministry of 
inforfflation of R.I., Jakarta, pp.35-37 
wsre fruitless due to stubborn attitude of the Dutch gorenaent. 
Again in the Deceaber 1951, a third conference was held to over-
ec»e the iapass created by the Dutch. The republic of Indonesia 
had givtnmtteh ccncesslons to the Dutch. The fourth conference vas 
cc«ivened in February 1952 at the Hag«e. 
Inspite of the strong protest by Indonesia aprainst the 
Dutch policy, the West irian was unilaterally annexed by the 
Netherlands in February 19» 1952, in midst of pending conferences 
end negotiations. It was included in the Dutch constitution. 
In the oeanwhile, the Indonesian cabinet decided to set 
up Btireau Irian %dth the task of coordinating and executing all 
means to restore Vifest Irla to Indonesian territory. The panitia 
aksi peabesan Irian (Irian liberation action committee) and All 
Indonesia Congress were fornsed in Deccraber 25, 195^ to strive 
for the eoancipation of West Irian. 
In Au9^ ust 10, 195^, the negotiation was resinwd in the 
Hague to terminate the Dutch Indonesian Ifeion with its E.T.C, 
aftreements of 19^9. As a result of this conference, a new protocol 
was signed by foreign minister, Mr.Sunario for Indonesia and 
by the Dutch foreign minister, ^ hr.Luns, for the Netherlands. But 
both the parliaaents of the two countries have never ratified it. 
Another conference was held in the Harue in Decenber 10 
10-17, 1955 and continued in r»eneva in January 7-Pebruary 10, 
1956 to substitute the new protocol and to settle the west Irian 
disputes and others. The Indonesian foreign minister, Mr.Anak 
A. Dge Agtmg returned to Indonesia without any result. 
In the li»:ht of the dead-lock in the negotiations between 
the delegatlwis, the republic of Indonesia has laiilaterally 
declared the abrogation of the Dutch-Indonesian union statute <m 
Februaif^  15, 1956. In February 21, the Indonesian Charge d affairs 
hoe 
in Holland inforiried the Eutch government about this atttion 
In March, 1956, the Indonesian permanent representative in the 
D.N.O. !'r.r>ud3Brv70 did the same to th'. secretary general Mr, 
Da^ Haininerskjolk. On March 1 , the Indone3ian parliament has 
adopted the abrogation bill by a 108 to 80 votes. Thi diploma-
tic relations bet\'(feen the two countries v:ere maintained on the 
basist^international law. The Colombo Power's ccnf i-renceCl 95^), th« 
Afro-Asian Conference(April, 19^5), and A.A,groups at the U.N.O. 
fully pirpporteo the Indonesian claiiu over Irian Barat, -he Afro-
Asian solidarity conference in CaiibC-^ e^cember 1957) also expressed 
its help and sympathy to Indonesia. The General assembly of 195^ 
1955, 1956, and 1957 has constantly discussed the wost Irian 
quer,tion v3)thout any good result. This led Indonesia in January 
195B, to s^ veve economic, cultural, and to some extent diplomatic 
relations bith the Netherlands. A central action committee for 
the lib ration of Vfest Irian was formed in Jakarta, under the 
chairmanship of ^Sr.SudibJo, Inforniaticn minister. Public opinion 
and the ptipple as whole hsve been mobilised to liberate Irian 
from the Dutch domination. All I^ -utch firms and plants have been 
taken over by the government. These firms are 500 in number and 
50,000 fnitch national'^  in Indonesia may leave the country without 
any restriction from the Indonesian povernment.l 
The r.bropation of the K.T.C. agreement resulted in 
1, PollticaTly, the republic of Indonesia has set up a West 
Irian province pt Tidorc in i^ ay, 1956. The administration of the 
province is conducted by a governor, Zainal Abidln Shah, who is 
assisted by an advisory council of five members. The functions 
of the governor ares 1. To fight for the return of the de facto 
1. ibid, pp.30-33; W.Siayasa Mentjapal Irian merdeka, Bandung, 
1955, pp.20-38 
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sovereignty over safest Irian to Indonesia5 (2) to carry out an 
autonomous admlnls tret ion end (3) to biilld up broader areas* 
(2) Kcananalcally, in August *f, 1956, the republic of 
Indonesia annoiaiced that it -would not pay any debts to the 
Netherlands amountinp to 3,66^,000,000 guilders. All Futch 
companies and Interests will be repuleted by special Isws.l 
Internationally, Indonesia firmly condemned the Anglo-
French Israll aggression on the Egyptlsn territory in August 
1956, the British action in Csanan in August 1957 and in other 
west Asian countries. Indonesia along with others nations demanded 
the immediate withdrawnl of their araed forced from the Egyptian 
soil in conformity with the general assembly resolutions of 
I^ ovember 2, ^ ^ and 7 tnd in accordance witii a joint cc^mtmiqiw 
of the Coloabo power's Conference of iiovexnber 12-1^, 1956 in 
New-Delhi, Ihe Indonesian delegates it.A.Gani, Lr.oubandrio, etc. 
participated in the liondon Ccwiference on i-uez Canal on August 
18-2^^, 1956. It again setnt 650 men of a i ^ unit to ,1oln the 
U.K.emergency forces in agypt. Besides, Indonesia was strongly 
reacting against the ^ isonhover doctrine In iciest Asia which wo]iild 
increase the confusion there, iegaroinp the i^ ussian armed 
intervention in Hungary, the Asian African groups in the U,H, 
and Goloiibo powers resolutions including Indonesia, also deaanded 
the withdrawal of all i ussian forces from Hungary and supported 
the struggle of the people of i^ astern £iurop© for complete self-
detenainotion. Indonesia is always supporting India and Pakistan 
in their fight against the segregation policy of south ifrlca 
governiMnt. it also gives full support to the admission of the 
1. Indonesia Vol. VII, Nn.30, 11^ New Delhi, ?ept. 1,1956,p.6 
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People's republic of China to th0 U.N. In Septamber, 1957, it 
has recognised the Independence of Kalaya when the latter 
achieved its freedcao in August 31, 1957 and su ported its 
admission to the U.N, in reptembci 18, 1957* It apains 
welcomes the re-unification noveaents of Germany, Korea and 
Indo-China as well ES peaceful settlements of the Kashmir dis-
pute, it is deadly opposed to th« cold war and future world 
war as well.l 
^* Pewsrts Kemlu; 11 Ofctober-Nopember, 1956,deterbitkancleh 
kerclu, i.I., D;53r:srtp, DD.687-723; I-idle lepublilr Indonesia 
D.i«karts, September,!7, 1957. 
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A P P E U B I C E S 
A, LINGGADJA'l'I AGREEMENT, MARCH 2 5 , 1 9 4 7 . 
PRisAMLLH. 
The N«th«rlan«l8 gov«rn£«it rttprtsentei by the commission 
general for the Netherlanda Iniies and the governinent of the 
republic of Indonesia, represe ted by the Indonesian delegation, 
moved by a siacere desire to insure good relations between the 
peoples of the Netherlands and IndOi esia in New fora of voluntbary 
cooperation which offer the best £uardLntee for sound and strong tw 
developaent of both countries ia the future and which aake it 
possible to i^ ive a new fou-nftation to the relationship between 
the two peoples} agree as follows yind will sulmit this a^rcMiaat 
at the shortest possdble notice for the appro\^l of the respective 
pariimentst 
Article 1. ^he Netherlands gevernmint recognises the 
overnaent of the republic of Indonesia as exercising da facta 
authority over Java, Madura, and Suaatra. The areas accupied by 
Allied or Netherlaads forces shall be included gradually, throOfh 
•utual cooperation, in republican territory. To this end, the saei 
necessary aeasures shall at once be taken in order that this 
inclusion shall be oofipleted at the latest on the date mentioned 
in article XXI. 
Aztlolex 11. ^ he Netherlands government and the 
i^overmnnt of the republic shall cooperate in the rapid formation 
of a sovereign deaoexwtie state on a federal basis to be called 
the United States of Indonesia. 
Article 111. The united states of Indonesia shall 
comprise the entire terriotory of the fietherlands Indias with 
provision, however, that in case the population of any territory, 
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aft«r 4u« consultation with the other territor^os, shall decide by 
de«oeratio prooess that they are not, or not yet, willing to 
^oin the United states of Indonesia* they can establish a special 
relationship for suoh a territory to the U.S.I, and to the kingdoa 
of the Ifetherlands* 
Art. IV. Tl&e component parts of the U7S.X. shall be the 
republic of Indonesia* Borneo amd tho Crreat East without 
pro^udiof to ^he right of the population of any territory to 
decide by destocratic process that its position in the U.S.I, shall 
be arranged otherwise. 
Without derogalian of the provisions of Art.Ill and 
the first paragraph of this ar^., the U.S.I, shall eiay aake 
special arran,iesr\pts concerning the territory of its oaf>ttal. 
Art. V. The constitutiori of the U.S.I, shall be deteraine 
by a constituent assenbly conpused of the deaiocratically 
noainated representatives of the republic m\d of the other future 
partbers of th^ U.S.I, to which ^he followiwf paragraph of this 
art. shall apply, 
Bot^ parties shall consult each other on the aethod 
of participation in this constituent assembly by the republic of 
Indonesia* by the territories not under the authority of the 
republic and by the groups of the population not or insuffloientl; 
represented with due observance of ihe respcnslblity of the 
Hetherlands -^overnjaent and the republic of there public respective 
ly. 
Art, VI. To proaote- the joint interests of the Hetherlaa^ 
and Indonesia* the ietherlands iiovernment and th© government of tfe 
republic of Indonesia shJLl cooperate in the estabiisH^^ent of a 
Hetherlands Indonesian Union by which tho Icingdoa of Ifotkerlands* 
ooaprising the Hetherlands, the Netherlands Indies* Surinaae and 
4&Z 
Cftraoaoy shall b9 converted into said union oonsisiins of the one 
ha^ id of the ktngios of the Ketherlaads, coaprising the Nethernlande 
Surinaae and Curacao and on the other hand, the U.S.I. 
The foregoing paragraph does not exclude the possibility 
of a further arrangesmt of the r«alations between the Netherlands 
and Surinam and Curaoae. 
Art* VII* A, The Netherlands Indonesian union shall have 
its own ergs^ ns to proBoto the }olnt interests of the kingdom of 
the Netherlands and the U.S.I. 
B, These organs shall be formed by the eovernments of 
the kigiioa of the Netherlands and the U.S.I, and if necessary, 
by the pariiaments of these countries. 
C. I'he joint interests shall be considered to be 
cooperatior; on f.ireign relations, defence and as far as necessary, 
finsuice as well as subjects of an economic or cultural nature. 
Art, VIII. The king (Queen) of the Hetherlands shall 
be at the head of t,he Ketherlands Indonesian union. Decrees and 
resolutions concernint' the joint interests shal. be issued by 
the king's (Queen) naee. 
Art, IX, In order to promote the interests of the U.S.I, 
in the Netherlands sna of the kingdom of the Netherlands in 
Indonesia, a Hi^h Coaoaissioner shalijbe appointed by the respective 
ii;overnaente. 
Art, X, Statutes of the Netherlands Indonesian union 
shall, furthermore, contain provision regard!lig: 
A. Safeuardin^i of the rights of both parties towards 
one anotner aid guarantees forfthe fulfilment of their mutual 
obligations. 
B, Mutual exercise of oivil rights by Netherlanda and 
Indonesian citizens. 
C, Regulations containini; provisions in case no afreement 
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caa b« raached hj tha organs of the Union. 
]>• R«gulations of the «aimer and conditions of th© « 
assistance to be given by the services of the kir^oa of the 
Netherlands to the U.S.I« as lon^ as the services of the later are 
not or are insufficiently ori^-a^isQd; an<i 
E, Safeguardirig in both parts of the vinioii of the fun-
daaonlal huBan)rights and liberties referred to in the charter of 
the united nations or4'anisation. 
Art, XI, A, The statutes of the Ke^ /^iarlands Indonesian 
tinion shall be drafted by a conference of reiiresentatives of the 
ki.'i^ doja of the Metherlaxids and the future U.u.I, 
B. The statutes shall cose into effect after approaval 
by the respective pariianents. 
Art,XII, The "etlzerlands ^ overnaent and the foveraaent 
of the republic of ludonesia snail endeavour to establish the 
U.^ i.Io ani he Netherlands ladonesiari union before Janu-ary 
1, 1949. 
Art.XIXI, The Metherla.ids government shall forthwith 
take the necessary staps in order to obtain the adaissien of 
trie U*^j,l» as a ai^ niber of tie U.H.O, i-iimediately after thn 
for«aation of the lietherlands Indonesian union. 
Art.XIV, The governaen^ of the republic of Indonesia 
recognises the claias of all non-Indo.iesians to the restoration 
of their rights i*nd the ra3|>itucion of trisir goods as far as they 
s»re execcised or tovfound in tne territory over whioh it exercises 
de facts authority. A joant co.i.;issio-i will "ue set up to effect 
tsiis restoration and r«3stitutioa. 
Art, XV. in order to reform th« *overnaent(of the Dndies 
an such a way that its coaposition an) procedure shall confora as 
closely as possible to the recognition of the republic of Indonesia 
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and to its projected const!tutl<»ial structure, tha lletherlands govt. 
pending the realisation of tha O.S.I, and of the Netherlands Inddnes-
ian union, shall forthwith initiate tha neeessary legal aeasures 
to adjust the constitutional and intematicmal position of the king—' 
d<» of the Metlwrlands to the new situaticm. 
Art.X7I. Directly after the ctmclttsion of this agreeaent, both 
parties shall proceed to reduce th*%r arned forces. They %d.ll consult 
together concerning the extent and rate of this reduction and tlwir 
cooperstion in military matters. 
Art, Xfll, A For the cooperation between the Netherlands govt. 
and the fovernaent of the repiibllc contemplated in this agreeBent, 
an organisation shall be called into existence of delegations to be 
appointed by each of the two governiaents with a joint secretariat. 
B. The Ttetherlands govarnaent and the govt, of E.I. shall Mttle 
by arbitration any dispute which might arise from this agreenent and 
which cannot be solved by joint consultation la conference between 
those delegations. In that case a chairman of another nstlcmality with 
a deciding vote shall be appointed by agreement between the delegations 
or if such agreement cannot be reached, by president of the Intema-
Aiional court of justice. 
Art. X7III, This agreement shall be drawn up in the Netherlands 
and Indonesian languages. Both texts shall have equal authority.1 
B. RSNVILLE AGB£iKBNT JANUAM 1?, 19^8 
TBUCE AGB££MgST 
ttM goverimant of the kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
gcfw^Timsnt of the republic of Indonesia referred to in this agreement 
as the parties l^reby agree as followst 
1. That a stand-fast and cease fire order we issued separately 
and simultaneously by both parties immediately upon the signing of 
1. Charles ^olfi Op.clt. pp.176-178s A.Isaccs: op.cit. pp.193-197 
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this agr«efl»nt and to b« fully effective within **8 )K>i3rs* This 
order v i l l apply to the troops of both parties al<mg the bom^ary 
lines of the areas diseribed in the proela»ati<» of the Netlwrlnnds 
Indian govemaent on August 29t 1957t which shall be called the 
status quo line and in the areas specified in the following 
paragraph. 
2, That in the first instance and for the time being demilitarised 
zones be established In general conformity with the above aentioned 
status quo line. These zones as a rule will comprise the territcKr^ es 
between this status quo line and on one side the line of the Mather — 
lands forward positions and on the other side the line of the 
Republican forward positions, the average width of each of the zcmeB 
being approximately the same, 
3» That the establishnent of the deaaitlitarlsed zones in no 
way projudlces the rights, claims or positions! of the parties tmder 
the resolutions of the security council of August 1, 25 and 26 and 
November 1, 1957. 
of 
h. That upon acceptance/the foregoing by both parties its 
military assistants who will be Instructed to assuae in the first 
instance responsibility for deterajinftiig whether any Incident requires 
enquiry by the higher authorities of either or both parties. 
5. That pending a political stttleaent the responsibility 
for the malntaince of law ?=?nd order and of security of life 
prc^erty in the deiailltai ise<^  zones will remain vested In the 
civil forces of the respective parties (the term civil police does not 
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not •xclu€te the t^myor&ry us« of a i i i t -ary personal in the cap-
a c i t y of c i v i l po l i ce , i t u^lii^ midarstood 111-*' the pol ice forces 
w i l l ue UKGtex c i « l l u o u t r o l ) . "^h^ c o a » i t t e e ' s mi l i t a ry a s s i s t a n t s 
w i l l be lavaila^le to ut\x&@ tne a p i r c p r l a t e a u t n o r i t i e s of the 
part . ies a m to serve lu su-h otner propur capaciities as ^ly oe 
requested} amotig otner& tuey snollMs 
A.Caii upou pools of i-oiiue ofxicer ebiHbiisnofli tey each 
party in i t s ao»i l i tar iae«i ssowe to auooapany tne u ix i t a ry asf-is-
taii is iu lihelr eiieleavuu.rB u.ua euovub ..nruugh;ut tna t deisil i tariseA 
zone* Jf.lce o f f i ce r s of on<a par ty wil.. uAt move Iwto and throughout 
twe AeiKilitarlstia s60t*e 01 the otaer pturty unxes^r acuoMpaxiied oy 
a Mil i tary lissistaiii; of znQ uoamittQ9 of good of f ices atta a p i l i c e 
t 
Oii iuer of tuat otner par^. 
B, Promote uoopertiSio*i ^etweei* tne two pol ice forces . 
6« -i-iiat trua^ uaci iuterc^mr^e betweea a l l areas snoulS be 
pertaitiest aa far at> posaiu^a. 5ucn r e s t r i c t i o n s aa loay be ueeessary 
w i l l ue agreed upo£i ine p a r t i e s ¥i%n tne as8istai4ce of the coaa i t t e 
mid i t s p reprei*^ .^ +tttiveB if requi red , 
7, I'nat t i i i s agreeaV*.^ <<nM.il inulu«ie a l l tne follewi»£ 
poiuttj already agreed vo in priii<?iplQ uy thts p a r t i e a i 
A, 1*0 proMui t tmuotiiiLd, i i i t i a iua t iou aad r e p r i s a l s 
aua otner aobivitiei^ of a sisaxlar nature ugainat iiiaivi&uals, 
ijffoups of iiaaiiviiiuals And proper ty , iuuluaiti^ icjstructioii of pro-
p«»rcy of aiiy jcitiol uiia uy waomnovver oimed und to ul^ilise evury 
f&®'A&s at i.neir coaaAanS to IHiB end., 
JS. 1*0 refrai i i frosi broaiuaates of any oiner fora of 
propa^aitae aiaetl uv piovokiii^; or Gilstmbiii^; droops and c iv i l i a / i s . 
C« io i t i i t i a t e oroactcasts aiui Aastit,ute otnur measures 
to lQfw>ite a l l troops muu e iv i i i a i i s of tiio de l i ca t e situa-ttion 
suA tne uecesai ty for s t r i c t ooapli^ijce with tae provisions sub 
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(A) mid ( » ) • 
D, ^o proviiie f u l l opporuuulty for observttiiee oy 
mi l i t a ry aiid i v i l a s s i s t a n t s ox tlm coaa l t ieo of good o f f i ce r s . 
S« cease iHaodiutely cue publ icat iou of a aai ly 
iiiiunlque or aity otner itifoi«»ttt.iou Huout a i l i t a r y 
to ay pr ior au tua l asrettaietit wmmmktimgx^ in 
weekly pub i ioa t i ju of l i s t s of iaaivi : iuais 
tti^bers and hoffie addresses) wiio aave ceou k i i i ed 
a r e su l t of iiijuri^as received la ac t ion , 
accept lije p r inc ip le of tfiw re lease jf pr isoners 
tti o^ aommenco discussions with a view to ih& aost 
l i en t iapiemwatatiOM tnerefore , twe re lease in 
» Witnout re%Hrd to tns nuauer of pr isoners held 
operational 
operaIions u 
writiii^, ejtc 
(giviuf: naaie 
or nave died 
F, 
by each pnri 
rapid ©nt. cc 
principles i 
by either p« 
8. Th; 
wiiitai'y asi 
lish whetne 
repuuxieau : 
a the auceptance of the foregoin? the cosiaittee's 
\iitz will immediataiy ootidact enquirxtj^, to estao-
t where, especiaxiy in Wect Java, ele^en!.s of tnt 
, taiy far*ces continue to ofier resistarice benini 
trm present iOrwsrd posititms of tne iieutierlsiias foroea. If tn« 
enquiry est enquiry eatabiissnes; ine^xisteiicG ni i^iicn forces these 
wouia withdraw as quickly s« practicacls ami in any case with-in 
21 days ss set out injthe following' paragraph, 
9# T-iat all forces of each party in any area accepted as 
a defiilitarised zone or in any area on the other party's Ei4e of 
a dessilitarised Eone will, under the obseivatijii ^f ailitary 
assistants of trsa committee and with arms and warlike equipment 
move peacefully to t ne territory on the ps,rty's own side of the 
derailitarised zones. Both p&rtiet, undertake to facilitate a spfsd; 
and peacefully evacuation of the forcee concerned. 
10. This agreeaant sholi be considered binding unless one 
party notiw*,. .,<,^i,'^_coffliBittee of gc.'d offices rxr^d the other parj;y 
4St» 
fkat ilk oonsiiLers th« true regulatiom aro not. beina. ob8«rvtt«l by 
the other party and that thla agreeMent anoiMl therefore be tem-
iaai;ei. 
?or the o^verniAeni of kingdoM of the Netherlands; 
Keden ^ bdulkadir widjojoataod^e, ohairaan of the delegation. 
I'or the goVBTimmit of the B.I.; Dr. Aair Sjarifuotdin, chairaan 
of the delegation. 
The signatures appeariiif above were hereunto subs-
crioed this 17 the day of «January« t94S) on board the USS 
iienvilie in ihe presence of the representatiwss of the United 
n.iti as security council committee of £Ood ofiices on the 
Indonesian question and the comiiittee secx^etary, whose signatures 
are hereunto subscribed as withesses, Chairman, Mr.Justice Richard 
C.Kirby ^Australia). Aepresentativevt Mr.i:>aul Van Zeeland 
{Belgiua) and Dr. I'rank P.^ rraliam (U.S.A.}, Secretary; Mr. T.O. 
Narayanan. 
Principles forming an agreed bsiis foz|the political 
discussion accepted at thts 4th aeeting otL January 17, 194B. 
PULlXlCAi, AGmimmU'l, 
i'he coasaittee of good offices has -.een informed oy the 
delegeti n of the king;doai of the Netherlands and cy the delegation 
of the republic of Indonesia that the truoe agreement having been 
siifned uheir governments accept the following principles on which 
Uie political discussions will be based: 
1, Ihat the as. istance of the cojmaittee of *food offices 
i 
ba sontin -ed in t he workin~g out and ^^ gning of an agreement for 
ihQ setileaant or the polietical dispute in th** li»sland8 of Java, 
Suaarta and Madura, bused upon the principles underlying; tne Lin-
^gadjati airreement. 
2, It is understood that neither pary has x^'ne right to 
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pr«ven th>. free oxpression of popular aove»«nts looking towards 
political or-ranisations i/hich are In accord with the principles 
of tha Linggadjati afrreemant. It is further un^lerstood that each 
parjtjf will guarantee tba frsedom of asseeoiy, spf«ch and publica-
tion at all tla«3, provided trst the .'ruar&ctee is not conitrued 
so as 1.0 include the advocacy of violence or reprisalo. 
3. It is ur^derstoo*! th-^ 't declssSons cunceruing cnsnge 
in adffiinistratiOi. of territory should be KP de only with the full 
©nd free c::nsent of the populRti' n of V one territories snd at a 
tis^ e when 'he oecuritii' and freedoe. froi. coercion c£ suoh popula-
tions will have L»een ensured, 
4. '^mit on the si/'nin^ : of tho political agreeaent 
provision be li^ de for the graciual reduction of the araed foraes 
of both pftrtieo, 
5, That as soon as prRoticable sfter ttp. sljming of the 
truce agreeaent economic activity, trnde, treusportation and 
coKtsunicRtioniB oe restored thr ragli t' a cooperntion of both 
r 
ppTties takine: into considerstion tn« interests of all the 
constituent pnrts of Indonesia, 
6, Thp.t provision ne Jiude for e suit^.Bl® period of no* 
less than 5 aonr.hs nor wore than 1 .ye&r after the signing of the 
agreeaen^ dunnp which tisae uncoerced and free discusr.ion and 
consideration :f vii^l issues will proceed; et tht? end or tnis 
period free elections will be held for self detersination by the 
people of their political relati :as*:i;' to tTiO U.S.I. 
7, Tu it a const i"-It Tonal convent i n be chosen accord 
-in^ to democratic arocedi^ro to fraft a constit-jtinn for the 
U.S.I. 
y. It is undersood th»t if, after the signin,- of the 
I. 
ai^reeaent referred in Ita® 1, either par*,v tspi^ld ask the united 
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to provid* an agenoy to obsarve conditions at any tiaa up to 
the point at whtih AommrUirXy is tranafarred froa the fovannaent 
of tha Netherlanda to the govariUBent of the U.S.I,, the other 
party will take this request in serious consideration. The follow-
ing 4 principles are from the Lirs^ j^ adjati agreeaent. 
9* Independence for the Indonesian peoples. 
10. A Sovereign state on a federal basis under a consti-
tution whioh will be arrived at by denoratic process. 
11. Cooperation between the peoples of the Netherlands 
and Indonesia. 
12* A union between the U.S.I, and other parts of the 
km^doa of the Netherlands under the k'n^ of the Netherlands. 
€cnfirned for the governaent of the kingdoa of the 
Hetherlandsi Haden Abdulkadir W.,charisan of the dela^tition 
Confimed for the governauuit of the republic of Indonesia! 
Dr. Afflir ^ Jarifuddin, Chairman of the delagation. 
The representatives of the united natious security 
council eonnittee of food offices on the Indonesian question wuA 
tne ooaaitt«e secretary, whose signatures are ||ereunto subsorioed 
on the 17th day of January, 1948, on the board the USS Heaville, 
testify that the above principles are agreed to as balSs for the 
political discussions. Cnairaans Mr.Justice ^iohard C.Rirby( 
Australia). Representativest Mr, Paul *an ^eeland (Belgiua) and 
Dr.F.P.Grahaa (U.S.A.), secretary, Mr.T.O.Marayanan. 1 
1, Prof.P.S.Serbaadyi op. cit. pp. 200-203 
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C.CHAliTiiR CF TRi.I3Fe*v CF SOVEReilGHTX, 191*9 
A r t i c U 1. 
1. Th« kingdom of the Netherlands unconditionally and 
irrevocably transfer* complete eoverignty over Indonesia to 
the repulilic of the united states of Indonesia and tnereby 
recognises said republic of U.S.I, as an independent and 
sovereign state. 
2. The republic of the U.S.I, accepts said sovereignty 
on the basis of tne provisions of its ooni^ ltution whioli as draft 
has been brought to the knowledge of the kln^doa of the Nether-
lands. 
3* The transfer of sovereignty shall take place at the 
latest on 30 December, 1949* 
'^rt.2. *ith regard to the residency of Mew Ouines it is 
decided; 
a. In view of the fact that it has not yet possibe to reconcll 
the view of the parties on New Guinea, whxch remain, therfore, in 
dispute, 
^. In view of desirability of the round table conference 
concluding successfully on November, 2,1949* 
e. In view of the important factors which should be taken 
into account in settling the question of New Guines. 
d. In view of the limited researea that has been undertaken 
and completed with respect to the problems involved in the 
question of New guinea. 
e* In view of heavy talks with which the union partners will 
initially be confeonted and, 
f. In view of the delioation of the parties to the principle 
of resolving by peaceful and reasonable means any differences that 
^ay herefi^ ter exist or arise between them. 
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That th« status quo of the residdnoy of New Guin«a shall 
be aaintained with the stipulation that within a year froa the 
date of transfer of severeifnty to the republic of the U.S.I, the 
question of political status of New Guinea be deterained through 
negotiations between the Republic of the U.S.I, and the Kingdom 
of the Metnerlands. 
UHIOH STATUTE, 
The kingdoa of the l^ etnerlands and the repoolic of the 
U.S.I., having resolved on a basis of fr^e will, equality and 
ooaplete independence to brin^ about friendly cooperation with each 
otnex and tdoreate the Netherlands Indonesian union with a view to 
effectuate this future cooperation, have agreed to lay down in this 
statute of the union the oasis uf their autual relationshhip as 
independent and sovereign states, tiioreby holding tnat nothing in 
this statute shall be consrued as excluding any fora of cooperation 
in any field not mentioned the rain, the need of which may be flet 
in the future b|> both parties. 
CHARTEK OF THE UHIOH. 
Article 1. 
1. The Netherlands Indonesian union effectuates the organised 
cooperation betwtsten the kinidoa of the Netherlands and the re^ /Ublio 
of the U.S.I, on the basis of free will and equality in status with 
equal rights. 
2. i^ h^e uMon does imir projudiue the statue of each of the 
two partners as an independent and sovereign state. 
PURPOSE '!i- THE UNION. 
Art. • 
1. The union aias at cooperation of the partners for the 
proaotion of their coaKon interest. 
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2« Thi'8 cooperation shall take place with respect to 
subjects lying prlaarily in the fleli of foreign relations ani 
defence and as far as necessary, finance and also in regard of 
subjects of an econlaics and cultural nature* 
Art. 3. 
1* The two partners uniertake to base their fom of 
govemaent oH the principles of dteKOoracy and to ai> at an 
independent judiciary. 
2, The two partners snail recognise the fundamental 
huMui rights and freedom enuaerated in the appendix to this 
statute. 
PROCEDURE OF THK UttXOtt, 
Art«4« All deoisions in the union shall be taken in 
acseeaentibetween the two parteners. 
Art, 5. 
1. At the head of the uAion shall ee Her Majesty Queen 
Juliana, Princess of Orange Hassau, and in oase of succession her 
lawful successors in tne crown of the Hetherlanis. 
2. In case of aiuority of the head of the union, or 
in oase the head of the union is unable to perfora his office 
and further in case the head of the union temporarily ceases to 
perfoaa his office, both partbera shall aake the necessary 
provision fUky be in coaaon agreeaent in advance. 
Ar$.6. The head of the union effectuates the spirit of 
voluntary and lasting cooperation between the partbers. 
THE ORGAMa OF THS UNION. 
Art.7« For the iapleuentation oi tke purposes of the 
union tne ainisters or persons vested by the respective consti-
tutions of the partners with equal or siailar responsibility, 
having been designeied for this purpose by each of the partners. 
JiAA 
shall hold conferonces twice a year and further aat often asjthe 
partners shall deea necessary. Unless otherwise agreeit three 
Ministers of each partner will participate in these conferences. 
Art, 8, The Binisters participatini; in the conference 
reaain repponsible to tke respective organs on the basis of the 
respectife constitutions of the partenere. 
Art.9. the conferenee of the Ministers shall institute 
eoaaittee as clreuastanoes sAy require* in which each of the par-
tners appoints aeiktoers on a basis of party. 
Art.to. 
1. The two partners shall effectuate n^ ood contact*'regular 
cooperation between the parlisjients of the ^ rtners. 
2. The fisst discussion between representatives of the 
parliaaents snail take place within 8 Months <fter the coaing into 
bein,^  of the provisional parlisMent of the U.S.I. 
Att. 11. 
1. The union stoll be server by a permanent sectetariate. 
Each of the partners shall appoint a secretary-general, each of 
whoM take charge of the ^ret.ariate by yearly rotation. 
2. The other personnel shall be appointed in agreeaent 
between the two secretaries-general in accordance with an 
inatruaent drawn up joiktli by the two partbers. 
DE3I3I0MS AND JOIMIS REGULATIQHS. 
Art. 12. 
1. Decisions of the conference of Ministers shall be 
taken by nunaaiMity of votes between the representsti«i of the 
kinidoa of the Netnerlands on tne one side and that of the 
republic of the U.S.I, on the other. 
2. Decisions of the conference aay be given effect in 
aeoerdance with t he fellewing producere. 
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3* l^ solsions taken at the conferenoe of the ninlsters 
for the anaetnent of joint regulations require approval hy the 
respective |pi|»rliaaent8 of the partners. After apj^ xoval by the two 
parlianentSf the heai of the union shall state that agreeaent ex-
ists between the two partners and the joint regulation shall 
thereupon be proaul||ate4 in the official statute book oi^ each 
of h^e partners. By this proaulgsticn the joint regulation shall 
have force of law* The joint rei^ulations are inviolable, 
4* In respect ef other decisions of th conference the 
head of the union, upon request of the Conference, aay likewise 
state that a^reea^nt exists between the two partners. 
UHIOM COUKT OF ARBITRATION. 
Art,15. 
1, There shall be a tmion court of arbitration for 
the settleaen of matters of law and justice in ftie name of the 
union. 
2, The court shal. take cognisance of legal disputes 
brougfct before the court by one of the partners against the 
other, jointly by both partbers, arising froa the union statute 
froa any agreement between the partners or froa joint regulations. 
Art. 14. 
1, The union court of arbitration shall consist of 
3 aeabers appointed by tha kingdoa of the Netherlands and 3 
aeabars appointed by the repub).ie of the U.S.I. 
2, Tha aeabers of th court shall be appointed for a 
period of 10 years. 
3, Th® chairman shalI be elected, every year a Het-
herlands aiid an Indonesian in tem, by end froa aaongst the 
aeabers of the court. 
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4. Prior to taking up thtir office^ ih« aoabtrs of the 
court shall , befor« the h%Ai of tka union, take th« oath or nakt 
the proaise in acoorelance with tM«ir religious faith,that they shall 
fulfill their office honestly, 8<lupulously and iapartially and 
shall eonport theaselves in the exercise of their duties as benifits 
a good aeaber of the u>»^ ion court of arbitration. 
Art.15. 
1. The union court of arbitration shall decided ^y ma;]ority of 
votes, 
2. In case votes are equally divided the oourt, shall, u lesss 
the two partners otherwise request, call upon the president of the 
international court of justice or upon another International 
authority,to be designated by aajority of votes, with the request 
to appoint a person of another nationalicy as special member, shall 
take part in a renewed consideration of tha dispute and in the 
dedision thereof. 
Art.16. Further provisions concerning the rules of procedure, 
the organisation and regulation of the activities of the union 
court of arbitration shall/be established in a joint regulation. As 
lon^ as such a joint regulation does not exist, the court itself 
shall deteraine its rule of procedure and the organisation and x 
regulation of its activities, paragraph 2 of the precedin,'-': art, 
being applicable if no agreement van be reached in this oat^er. 
Art.17. ^he two partners undertake to co.ply with the 
decisions of the uy^ ion court of arbitration and responsibility 
each within his territory. 
Art.IS* In case of conflict between provisions of the part-
ners and of public bodies within their jurisdiction on the one side 
and the ui\ion statute or any agreenent between the partners or a 
joint regulation on the other, the latter category of provisions 
447 
•hall prtvail. 
Art. 19* ^he tvq^artn«r« rassrve all thair rights unilar 
intarimtlonal law or otherwise ,0 solicit the decision or an 
internatconal court or arbitrator in oases where both partners 
consider the union court of arbitration incoape'ent or in 
where the court declares Itself inconpetent, 
POREIGM .ELAVIOHS. 
Art.20, Provisions conoernin,;; he cooperation be-eeon the 
partners in 'he field of foraign rela ions are set forth in the 
a^ reeajent et^ached to the present statute. 
DBTENCE. 
Art.21. Provisions conoerning he cooperation between the 
partners in the field of defence are sst forth in the agreenent 
attached to the present statute. 
FINANCIAL kUD BCOSOMIC RELATIOMS. 
Art,22. Provisions concernln.f the cooperation between the 
partners in the field of financial and eoono:r,ic relations are set 
forth in the agreement attached to the present statuie. 
CULTUIIAL kELATlONS. 
Art. 3. Provisions concerning the cooperate on between the 
partners in the Cultural field are set forth in the agreeaent 
attached to the present statute. 
MTIOKALITY. 
Art.24. Without projudice to the provisions made or 
still table aiade in special arraa^eaents between the partnerSf 
with regard to the exercise of political and other rii^ hts by 
nationals of one partner within the Jurisdiction of the other 
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partner the following shall ap, lyi 
a. Th« nationality of ona partner shall not constitute 
an objection afainat serving: efficially within the jurisdiction 
of t>he oiher partner, excepts for* 
r 
1, Offices, the holders of which is respensibl* to reaesent-
ative booty, u less the law should provide etfaerwise} 
2. These political, authoritative, judicial and leading 
offices which are specified as such by law. 
¥• With regard to the exercise of civil rights and social 
activities, each partner shall always fully appreciate the special 
interests within his jurisdiction of the nationals and corporate 
bodies of the other partner, and therefore shall nake no appreci-
able discrinination between their respective nationals and cor-
porate bodies, without prejudice to the power of either partner 
to establish regulations required for the protection of their 
national interests or for the protection of econoaically weak s^ 
groups. 
2* On no account shall the nationals and corporate bodies of 
the 64her partner treataent less favourable than nationals and 
corporate bodies of a third state. 
SPECIAL PkOVISIONS. 
Art.25. ^o further the interests of the partners within 
each other's territory the i5overnaent of the part of the partners 
shall apj^ oinc high ooimissioners. These shall have the statue of 
diploaalio represent^atives with the rank of aabassader. 
Art,26. 
1. Unless otherwise agreed each pari.ner shall bear one 
half of the expenses of the union. 
2. Further provisions in respect of whe expenses of 
the union shall be established by joint refualtion. As long as 
m 
such a joint- regulation ioes noi exist, the conference of the 
ainisiers shall sake the necessary provisions. 
Art,27. 
1. All Official iocuwents, Issued by the conference of 
ministers or by other union organs shall be in the Netherlends 
an4 Indonesian languages. 
2, Both texts shall be equally authentic. 
Art.28. The union statute and t,he agreements pertaining there-
to as well as the joint regulations and future agreGBen'.8 may be 
presented to the secretariat of the united nations for registra-
tions in accordance with article 102 of the charter of the United 
Nations* 1. 
1. Hedeka, I.I.S.,Mew Delhi, 19^0; Prof.P.S.Gerbrandyi 
op.cit,pp.210-?16. 
